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Summary 
 
This thesis provides a political economy account of how four small open economies 
– Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland – have coped with the adaptation 
required by the exogenous pressures of Europeanisation over a period of 25 years. 
The research is grounded in Polyanian conceptualising of the interaction of States 
and markets using Varieties of Capitalism as a theoretical foundation.  Starting with 
Katzenstein’s (1985) comparative study as a departure point, the research evaluates 
how each country responded to deepening EU integration over a four stage 
periodisation broadly aligned to critical junctures of integration, and closing with the 
fifth anniversary of the Lehman Bros bank collapse on 15
th
 September, 2013.   
 
Particular attention is paid to the Irish case, with a view to resolving the puzzling 
question of why its ‘Celtic Tiger’ phase of development proved to be unsustainable. 
The research also identifies the areas where the different Varieties of Capitalism 
converge and diverge. 
 
The findings are that the ‘Democratic Corporatism’ which Katzenstein identified as 
the means by which small open economies could cope with market forces by 
balancing them with social compensation, is still intact.  Finland, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands have all made necessary reforms to welfare regimes and labour markets 
without compromising societal values.  While having to accommodate to an extent 
to liberalising forces, they remain developmental states. 
 
Ireland exhibited developmentalist characteristics during the 1990s.  It caught up 
with the rest of Europe in a material sense but not in respect of the capabilities 
required to carry this developmentalism forward to the new millennium.  On the 
contrary, the 2000s saw the country make serious policy errors principally due to an 
intellectual failure to assimilate the requirements of living in a currency union.  
Moreover, democratic corporatism in an Irish context was not embedded.  It is 
imperative that Ireland recaptures this developmentalism and repertories of action to 
help it do so are identified. 
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A number of dilemmas confronting the European integration project are outlined.  
Foremost among them is the challenge of embarking on a course of deeper 
integration necessary to consolidate the future of the currency in circumstances 
where political legitimacy is seriously undermined by austerity. A singular focus on 
fiscal adjustment has resulted in a deflationary debt crisis which seems set to 
continue for some time.  There is no obvious escape route for Ireland.  Indeed the 
situation is much complicated by its relationship with Britain which is becoming 
increasingly semi-detached from Europe.  Within the policy space available to it, the 
best course for Ireland is to reinvent itself as a Social Market Economy, as far as 
possible in the image of its northern European peers.   
 
For all the bleakness of the current environment there is opportunity too.  The 
institutional architecture of EMU is so dysfunctional that it must eventually yield to 
reform if European integration as a project is to survive.  Therein lies the possibility 
for a social democratic revival if a convincing narrative for it can be communicated. 
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction 
 
On 18
th
 November, 2010, the Irish public awoke to hear their Central Bank 
Governor, Professor Patrick Honohan, announce on the Morning Ireland radio 
programme that the country was shortly to be a ward of court of the European Union 
and International Monetary Fund. The fact that the Governor was the messenger was 
symptomatic of the state of disarray of the Irish government. All the previous week 
ministers had denied that this event was in prospect.  It was symbolic too that he was 
speaking from the headquarters of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.  It 
emphasised who was in charge (Donovan and Murphy, 2013: Appendix 1). 
 
Ireland had been the poster child of Europeanisation and globalisation.  The rapid 
transformation of the Irish economy from one with high unemployment and 
emigration, persistent budget deficits and a debt to GDP ratio of over 100 per cent in 
the 1980s to full employment, net immigration and a debt ratio below 40 per cent by 
2000, earned it fulsome praise.  For this reason the rapid onset of the 2008 crisis, and 
the consequences that flowed from it, came as a great shock. 
 
This was, moreover, in marked contrast to the other small open economies in 
Northern Europe, in particular Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands.  These were 
champions of free trade and globalisation too and, while hard hit by the global 
downturn, were better able to alleviate the domestic consequences of the crisis. An 
extraordinary range of policies were deployed to ease stress in the financial system 
and, in the case of the Nordic countries, these were accompanied by fiscal stimulus. 
Generally speaking the Nordic and continental small states have an impressive 
record of combining economic efficiency and social cohesion including the highest 
levels of employment and most generous welfare systems in the affluent world 
(Gylfason et al, 2010; Hemerijck, 2013; Schmidt, 2011).  This thesis traces and 
compares the evolution of the development models of Finland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Ireland over the quarter century spanning the years 1987-2013.   
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The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a context for this study in 
comparative political economy.  It explains the purpose of the thesis, states the 
research question and identifies the theoretical foundation underpinning the work.  It 
briefly profiles the four small open economies included and gives reasons for their 
selection.  Finally, it outlines the structure of the thesis with a brief account of the 
task and conclusions of each of the remaining chapters. 
 
The key question of this thesis is how these four countries managed the process of 
Europeanisation. European integration picked up pace in the late 1980s and Ireland’s 
achievements seemed to parallel it.  German policy makers and bankers had urged 
Europe towards financial integration since the 1950s.  The course of this trajectory 
took an upward swing in June, 1988, when the European Council agreed to liberalise 
all capital movements.  In effect this was formal financial integration, which was 
copper fastened by the Maastricht Treaty which came into force in 1994.  Its effect 
was to elevate capital to the same legal status as goods, services and people which 
had enjoyed free movement within the borders of the EEC for forty years (Abdelal, 
2009). 
 
The European Central Bank (ECB) subsequently became the premier institution of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty.  
The single currency came into force ten years later in 2002.  EMU did not, however, 
involve any institutions for fiscal or banking union which subsequently were 
revealed as serious deficits.  The ECB received the singular mandate to maintain 
price stability.  A Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) were intended to control fiscal sustainability, with the Maastricht Treaty 
explicitly proscribing bail-outs of imprudent members.  These rules were believed to 
be sufficient to foster real economic convergence.  It didn’t work, not least because 
the architecture failed to take into consideration current account competitiveness 
divergence across the Euro area.  The fiscal rules were ignored to allow Greece and 
Italy to join the currency union and deficit limits were ignored when exceeded by 
France and Germany in 2004.  Moreover, the EMU’s design bias towards public 
budgetary discipline let policy makers take their eye of the ball of private debt.  In 
short there were serious design flaws in EMU (Hemerijck, 2013). 
 
13 
 
These were exposed following the collapse of Lehman Bros. bank in the United 
States on 15
th
 September, 2008.  Allowing Lehman to collapse without stabilising 
the banking system turned out to be a costly policy mistake.  Shortly after the 
Lehman shock, the full effects of the market concerns began to be felt in Europe.  A 
number of European banks – Dexia, Fortis and Hypo Real Estate – had to be 
rescued.  Within days Ireland was pitched to the front of the gathering crisis.  Up to 
that point it had enjoyed the sobriquet ‘Celtic Tiger’ but inappropriate risk taking by 
banks had built up unsustainable financial exposure to a falling property market.  
Ireland’s banks had borrowed short from the European banks and lent long to 
developers and home buyers.  The collapse of Lehman’s Bank caused a crisis of 
confidence such that interbank lending froze. This meant that Irish banks could not 
roll over their loans.  Initially this was seen by the authorities as a liquidity crisis.  
Under pressure from the ECB not to allow any bank to fail the Irish Minister for 
Finance guaranteed all bank liabilities at six financial institutions, an approximate 
potential liability of €440 billion.1  This was the equivalent of 250 per cent of GDP.  
In the event the liquidity crisis turned out to be a solvency crisis and banking debt 
turned into sovereign debt crippling future generations of Irish citizens fiscally.  The 
Celtic Tiger was dead (Hemerijck, 2013, Lewis, 2010; Marsh, 2011; Mason, 2009). 
 
Membership of the Eurozone meant that the policy of adjustment adopted was to 
engineer an internal devaluation in an effort to bring down wages and prices.  The 
peripheral countries were judged ineligible for what they really needed i.e. outright 
debt relief via Eurobonds or other mechanisms. Such options were opposed because 
of a kind of moral distain on the part of the creditor countries and because of a fear 
that any such action might be judged illegal by the German constitutional court 
(Hemerijck, 2013; Marsh, 2011).   
 
The speed of change in Ireland took people by surprise.  Unemployment rose 
quickly from 4 per cent to 15 per cent.  This was most acute in the construction 
industry where employment fell from a peak of 286,000 to about 80,000.  Overall 
                                                 
1 In June 2013 taped conversations between top executives of Anglo Irish Bank were revealed in the media.  In 
one exchange the executives candidly admit asking for €7 billion from the Financial Regulatory Authority 
despite knowing that the needs of their troubled bank were much larger.  Had truth been told the authorities 
might have let the bank fail.  Moreover, the bankers appeared to have abused the guarantee by chasing deposits 
from the UK and Germany.  These revelations, in their content and tone, caused enormous anger and damaged 
Ireland’s diplomatic campaign to secure an EU recapitalisation of the banking system via the ESM (Financial 
Times Editorial, 26th  June, 2013, P.10). 
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some 365,000 jobs were lost.  Net immigration turned quickly to net emigration.  
Wage cuts were imposed or negotiated in the public service and in some industries 
like construction, newspapers, radio & television, and aviation.   A series of harsh 
budgets took about €25 billion out of the economy and this contributed to reducing 
domestic demand by 26 per cent. 
 
Kelly and McQuinn (2013) argue that, in the context of the financial crisis, the Irish 
economy presents an exceptional case.  The impact on output and employment has 
been very severe with GDP in 2011 still 9 per cent below its 2007 peak level. Nearly 
40 per cent of the stock of Irish mortgages was issued between 2004 and 2007, when 
house prices were at their peak.  With a 50 per cent fall in house prices since, 
negative equity has become a serious problem for many householders.  The 
combination of a rapid rise in unemployment and increasing mortgage arrears 
created conditions of credit risk in the books of Irish banks which contributed 
significantly to the crisis which engulfed the Irish banking sector. 
 
Looking back at Ireland’s economic performance since achieving independence this 
is the fourth occasion on which the country’s very survival has come into question.  
The first occasion was in the 1930s when the first Fianna Fáil government responded 
to depression by transitioning from an agrarian economy to import substitution 
industrialisation.  The small scale of the Irish market and inept attempts to build 
viable indigenous industry behind tariff walls meant that by the 1950s the country 
was again in crisis.  This time the solution involved a volte face on industrial policy 
moving to export orientated industrialisation.  Opening the economy gave access to 
Marshall Aid and led, first to the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement of 1965, and 
then to membership of the EEC with Britain and Denmark in 1973.  The initial ten 
years of EEC membership did not transform the country or achieve the catch up on 
the post-war ‘Golden Age’ that Ireland had missed out on.  In fact by the mid-
eighties Ireland was again in deep trouble with high unemployment and emigration 
and unsustainable public finances.  This time the solution involved a combination of 
neo-corporatism in the form of Social Partnership, a global economic upswing and 
two currency devaluations.  The second of these was ten per cent devaluation within 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in January 1993.  Still, although the macro-
economic indicators began to come right after 1987 employment levels did not begin 
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to rise until after 1994.  Between then and 2001 over 400,000 new jobs were created.  
This was the beginning of the Celtic Tiger
2
 period and nobody expected it.  Actually 
in the early 1990s people were beginning to doubt whether Ireland was a viable 
economic entity at all and whether the entire independence project had been a failure 
(Adshead et al, 2008; Ahern, 2009;  Garvin, 2005; Kirby, 2010); MacSharry and 
White, 2000; Murray, 2009; O’Donnell, 2008; O’Riain, 2004 and 2008; Smith, 
2005). 
 
To an extent this uncertainty about economic development was influenced, not just 
by disappointment at the stagnant economy, but by comparison with the 
achievements of other small open economies in Europe.  This caused the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC) to commission a Norwegian academic, Lars 
Mjoset, to conduct a comparative study of Ireland with other countries with a view 
to determining why they had done so well and Ireland had done so badly. 
 
In his report Mjoset (1992) argued that Ireland, by comparison to small Northern 
European economies, had failed to develop a national system of innovation.  An auto 
centric national economy had not emerged and therefore the dynamic of socio-
political mobilisation and economic performance combining to generate pressures 
for a widespread Fordist system of production and consumption had not materialised 
in a manner redolent of the comparator countries.  Moreover, a weak national system 
of innovation contributes to social marginalisation and mass emigration, which in 
turn lessens the possibility of sociological pressures to improve the system of 
innovation.  Mjoset further argued that reliance on FDI, and earlier on live cattle 
exports to the UK, militated against building a national system of innovation.  These 
factors were compounded by the conservative nature of society influenced by the 
church and the populist nature of Irish political parties based on competing versions 
of nationalism arising out of the civil war in the 1920s (see also O’Riain, 2004: 
Chapter 3).   
 
The three other comparator countries in this study were not without their difficulties 
at the time of Mjoset’s report but they were better placed than Ireland. 
 
                                                 
2 The phrase ‘Celtic Tiger’ was coined in 1994 by Kevin Gardiner of US investment bank Morgan Stanley, who 
suggested that Ireland’s high growth rates were comparable to those of the East Asian ‘Tigers’ (Smith, 2005: 37). 
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Per capita growth in Finland stayed in positive territory for the most part throughout 
the post war period with the exception of a banking crisis in 1992/93, when 
unemployment rose to 17 per cent of the labour force. The period until the mid-
1980s was a phase of catching up and mobilisation of resources. The policy regime 
relied on state intervention in the manner of the Asian tiger economies.  Public 
savings were an important factor in capital accumulation.  Credit rationing was used 
to promote manufacturing investment and corporatist incomes policy underpinned 
export industry profitability.  The geopolitical constraints of the Cold War were a 
major influence on public policy.  Mjoset notes that trade with the Soviet Union was 
of major importance being a continuation of post-war reparations.  The oil price rises 
of the 1970s served to consolidate this trade which was organised on a semi-barter 
basis in which Finland swapped manufactured goods for Soviet oil.  This created a 
beneficial counter cyclical effect (Gylfason et al, 2010; Mjoset, 992; Vartiainen, 
2011). 
 
Denmark, unlike Sweden, Finland and Norway, had no banking crisis to speak of in 
the late 1980s or early 1990s. While there were problems in the sector they never 
amounted to a full blown crisis. The two post-war episodes of mildly negative per 
capita growth coincided with the oil crisis of 1973-1974 and 1979-1981.  Domestic 
demand in the economy was sluggish in the aftermath but accelerated in 1985-6 as 
the savings rate reduced.  This eventually developed into a consumption boom 
prompting a rather extreme policy response. The so called ‘potato cure’ adopted by 
parliament in 1986 took the form of a 20 per cent surcharge on the net interest rate 
payments of households.  This curtailed consumption severely and increased savings 
again.  Unemployment actually reduced and the budget returned to surplus in 1986.  
Nevertheless, balance of payments problems caused growth to stagnate while the 
rest of Europe grew at the rate of 3 per cent. This in turn caused employment to 
stagnate and Danish firms began to lose market share internationally and at home.  
The resolution of Denmark’s structural balance of payments problems in the early 
1990s paved the way for long-term prosperity (Goul Andersen, 1011; Gylfason et al, 
2010, Mjoset, 1992). 
 
In the 1980s centre right coalition governments in the Netherlands relied on price-
incomes policies and exchange rate stabilisation for macroeconomic adjustment.  
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The emphasis of policy was on shoring up corporate profits rather than sharing the 
burden of adjustment across societal cleavages or socio-economic groups.  It was 
only in the mid-1990s that analysts reinterpreted the Dutch Model as being a 
consensual one.  For a time the effectiveness of the ‘Polder’ model as a consensual 
adjustment strategy remained controversial.  The effect of the two oil crises of the 
1970s in the Netherlands was to drive up inflation, reduce exports and increase 
unemployment.  The fact that the currency was pegged to the Deutschmark did 
mitigate inflationary pressures as the German currency appreciated after 1976.  But 
appreciating exchange rate movements harmed exports competitiveness in 
circumstances of declining world markets.  By 1984 unemployment had reached a 
record high of 800,000 or 14 per cent of the labour force.  This was compounded by 
similar numbers on disability benefit or early retirement.  Nevertheless, within ten 
years the unemployment figure had been halved (Jones, 2008; Visser and Hemerijck, 
1997). 
 
It would appear that not a lot of attention was paid to Mjoset’s Report by the policy 
making community in Ireland.  One senior minister of that period interviewed for 
this research had never heard of it.  It may be that the technical nature of the report 
made it difficult to access or that more likely the rapid expansion of the economy 
began soon after its presentation and perhaps people felt that the source of their 
concern had dissipated. 
 
But the events of 2008 and since have reawakened those old fears again.  The 
difference now, however, is that we know that Ireland not alone performed well for 
over 20 years but became the toast of Europe, or at least of neo-liberal cheerleaders 
and commentators.  On the other hand there were those who had doubts about 
whether the feted Irish model was built on solid foundations.  Sean O’Riain (2008) 
questioned the Celtic Tiger explanation for the phenomenon of the 1990s expansion 
given its roots in the vicious circles described in the Mjoset (1992) analysis.  
Perceptively he also identified that during the 1990s new institutional spaces 
emerged via Social Partnership where movements for developmentalism and public 
participation were able to establish themselves.  This created a virtuous circle where 
18 
 
an improved national system of innovation
3
 combined with local demand for growth 
created jobs and better wages.  Problematically, though, the 2001 dotcom crash 
created a hiatus in which the central state and market began to reassert control over 
the spaces for developmentalism that had emerged in the 1990s.  The effect of this 
was to shift the dynamic of growth away from developmentalism and towards 
construction and consumer led growth.
4
  Peadar Kirby (2002 and 2010) was also 
unconvinced about the Celtic Tiger.  He argued essentially that long standing 
weaknesses in the economy, society and the political system were simply 
camouflaged during the boom and became apparent again amid economic decline.  
These separate critiques can be characterised by O’Riain’s argument that Ireland 
can, in the right circumstances, be a developmental network state but that liberal 
forces are constantly trying to drag it in a ‘competition state’ direction.  Kirby’s 
view is that Ireland is already a ‘competition state’ although he would wish it to be 
otherwise. 
 
 
The pity is that Mjoset’s work was not really completed.  He wrote about Ireland: 
 
‘Are there any lessons to be learnt from the contrast cases?  This would be the 
traditional field of the applied social scientist.  The long-term problems can be 
understood and they can be specified as complicated vicious circles, and a more 
thorough analysis might specify how many “small” causes accumulate to create 
them’. 
 
(Mjoset, 1992:20) 
 
He specifically identified the question of the role of institutions as requiring further 
in-depth study.  No studies of this nature were proceeded with, but if they had been, 
they might have captured the shifting emphases about to take place in the models of 
the comparator  countries revealing a richer source of inspiration for Irish policy 
makers. 
                                                 
3 The 1990s saw rapid growth in the indigenous software industry driven largely by people outside the business 
establishment who had gained experienced in the high-tech MNC sector (O’Riain, 2004). 
4 Perhaps the two most egregious examples of this are:  (i) Irish banks in 2003 borrowed the equivalent of 10% of GPD from 
foreign banks to fuel a credit expansion.  By 2008 it was the equivalent of 60% of GDP (Honohan 2009), (ii) Between 2001 
and 2008 capital stock expanded by 157 per cent.  Most of it went into property.  Only 14% went into productive investment. 
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Purpose of Thesis 
 
Ulrich Beck (2013) makes the point that a purely economic analysis of the European 
crisis which started in 2008 neglects the dimensions of society and politics and our 
prevailing ways of thinking about them.    He opines that, while there is a 
widespread view that what we need to overcome the crisis is more Europe, we find 
less and less assent to this idea amongst the citizens of the Member States.  He poses 
the question of whether preoccupation with economic issues and a political union 
has obscured the more crucial question of a European society for so long that we 
have ended up leaving the most important factor out of the reckoning altogether?  
This resonates with the thinking of Karl Polanyi who sixty years earlier advanced 
the concept of embeddedness, meaning that the economy is not autonomous, as 
suggested in economic theory, but subordinated to politics, religion, and social 
relations (Polanyi, 1944). 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the core Polanyian tension between 
markets and social protection, with particular reference to the capacity of 
selected small open economies – Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands – to 
manage that tension, and to compare these countries with Ireland. 
 
This tension between markets and society is an acute dilemma for small open 
economies.  Coping strategies to deal with it have long been central to the polities of 
the Nordic countries in particular.  This was the focus of a study by Katzenstein in 
1985 but Christine Ingebritsen (1998) has pointed to the difficulty of maintaining 
national systems for social protection in the face of encroachment of international 
capital markets, particularly post 1985. 
 
These tensions lend themselves most appropriately to analysis within that Polyanian 
framework.  Why?  Because as Fred Block (2001) explains, for Karl Polanyi (1944) 
the deepest flaw in market liberalism is that it subordinates human purposes to the 
logic of an impersonal market mechanism. The answer according to Polanyi, is for 
people to use the instruments of democratic governance available to them to impose 
the popular will on markets. Thus politics is the medium for this although quite what 
tools to use is not made clear (O’Riain, forthcoming, 2014).  Bohle and Greskovits 
(2012) write that in their reading of Polanyi, market expansion and market 
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regulation did not develop in a tightly coupled pattern, but occasionally followed 
each other with considerable time lags.  Accordingly, the pendulum logic of the 
double movement could lead to extreme swings in either direction, the one driven by 
market expansion and the other by its opponents.  For them, Polanyi’s work is a 
statement of the difficulty and occasional impossibility of balancing regulation by a 
politically agitated mass society against the needs of a functioning market economy.  
They conclude with the observation that, with the global crisis still unfolding, there 
is great uncertainty as to the course capitalist development may follow. 
 
Peter Katzenstein’s (1985) account of how small open economies have to balance 
openness to international markets with social compensation, mediated through the 
politics of corporatist negotiation of adjustment and social pacts is a good reference 
point.  But in the intervening period exogenous pressures have become more acute 
with the extended reach of global capital post the collapse of the Soviet Union, a sea 
change in financial liberalisation post 1985 and concurrent deepening of European 
integration via the Single European Act (SEA) and the subsequent Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). These developments justify using the lens of European 
integration to view and compare the trajectory of each country’s evolution. 
 
Ireland appears to be an outlier. It is the sole Liberal Market Economy within the 
Eurozone, the most distant geographically of the Northern Member States from the 
heart of Europe, and one of only three countries not part of the continental land mass 
(Hay et al, 2008).   O’Hearn (2001) points to its historical place in the Atlantic 
economy, with Britain as hegemon, and subsequently the United States.   It was a 
late industrialiser and  it missed out on the post-war ‘golden age’.  When it joined 
the EEC it had a long way to go to catch up and as late as 1994 its GDP per capita 
was only 60 per cent of the EU average.  For a country with no tradition of class 
politics it nevertheless developed a sophisticated system of corporatist Social 
Partnership which had a central role in policy formation for 22 years.  While the 
other countries in the study are firmly within the German sphere of influence (In 
Finland’s case this is a recent development) Ireland’s single biggest trading partner 
and closest ally in Europe is Britain.  Put another way, when Ireland joined EMU no 
other potential entrant had the same trade exposure to non-entrants as it had 
(McCarthy, 1997).    Moreover, the Irish economy cycles out of phase with that of 
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the core continental states of the Eurozone because of its heavy export and 
investment dependence on Britain and the United States and it has low levels of 
intra-industry Euro-area trade.  This misalignment means that Ireland’s interest rate 
requirements are different and unlikely ever to be a priority for the ECB.  As Hay et 
al (2008) forecast, the absence of the devaluation option, and the fiscal constraints of 
the 3 per cent budget deficit limit of the Stability & Growth Pact, rendered Ireland 
much more vulnerable to an external shock justifying their description of Ireland as 
an ‘Outlier’ inside the Eurozone (ibid: 188). Despite this unique risk exposure EMU 
membership never became a highly politicised issue among the mainstream political 
parties (ibid: 189).   Given their respective histories it is worthy of exploration 
whether Ireland could develop the kinds of institutions that characterise the other 
small open economies in this study and the extent to which the absence of a tradition 
of class politics influenced that.  On the other hand Ireland has over the years since 
independence displayed a capacity to change direction in quite a radial way on a 
number of occasions.  It has also been able to accommodate the social strains of both 
emigration and immigration with less angst than the comparator countries and it has 
found ways to permit a dual economy – hi-tech foreign multinational companies and 
traditional indigenous labour intensive industries – to coexist for a long period 
within a distinctive  social partnership model.  In this there is the possibility of 
mutual learning between the models.  This all makes it an interesting case.  
The Research Question 
 
What can be said with a degree of certainty is that there are still gaps in our 
knowledge about the influences causing different developmental outcomes amongst 
the small open economies of Europe.  Mjoset (1992) was given a very tight 
timeframe by NESC to conclude his evaluation of the performances of the countries 
selected.
5
  He focussed on development theory.  However, he did recommend further 
study of a number of areas including institutions.
6
  Most importantly, however, 
Mjoset’s study used a periodisation from the 1970s to the late 1980s when Social 
Partnership began.   Its effect was therefore not considered.  Nor could it take on 
                                                 
5 The countries used for comparison purposes by Mjoset were:  Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and 
Switzerland (Mjoset, 1992: 5). 
6 The original terms of reference included a second stage investigation intended to achieve two things:  First the 
analysis would move towards a causal account, based on comparative reasoning, and, second, specific issues for 
in-depth analysis would be identified.  This second stage could not be completed within the time allowed 
(Mjoset, 1992:5). 
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board the financialisation of the global economy that was to happen subsequently.  
Katzenstein’s (1985) seminal work of comparative political economy deliberately 
excluded Ireland and Finland from an analysis of the industrial adjustment strategies 
of seven small corporatist European States
7
 because he considered both to be late 
industrialisers and it too missed out on financialisation.  In general, also, the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature, which will be discussed later, is concerned mainly 
with ideal types.  As mentioned above, the debate about the nature of the State in 
Ireland has to include this question of whether, and to what extent, Ireland is sui 
generis and perhaps not easily fitted into an ideal type.   
 
 A final point is that the pace of European integration accelerated after the 
Maastricht Treaty was implemented in 1994 and this has added to the exogenous 
forces with which small open economies have had to grapple.  To the extent that this 
was a common factor it offers a useful lens through which to look at what has been 
happening in small open economies. 
 
The research question explores whether Katzenstein’s thesis on democratic 
corporatism holds true for selected small open economies under the influence of 
Europeanisation over a four stage periodisation from 1987 to 2013.  It asks to 
what extent Ireland is sui generis within its peer group and whether, and to 
what extent, certain counter tendencies to its categorisation in the literature as 
a liberal market economy have a bearing on its capability to match the 
economic and social achievements over time of the democratic corporatist 
economies. 
 
This research question suggests a number of lines of enquiry, viz: 
 
(i) Katzenstein’s principal focus was the performance of small open economics 
under conditions of increasing market openness.  Does his thesis hold in 
circumstances of deepening European integration in a single currency context 
and where rules are set at European level? 
 
                                                 
7 The States included were: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland 
(Katzenstein, 1985:21). 
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(ii) Countries respond to exogenous influences in different ways during different 
periods. What openness means to a country may vary over time. Some 
countries that may have a democratic corporatist polity may do better or 
worse than others also based on democratic corporatism.  Factors which 
might influence this include, inter alia, changing political landscapes or the 
emergence of new ideas.  This topic is the subject of a study by Monica 
Prasad (2006) for some of the larger countries.
8
 
 
(iii) Katzenstein writes in a uniform way about national systems but does not go 
into countertendencies.  Therefore, some extra means of analysis is needed to 
explain the Irish case. 
 
The countries selected as comparators with Ireland are:  Denmark, Finland, and the 
Netherlands.  The reasons for selecting these countries are as follows: 
 
Finland – a late industrialising country like Ireland but now widely regarded as a hi-
tech success story.  Unlike Ireland, however, this success is based on the 
extraordinary achievements of an indigenous company, Nokia.  The type of financial 
and banking crisis which hit Ireland in 2008 was experienced by Finland in 1992/93 
but it recovered quickly albeit with a long term scarring effect.  Moreover, Finland 
lost a significant export market when the Soviet Union collapsed around the same 
time.  Basically the Finns had to reinvent their economy and aim it at western 
markets.  Finland joined the EU in 1995 and qualified for membership of the 
Eurozone, like Ireland, in 1999.  It is the only Nordic member of the Eurozone.  
Today it is at the heart of Europe and is one of the creditor countries taking a hard 
line on the need for fiscal consolidation.  With Germany and the Netherlands it came 
out against allowing the ESM to recapitalise the Irish banks, contrary to an 
agreement apparently made by the European Council on 29
th
 June, 2012.  Finland 
has a population of 5.2 million.  It has a 1500 km border with Russia. 
 
Netherlands- an economic powerhouse at the heart of Europe but still a small open 
economy, albeit with a GDP four times the size of Ireland.  It has a population of 16 
million and the highest population density in Europe (493 people per sq. km).  It has 
                                                 
8 Hemerijck (2013:44) also suggests that evolving cognitive understanding of policy elites, changing beliefs of 
politicans, and changing normative orientations with respect to social justice issues can be important factors 
affecting welfare state reform.  
24 
 
a total geographic area of 41,526 sq. km much of it below sea level. Dutch society 
traditionally had had deep religious cleavages and managing these differences – 
often referred to as pillarisation – has been a focus of public policy.  Consensus 
building is at the core of the polity and the result is a consociational democracy.  The 
Netherlands has been a key actor in the European integration project from the 
beginning.  With Belgium it convened the 1956 Messina conference which led to the 
Treaty of Rome two years later.  The Netherlands is a close ally of Germany and its 
currency has been pegged to the Deutschmark since the 1970s.  For the Netherlands 
EMU was a logical stage of European integration and its membership of the 
Eurozone was never in doubt.  The Dutch shocked the European elite by voting 
against the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005.  Also a hardliner amongst the creditor 
counties it has had to eat some humble pie due to increasing difficulties with its 
public finances in 2013.  
 
Denmark – Denmark has a landmass of 43,000 sq. kms and a population of 5.6m.  It 
ranks 21
st
 in the world in terms of GDP.  Like the Netherlands it pegged its currency 
to the Deutschmark in 1982 but has never been able to convince its population to 
join EMU.  Nevertheless, its polity is constructed as if it were a member and 
European integration requirements have been a key focus since the early 1990s.  
Denmark has a strong agricultural tradition and is often compared to Ireland for that 
reason.  It has also been compared with Ireland as an exemplar of the success of 
‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ (Blyth, 2013).  Industrially, however, it is the 
mirror image of Ireland with a strong indigenous SME industrial base and a 
relatively small amount of FDI.  It is an important sub supplier of German industry.  
Consensus building is a way of life in Denmark.  All interest groups in society have 
some form of representation and it is often described as a negotiated economy.  The 
comparison of Ireland and Denmark is developed further in Chapter 3. 
 
To sum up, what makes these countries appropriate for comparison with Ireland is 
that they are all small open economies.  All three are social market economies and 
they are at the heart of Europe (even though Denmark is not formally a member of 
the Eurozone).  Denmark and the Netherlands were covered in Katzenstein’s (1985) 
study while Finland and Denmark were analysed by Mjoset (1992).  Accordingly 
there is a solid body of research to build on. 
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Theoretical Foundation 
 
The Theoretical Foundation for this research is the Varieties of Capitalism literature 
with a particular focus on the new institutionalisms.   
 
Arguably the most influential critique of market liberalism ever written was The 
Great Transformation (1944) by Karl Polanyi.  Fred Block (2001) says of it that the 
emergence of the Cold War, and the polarised public discourse that attended it, left 
little room for Polanyi’s nuanced and complex arguments.  But in the context of the 
modern debate about globalisation his work is increasingly seen as being particularly 
relevant. 
 
According to Fred Block (ibid) Polanyi does not fit easily into standard mapping of 
the political landscape; although he agreed with Keynes’ critique of market 
liberalism, he was not a Keynesian per se. He claimed to be a socialist although he 
did not agree with the concept of economic determinism in a Marxist sense.  The 
core tenets of his argument were that labour, land and money could not be treated as 
commodities and that the economy should be embedded in social relations rather 
than the other way around as is the case with market liberalism.  Mark Blyth (2002) 
describes Polanyi’s Double Movement theory in which the advance of capitalism 
and the commodification of labour create disembodied markets provoking a reaction 
by labour.  In other words those dislocated by the market will try to use the state to 
protect themselves, the consequence of which is large scale institutional change.  Of 
course this can happen in reverse too as was the case in the early 1970s when 
business interests in the US mobilised to deconstruct the New Deal Settlement.  
David Harvey (2005) says that Polanyi saw liberalism (and by extension neo-
liberalism) as a utopian construct.  As such his fear was that it could only be 
sustained by resort to authoritarianism.  The freedom of the masses would be 
restricted in favour of the freedom of the few. 
 
Fred Block is the best known proponent of neo-Polanyian theory which he 
conceptualises in terms of four specific theses, viz: 
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i. Market economies are always and everywhere embedded. 
 
ii. Market societies and the contemporary world economy have been shaped by 
an on-going double movement. 
 
iii. The interests of employers vary over time and space, but they play a critical 
role in shaping the development of market societies. 
 
iv. Competition among nations within the world economy tends to produce new 
variations in the structures of economic institutions. 
 
This latter thesis links with the Varieties of Capitalism School insofar as it implies 
that there are multiple strategies for maintaining or improving a nation’s relative 
position.  For example, investment strategies for different economic sectors or for 
education and training might be prioritised.  The path chosen is likely to lead to 
institutional innovations that could increase the institutional variations among 
market societies.   
 
Taken together these four theses suggest that the trajectory of market societies can 
be seen as being shaped by political conflicts and political struggles.  The 
importance of political institutions and political conflicts in shaping social 
development represents an overlap of significance between neo-Polanyian theory 
and the work done within ‘new institutionalist’ frameworks in political science and 
sociology.  Carlo Trigilia (2002) suggested that Polanyi was an institutionalist, 
meaning that for him economic life could not be understood in individualistic terms 
but was influenced by social institutions. 
Moreover, employer class interests and counter movements can contest to influence 
State power to make deep changes in the structure of the economy thus providing 
multiple paths to successful economic adaptation.   
 
In Polanyi’s reasoning it was not the First World War, or fascism in Europe nor the 
onset of the Russian Revolution that ended the civilisation of the nineteenth century 
as manifested in liberal capitalism.  Rather it could be traced to a conflict between 
the functioning of markets and the requirements of social life – a view that finds a 
resonance in Europe post the 2008 financial crisis.   
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According to Katzenstein (1985:34) for small European states, with their open 
economies and fear of retaliation by other governments, exporting the costs of 
market competition and change through protectionist policies was not a viable 
option.  Protectionism would risk retaliation. Competitiveness was the only 
economic option but that required building a national consensus. A consensus 
required everybody to realise that they were in the same small boat, fighting high 
waves, and everybody needed to pull the oars.  Thus it followed that domestic 
quarrels were a luxury that could not be afforded.  Building a consensus required the 
protection of citizens from the worst effects of open international markets. 
 
The formula adopted was democratic corporatism.  It involved agreements on 
incomes policy and broad social and economic policy between government and both 
sides of industry.  Initially these were embodied in a number of landmark 
agreements as follows:  Norway’s Basic Agreement of 1935, Sweden’s Saltsjobaden 
Agreement of 1938, the Netherlands’ fifth corporatist chapter of the new 
Constitution of 1938, Belgium’s Social Solidarity Pact of 1945 and Switzerland’s 
Peace Agreement of 1937. The ‘truce’ between employers and unions eventually 
transitioned into a permanent way of doing business which was consolidated after 
the war (Katzenstein, 1985: Chapter 1). 
 
However, it would be wrong to think that everything went smoothly at all times.  
Industrial conflict did occur.  Moreover, centralised bargaining was abandoned in 
Sweden in 1984 and subsequently in some other countries.  Incomes policy in both 
Denmark and the Netherlands has a mixed record.  One of the interesting points 
brought out by Katzenstein is that best results are achieved where strong peak 
organisations of employers and unions exist.  He notes that while Britain tried 
incomes policies on a few occasions, weak peak organisations and decentralised 
systems of collective bargaining condemned Britain’s efforts to no more than 
intermittent success (Katzenstein, 1985: Chapter 2, see also Scharpf, 1991:  Chapter 
5). Hardiman (1988) argues that Ireland was subject until the 1980s to similar 
problems in its collective bargaining system. 
 
Another feature of small European States is that protection of citizens from the 
ravages of markets requires a fairly large public sector to provide social transfers for 
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compensation and good quality public services.  Therefore, public spending, and 
taxation, tends to be high.  When Katzenstein was writing the average small State 
spent 45 per cent of its gross national product on public services while the large 
countries averaged 38 per cent. 
 
The defining characteristics of corporatism are (i) an ideology of Social Partnership, 
(ii) a centralised and concentrated system of economic interest groups, and an 
uninterrupted process of bargaining among all the major political actors across 
different sectors of policy.  Proportional Representation in the electoral system is 
important because it lends itself to a system of coalition or minority governments.  
This fosters an inclination to share power between political opponents with a view to 
jointly influencing policy.  It adds to the orientation towards consensus and a 
negotiated economy (ibid, see also Lijphart, 1999). 
 
This is very much associated with the social democratic model whereby the labour 
movement is integrated to a strong national consensus through strong socialist 
parties and strong trade unions. While it does not mean that social democratic parties 
will always be successful in elections it does mean that even conservative parties 
have to stay with a social democratic policy framework if they want to be successful 
(Vartiainen, 2011).  In some cases, for example Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former 
prime minister of Denmark, politicians of the right have acknowledged the merits of 
the social democratic framework (Boss, 2010). 
 
To summarise Katzenstein’s thesis it is that the vulnerability of small countries to 
internal conflicts and external changes in the 1930s and 1940s caused them to adopt 
a policy of combining openness to international markets with social compensations.  
He described this as ‘Democratic Corporatism’ constituted of a blend of centralised 
politics, ideological consensus and complex bargains among interest groups, 
politicians and administrators. By balancing open economies and flexible industrial 
policies within Social Partnership the small countries of Northern Europe succeeded 
in adjusting to rapid changes in the international political economy without 
damaging social cohesion or political stability.  However, he did not see that there 
was a universal model to fit all situations but rather that historical and institutional 
factors were influential (ibid). 
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While small countries lacked the market size and economies of scale of larger 
countries Katzenstein saw that there were alternative advantages to small size.  All 
relevant parties could more easily get to sit around a table together to discuss 
pragmatic approaches to problems associated with vulnerability and to devise 
solutions.  It was also possible to coordinate, to limit internal conflict and to duck 
and weave around international vulnerabilities sometimes by designing policies and 
institutions with which to contend with international forces otherwise beyond control 
(see also Campbell and Hall, 2010 a). 
 
Hall and Soskice (2001) developed this thinking about coordination and institutions 
further.  In their perspective Katzenstein had also given insufficient weight to the 
role of firms in the economy.  This was something of a rebalancing of the primacy 
given to trade unions.  They also emphasised the importance of culture.  Societies 
that are deeply divided culturally, for example, might find difficulty in cooperating.  
A feature of the Northern European countries is that they are culturally quite 
homogenous (although this may be changing somewhat with immigration as 
discussed in Chapter 6).  In this respect Campbell and Hall (2010) note that 
according to the World Economic Forum in 2006, five small countries – 
Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Singapore – are the most competitive 
economies in the world. 
 
Whereas this ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literature speaks to the practical way 
economies and societies are organised, political science provides a theoretical 
approach with three main perspectives:  rational choice theory; behaviouralism; and 
the new institutionalisms. Rational choice theory is based on the assumption that 
individuals are rational and behave as if they engage in a cost-benefit analysis of 
each and every choice available with a view to maximising their material self-
interest.  Rational choice theory seeks to produce a deductive and predictive science 
of the political, modelled on neo-classical economics. The behaviouralism approach 
is to focus on power as decision-making and to assume that an analysis of the inputs 
into the political system, such as the pressure exerted by interest groups upon the 
State, is sufficient to account adequately for political outcomes.  Both approaches 
have been criticised by Colin Hay (2002).  In particular he has drawn attention to an 
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inherent flaw in rational choice theory by virtue of perverse incentives not to engage 
in collective action in pursuit of public goods.  Referring to the so-called ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ he explains how an individual country might not want to incur the 
competitive disadvantage of the costs of environmental protection if it can be free 
rider getting the benefit of the input of others.
9
 
 
The origins, philosophy and approach of new institutionalism are given detailed 
treatment in a book written by John L Campbell Institutional Change and 
Globalisation.  He explains that new institutionalism emerged in the 1970s in 
reaction to persistent problems for which neo-classical economics seemed to have no 
answer. These related to the realisation that competitive markets did not always 
produce the most efficient economic behaviour.  The new institutionalists argue that 
markets were in fact typically inefficient insofar as monitoring and enforcing 
transactions could be done at lower costs through different institutions like corporate 
hierarchies or long term subcontracts. By institutions they meant systems of formal 
and informal rules and compliance procedures. Whereas neo-classicals had 
disregarded institutions in favour of unfettered markets the new institutionalists 
wanted to bring the analysis of institutions back into economics. The new 
institutionalists, however, cannot be said to hold a homogenous world view 
(Campbell, 2004). 
 
New institutionalism is also explained in terms of the extent to which it emphasises 
how political conduct is shaped by the institutional context in which it occurs, the 
historical legacy and the diversity of actors’ strategic orientation to the institutional 
situation in which they find themselves.  Rational choice institutionalism presents 
the State as a rational actor pursuing the national interest or as a structure of 
incentives within which rational actors follow their preferences.  Historical 
institutionalism focuses on the constituent parts of the State and on how the State has 
originated and evolved.  This brings into play a logic of path dependence.  
Sociological institutionalism sees the State as socially constituted and culturally 
framed, with political agents acting according to ‘the logic of appropriateness’ that 
                                                 
9 One is tempted to suggest that Ireland’s attitude to corporation tax and transfer pricing fits this description.  By 
undervaluing imports from subsidiaries abroad and overvaluing exports to subsidiaries outside Ireland, affiliates 
of MNCs can declare higher profits for taxation purposes in Ireland and move after tax profits out of the country.  
Ireland’s 12.5 per cent corporation tax rate allows it to attract FDI but it is arguably contributing to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ for all European countries in their tax relations with MNCs. 
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follows from culturally-specific rules and norms.  Discursive institutionalism is 
concerned with ideas and discourse used to explain or legitimate political action in 
an institutional context.  New institutionalism began in the 1970s with the aim of 
bringing institutions of the State back into the explanation of political action (Hay, 
2002; Schmidt, 2006). 
 
But it is the treatment of ideas that is particularly challenging within this discipline.  
Mark Blyth (2002) asserts that ideas are important because they can change how 
people conceptualise their own self-interest.  He complains that social scientists have 
had difficulty accepting that ideas matter, preferring instead to rely on self-interest 
as the ever ready tool of explanation.  He makes the case for reconceptualising 
Polanyi’s double movement thesis towards an analysis which is not static but which 
sees institutional change being driven sequentially by events where ideas have 
different effects at different junctures.  In other words, institutional change may be a 
process comprehending the reduction of uncertainty, the specification of causes and 
the actual supply of new institutions.  He explains it this way: 
 
‘While Polanyi saw the double movement as a function of agents with structurally 
given interests reacting to self-apparent crisis, what this and other static accounts 
of institutional change miss is the importance of uncertainty and ideas in 
determining the form and content of institutional change.  Economic ideas are 
causally powerful in this way because of the world that precedes them.’ 
 (ibid:10) 
 
Colin Hay (2002) suggests that the new institutionalism departs from the mainstream 
political science of the 1980s in important respects.  First, it rejects the simplifying 
assumptions which make possible rational choice theory’s modelling of political 
behaviour. Secondly it challenges the assumed regularity in human behaviour in 
which rests behaviouralism’s reliance on a logic of extrapolation and generalisation 
(or induction).  In their place the new institutionalists propose more complex and 
plausible assumptions which seek to capture and reflect the complexity and open-
endedness of processes of social and political change. The result has been a series of 
hybrid positions, the most influential of which is probably rational choice 
institutionalism which examines the extent to which institutions can provide 
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solutions to collective action problems and, more generally the (institutional) 
context-dependence of rationality. 
 
Vivien Schmidt (2006) suggests that Peter Katzenstein has moved his thinking in a 
constructivist direction. She categorises him as being in the historical institutionalist 
tradition when he wrote his book on small open economies in 1985 but by 1996 she 
considered him to be in the sociological institutionalist camp.  This trajectory is 
associated with the accommodation of ideas. She regards him as one of those 
scholars, ‘who see ideas more as static ideational structures, as norms and identities 
constituted by culture and thus remain largely sociological institutionalists….’ (ibid: 
112).  Similarly Peter Hall, whose original work was within historical 
institutionalism, moved over time to combine a historical institutionalist approach to 
the structures of capitalism with a rational choice institutionalist focus on strategic 
firm coordination (2001), and in between focussed on the role of economic ideas to 
explain change.  Schmidt’s (ibid) opinion is that, whereas in his first ideational 
approach on the adoption of Keynesian ideas he remained largely historical 
institutionalist because historical structures come prior to ideas, influencing their 
adoptability, the second work on the introduction of monetarist ideas to Britain 
crossed into discursive institutionalism because ideas are central to change and 
constitutive of new institutions. 
 
Discursive institutionalism came along somewhat later than the other three 
institutionalisms and arose from a concern that none of them were seemingly able to 
explain change, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, given their often static view 
of institutions.  The use of ideas and discourse to explain change was a natural step 
in these circumstances.  On the other hand ideas had formerly already been part of 
the DNA of sociological institutionalism (ibid).  This is a point which has 
implications for the methodology used in this research which will be revisited in the 
next chapter (ibid:109). 
 
Hall and Taylor (1996) identify three sub species of institutionalism as manifest in 
theories of EU integration.  The first is rational choice institutionalism which is 
closely related to liberal intergovernmentalism and rational choice theory.  It is 
based on the idea that human beings are self-seeking and behave rationally and 
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strategically.  This means that institutions do not alter preferences but will have an 
impact on the ways in which actors pursue those preferences.  Consequently, 
changes in the institutional rules of the game, such as the introduction of the co-
decision procedure, will cause actors to recalculate how they will behave in order to 
realise their preferences.  What can be strategically important in this analysis is the 
agenda setting power of the various institutions.   Another important aspect of 
rational choice institutionalism is the application of the ‘Principal – Agent Analysis’ 
to EU politics.  Here self-regarding actors (Principals) find that their preferences are 
best served by the delegation of certain authoritative tasks to common institutions 
(Agents).  In an EU context this might be the Commission or the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) (ibid). 
 
If institutions engage with one another in a decision making process, then patterns 
that evolve over the early years of that institution may ‘lock in’ and become a 
permanent template for decision making.  This is the basis of path dependency in 
which it is very difficult for the institution concerned to break out from established 
patterns of decision making.  Policy entrepreneurs may attempt to redesign 
institutions to meet current needs, but they do so in the face of institutional agendas 
that are locked in and which are, in consequence, difficult to reform.  This is the 
essence of historical institutionalism (ibid). 
 
Sociological institutionalism is somewhat aligned to the constructivist school in 
international relations.  The literature tends to reject the other institutionalisms 
because of their inherent rationalism.  Sociological institutionalism/constructivism 
operates with a distinct ontology by which actors’ interests are not seen as pre-set 
but as being the product of interaction between actors.  As Hall and Taylor  (1996) 
explain it, ‘Institutions do not simply affect the calculations of individuals, as 
rational choice institutionalists contend, but also their most basic preferences and 
very identity’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996:948).  In this context sociological 
institutionalists tend to watch for patterns of institutional behaviour, for example, the 
way in which different Directorates General of the European Commission function 
in quiet distinct ways.  A refinement of this is the quest to establish whether 
individuals in positions of influence manage to turn their own beliefs into wider 
shared understandings or values. According to Rosamond (2010) a lot of work is 
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being done on the interaction of national and European – level norms and in 
particular the ways in which ‘European’ norms filter into the existing political 
cultures of member states.   
 
According to Marsh et al (2006:176) authors such as Hall and Soskice (2001) aim to 
‘bring institutions back in’ to the study of capitalism. They argue that, while nations 
may experience common pressures, the existence of different institutional and 
cultural environments means that they may respond in a variety of different ways 
and achieve different outcomes.  The institutionists believe that there is considerable 
scope for government intervention in economic and social affairs. 
 
Thus The Varieties of Capitalism School divides economies, both large and small, 
into coordinated market economies and liberal market economies.  As the name 
suggests, the former seeks competitive advantage through cooperation and through 
the efficacy of labour market and other institutions.  The latter relies on the free play 
of market forces and minimal regulation. 
 
The development of these ideas was partially at least also a response to the hyper-
globalisation thesis which suggested that corporatist policies could not survive the 
diminution in the power of the state that would necessarily be a feature of 
globalisation.  This suggested that the power of transnational corporations would 
force countries to accommodate to demands for low corporate taxes, favourable 
regulatory regimes and business friendly labour market conditions.  On the contrary, 
however, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that it was precisely the competitive 
institutional advantage and the dynamic approach to globalisation it entails, that 
explains why wholesale neo-liberalism did not take control in small States as 
predicted by the globalisation thesis.  In other words they dispute the view that long 
term trends such as globalisation and the decline of manufacturing will drive a 
convergence on a single best or most efficient model of capitalism. 
 
There are, of course, other perspectives on this.  Wolfgang Streeck’s (2009) study of 
Germany is sceptical of the endurance of the coordinated market economy model.  
He sees some evidence of convergence with the features of the Anglo Saxon liberal 
market economy model.  In a nutshell his view seems to be that capitalism is 
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capitalism, red in tooth and claw, and it will not accommodate itself to the desires of 
society any more than it has to.  In later work (Streeck 2014:31), he advances the 
opinion that, whereas Polanyi had seen a human need for stable social relations as 
‘The Archimedean Point’ for a fight back against the liberal project, the cultural 
tolerance of market uncertainty grew against all expectations in the last  two decades 
of the twentieth century.  Kathleen Thelen (forthcoming) makes the point that what 
Streeck has to say about Germany is not true of the Nordic countries that have 
retained their status as successful models of social solidarity and economic 
efficiency.  She suggests that the role of institutions may be less important than the 
political coalitions on which they stand. 
 
Fred Block (2007) finds Hall and Soskice’s (2001) categorisation of the United 
States as a ‘Liberal Market Economy’ in contrast to European ‘Coordinated Market 
Economy’ to be problematical.  He asserts that the US model of capitalism is built 
around a core of highly protected and State-dependent industries especially relating 
to defence, agribusiness, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications and financial 
services.  This suggests a degree of coordination which would imply that the US is 
not an ideal type liberal market economy. 
 
Monica Prasad (2006) is slightly sceptical of the “Varieties of Capitalism” thesis.  
She defines it as an argument that high taxation, high welfare state spending, and an 
interventionist industrial policy can add up to an equally efficient and equally stable 
alternative form of capitalism.  She notes that the Varieties of Capitalism literature 
sees firms as the central actors in generating persistent differences across countries; 
the argument is that firms in countries specialising in high-tech, high-quality, high-
cost products that require highly skilled labour need, above all, a predictable 
political-economic environment.  Firms in such countries will agree to the welfare 
projections and labour regulations necessary to convince labour to invest in the years 
of training necessary for such production.  She says: 
 
‘The Varieties of Capitalism thesis is a powerful and provocative synthesis of 
institutional and political economy approaches; however, at least for the 
countries and the time period examined here, the empirical evidence for this 
thesis based on the behaviour of employers is not strong.’ 
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         (ibid: 18) 
 
Erik Jones (2008) is another critic.  His argument is that consensual adjustment 
strategies are self-destructive even where they succeed in fostering economic 
adjustment.  The causal mechanism he relies on runs from consensual adjustment to 
political instability.  Small States, he observes, react to international vulnerability by 
forging consensus.  But over time he reckons that citizens begin to chaff under the 
discipline such consensual politics implies.  Once they throw off the discipline of 
consensus at home, their vulnerability to world markets reveals itself in force.  Then 
politicians used to promoting adjustment with broad based popular support are 
unable to act effectively without it.  Moreover, economic and political actors are not 
alone in this exposure.  Welfare state institutions are affected as well.  An institution 
that plays an important redistributive function in one context may emerge as a 
powerful constraint on competitiveness in another.  Thus, he argues, welfare-state 
institutions become focal points for political conflict.  The problem with this 
analysis is that it is based on the emergence of the right wing List Pim Fortuyn Party 
in the Netherlands.
10
 Moreover,  the discipline he refers to has been a feature of the 
Dutch polity since the currency was pegged to the Deutschmark in the 1970s and is 
clearly deeply embedded. 
 
While Colin Crouch (2011) is rather fatalistic about society’s lack of power to rein 
in the oligopolistic MNCs, Otmar Issing, a former member of the European Central 
Bank’s Executive Board has a different perspective.  Writing in the context of a 
series of articles on the future of capitalism in The Financial Times in early 2012 he 
saw it as the responsibility of governments to prevent the financial industry from 
pursuing activities which are detrimental to society.  This, he wrote, required 
governments to create a convincing system of regulation and supervision. 
Specifically, he emphasised that this was in the control of society rejecting Francis 
Fukuyama’s (1992) determinist view of the inevitability of just one variety of liberal 
capitalism. (Issing, 2012:13) 
 
The seminal work on welfare systems and labour markets is that of Gösta Esping-
Andersen (1990).  A good deal of his analysis is based on Karl Polanyi’s (1944) 
                                                 
10 This party is today the Party for Freedom PVV led by Geert Wilders.  Pim Fortuyn, the first leader, was 
assassinated.  
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original work on transformation and commodification of labour.  In relation to the 
institutional problems of full employment he observes that pre-war reformists 
foresaw that full employment with welfare policies could establish a capitalism that 
was both more humane and more productive.  Liberals, such as Beveridge, and 
Social Democrats such as Wigforss and Myrdal, were in agreement and placed their 
faith in the promotion of Keynesian welfare-state policies.   
 
The pursuit of social justice and full employment and the issue of institutional 
accommodation condense into the problem of how labour’s redistributional power 
will not jeopardise the need for balanced economic growth.   The central question 
becomes how to turn potential zero-sum conflicts into positive-sum trade-offs that is 
consistent with both sustained price stability and full employment.  In essence a 
question of the type of institutional framework that would allow private enterprise 
and a powerful working class to co-exist. 
 
This dilemma has not been resolved conclusively.
11
  But labour markets and welfare 
systems are related and Esping-Andersen (ibid) distinguishes their working into 
three groups or clusters.  The Nordic group of countries broadly have a Universalist 
welfare state based on high levels of labour force participation and high taxes.  The 
Continental European countries, epitomised by Germany, have systems with their 
origins in the Christian democratic tradition where welfare entitlement is based on 
work related social insurance contributions and where full employment is sometimes 
pursued at the expense of labour force participation (for example early retirement is 
often used to maximise sustainable employment).  This is described as a Corporatist 
Regime, shaped by the Church, and hence strongly committed to the preservation of 
traditional family-hood.  Unlike the Nordic cluster, day-care and similar family 
services are underdeveloped. 
 
The third cluster contains the Liberal Welfare State, in which means tested 
assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social insurance plans predominate.  
Benefits cater mainly to a clientele of low income, usually working class state 
                                                 
11 Paul Mason (2009)  opines that there is an enduring aspect to the conflict between capital and labour which 
has become more acute with the addition of 1.5 billion new workers since the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the decision of China to go capitalist.  The change in the balance of power may take 30 years to work out. 
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dependents.  The archetypical examples of this model are the US, Canada and 
Australia. 
 
Esping-Andersen deals extensively with the potential of welfare regimes to achieve 
a decommodification of labour in line with Polanyi’s (1944) precepts.  He remarks 
that: 
 
“When workers are completely market-dependent, they are difficult to 
mobilise for solidaristic action.  Since their resources mirror market 
inequalities, divisions emerge between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’, making 
labour-movement formation difficult.  Decommodification  strengthens the 
worker and weakens the absolute authority of the employer.  It is for this 
reason that employers have always opposed decommodification.” 
 
         (ibid: 22) 
 
In summary, Esping-Andersen explores how contemporary welfare states cluster 
into three distinct regime types and asserts that different country’s labour markets 
derive much of their logic from how they are embedded in the institutional 
framework of social policy. 
 
Huber and Stephens (2001) modify Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology by adding 
the category of wage earner welfare states (Australia, New Zealand) and by taking a 
different perspective on his conservative-corporatist typology.  In their view it is 
more appropriate to categorise this cluster as a Christian democratic type based on 
its political foundations, to fit in with the typology of the other clusters as Social 
Democratic and liberal types.  In particular they emphasise the significance of the 
public provision of welfare services and gender-egalitarian policies as distinctive 
qualities of the Social Democratic welfare state. 
 
The theme of equality under different regime types is also explored by Jonas 
Pontusson (2005).  Whereas the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ school of comparative 
political economy emphasises the capacity to coordinate the economy and generally 
divides the OECD countries into coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal 
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market economies (LMEs), Pontusson insists on the term social market economy 
(SME) in place of the former.  His argument is against including Japan as 
exemplifying the same Variety of Capitalism as Germany and Sweden because the 
role of trade unions is much less influential in Japan and is institutionally different.  
Moreover, he explains that, taking Sweden as the epitome of the social market 
economy, it involves a very distinct strategic vision based on the idea that low wages 
represent a subsidy to inefficient capital.  This is known as the Rehn-Meidner 
system.  It recognises that wage differentials are necessary as an incentive for 
workers to acquire skills and to take on more responsibility in the production 
process.  The goal of union wage policy should be to eliminate differentials based on 
corporate profitability while maintaining differentials based on skill and 
performance. 
 
Lennart Erixon (2008) has written an extensive account of how the Rehn-Meidner 
model was implemented in practice.  The essence of the model involves the use of 
selective employment policy measures, a tight macroeconomic policy and a wage 
policy of solidarity to combine full employment and equity with price stability and 
economic growth.  Although never consistently applied in Sweden, it is possible to 
distinguish a period between the 1950s and 1970s when it was most effective.  This 
was the period when active labour market policy came to the fore.  The use of 
selective employment policy was a departure from Keynesian demand management 
approaches.  Rehn in particular believed in mobility enhancing employability as 
giving individuals more power over corporations than laws to protect job security.  
In many respects it is the opposite of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) approach to de-
commodification of labour markets.  Rehn and Meidner thought that their approach 
to restraining aggregate demand, intensifying price competition, squeezing profit 
margins and making labour markets more effective was superior to a Keynesian 
strategy for fighting inflation in an economy approaching full employment.  The R-
M model was basically formulated for an overheated economy and the medium 
term.  According to Erixon (ibid:28), in the period 1985-2005, supply and matching 
(training) orientated measures were the most important components of Swedish 
labour market policy.  Globalisation of financial markets and the risks of capital 
flight have imposed limitations on the operation of the R-M model as originally 
conceived as a national policy, especially in relation to profit squeezing.    
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Pontusson assembles an enormous amount of data on social and economic indicators 
by which he categorises OECD countries into clusters somewhat on the same lines 
as Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990).  Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are 
designated as Nordic SMEs. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and 
Switzerland are clustered together as continental SMEs.  The Anglophone countries 
– Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Britain and the United States  - are 
regarded as LMEs and France, Italy and Japan are considered to be outside the 
framework entirely.  
 
 
It is striking that the comparative analysis based on a very extensive range of 
indicators and data places Ireland consistently in the Liberal Market Economy 
cluster. 
 
However, using a statistical cluster analysis approach embracing four  dimensions, 
family, market vs. state, religion and clientelism, a new paper (Minas et al, 
forthcoming) refines Esping-Andersen’s findings to include southern 
European/Mediterranean (SE/M) or peripheral countries as a separate welfare 
cluster.  Interestingly Ireland is included in this cluster. The authors cite Ferragina 
and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) to say that of 19 other studies reviewed only one clusters 
Ireland with the SE/M group of countries and in this one study, Obinger and 
Wagscal (2001), the findings are ambiguous in respect of Ireland. 
 
The seminal work of comparative political economy from a European social 
democratic perspective is that of Fritz Scharpf (1991).  Its focus is the efforts made 
by social democratic governments in Germany, Austria, Sweden and Great Britain to 
achieve full employment in the 1970s.  It exposes the constraints faced by Social 
Democrats trying to utilise Keynesian economic strategies, especially in the context 
of financialisation and capital liberalisation,  in an increasingly globalised world. His 
later book (1999) explores the hypothesis that the weakening of political legitimacy 
in Western Europe is a consequence of the loss of problem solving capacities of 
political systems which have been brought about by the interrelated processes of 
economic globalisation and European integration. Colin Hay (2004) has also written 
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about the challenges faced by Social Democrats under conditions of complex 
economic interdependence in Europe.  In more recent times a number of scholars 
have been grappling with a puzzle thrown up by the 2008 crisis i.e., why social 
democracy has so far failed to benefit from the failure of neo-liberalism.  
Specifically, the exploration of ‘The Third Way’ during the 1990s is seen as not 
having offered a credible alternative explanation and so people did not really trust 
social democracy enough to embrace it after 2008 (Cramme and Diamond, 2012; 
Cramme, 2013; Meyer and Hinchman, 2007; Painter, 2013).   Crouch (2011) defines 
social democracy as covering all strategies for combining government power with 
the market to try to produce an economy that maximises efficiency in a manner 
designed to minimise the impact of man-made shocks, and which allows for the 
achievement of social goals and limitations of inequality that market processes 
produce.  He cites the 1959 declaration of the German Social Democrats, “as much 
market as possible; as much State as necessary” (ibid:9).  However, Crouch (ibid:12) 
also notes the fundamental importance of neo-corporatist industrial relations to the 
Nordic, Dutch and Austrian cases and points out that neo-liberals are unequivocally 
hostile to trade unions, which interfere with the smooth operation of the labour 
market” (ibid:18). 
 
A comparative study of modern democracies and their political institutions drawn 
upon for this research is that of Arend Lijphart (1999), specifically in his 
categorisation of countries as majoritarian or consensus democracies in the context 
of exploring how the four countries converge and diverge. This is developed further 
in Chapter 3. 
 
Structure of Thesis 
 
The remaining chapters are structured along the following lines: Chapter 2 explains 
the research methodology used and the precautions taken to prevent bias.  It outlines 
the periodisation used beginning where Peter Katzenstein left off in 1985 and 
continuing through four periods of ever deepening European integration to a 
culmination coinciding with the fifth anniversary of Lehman Bros. bank collapse in 
September 2013.  This is a point at which the EU may be on the cusp of the most 
ambitious phase of integration to date, paradoxically at a time when European 
42 
 
citizens have never been more hostile to the idea.  Chapter 2 also shows how a 
model is constructed, drawing on the disciplines of political science and 
international relations, to remove the cover from the black box which is the Irish 
polity and to understand how its gears and levers operate.  The model is effectively a 
tool kit to juxtapose the four new institutionalisms to the policy making system in 
Ireland, to expose any countertendencies which differentiate it from the ideal type of 
liberal market economy  and to derive explanations therefrom as to why Ireland 
performed so well as an economy for so long, by reference to the comparator 
countries of Finland, Denmark and Netherlands, yet collapsed catastrophically when 
the 2008 financial crisis hit. The research methodology uses the lens of European 
integration because it is the common exogenous influence on each country. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the history of each country and the evolution of its political 
economy from 1987 to 1994. This periodisation is used as a benchmark to compare 
the different political economies of each country. It can be seen that, while there are 
obvious similarities in size and in terms of living in the shadow of a large neighbour, 
there are also quite significant differences. Denmark and the Netherlands have been 
closely aligned with the German economy since the 1980s and 1970s respectively. 
Finland’s economy and geo-politics was closely associated with Sweden and Russia 
but it is now at the heart of Europe.  Ireland is Britain’s sixth largest trading partner 
and has a unique relationship with that country and the United States which is quite 
different to the others.  Moreover, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands would 
each fit Arend Lijphart’s (1999) typology of consensus democracies while Ireland 
straddles a line between consensus and majoritarian models.  Similarly Ireland is 
regarded in the Varieties of Capitalism literature as a liberal market economy (with 
countertendencies) while the others are social market economies. 
 
The so called age of ‘employment miracles’ when Denmark, Netherlands and 
Ireland created large numbers of jobs and achieved virtual full employment is 
covered in Chapter 4.  It relates to the periodisation 1994 to 2001, which in Ireland’s 
case saw the emergence of the Celtic Tiger. Finland was the outlier at this time 
because it was hit by an endogenous and exogenous shock at the same time.  Its 
banking system went into crisis and the Soviet Union fell apart bringing down 
approximately 20 per cent of Finland’s exports. The country had to re-orientate its 
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economy towards the west which it did very effectively by creating an ICT industry 
based on Nokia, a former general purposes conglomerate. Finland recovered quickly 
from the crisis and the speed of this recovery, particularly in domestic demand, has 
been contrasted favourably with Ireland’s difficulty in recovering from the 2008 
crisis by NESC (2013).  This era of ‘employment miracles’ coincided with social 
democratic government in the three comparator countries and with Labour being the 
junior partners in coalition in Ireland for part of the time (1994-1997). Another 
finding of interest for this periodisation is that the approaches to job creation were 
all different; increased female participation via part-time jobs in the Netherlands, 
active labour market policies and public investment via ‘flexicurity’ in Denmark; the 
use of science and technology councils to drive a national system of innovation in 
Finland (aided by a 30 per cent currency devaluation) and a combination of robust 
FDI (consequent upon the Single Market Act), devaluation in 1993 and genuine 
developmentalism boosting indigenous industry and public sector employment in 
Ireland.  In comparative terms it can be observed that Denmark and the Netherlands 
had a human capital focus, the former developing a ‘flexicurity’ model to maximise 
labour force participation.  The latter increased female participation through its ‘one 
and a half jobs per family’ approach to part-time work.  Ireland and the Netherlands 
relied heavily on social pacts to kick start employment recovery as with the 
‘Wassenaar Accord’ in the Netherlands and the ‘Programme for National Recovery’ 
in Ireland.  Stabilisation agreements with the trade unions were important too in 
Finland when recovery came in the mid to late 1990s. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with the periodisation bookended by bursting of the dot-com bubble 
of 2001 and the onset of the European banking crisis following the demise of the 
American Lehman Bros bank in Mid-September, 2008. Politics in all four countries 
moved to the centre-right during this period with some unravelling of social bargains 
struck in the 1990s.  In Ireland’s case it will be seen that the change from 
developmentalism to speculation (in circumstances of increasing financialisation of 
the global economy, including Europe) sowed the seeds for the fall of the Celtic 
Tiger economy. The effects of this change in political governance on welfare reform 
and neo-corporatism are explored as is the working out of EMU in its first years. 
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Chapter 6 looks at how each country coped with the onset of the 2008 financial 
crisis. What this reveals is that, while all small open economies were hit hard, none 
of the comparator countries was as exposed as Ireland.  Their banking and regulatory 
systems were more robust and, although any one of them could have availed of the 
cheap interbank credit available in Europe consequent upon deregulation of capital 
markets, none did to the extent that Ireland did (Netherlands was closest).  
Moreover, their fiscal policy was more prudent.  It did not allow bubbles to inflate, 
at least not to the same extent, and the tax base of each country was more sustainable 
not being based on property transactions taxes.  When the crisis hit fiscal policy in 
Ireland had little scope for accommodative or expansionary initiatives to alleviate 
the consequences.  In short, as stated by Glyfason et al (2010:16), the global crisis 
emanated from the conjunction of widespread financial fragility and a lopsided 
globalisation process proceeding rapidly amongst large financial imbalances and 
exacerbated in Ireland’s case by domestic policy failures. 
 
Chapter 7 addresses Ireland specifically, taking account of the relevance of 
countertendencies and undertakes the task of unpacking its polity in a forensic way 
from a new institutionalist perspective using the model described in Chapter 2.  This 
study in comparative political economy uses the lens of European integration and 
Chapter 7 focuses in on three aspects of this process viz; the general policy of 
successive Irish governments towards integration, economic and monetary union, 
and social policy as mediated through social pacts.  One striking aspect of this 
inquiry is what former Taoiseach, John Bruton, describes as ‘a lack of philosophical 
enquiry’ or ‘intellectual failure’ permeating many layers of the decision making 
apparatus of the State and of the larger society.  This is particularly interesting from 
the standpoint of ideational or discursive institutionalism which is built into the 
research model as an overarching feature. 
 
Chapter 8 compares the Varieties of Capitalism in the context of European 
integration as it impacted on individual countries over the entire periodisation.  All 
of the countries looked at in this research are small open economies and thus, by 
their nature, very exposed to turbulence in the international environment. What 
Katzenstein’s (1985) study showed is that they have, since the 1930s, developed 
political and societal coping strategies to deal with this exposure and these are well 
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embedded and have survived in a world more integrated than Katzenstein could have 
imagined.  Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands have, over the periodisation used, 
overcome serious challenges to their economies and welfare models.   They have 
reformed both to accommodate the demands of European integration.  This change 
has been effected without changing their values or intellectually embracing neo-
liberalism  They managed to introduce flexibility to labour markets without 
jeopardising security and welfare reform has been accomplished without 
compromising the values of equality, universality or solidarity.   Corporatist 
institutions in Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands proved more enduring than in 
Ireland indicating that Katzenstein’s (1985) ‘Ideology of Social Partnership’ is more 
deeply rooted in them. . Where they have been less successful is in maintaining 
broad public support for European integration.  Overtly anti-immigration and anti-
EU political parties - The True Finns, the Danish Peoples Party and the Party for 
Freedom in the Netherlands – have gained substantial political support with the 
effect of pushing mainstream parties into a more conservative posture on 
immigration.  There is some evidence of a Polyanian ‘Double Movement’ born of 
disenchantment and disillusionment with globalisation and Europeanisation amongst 
the lower middle class socio-economic cohorts of the population in particular.  
Ireland by contrast is not in a good space.   For a period during the 1990s 
convergence with the other comparator countries – in a material sense if not in 
respect of capabilities – was achieved.  Unfortunately, developmentalism was 
trumped by speculative policies in the 2000s leading to divergence again.   As 
regards welfare effort Ireland spends considerably less than most of the comparator 
countries under most headings (Hemerijck, 2013).  Its public sector is smaller and 
tax levels and public spending generally are more in line with the liberal market 
economies.  The depth and severity of the economic crash it suffered after 2008 was 
one of the worst.  For three years since 2010 it has been a ward of court of the 
EU/ECB/IMF Troika.  Poised to exit the bailout programme by mid-December 
2013, and with bond yields trading below 4 per cent at the end of September 2013, it 
can claim to have put clear blue water between itself and the other peripheral 
countries in bailout programmes.  Still it lacks the escape velocity to make a full and 
sustained recovery, mainly due to a relentless decline in domestic demand and an 
enormous burden of public and private debt.  The chapter also identifies some 
dilemmas that arise about the country’s relationships with Britain and Europe and 
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points to repertoires of action that could recapture the developmentalism of the 
1990s and put the country on a trajectory of convergence with its northern European 
peer group again.  Noting that this is the third time since independence that Ireland 
has looked into the abyss of economic desolation the chapter ends with a call for the 
construction of a Social Democratic narrative, similar in objective if not in content, 
to the Rehn-Meidner plan which framed the Nordic model in the 1950s.  In this way 
it may be again possible for Irish citizens to start imagining the future in its more 
promising terms.  
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CHAPTER 2:  Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
This study begins where Katzenstein left off in 1985.  The global context has 
changed significantly since as indeed the literature on comparative political 
economy has evolved as described in Chapter 1.   It ends with the fifth anniversary 
of the Lehman Bros Bank collapse i.e. mid-September 2013. 
 
The world Katzenstein analysed was increasingly concerned with the openness of 
trade and the vulnerabilities associated with it.  His American audience was 
obsessed with the rise of Japan as an economic power in competition with the United 
States.    His purpose in writing the book was largely to point out to that audience 
that small European states, lacking the economic clout of big countries, could yet 
harness strength from weakness by choosing economic and social policies which 
accepted the change brought by more open international markets while 
compensating for it socially.  He argued, in other words, that in the case of small 
European states, economic flexibility and political stability are mutually contingent.  
He described this approach as ‘democratic corporatism’. 
 
Deep economic integration in Europe was close but still in the future.  The passage 
of the Single European Act in 1986 brought with it a dynamic for negative 
integration and an increasing influence for competition law and an activist European 
Court of Justice.  Financial markets were to be fully deregulated and indeed 
financialisation of the global economy was facilitated by the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the embrace of capitalism by India and China to a degree not possible to 
envisage when Katzenstein was writing in 1985.  By 1992 Francis Fukuyama was 
writing about ‘The End of History’ meaning the ultimate ideological victory of 
liberal capitalism.  It didn’t turn out like this of course but global economic 
integration – and especially European Union enlargement and integration through 
EMU – made for a different world than Katzenstein pondered. 
 
The biggest challenge of all for the system of democratic corporatism described by 
Katzenstein came with the 2008 financial crises.  Nevertheless it is proposed to 
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study how the comparator countries stood with reference to it at different stages over 
the quarter of a century since the book was written.  This chapter is about two 
things; the collection of data and an approach to comparative analysis.  The latter 
comprehends first of all the periodisation for the study and the basis for it. Secondly, 
it outlines a conceptual framework for a detailed case study of Ireland. 
 
Periodisation 
 
Colin Hay (2004:255) contends that it is within the interaction of the processes and 
in the mobilisation of counter-tendencies to the tendencies they otherwise impose, 
that political opportunities can be shaped.  He cites European integration as a key 
contemporary challenge and the institutional architecture of economic and monetary 
union and the processes associated with it as a case in point.  But he is adamant too 
that of all the existing perspectives within comparative political economy, it is the 
institutionalism of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach that offers the best 
analytical purchase on such questions. 
 
In light of the foregoing it is considered that the best   explanatory outcome can 
be achieved by adopting a periodisation which takes as its context the differing 
stages of EU integration linked to periods of development affecting the 
comparator countries.  
 
In Ireland’s case the decision to join the European Monetary System (EMS) in 
December 1978 led to the breaking of the one to one parity between Sterling and the 
Irish Pound in 1979.  From then onwards, the Irish Pound, newly linked to the 
currencies of the ERM, floated against Sterling as the European currencies 
themselves floated against Sterling. 
 
Following the Plaza Accord of 1985 European countries had to deal with the 
competitive pressures of a weaker Dollar. They also had to grapple with the need to 
achieve a minimal stability in their currencies in order to mitigate large and 
frequently unexpected variations of exchange rates between their currencies and the 
Dollar, Yen and other currencies which the EMS had not totally managed to achieve.  
There were, in fact, severe crises within the EMS in 1992 and 1993 involving, inter 
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alia, the departure of Sterling and a 10 per cent devaluation of the Irish Punt on 31 
January, 1993. 
 
A combination of global buoyancy and the difficulties just described created a 
certain willingness to accept a liberalising programme of measures towards 
European integration.  In fact the period between 1990 and 1997, following the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, was probably the heyday of neo-liberal doctrine.  The Single 
European Act (1987) initiated a new era in European co-operation which led to an 
explosion of laws.  It was followed by the Treaty of the European Union (1992) (the 
Maastricht Treaty), of Nice (2001) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009).  The Single 
European Act gave a decisive impulse for completion of the internal market and the 
treaty on the European Union (The Maastricht Treaty) cleared the way for the 
creation of EMU. The other treaties were mainly concerned with power distribution 
between EU institutions and facilitating enlargement. 
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Table 1: Establishment and Expansion of Treaty-based policy domains/analytic categories, 1957-1999   
Treaty of Rome Single European Act (1987) 
General, financial, and 
institutional matters 
Law relating to undertakings 
Customs union & free movement 
of goods 
Common, foreign, and security policy 
Agriculture Environment, consumers, and health protection 
Fisheries (Expanded) Economic and monetary policy and 
free movement of capital 
Freedom of movement of 
workers and social policy 
(Expanded) Science, information, education, and 
culture 
Right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services 
(Expanded) Industrial policy and internal market 
Transport policy (Expanded) Taxation 
Competition policy (Expanded) Energy 
External relations (Expanded) Right of establishment and freedom 
to provided services 
Industrial policy and internal 
market 
(Expanded) Free movement of goods 
Economic and monetary policy 
and free movement of capital 
(Expanded) Free movement of capital 
Taxation (Expanded) Regional policy and coordination of 
structural instrument 
Energy  
Regional policy and coordination 
of structural instruments 
 
Science, information, education 
and culture 
 
Treaty of European Union (1992) Amsterdam Treaty (1999) 
Cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs 
Enlargement 
People’s Europe (Expanded) Justice and home affairs 
Monetary union (Expanded) Common, foreign, and security 
policy 
(Expanded) Freedom of 
movement of workers and social 
policy 
(Expanded) Education 
(Expanded) Transport (Expanded) Environment 
(Expanded) Science, information, 
education, and culture 
 
(Expanded) Economic and 
monetary policy and free 
movement of capital 
(Expanded) Health and consumer protection 
(Expanded) Regional policy and 
coordination of structural 
instruments 
 
(Expanded) Energy  
(Expanded) Environment, 
consumers, and health protection 
 
 
Source:  Fligstein, Neil, (2008:44) 
 
The increase in the pace of legislative activism after the Single European Act came 
into force in 1987 precipitated a number of critical junctures on the road to European 
integration.  On 2
nd
 June, 1992, Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a 
referendum crystallising the gap in attitudes to European integration between the 
elite and ordinary citizens.  In 1999 those countries participating in EMU locked 
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their currencies together and this was followed by the introduction of the Euro 
currency in 2002.   
 
These events happened against the background of a rapid expansion of globalisation 
from around 1990 which saw hundreds of millions of additional, mainly Asian, 
workers join the industrial labour market and in so doing altering the power balance 
between labour and capital in favour of capital.   Clearly this alone represented a sea 
change from the world considered by Katzenstein (1985) for his analysis of small 
open economies.   
 
The period from 1986 to the coming in to effect of the Maastricht Treaty on 31
st
  
December 1994 will be used to establish a reference baseline for all four countries in 
the study.   
 
The Maastricht Treaty was a critical juncture in terms of European integration. 
(Raunio and Tiilkiainen, 2003; Verdun, 2010).   The period from 1992-2002 posed 
numerous challenges for EMU, most notably over ratification of the Treaty and the 
criteria for membership of EMU.  Prior to its promulgation it could be claimed that 
member states would not delegate powers to the EU in so called ‘high politics’ areas 
but post Maastricht the jurisdiction of the EU extended into an increasing number of 
policy areas.  The EU is responsible, for example, for almost 80 per cent of 
legislation on the production, distribution, and exchange of goods, services, capital, 
and labour in the EU countries.  It pursues negative integration by deregulating 
exchange through removing barriers to trade while simultaneously establishing 
common standards to achieve positive integration.  Negative integration is really a 
process of ‘market making’ while positive integration, although in some respects and 
situations market making, is more often ‘market correcting’.  Herein lies an 
ideological conflict between neo-liberal and Keynesian (Social Democratic) 
theorists.  The latter consider negative integration problematical unless accompanied 
by the creation of political capacities for market-correcting positive integration while 
for the former positive integration is acceptable only insofar as it serves market-
making purposes, for example through the adoption of rules for undistorted 
competition (Scharpf, 1999:  Chapter 2).Accordingly, the second period extends 
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from Maastricht Treaty to the Nice Treaty in 2001 (and the collapse of the hi-tech 
bubble).  This was a time of expansionary growth.   
 
 
The next period is book ended by the Nice and Lisbon Treaties and the onset of the 
financial crisis. In 2000-2001 the hi-tech bubble burst causing a pause in global 
growth and a reduction in interest rates (Eichengreen, 2007; Gylfason et al, 2010; 
Mason 2009). From 2000 on there was an explosive growth in the volume of 
structured financial products issued and consequently in the growth of shadow 
banking which was to have such a malign influence in the evolution of the 2008 
financial crisis. The ‘Lisbon Agenda’ on labour market reform was published in 
2000 and Portugal exceeded the parameters of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
in 2001 to be followed in 2003 and 2004  by France and Germany. This resulted in a 
revised SGP in 2005.  The EU experienced its biggest ever enlargement when 10 
new CEE states joined in 2004.  A new constitutional treaty was promulgated 
following a two year long convention in 2003 and 2004.  Its aim was to rebalance 
the institutional power of the ECB but ironically it was rejected by French and Dutch 
voters. 
 
To some extent the Lisbon Treaty could be seen as accommodating a political 
backlash against the more enthusiastic integrationists.  They were obliged to accept 
the disappearance of any word or symbol which aimed at stressing that the union 
could be compared to an entity having more and more elements in common with a 
State (Boyer, 2000; Eichengreen, 2007; Fligstein, 2008; Piris, 2010). 
 
To sum up, the periodisation used is as follows: 
 
1986-1994: historical context and evolution of development models from the 
Single European Act to the coming into effect of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
1994-2001: Preparation for EMU and deepening of European integration post 
Maastricht until the dot.com bubble collapse. 
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2001-2008:  Implementation of the single currency to the onset of the financial 
crisis.  
 
2008-2013:  The European crisis. 
 
The intention is to give a political economy account, in the context of EU 
integration, of how each country mediated the exogenous pressures arising 
therefrom, to explore the trade-offs involved for example between economic and 
social progress, to look at how sustainable their growth models were when the 2008 
crisis hit and to evaluate how they stand today.  In so doing it should be possible to 
evaluate the extent to which Katzenstein’s (1985) thesis remained valid and, in 
Ireland’s case, why it did not apparently enduringly penetrate the Katzenstein world.  
This latter enquiry involves a forensic review of policy making using an analytical  
model which draws on the fields of international relations and new institutionalism.  
Research Methods – Qualitative Interviews 
 
 
Primary research material was collected by means of qualitative interviews with elite 
actors in each country.  These interviews were conducted face to face and involved 
two field visits each to Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands.  Being resident in 
Ireland it was possible to spread the work in that country over a longer period.  The 
interviews were semi-structured to allow participants to range freely over subjects 
they were happy to discourse on, and were underpinned by the principle of 
triangulation (cross checking the accuracy of information with alternative sources as 
far as possible). 
 
Overall the research was conducted between 2011 and early 2013.  The procedure 
received pre-clearance from the Ethics Committee of the National University of 
Ireland at Maynooth (NUIM) and followed the guidance provided in Alan Bryman 
(2008, Chapter 18).  A list of those interviewed is included in Appendix 1. 
 
For the purpose of analysing the research material to obtain the most explanatory 
power from it a dual approach was adopted in the case of Ireland.  This involved 
drawing on both the fields of international relations and of the new institutionalisms 
in the manner described below.  Moreover, Ireland presents a more complex case 
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because of the existence of countertendencies to an ideal type of liberal market 
economy.   It was decided to use this methodology for Ireland because of the access 
available to a wide range of actors in politics, public administration, business and 
trade unions.  It was also felt to be the most effective approach to getting 
explanatory power out of the interplay of institutions, policy and ideas. 
 
In Denmark three of the people interviewed were from the world of politics, one was 
from a university based sociological institute, one had both business and university 
connections, and one was from the trade unions.  In Finland one interviewee was 
from politics, two were from public administration, two were from research 
institutes, one was from a business related university R&D fund, one was from the 
disability sector, and one was from the trade union centre.  Three people interviewed 
in the Netherlands were politicians, two were trade unionists, one was from 
business, one was head of the Social & Economic Council with a business 
background, and one was a university professor.  In Ireland five people were from 
the world of politics, ten were from public administration, eight were from business, 
one was from academia and politics, two were from trade unionism and politics and 
two were trade unionists.  These people were selected because they were judged to 
be either key actors or in a position of some influence.  Access was a crucial 
consideration too and this was achieved through networks in academia, business, 
politics, public administration and trade unions.   
 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012:346-347) call attention to the need for 
reflexivity – considering the possibility of lack of objectivity or bias on the part of 
the researcher – when conducting research.  In that spirit the reader should be aware 
that this researcher has been a participant either direct or indirect in some of the 
matters inquired into.  Specifically, he is currently General Secretary of the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), a member of the Executive Committee of the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), and a former Director of the Irish 
Central Bank.  Clearly it is not possible to lay claim to complete detachment and it is 
perhaps unusual for people who have been active in aspects of public affairs to study 
same as a social scientist.  That said, there are certain advantages in terms of access 
to key decision makers from being part of a network.  Being personally known to 
people means that interviews can be conducted in a more relaxed and open way.  
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The mirror image of this is that people might be more guarded in what they choose 
to reveal.  A case in point could be representatives of employers’ organisations with 
whom the researcher has a professionally adversarial (but good personal) 
relationship.  The experience of conducting many quite long interviews is that 
people were unfailingly courteous, open and discursive.  In one case one of the 
interviewees asked for the recorder to be turned off, having originally assented to its 
use, but was happy to proceed on the basis of written notes.  There is also a 
possibility that high profile interviewees subjected to public criticism – former 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern for example – might indulge in self-justification in the 
knowledge that their actions might come under further scrutiny.  This must be 
balanced against the acute knowledge of public affairs in the possession of these 
interviewees.  In Bertie Ahern’s case he represented Ireland at the European Council 
for twenty-one years and was one of the longest serving Prime Ministers in Europe.  
It would be hard to think of anyone with greater practical knowledge of Ireland’s 
experience of European integration.  In the case of the present and former governors 
of the Irish Central Bank it will be seen that triangulation is used to good effect to 
bring out contrasting perspectives on the 2008 financial crisis and the bank’s role in 
it (see pp. 206-207).  Finally, it should be noted that not all those approached agreed 
to be interviewed.  EU Commissioner Ollie Rehn declined for lack of time while 
former Taoiseach Brian Cowen and former Secretary to the Department of Health, 
Michael Scanlan simply declined.  Former Prime Minister of Finland, Paavo 
Lipponen, said he longer gave interviews as he was too busy.   
 
Having regard to the foregoing the potential for bias was addressed in two ways.  
First by ensuring that the people interviewed were disproportionately drawn from 
the worlds of business, politics and public administration by comparison with the 
trade unions in Ireland.  A second filter against bias was employed through asking 
two interviewees, one a former secretary general to the government and the other a 
former Minister and Advisor to the liberal Progressive Democratic Party,
12
 to read 
drafts of chapters at different stages of development and to give feedback.  More 
generally the danger of encountering group think, or ‘cognitive lock’ as Blyth (2002) 
describes it, amongst the elite actors interviewed was countered by having a wide 
                                                 
12 The Progressive Democratic Party was a small party with a strong liberal platform much like the Free 
Democrats in Germany.  It was formed in 1987 and was a coalition partner in government for most of the period 
until its demise in 2010.  Its outlook was not sympathetic to trade unionism although it supported Social 
Partnership for pragmatic reasons. 
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ranging group of interviewees whose interests would sometimes be opposed one to 
the other, and by asking international interviewees for their impressions of Irish 
policy at different stages.  This risk was also mitigated by an extensive review of 
literature.  In his comparison of four countries Scharpf (1991) followed a similar 
approach noting that elite interviews were essential to his research project because, 
‘one must meet the actors in their milieu before one can interpret “objective” data’ 
(ibid: xix).    Moreover, Katzenstein’s focus is on elites.  He observes that while 
letting international markets force economic adjustments, elites in small open 
economies choose a variety of economic and social policies that mitigate the costs of 
change (Katzenstein, 1985: 24). 
A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Interdependence – 
Ireland 
 
Colin Hay (2002:5) has drawn attention to the relationship between political science 
and international relations in the context of interdependence and international 
economic integration.  He argues for an approach which accepts that the domestic 
and the international, the political and the economic are interdependent and the 
world so ordered must be analysed as such.  This then entails a political analysis 
which refuses to accept a resolute internal division of labour between political 
science and international relations.  Likewise it refuses to accept that the analysis of 
economic conditions can be left solely to economists.  With this in mind an 
analytical model for specific application to the Irish case has been developed as 
explained hereunder and following from the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 
 
 
(i) International Relations 
From the field of international relations Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) publication is 
the second edition of a work first published in 1970 by Allison to explain the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.   
 
The book is divided into three parts, each containing a conceptual framework or 
model which consists of a cluster of assumptions and categories that influence what 
the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates the question, where he looks for 
evidence, and what he produces as an answer. 
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The first part of the conceptual framework is the Rational Actor Model.  It is 
intended as a way of explaining events by recounting the aims and calculations of 
governments as if they were the product of a single rational unitary actor.  
 
The second conceptual framework is the organisational behaviour paradigm.  This 
can be understood as government decisions being seen less as deliberate choices and 
more as outputs of large organisations functioning according to standard patterns of 
behaviour.  To perform complex tasks, the efforts of large numbers of people must 
be coordinated.  Coordination, in turn, requires standard operating procedures; rules 
according to which things are done.  Organisations create capabilities for achieving 
tasks that might otherwise be impossible.  But every organisation has its own culture 
which shapes the behaviour of individuals.  The result becomes a distinctive entity 
with its own identity and momentum.   It is also the case that organisations may 
become so dependent on a particular path towards prosperity that the inertia and 
transaction costs of change become so high that choices for future development 
become constrained. 
 
The difference between the first and second paradigm is that the rational actor model 
involves governments making decisions based on the logic of consequences. Actions 
are taken based on evaluation of the probable consequences on the preferences of the 
actor.   It involves the evaluation of alternative courses of action. 
 
Organisations, on the other hand, act on the logic of appropriateness.  Actions are 
taken on the basis of matching a recognised situation to a set of pre-ordained rules.   
 
The basic unit of analysis under the organisational behaviour paradigm (Model 2) is 
that of government action as organisational output.  It assumes that governments sit 
atop a complex organisation structure of departments and agencies and that 
decisions are essentially decided by the output of this organisational structure.  This 
model’s explanatory power is achieved by uncovering the special capacities, 
repertoires, and organisational routines that comprise the puzzling behaviour under 
scrutiny.   
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The third part of the conceptual framework is the government’s politics paradigm 
(Model 3). This posits that the leaders who sit atop the organisations of state are 
themselves no monolith. Rather, each individual in the group is, in his or her own 
right, a player in a central competitive game.  The name of the game is politics:  
bargaining between players positioned hierarchically within the government.  
Outcomes are formed, not as organisational outputs, but as political compromises 
reflecting competing preferences.  In contrast with the rational actor model there is 
no unitary actor but rather many actors who focus, not on a single strategic issue,  
but on many, players who act according to various conceptions of national, 
organisational and personal goals.   Other issues adding to the complexity is the 
matter of who frames the problem and how it reaches the government’s agenda.  
This is discussed in some detail by Allison and Zelikow (1999: 280-287) as is the 
phenomenon of ‘Groupthink’ – meaning that the cohesion that develops in small 
groups produces a psychological drive for consensus, which tends to suppress any 
dissent and the consideration of alternatives.  The importance of framing the 
question and controlling the agenda for cabinet was confirmed in Ireland’s case by 
the former secretary to the government, Dermot McCarthy.  As he puts it, ‘what is 
not put before a cabinet is often as important as what is.  In other words; ‘whoever 
controls the input controls the output’. 
 
(Interview, 4
th
  February, 2011). 
 
He also makes a point, which reinforces the case for this methodology, that civil 
servants are good for keeping things running, and for blocking things, but only 
politicians can effectively take initiatives (ibid). 
 
Overall the government politics paradigm sees action as a political resultant.  
Government decisions are made, and government actions are taken, neither as the 
simple choice of a unified group, nor a formal summary of leaders’ preferences.  
Rather the context of shared power but separate judgements about important choices 
means that politics is the mechanism of choice.  Each player pulls and hauls with the 
power at his/her discretion for outcomes that will advance his/her conception of 
national, organisational, group and personal interests.  (Allison and Zelikow, 
1999:302).  This is likely to be particularly the case with coalition government. 
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In summary the three models or paradigms developed by Allison and Zelikow (ibid) 
can be represented schematically as in the conceptual framework included as 
Appendix 2.  They can be described in this way.  Each is complementary to the 
other.  Model 1 fixes the broader context, the larger national patterns, and the shared 
images.  Within this context, Model 2 illuminates the organisational routines that 
produce the information, options and actions.  Model 3 focuses in greater detail on 
the individuals who constitute a government and the politics and procedures by 
which their competing perceptions and preferences are combined. Each, in effect, 
serves as a search engine in the larger effort to identify all the significant causal 
factors that determine an outcome.   
 
Allison and Zelikow (1999) make the claim for their framework that it can be used 
by analysts to weave strands from each of the three conceptual models into their 
explanations and that by integrating factors identified under each lens, explanations 
can be significantly strengthened. Vivien Schmidt (2006), in the context of the new 
institutionalisms,  observes similarly that the more problem-orientated scholars mix 
approaches all the time, pursuing whichever approach seems the most appropriate to 
explaining their object of study.  In particular she notes that in regard to the new 
institutionalisms scholars have been exploring how to use insights from all four 
approaches in their empirical work.   
 
The first edition of Essence of Decision, as the book was titled, was criticised, inter 
alia, by Miriam Steiner (1977) on the grounds that it was plagued by inconsistencies 
and contradictions.  In the second edition with Zelikow twenty-five years on many 
of the criticisms are accepted.  The authors acknowledge that new evidence showed 
a number of explanations in the original edition to have been incorrect, and others 
insufficient.  Accordingly, the theoretical models were materially revised in the 
second edition to reflect advances in the disciplines of political science, economics, 
sociology, social psychology, organisation theory and decision analysis.  The 
authors note that, while most of the text of the second edition was new, the basic 
structure of the book remained unchanged.  It is cited as a seminal work of case 
study design in Yin (2009:7) and Bryman (2008:53). 
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(ii) Political Science – New Institutionalism 
The task at hand, therefore, is to build a research model which, using the Allison-
Zelikow approach just described as a toolbox, can apply new institutionalist insights 
to explain why Ireland made such extraordinary economic progress for a long time, 
and in many respects appeared to be converging with the comparator countries, but 
ultimately could not sustain a Katzenstein (1985) like polity when the 2008 financial 
crisis hit. 
 
Table 2: Key Features of New Institutionalism 
  
 
Aim/Contribution 
 
 To restore the link between theoretical assumptions and 
the reality they represent. 
 To acknowledge the crucial mediating role of institutions 
in shaping political conduct and translating political inputs into 
political outcomes. 
 To acknowledge the complexity and contingency of 
political systems. 
 
Key Assumptions 
 
 ‘Institutions Matter’ – political conduct is shaped 
profoundly by the institutional context in which it occurs and 
acquires significance. 
 ‘History Matters’ – the legacy the past bequeaths to the 
present is considerable. 
 Political systems are complex and unpredictable. 
 Actors do not always behave to secure their material self-
interest. 
 
Source: Derived from Table 1.3 of Hay (2004:14)  
 
The refined analytical model depicted in Table 3 is designed to incorporate both 
international relations and political science approaches to obtain maximum 
explanatory potential.  By combining the techniques of Allison and Zelikow (1999) 
to apply new institutionalist insights to selected aspects of European integration 
decision making we can gain a deeper understanding of policy making in Ireland by 
looking at it through a number of different lenses.  In effect the model aligns Allison 
and Zelikow’s rational actor model with rational choice institutionalism in a way 
that allows actions in a given institutional setting to be evaluated. The capabilities of 
the state model are aligned with historical institutionalism to explore the manner and 
degree to which organisations influence policy and the extent to which path 
dependence conditions their response to any situation.  This comprehends employer 
and union organisations as well as state agencies.  Finally the politics paradigm is 
considered to be a proxy for sociological institutionalism as it captures the 
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motivations of individuals and the norms and cognitive frames that guide their 
actions.  The influence of ideas (ideational/discursive institutionalism) is built in to 
the model in an overarching way and issues pertaining to this innovation are 
discussed further below. 
 
Table 3: Refined Research Model 
PARADIGM/NEW/INSTITUTIONALISM OBSERVABLE  
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
National Government Rational Actor 
Model/Rational Choice 
Institutionalism. 
 
 
 
(a) How can the Irish State 
be categorised? 
(b) What objectives are 
being pursued in economic, 
social and foreign policy? 
(c) What are the best 
choices available?          
T
h
e In
flu
en
ce o
f Id
ea
s 
Capabilities and Practices of 
Institutions/Historical Institutionalism 
(a) What are the key State 
institutions? 
(b) What are their 
capabilities? 
(c) How well did they 
perform? 
(d) How are they influenced 
by culture and identity? 
(e) What tensions exist 
between them? 
(f) How well did the non-
government institutions perform 
(e.g. Social Partnership)? 
The Politics Paradigm (Role of the 
Elites)/Sociological Institutionalism. 
a) What constitutes the elite 
in Ireland? 
b) How did interchange 
(‘Pulling & Hauling’) between 
them affect outcomes? 
 
Analytical Model derived from combining Allison and Zelikow approach and new 
institutionalism  
 
 
(iii) Issues which Arise with a Unified Analytical Model 
Some issues are thrown up by combining the Allison and Zelikow (1999) framework 
with the four new institutionalisms approach.  In the first instance this brings the 
difficulty of rational choice to the fore.  The main points of criticism of Hay (2002) 
have already been referred to.   The difference between rational choice theory and 
rational choice institutionalism is that, whereas the former sees individuals as utility 
maximisers acting without regard for the collective interests, rational choice 
institutionalism is described by Schmidt (2006) as working best when explaining the 
interests and motivations behind rational actors’ behaviour within given 
Black Box Labelled 
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institutional settings (emphasis added).  The deductive nature of its approach to 
explanation means that it is good for capturing the range of reasons actors would 
normally have for any action within a given institutional incentive structure 
(emphasis added). 
 
In his study of the efficacy of Social Democratic politics in Austria, Britain, Sweden 
and the then Federal Republic of Germany Fritz Scharpf (1991) also raises the 
difficulty of relying on a rational choice frame of reference.  As he puts it: 
 
‘The analysis I offer is formulated within the rational choice frame of reference 
that also underlines the economic theory of politics.  But I have found myself 
unable to pursue this approach in a particularly rigorous fashion, since my study 
also demonstrates how “rationality” of action is defined by historically 
contingent, institutionally shaped identities, goals and perceptions of a situation 
that resists reduction to the universal assumptions used in economic analysis.’ 
 
(ibid: xix) 
 
Two points arise from this; in the first case the methodology proposed here does not 
rely solely on the rational choice component of Allison and Zelikow’s framework.  It 
is one part of a three part framework in respect of which the advantages of weaving 
a number of explanatory sources have already been cited.  Moreover, the whole 
intention of the authors is to show that rational choice on its own does not provide a 
reliable explanation. That is the reason for adding two complementary models to the 
framework.    More importantly, however, the roles of the actors which are to be 
considered are discharged within a rigid European institutional framework which has 
existed from the beginning of the periodisation of this study.  Scharpf’s (ibid) 
analysis points to the restraints on social democratic governments trying to manage 
policy within the confines of inflexible European institutions.  It follows that using 
the Allison and Zelikow rational actor model, where the actors are operating within 
the same institutional constraints, is in effect to adopt a rational choice 
institutionalist approach. 
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The second problematical consideration arising with the model relates to how to deal 
with the influence of ideas. Discursive institutionalism, the fourth and newest of the 
‘new institutionalisms’,  is sometimes referred to as ideational institutionalism.  It is 
concerned with explaining changes within the state and to the state. But Allison & 
Zelikow’s framework does not, on the face of it, accommodate this fourth 
institutionalism.  Schmidt (2006:112) argues that the sociological institutionalist 
tradition has always had ideas at its core as norms, cognitive frames and meaning 
systems. While rational choice institutionalism has always eschewed ideas, in the 
case of historical, sociological, and discursive institutionalism ‘the dividing line is 
admittedly fuzzy’ (ibid: 111). Another factor to take into account, given the 
centrality of Katzenstein’s (1985) study of small open economies and the Varieties 
of Capitalism literature to this research, is the intellectual journey that has brought 
Peter Katzenstein and Peter Hall to deal with ideas from the perspective of 
sociological institutionalism (ibid: 110). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 (Page 23) further insight is added by Mark Blyth (2002: 
Chapter 1) whose objective it is to open up the space for an ideational account of 
institutional change that builds on Polanyi’s original concept of the double 
movement.  This he does by considering the role of economic ideas in providing an 
interpretive framework with which to analyse situations.  He argues that ideas allow 
agents to reduce uncertainty, propose a particular solution at a moment of crisis, and 
empower agents to resolve that crisis by constructing new institutions in line with 
these new ideas. 
 
The analytical-model would arguably fall short of its full explanatory potential if the 
influence of ideas in institutional change was not part of it.  Accordingly, it is 
proposed to look at this dimension in an overarching way and to weave insights 
gained into the total explanation as represented in Table 3. 
(iv) Policy Domains to be Examined 
This study in comparative political economy uses the lens of European integration, 
of which EMU is the flagship project.  But integration has affected a wide area of 
social and economic policy particularly since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.  
Accordingly, it is proposed to apply the refined analytical model to a  number of 
aspects of European integration including:  the general policy approach of 
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governments to integration; Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and social 
policy and social pacts. 
 
These three aspects were chosen because how the Irish government conceptualised 
what the process of integration would mean is central to understanding the polity.  
EMU not only shapes the European macro-economy but it is the flagship project of 
integration and in many respects the institutional architecture associated with it 
determined outcomes in other policy areas.  Social policy in Ireland is an example of 
where EMU foreclosed options and social pacts were the instruments through which 
social policy was mediated for 22 years from 1987 to 2009.  Moreover, as Anton 
Hemerijck (2013:383) points out, the interaction between economic performance 
and the welfare state is largely mediated by the labour market.  He argues that 
quality employment is the best guarantee against poverty and inequality and so it is 
crucial to place employment at the centre of welfare provision.  This requires 
attention to such labour market issues as increasing the participation of women, 
eliminating long term structural unemployment and providing employment 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups, activation and upskilling.  Hemerijck (ibid) 
sees these matters as being appropriate to the collective bargaining agenda. And 
from a European integration perspective this was the focus of the Lisbon Treaty and 
Europe 2020 which embodies the EU’s normative commitment to a highly 
competitive social market economy (ibid:395).  Hemerijck also notes that Ireland 
followed a distinctly different road to institutional redesign than did the UK under 
New Labour, moving closer to European patterns of social partnership cooperation 
through a series of social pacts (ibid:178). This was important in the context of 
intensified interdependence between European economic integration and national 
welfare states.  For comparative purposes the Nordic countries have produced the 
best solutions to the challenges of structural social and economic change by 
combining economic efficiency with high levels of distributional equity (ibid: 379; 
Sapir, 2006).   
 
Against this background it is plausible to argue that an in depth examination of the 
three linked aspects of European integration outlined above can provide the best 
explanatory result. 
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Alternative Methodological Approaches Considered 
 
Other methodological approaches were also considered but it was felt they would 
not offer sufficient insights.  In particular sectoral analysis was looked at.  Christine 
Ingebritsen (1998) argues that the sector  approach is well suited to the study of 
European integration insofar as it has proceeded according to a sectoral logic – from 
coal and steel to agriculture, capital goods, and services.  She opines that the small 
Nordic states are particularly appropriate for the application of sectoral analysis 
because of their high degree of dependence on a limited number of exports.  This 
may be true for the Nordic countries but it would not necessarily assist in 
understanding, say, the complexities of consociational democracy underpinning the 
polder model in  the Netherlands or the imperatives for policy that arise from 
overarching features of European integration such as EMU. Nor would it be 
particularly helpful in explaining the dualist nature of the Irish economy which relies 
on foreign companies for 90 per cent of its exports.  These FDI companies enjoy a 
completely different and higher status in the power constellation than do indigenous 
companies.  Whereas Nordic states which are export-dependent might seek to defend 
leading sectors in foreign economic policy, Ireland would be much more motivated 
to defend its independence in areas of fiscal policy such as corporation tax so as to 
attract inward investment.  Moreover, as Ingebritsen (ibid:44) acknowledges, sectors 
do not always define the choices available to the State (geopolitical issues might be a 
factor, for example) and sectors are caught in a two level game because by their very 
nature they bridge the international and domestic political spheres. 
 
Ingebritsen (ibid) herself considers and rejects certain theories of EU integration as 
unsuitable for the study of small open economies.  Neofunctionalism she believes 
does not allow for the fact that the shift from national policy making to supernational 
policy making has been much more contested in the Nordic States.  She also asserts 
that intergovermentalists miss important variations in the political influence of social 
actors.  Citing Maria Green Cowles (1995) she uses the example of the European 
Roundtable of Industrialist (ERT), set up by the Swedish industrialist Pehr 
Gyllenhammar, as strongly influencing the Single European Act.  In any event 
Ireland, it will be seen later, never attempted to strongly influence the course of 
European integration through intergovernmentalism.   
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Conclusion 
 
This research takes as its starting point the study of a number of small open 
economies conducted by Peter Katzenstein (1985).  It concludes with an assessment 
of where the comparator countries – Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland 
– find themselves on the fifth anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Bros.  Bank on 
15
th
 September, 2013.  The periodisation book ended by these events is organised to 
reflect key phases of European integration and its impact on developmental 
outcomes in each country.  
 
The objective of the research is to evaluate how the world of Katzenstein changed 
with Europeanisation – and with globalisation and financialisation more generally – 
and how the development models of the individual countries evolved with that 
change. 
 
In Ireland’s case the research methodology goes deeper and draws on the fields of 
international relations and political science.  A conceptual framework first 
developed in 1971 and substantially reengineered by Allison and Zeilkow in 1999 is 
refined by incorporating  new institutionalist approaches.  A number of precautions 
are taken to mitigate potential flaws which might otherwise skew the explanatory 
output from the model in one direction or another. 
 
The refined model aims to give a ‘thicker’ explanation of why Ireland performed as 
it did over the periodisation by looking at specific aspects of Europeanisation 
including; the general stance of the country towards European integration, economic 
and monetary union, and social policy and social pacts.  This approach is also 
consistent with certain requirements of analysis proposed by Hemerijck (2013) when 
he observes that policy actors reflect not only on policy problems and their 
resolutions, but also on causal links between institutions and their power positions.  
It accommodates his call for, ‘a better understanding of how policy relevant ideas 
get selected, modified or ignored depending on constellations of power’ (ibid: 46). 
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CHAPTER 3:  Katzenstein’s World and The 
Comparator Countries 
 
Introduction 
 
Katzenstein (1985) was writing against the background of quite impressive political 
advancement in Europe as a whole.  In 1974 the Caetano regime in Portugal was 
ousted in a military coup. By 1976 Mario Soares had settled the country down into 
peaceful democratic rule.  The military dictatorship of the colonels was also ended in 
Greece in 1974 clearing the way for the election of the Karamanlis led government.  
A year later, in 1975, General Franco of Spain died allowing that country also to 
transition to democracy.   It should not be forgotten, however, that the EEC and 
United States had been willing to deal with these states as dictatorships for reasons 
of geopolitical and military expediency. There were added complications in 
Portugal’s case, which complicated life for the EEC, because it had colonial 
possessions in Mozambique and Angola from which it disengaged in the mid 1970s.  
By the 1980s each country was part of a stable, if divided, liberal democratic 
Europe.  That was only the beginning of the transition.  Few could have imagined in 
1985 that six years later, the USSR would cease to exist and that Germany would be 
united.  The end of the bi-polar cold war world could not have been foreseen in 1985 
nor could the savage conflict in the Balkans which was to erupt on the European 
Union’s doorstep (Fukuyama, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1994; Huntington, 1997). 
 
Katzenstein (1985:20) identified three dominant political forms of contemporary 
capitalism:  liberalism in the United States and Britain; statism in Japan and France; 
and corporatism in the small European states and, to a lesser extent, in West 
Germany.  Those models of capitalism were engaging with what Katzenstein 
(ibid:22) described as ‘rapid change in the global economy’.  Some of these changes 
have already been adverted to in Chapter 2 and can be summarised as including:  
global inflation, escalating energy prices, prolonged recession, increases in trade 
rivalries and protectionism, volatile foreign exchange markets, skyrocketing interest 
rates and debts, and structural readjustment.  The oil crisis of 1973/74 had been 
compounded in 1979/80 by a major conflict between Iran and Iraq.  Whereas 
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exporting or pre-empting the costs of change in adversity might in certain 
circumstances be options available to large industrial states, it was Katzenstein’s 
(ibid) contention that small open European economies had no choice but to accept 
economic adjustment forced on them by markets while using a variety of social and 
economic policies to prevent the cost of change from causing political eruptions.  In 
other words, economic flexibility and political stability are mutually contingent 
(ibid:191).   
 
Nevertheless, Katzenstein (ibid: 192) acknowledged that in the early 1980s 
increasingly adverse economic trends were putting the corporatist model under 
strain.  A 50 per cent decline in the growth rate of world trade (from 8.6 per cent in 
1960-73 to 4.2 per cent in 1974-80) had created a more difficult economic 
environment for small countries depending on trade with others. The five small 
countries (including the Netherlands and Denmark) that accounted for most of the 
engineering exports from small countries had been losing market share from the 
mid-1970s.  This crisis in industrial production created the phenomenon of  
stagflation, that is simultaneous inflation and unemployment.  From the vantage 
point of the mid-1980s this trend appeared to be structural rather than cyclical.  
These structural problems were compounded by economic policy decisions by large 
countries which caused high interest rates more damaging even than the 1973 and 
1979 oil crises.   Specifically, changes in US monetary policy in 1979/80 led to a 
major increase in international interest rates (Mjoset, 1992:72). 
 
Scharpf (1991) observes that a coherent social democratic or Keynesian economic 
policy – one which gives priority to full employment – was objectively still possible 
during the 1970s.  Mjoset (1992) refers to a period  when Keynesian and non-
Keynesian approaches co-existed but often produced unintended outcomes.  He 
describes this as a phase of ‘fumbling’ or ‘muddling through’, which reflected the 
contradiction between domestic priorities and economic feasibility.  However, the 
crisis of the early 1980s marked the transition to a new more liberal era.   
 
Katzenstein (ibid:197) noted that political leaders in the Netherlands and Denmark 
were already contemplating welfare reforms to bring social spending into line with 
the new realities but he predicted that even conservative leaders would not be 
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allowed to dismantle the welfare state.  But he also observed that the calibration of 
welfare policies with international competitiveness had intensified political conflicts 
in the small European states. As an example of this he cited Swedish prime minister, 
Olof Palme, calling businessmen ‘Baboons and Elephants’.   
 
Katzenstein was concerned to keep things in perspective.  He pointed out that while 
the formal ‘consociational’ arrangements made between political parties in the 1960s 
in several of the small European States had eroded, and Social Democratic 
hegemony in Scandinavia partially decomposed in the 1970s, both developments 
had left democratic corporatism remarkably unchanged.  The reason he gave for this 
is that democratic corporatism is not an institutional solution to the problems of 
economic change but a political mechanism for coping with change (ibid:198). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to chronicle the major historical events which 
contributed to the formation of the polities of Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands 
and Ireland, and, in addition,   the 1987 to 1994 period will then be used as a 
reference baseline against which to compare how the development models evolved 
once European integration began to intensify as the Maastricht Agreement came into 
effect.  The chapter will conclude with a reflection on the key differences which 
characterise the political economies of the four countries. 
FINLAND 
 
The History and Political Economy of Finland 
 
Finland enjoyed home rule status within the Russian Empire from 1809 but when the 
Bolshevik Revolution occurred Finland seized the moment and declared its 
independence on 6 December, 1917.  A bitter civil war followed from January to 
May 1918 between Finish government ‘White Forces’ and rebel ‘Red’ socialist 
forces supported by Russian troops stationed in Finland at independence. The 
government ‘White’ army was supported by a German expeditionary force. The Red 
forces were defeated and a peace agreement was concluded with Russia in 1920.  
70 
 
This was followed in 1932 by a non–aggression pact signed with the USSR (Mjoset, 
1992).
13
 
 
This did not prevent the Soviet Union from invading Finland on 20 November, 
1939. The Soviet objective was to gain possession of the whole country but this 
failed because of unexpected strong Finish resistance.  The ‘Winter War’ as it is 
known ended in March 1940 with the cession of 12 per cent of Finland’s land area to 
the Soviet Union.  The entire population of this territory was evacuated to other parts 
of Finland.  The ‘Continuation War’ of 1941-1944, in which Finland was allied to 
Germany,  was concluded by the armistice of September 1944 and confirmed in the 
Paris peace treaty of 1947.  In addition to the 12 per cent of land area lost after the 
Winter War Finland had to cede more land.  A third war was fought in 1944-45 to 
get rid of German army units in Lapland (ibid; Vartiainen, 2011). 
 
After independence Finland shared a 1566 kilometre border with the Soviet Union. 
This did not prevent Finland from developing an advanced free market economy and 
its polity was firmly based on western democracy.  Today it is recognised as one of 
the five Nordic countries of Europe.  It would though also be true to say that its 
proximity to the communist superpower conditioned Finland’s foreign policy.  After 
WW11 it followed a policy of military neutrality, it did not accept Marshall Aid and 
sought to live in ‘peaceful coexistence’ with its communist neighbour, and cultivated 
good relations with all countries (Personen and Riihinen, 2002; Raunio and 
Tiilikainen, 2003, Senghaas, 1985).  This was sometimes referred to pejoratively in 
the West by the term ‘Finlandisation’ meaning the enforced neutering of foreign 
policy by the Soviet Union (The Economist, 21
st
 June 2014). 
 
As Personen and Riihinen (2002) note, industrialisation involved a significant rise in 
productivity. Finland was in a position to benefit from a catch-up effect insofar as it 
could adapt innovations developed by the forerunners of industrialisation.  The 
preconditions for catching up involved improving the proportion of the population 
with higher levels of education, improving public administration, expanding foreign 
connections and so on.  In the last two decades of the 20
th
 century Finland achieved 
                                                 
13 Nationalism is a common feature in the respective histories of Ireland and Finland.  Mjoset (1992:61) argues 
that, among the smaller European countries Finland is the only one that experienced a nationalist mobilisation 
similar to Ireland  to liberate itself from Russia. 
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phenomenal progress causing it to be regarded in a post-industrial stage of 
development. The structural changes of industry are usually caused by three 
different factors:  demand, international trade, and technological changes.  The 
Finish achievement is primarily down to the latter made possible by intensifying 
research input, which has been growing faster in Finland than in any other OECD 
country.  
 
In terms of its relatively late industrialisation and rapid catch up Finland is not 
unlike Ireland.  However, insofar as Ireland laid more emphasis on trying to import a 
system of innovation through an industrial policy heavily dependent on FDI, and 
invested less in R&D (and was less successful in commercialising its investments), 
Ireland’s industrial achievements seem to be less secure.  It is now proposed to look 
at the benchmark periodisation 1986-1994. 
 
 
1986-1994:  Finland Moves Towards a Post Industrial Stage of 
Development 
 
 
Only seven countries in the world had a GNP per capita that was higher than Finland 
in 1988 according to the World Bank:  in 1990 Finland ranked third highest in 
Europe in GDP per capita, below only Switzerland and Luxembourg.  However, as 
Personen and Riihinen (2002: 246) observe, this ranking looks better than it really 
was because the Finnish Markka was overvalued at the time. Indeed, Vartiainen 
(2011) has drawn attention to Finland’s particular practice of Keynesian 
interventionism which took the form of repeated devaluations and incomes policy 
settlements.  In part this was due to Finland’s vulnerability to external threat and 
particularly its exposed geographical position.  Thus a political demand for 
democratic corporatism – Social Partnership between business, unions and 
government – was a strong feature of the Finish polity.  This sense of acting 
together, and containing quarrels within acceptable limits, was in conformity with 
Peter Katzenstein’s (1985) analysis of industrial policy in small states in the 1980s. 
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The Finish economy is very dependent on foreign trade and more than 10 per cent of 
exports were sold to the Soviet Union. The loss of that market came at the worst 
possible time for the economy.
14
  In addition the public sector expanded greatly 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  Liberalising decisions involving deregulation of 
interest rates and capital movements by the Bank of Finland caused uncontrolled 
credit expansion, doubled house prices, and motivated excessive salary increases.  
The Bank of Finland reacted to these developments by pushing up interest rates, 
which in turn caused the economy to go into decline.  There were many bankruptcies 
causing unemployment to rise.  A devaluation of the currency helped exports but 
increased the burden of debt for those who borrowed from abroad (Personen and 
Riihinen, 2002). 
 
In a refinement of this analysis Vartiainen (2011) opines that financial deregulation 
was a major development not properly planned for.  It should have been carefully 
coordinated with other economic policy areas.  He claims that the repercussions of 
such an enormous policy shift were never really discussed and evaluated in political 
circles. The Bank of Finland had attempted to steer the economy away from repeated 
devaluation cycles.  It advocated in favour of adopting an exchange rate target as a 
new, more robust anchor for monetary policy.  In a time of vigorous credit 
expansion and growth of nominal demand, coupled with a large inflow of capital, 
this amounted to a policy of quite low interest rates in the middle of an economic 
boom.  It is hardly surprising that many households and businesses took this 
advocacy as sound guidance and borrowed in foreign currency.  What was really 
called for was  an extremely tight fiscal policy, both at a macroeconomic level and 
with regard to behavioural incentives.  Both domestic bank credits and foreign and 
capital inflows (borrowing) were in foreign currency terms. The credit expansion 
fuelled a general increase in aggregate demand.  Housing and equity prices increased 
significantly, with a knock on effect on increased household spending and on 
spending by firms and  general increase in consumption. Between 1986 and 1989 
private consumption and investment at around 5-7 per cent of GDP was above trend 
growth.  The problems of this exuberance were compounded by a strong currency 
which increased imports while exports declined pushing the current account into 
deficit to the extent of -4 per cent. 
                                                 
14 The Finish Ambassador to Ireland told this author in 2009 that despite impressions to the contrary,  Russia was 
a good trade partner to Finland, being very reliable. 
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This explanation is remarkably similar to that put forward by a former Finnish 
central banker, Peter Nyberg, to explain the lead up to the crisis in Ireland that began 
in 2008 (Nyberg, 2011). 
 
The economic crisis brought forward a move in a liberal direction in Finland during 
the 1990s.  This was also influenced by a sharp rise in foreign ownership and 
resulted in ideas which challenged the corporate governance system including 
corporatism in industry.  This trend in thinking was reflected in reductions in social 
welfare benefits in order to curb rising budget deficits.  Product markets were 
deregulated and the system of coordinated wage bargaining came under attack. This 
was attended by a drop in inter-elite trust which is a hallmark of the Nordic society.  
Inexorably this led to tensions between the unions and centre right governments. 
(Lindgren, 2011:57). 
 
As the world economy slowed and oil prices began to increase in the aftermath of 
the first Gulf War, GDP growth which had been around 5 per cent in 1990 declined 
by 1991 and –remained negative for the following 2-3 years. Vartiainen (2011) sees 
decline in investment as a critical component of that turnaround.  He accepts that the 
trade effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union were important but not the only 
factor in export decline.  He also emphasises the influence of debt deflation where 
the economy shrank as all agents wanted to get rid of extra leverage.  All large 
banks, bar one, became bankrupt and had to be bailed out by the taxpayer.   
 
Sixten Korkman, senior advisor to the Finnish Innovation Fund (SITRA), concurs 
with the view that capital market deregulation was a primary factor in the 1992/93 
crisis.  He described it as; ‘bad banking, bad policy, bad timing’ (interview, 28 
September, 2012).  Former prime minister, Matti Vanhanen, was more circumspect 
about deregulation.  He felt it had to be done because other events were leading 
towards a crisis.  He did say that the banking crisis caused enormous hardship for 
small business owners with more than 20,000 going to the wall.  He said he thought 
this experience would exert a downward pressure on entrepreneurialism for a long 
time.  In this regard he was very critical of the banks and felt they had to be 
74 
 
punished for the way they had behaved towards SMEs (interview, 27
th
  September, 
2012). 
 
On the relative significance of the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union Korkman 
and Vanhanen agreed that the event was serious but cathartic for Finland.  The 
collapse of trade accounted for about half of the increase in unemployment but it 
forced Finland to confront the reality that exports to Russia were ‘trash’ which 
would not be acceptable in the West.  This precipitated a major policy change in 
favour of innovation and the R&D  investment to achieve it.  Vesa Vihriala, 
Managing Director of the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), 
described the exports as being ‘of medium technology and quality’.   This market 
disappeared just as the bubble burst.  He estimated Soviet exports to account for 
roughly half of all exports (interview, 28
th
  September, 2012). 
 
The decision to re-orientate policy towards innovation and technology was to have a 
huge influence on the rise of Nokia, the ICT multinational, and Nokia in turn had 
huge importance for Finland.  This topic will be dealt with in detail in the next 
chapter. 
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DENMARK 
 
The History and Political Economy of Denmark 
 
The shock to the Danish psyche of defeat in war and the loss of Schleswig-Holstein 
to Germany in 1864 led to a great debate about national identity. Denmark was now 
but a rump State of its former empire. The Danish political elite were discredited.  
Out of this national crisis emerged a movement led by Nikolai Grundtvig which 
purported to define national identity.  The Groundtvigian movement cut across 
social classes and stressed the importance of individual freedom, volunteerism, free 
association, and popular education.  In other words it was a classical liberal 
movement.  Perhaps the most important legacy of the Grundtvigian movement was 
in education.  They built an alternative educational system for the population in 
parallel with the State system (Campbell and Hall, 2006; Ostergard, 2006). 
 
After 1864 Denmark was left with a sense of vulnerability, a condition which 
continued thereafter with a fear of both Germany and later the Soviet Union. This 
led to a consensus that external threats required a level of cooperation in society that 
would create an identity so strong that the nation would survive even the absence of 
its own State. After 1864 moderates from the political right and left began to 
cooperate and this led to a polity with a strong social orientation which reduced 
inequality through the establishment of institutions for this purpose and tended 
towards uniting the people of the nation.  The populism of Grundtvigianism served 
as a bridge between the idea of the nation as ethnic and the idea of the nation as 
demos. Thus the redefined nationalism in many ways underpinned social democracy. 
By 1933 the Social Democrats, under the leadership of Thorvald Stauning, were able 
to accomplish an alliance between industrial workers and farmers which 
institutionalised democratic politics and thereby consolidated social democracy for 
the long term.
15
   The value of this was evident in the manner in which the people 
internalised the concept of the nation allowing them not only to survive Nazi 
occupation in World War 11 but to act with a solidarity which allowed most of the 
Jewish population to survive the Holocaust (Østergård, 2006: 72).  On the other 
hand economic cooperation between Denmark and Germany continued until 1943 
                                                 
15 It is not just a coincidence that this happened on the day Hitler came to power in Germany. 
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and Danish citizens volunteered to fight the Soviet Union in cooperation with 
Germany as part of Frikorps Danmark. 
 
The cross-class consensus established in 1933 allowed for huge Keynesian inspired 
public investments to help solve the unemployment crisis of the depression years.  
This continued after the war when corporatist wage bargaining and other forms of 
cross-class agreements were adopted to promote the country’s economic 
competitiveness internationally. 
 
In Denmark’s political makeup it is also necessary to say that there has always been 
a strong vein of liberalism going back to the Grundtvigian movement.  What is 
unique about Denmark is the willingness of different political parties and social 
organisations to work together for the common good. As Campbell and Hall (2006) 
point out there is nothing naïve about this.  Cross-class collaboration in politics and 
the economy is possible because everybody agrees that conflict is an indulgence that 
cannot be afforded in the face of a state of permanent, albeit varying, external threat.  
Denmark has lived with a long series of fragile minority governments since 1920 
when proportional representation was instituted.  The Social Liberal Party was often 
the cement that held governments together demanding at times that the parties in 
opposition and in government compromise for the good of the nation. 
 
Denmark has managed to develop its own unique variety of capitalism which is 
neither liberal in the Anglo-Saxon sense or yet social democratic in the traditional 
understanding of that model.   
 
Today Denmark is one of the most productive, competitive, economically egalitarian 
countries in the world and has one of the most generous welfare states.  In fact it 
came third in the World Economic Forum competitiveness ranking in 2007 (Böss, 
2010a). Danes uniquely manage to put the common good ahead of everything else 
and they will do whatever it takes – electoral reform, wage restraint, pension reform 
and tax changes – to achieve this. They place a high value on human capital which is 
reflected in their unique approach to the labour market and international 
competitiveness. Danes are assimilated to this way of thinking even before they 
enter the labour market.  Teaching in schools emphasises how to interact with other 
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people and how to improvise.  According to the Speaker of Parliament and former 
Finance Minister, Mogens Lykketoft, children are educated to be ‘socially strong, 
critical, independent, and innovative’ (interview, 22nd  May, 2012).   These are the 
skills Katzenstein (1985) identified as being necessary for small states to prosper.  In 
the description of Ove Pedersen (2006, Chapter 6) Denmark is a negotiated 
economy.  This means that it operates through a complex set of institutions 
developed during the 1960s and the 1970s allowing for matters of economic and 
social policy to be negotiated between all the major economic and political actors 
(see also Jessop, 2010 and O’Donnell, 2010).   
(For a deeper discussion of what the negotiated economy entails see also Kjaer and 
Pedersen, 2001). 
 
1986 – 1994: The Danish Concept of a Negotiated Economy 
 
The renowned business guru, Michael Porter, predicted the certain decline of 
Denmark in 1990 because he believed the country’s political economy was not fit 
for purpose (cited in Campbell and Hall, 2006:3). Events proved him wrong.  By the 
mid-1990s Denmark’s economy was performing strongly.  
 
Cathie Jo Martin (2006:280) identified two immediate causes of Denmark’s 
economic recovery in the early 1990s viz, resolution of the country’s debt problem 
and a positive effect from post-Fordist production systems.  Debt reduction 
coincided with a decrease in interest rates, an increase in housing prices and tax 
reductions on mortgages altogether creating a wealth effect which stimulated 
domestic demand in the economy.  The Danish economy is dominated by small and 
medium enterprises which lacked the economies of scale to benefit from Fordist 
production techniques in their heyday of the 1960s and 1970s. This possibly 
accounts for Porter’s negative assessment but with the advent of consumer demand 
for unique, well designed and not mass produced products offered by Danish SMEs 
the economy began to prosper again.
16
   
                                                 
16 The Danish manufacturing sector is very diverse.  In 1991 only about 100 firms employed more than 500 
people. Due to the lack of indigenous raw materials, industry is mostly confined to reprocessing and light 
industry.  The dominant sectors were food processing, chemicals, furniture, and engineering.  The value of 
industrial goods sold in 1991 was equivalent to $64.8 billion (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993/4). 
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This, no doubt, is a credible explanation for the immediate change in economic 
circumstances but much deeper restructuring of the Danish political economy was 
going on in the 1980s and early 1990s.  One indicator of this is the shift in 
production between different sectors of the economy detailed in Table 4 below. 
Growth is evident in sectors like mining and quarrying, food, chemicals and metal 
products while textiles, furniture and paper either contracted or stagnated (see also 
Lykketoft, 2009). 
 
Table 4: Denmark: Volume of Industrial Sales by Sector 1987-1992 
 (1985: 100 annual averages) 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Mining & quarrying 111 113 120 105 103 118 
Food, beverages & tobacco 102 105 104 107 115 114 
Textiles, wearing apparel & 
leather 
96 88 87 84 84 85 
Wood & products, incl 
furniture 
108 105 104 102 105 107 
Paper & products, printing & 
publishing 
104 108 106 107 106 106 
Chemical, petroleum & plastic 
products 
107 113 114 115 117 125 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 
104 103 104 102 99 97 
Basic metals 90 94 106 99 96 95 
Metal products, machinery & 
equipment* 
106 109 114 114 115 117 
Other manufacturing 
industries 
102 111 121 125 132 138 
Total mining & 
manufacturing* 
104 106 109 109 111 113 
% change -2.8 1.9 2.8 - 1.8 1.8 
 
*Excluding goods resold without further processing, shipbuilding and ship repair 
 
Source:  EIU Country Report 1993/4 
 
In Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology Denmark is included with a Nordic grouping 
of advanced social-democratic welfare states.    A less sustainable aspect to this was 
that by the 1990s the livelihood of a third of the population was in some degree 
linked to welfare thus creating issues of dependency (Rasmussen, 2006: 240).  On 
the other hand Cathie Jo Martin (2006) has pointed to some demographic positives 
in the population.  Danish fertility rates were among the highest in Europe in the 
1990s which would normally help the state to fund pensions and healthcare in a 
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planned intergenerational way.  But an early retirement scheme introduced in 1979 
in which people could retire at 60 tended to negate these positive demographic 
trends. 
 
Reform initiatives by Conservative led governments were opposed tooth and nail by 
the Social Democrats and the unions.  The unions ran a strong public campaign 
against reform, including placing advertisements in national newspapers, and even 
threatened a general strike.  The government modified their proposal but that made 
little or no difference to the intensity of public debate.  Eventually the proposals 
were abandoned altogether.  It was only when Poul Nyrup Rasmussen took over as 
leader of a left wing bloc Government that any progress was made. (Green – 
Pedersen, 2002). 
 
The new Government elected in 1993 launched on its term with the motto ‘new 
course towards better times’.  The Social Democrats did not do well in the 
subsequent 1994 election but were able to continue as a minority government.  
Eventually this government passed the first major retrenchment in social welfare 
since 1984.  This was achieved by what Green – Pedersen (2002:128) describes as a 
‘Nixon goes to China’ logic.  He explains this as meaning that until 1994 the 
government’s short time horizon was dominated by electoral considerations.  But 
after that, social democratic led governments were able to get tacit agreement of 
unions and society for unemployment benefit and early retirement changes that a 
right wing government never could. 
 
These efforts at reform culminated in what is today the hallmark of the Danish 
welfare state and that which is widely admired in Europe, viz; flexicurity.  In truth it 
would be more accurate to say that flexicurity straddles both the welfare regime and 
the labour market.  It combines vocational training and employment support into a 
highly fluid labour market in which employees are very flexible in the knowledge 
that they will retain high levels of income support and employers have much less 
restriction in firing people than in most other countries.  Peer Hull Kristensen (2006) 
makes the point that although this flexibility has been a feature of the Danish labour 
market for 75 years it is only in recent years that the concept has been captured in 
the term ‘flexicurity’.  It is an approach which is seen as being especially 
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accommodating to the emerging new economy.  Per Kongshoj Madsen (2006) sees 
in flexicurity the means of adapting to a changing international environment while 
maintaining the type of solidaristic welfare system necessary to protect citizens from 
the more brutal consequences of structural change (see also Torben M Andersen 
(2011) for a discussion on how well flexicurity has coped with the global financial 
crisis of 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen  and former Finance Minister, Mogens 
Lykketoft,  are highly critical of how the Conservative successors of the Social 
Democrats weakened flexicurity by reducing  the duration for payments from 4 
years to 2 and changing the qualification criteria.  “It is now just therapy – asking 
middle aged shipyard workers to do things which are meaningless” says 
Rasmussen (interviews, 21
st
  & 22
nd
  May, 2012) (see also Goul Andersen, 2011). 
 
The concept of ‘structural competitiveness’ was developed in the mid-1980s.  It 
meant that the competitiveness of Danish industry was seen as being a function of a 
much wider variety of structural considerations including R&D and the existing 
orientation of the economy towards producing for low-growth markets and a general 
lack of adaptive and innovative capabilities in Danish industries.  Some of this 
thinking was infused by neo-liberal ideas, particularly during the 1990s, but this 
never dislodged the propensity towards consensus building.  What it did arguably do 
was bring about a fundamental change in how problems were looked at.  Out of all 
this came what is widely accepted now as Denmark’s negotiated economy.  
 
Apart from consensus about the competitiveness of Danish industry much of the 
restructuring of the economy that happened during the 1980s and 1990s was driven 
by the perceived imperative of dealing with EU integration.  This process has been 
characterised by a number of historical compromises made by Danish society. 
 
In the late 1980s the Danish peak organisations gave de facto acceptance to the 
Monetarist Agreement dealing with the overall monetary and fiscal stability of the 
Danish economy by reference to selected other countries. At the sharp end this 
meant accepting the policy started by the Conservatives in 1982 of pegging the 
currency to the Deutschmark, liberalising capital markets and accepting a 
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programme of fiscal retrenchment.  This would ultimately lead to gradual reduction 
in inflation and real interest rates but the absence of control of these levers could 
lead to unemployment.  The solution, insofar as one existed, was to effect 
coordination of the economy through keeping market mechanisms embedded in 
collective agreements thereby giving unions influence on social policies to mitigate 
the negative effects of monetarism (Pedersen, 2006 b: 460). 
 
Similarly the public sector reforms were articulated as part of a broad programme to 
resolve structural problems by improving the adaptive capacity of Danish society as 
it coped with European integration. These too were unpalatable, involving as they 
did elements of privatisation and outsourcing of work.  This provoked a backlash 
resulting in the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Pedersen, 2006 a: 256). 
 
The importance of EU integration should not be underestimated in terms of 
structural change.  Around 1990 the evaluation of structural impediments moved in 
the direction of adaptation of Danish society as a whole to European integration. The 
political elite formed the view that the public sector had an important role in 
changing the political economy of Denmark to match the demands of EU integration 
and the longer term development of the EU.  In the words of Michael Boss: 
 
“The result was that Danish society developed into an integrated and 
coordinated political system of negotiations involving multiple private and 
public actors on national as well as local levels.” 
(Boss, 2010b : 270) 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
The History and Political Economy of The Netherlands 
 
Over the five years between 1945 and 1950 output in the Netherlands rose by 10 per 
cent per year, faster than any other Western European country.  According to Barry 
Eichengreen (2007:97) the roots of this extraordinary success lay in the country’s 
neo-corporatist institutions.  In the Depression of the 1930s Social Democrats and 
Progressive Catholics engaged in extensive discussions about alternatives to 
Liberalism which they saw as a failed ideology. After the war this morphed into 
important institutions including the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid) 
and the Social & Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad) where 
government, trade unions and employers could discuss wages, investment and social 
policies.  This dialogue developed into strategies for coordinating economic and 
social activity especially wage negotiations.  The process was given a legislative 
foundation in 1950.   
 
Another key driver of European post war recovery was The Marshall Aid Plan.  This 
was an American led initiative to sustain Europe’s strategy for investment-led 
growth.  According to Barry Eichengreen (2007:69) the people who designed The 
Marshall Plan saw it as having the potential to bring about a ‘United States of 
Europe’ where economic and political interdependence would make war impossible 
and would also achieve a solid pro-American European ally against the Soviet 
Union.   Thus it was an important influence for European integration and a way of 
reconciling those countries, such as the Netherlands and France, which had suffered 
at Germany’s hands during the war, to higher levels of that country’s industrial 
production.  The Netherlands was one of the nations which participated in, and 
subsequently benefitted from, The Marshall Plan.
17
  Today it is a country with a 
highly developed welfare state and high taxation, resulting in low net income and 
wealth differentials.  It is a strong proponent of free trade in the European 
Community.
18
  While formally there are strong differences between political parties 
                                                 
17 The Marshall Plan addressed the obstacles to post-war recovery in Europe by providing thirteen billion Dollars 
in US government grants over four years (Eichengreen, 2007:65). 
18 Even before the end of the war the Dutch government in exile together with Belgium and Luxembourg signed 
the Benelux Agreement eliminating tariff barriers and looking forward to free movement of services, capital and 
labour between them (Judt, 2005). 
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in practice there has been a considerable degree of consensus around a centre of 
gravity which, in comparison with neighbouring countries, is relatively to the left.    
 
When the French National Assembly dealt a body blow to hopes for enhanced 
European cooperation by vetoing the concept of a European army, the Dutch and 
Belgians together acted to convene a meeting to consider a strategy for European 
integration at Messina, in June 1955.  Three years later the Treaty of Rome 
establishing the European Economic Community came into force on 1
st
  January, 
1958.  According to Segers (2010) not only were the Dutch closely aligned with 
Germany but they were also key proponents of Britain’s case for joining the EEC 
which placed them in very direct conflict with de Gaulle. 
 
European integration vindicated Dutch policy.  At an early stage the benefits began 
to flow.  Agriculture, for example, became more efficient and less labour intensive 
with access to wider markets, particularly for butter, cheese, and pork products.  The 
Dutch economy grew by 3.5 per cent each year from 1950 to 1970 – seven times the 
average annual growth rate for the preceding forty years.  In the same period the 
population increased by a staggering 35 per cent such that by1960, 30 per cent of the 
population was under 15 (Judt, 2005: Chapter 10).
19
 
 
The two oil crises of the 1970s brought forward a policy response described by 
Green-Pedersen (2002:95) as ‘fumbling’ which was exacerbated by ‘Depillarisation’ 
which caused much unrest in Dutch politics during that decade.  Nevertheless, the 
politics of accommodation inherent in a consociational democracy survived with 
politics being largely about governing from the centre.  The deteriorating economic 
climate became the main focus of the CDA-VVD government elected in 1982. 
 
Under the slogan of ‘no nonsense’ the new Lubbers led government launched an 
austerity programme the centrepiece of which was a demand for wage restraint.  
This implied a direct intervention by government in collective bargaining, a step 
which would have been most unwelcome to the social partners.  Under pressure 
from this threat unions and employers agreed upon a social contract known as the 
‘Wassenaar Accord’ days before an expected government policy statement in 
                                                 
19 Some of the population increase can be accounted for by people returning from the former colonies. 
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Parliament.  This in effect conceded the government’s objectives but on terms the 
social partners could live with.  The Wassenaar Accord of 1982 turned out to be a 
ground breaking event with significant effects on the economy and society in the 
following years (Green-Pedersen, 2002).   
 
Today the Netherlands has a population of 16 million and is often described as a 
‘consociational democracy’.  This description is based on the idea of a society 
organised on ‘pillars’ or competing religious or ideological groups.  Rising 
secularism since the 1960s means that this pillar structure is less valid but still has 
some influence on political allegiance.  The Dutch economy is structured to a 
significant degree around transportation and logistics, international finance, business 
services and agro-industry.  The country is highly economically dependent on access 
to world markets but unable to influence world market prices (Houwing and 
Vandaele, 2011:128). 
1986-1994: Dutch Corporatism Re-emerges as an Alternative to 
State Intervention and Becomes Standard Operating Procedure 
at Times of Crisis. 
 
The CDA-VVD Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition led by Ruud Lubbers was re-
elected in 1986 but an internal dispute over environmental policy caused the VVD to 
leave the government subsequently thereby causing an election.  The Liberal vote 
fell as did that of the PvdA Labour Party.  The CDA vote held up and a number of 
small fringe parties gained support.  
After protracted negotiations a new coalition government of CDA-PvdA was formed 
in which Mr Lubbers was prime minister and the Leader of PvdA (and former head 
of the Dutch Trade Union Federation FNV) Mr Wim Kok, became Finance Minister.  
The programme of the new government allowed for increased social spending but 
this was balanced by a strong commitment to fiscal discipline, specifically reducing 
the budget deficit from 5.5 per cent of net national income to 3.25 per cent over the 
expected life of the government.  Public reaction against this fiscal policy was 
damaging to PvdA who suffered in local elections in 1991.  It was the government’s 
resolve to tighten up welfare expenditure – especially disability claims – that was the 
focus of public anger.  The problem for Wim Kok was that Labour was seen to be 
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acting against the interests of its natural constituency (EIU, 1993/4:  Visser and 
Hemerijck, 1997).   Nevertheless,  he is unrepentant about welfare reform: 
 
“Any welfare system can only survive if the benefits are confined to those who 
genuinely need them.  If you really care about welfare you must be critical of the 
balance between how it runs.” 
 (Wim Kok Interview, 12
th
  September, 2012). 
 
Table 5 below outlines the composition of governments in the Netherlands over the 
20 years from 1982 to 2002. 
 
Table 5: Governments in the Netherlands, 1982-2002 
 Prime Minister Party Composition Minority/Majority 
1982-1986 Ruud Lubbers (CDA) CDA and VVD Majority 
1986-1989 Ruud Lubbers (CDA) CDA and VVD Majority 
1989-1994 Ruud Lubbers (CDA) CDA and PvdA Majority 
1994-1998 Wim Kok (PvdA) PvdA, VVD, and D66 Majority  
1998-2002 Wim Kok (PvdA) PvdA, VVD, and D66 Majority 
Source:  Green-Pedersen (2002:51) 
 
Politics in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s was dominated by the issue of 
welfare state reform and retrenchment.   
 
The Netherlands is an example of a Christian democratic political economy, the 
unique features of which are well documented in the academic literature (for 
example:  Esping Andersen, 1999; Huber and Stephens, 2001;  Pontussen,  2005; 
Green-Pedersen, 2002; Scharpf, 1999).  The main differences with a social 
democratic political economy like Denmark are seen in lower levels of female 
labour force participation, a strong bias towards protection of steady employment 
organised around a presumption of male breadwinners, combined with subsidised 
labour exclusion.   
 
In the early eighties 10,000 jobs a month were being lost.  Nearly all were full time 
and, as such, presented a real crisis for the political economy model just described.  
By 1984, 800,000 people – 14 per cent of the workforce – were unemployed and 
there was no sign of a let up in the trend.  (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997:13). 
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This situation was characterised by Goran Therborn (1986) as the most spectacular 
employment failure in the advanced capitalist world.  But this was not solely  a 
problem of lack of jobs, it was also a problem of the welfare regime and an example 
of Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1996) pathology of ‘Welfare Without Work’ 
manifested in 27 per cent of the labour force being unavailable for work through 
disability, early retirement or other headings of the welfare code.   Jelle Visser and 
Anton Hemerijck (1997) refer to the expression ‘Dutch Disease’ being used to 
explain this phenomenon in economic text books in the 1980s.  In short it meant that 
the Netherlands had become an expensive and unsustainable welfare state.  Yet 
within less than fifteen years unemployment was reduced to low single figures and 
the Dutch Disease became the ‘Dutch Employment Miracle’.   
 
Between 1980 and 2009 there were eight social pacts negotiated in the 
Netherlands.
20
  Basic information relating to the pacts and the economic and 
political conditions in which they were negotiated is set out in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6: Social Pacts in The Netherlands 1980-2009 
Year Name Issues Economic 
Cycle 
Governing  
Coalition 
Year Initiative 
1982 ‘Wassenaar’ 
Agreement 
Wages, working 
hours 
Recession Centre-right 1 U, E 
1989 Joint Policy 
Framework 
Indexation 
(benefits), social 
security, budget 
Boom Centre-right 1 G 
1993 ‘New Course’ 
Agreement 
Wages, 
decentralisation 
Downturn Centre-right 4 U, E 
1996 ‘Flexicurity’  
Agreement 
Regulation of 
temporary agency 
work 
Growth Left-right 3 U 
2002 
 
‘Mini-Pact’ Wages, job 
subsidies 
Downturn Centre-right 1 G 
2003 ‘Demi-Pact’ Wages, negotiated 
reform 
Downturn 
 
 
Centre-right 1 G 
2004 ‘Museum 
Square Pact’ 
Wages, early 
retirement, 
disability pensions 
Downturn Centre-right 2 G 
2009 ‘Crisis Pact’ Wages, part-time 
unemployment, 
public investment, 
pensions 
Recession Centre-left 2-3 U, E 
 
Source:  Visser and van der Meer (2011:204) 
 
                                                 
20 This is quite similar to Ireland where the process of making social pacts started in 1987 and seven pacts were 
negotiated up to 2009 when the process fell victim to the economic crisis. 
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The evolution of corporatism in the Netherlands is explored in depth by Jelle Visser 
and Anton Hemerijck (1997). They identify two distinct periods of corporatism, the 
first between 1950 and 1962, and the second after 1982.  Over that timeframe the 
transition from Keynesianism to Monetarism did occur but the existence of a 
consociational polity meant that it occurred over a longer timeframe, was less 
celebrated by its victors and less hard on its victims.   
 
Physical and social distances in the Netherlands are not large which means that key 
actors in politics, business and the unions have ready access to each other.  This is 
not unlike the situation in Ireland and it helps create an environment where it is 
easier to reach agreement.  Moreover, in the Netherlands there is a convention about 
social pact negotiations which holds that lines of communication should be kept 
open, there is no boasting and some compensation is always offered for losses.  
Above all, agreements once made must be kept.  The principal trade union 
federation in the Netherlands is the Socialist Federation of Dutch Unions (FNV) and 
collective agreements made by it apply to 86 per cent of workers.  The principal 
employers’ organisation is VNO-NCW, a Christian employers’ body with roots in 
the old pillar system.  For the purpose of wage bargaining the Foundation of Labour 
(STAR)  - founded in 1945 by the employers and unions – is the neutral ground 
where they meet to do business. The Social-Economic Council (SER) is a body 
which involves representatives of business and labour with a remit to advise the 
government.  It performs much the same function as NESC does in Ireland albeit 
that the STAR tends to overshadow it within the institutional architecture of the 
labour market (Visser and van der Meer, 2011; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; 
Houwing and Vandaele, 2011
21
). 
 
The core exchange in the 1982 Wassenaar Accord was an exchange of wage 
moderation for jobs effected through a reduction in working hours progressively 
from 40, to 38, 36, and 34 and ultimately 32 hours by 1990.  The employers did not 
like this approach and by the mid-1980s ramped up a campaign for part-time jobs.  
They succeeded in arresting the campaign for reduced hours and by 1987 it was 
dead, significant achievements being made only in 1983/84.  The Central Planning 
                                                 
21 Smaller and medium enterprises are represented by MKB (the literal translation of SME).  The overall 
organisation rate of employers is about 85 per cent.  On the union side there is also the Dutch Christian Unions 
(CNV) and a smaller union for medium and higher skilled workers (De Unie/MHP).  Union density was 22 per 
cent in 2006.  (Houwing & Vandaele, 2011:28). 
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Bureau estimated that 25 per cent of the reduced working hours translated into new 
jobs.  Insofar as there were further achievements in reducing working time it was 
through extra days off rather than hours’ reduction.  Nevertheless, there was a strong 
willingness on the part of union members to accept shorter working hours with 
income loss.  According to Visser and Hemerijck (1997) 71 per cent would do so 
provided everybody signed up for it.  A certain fatigue eventually entered into the 
equation and with an improvement in economic conditions between 1988 and 1991 
pressure to recover ‘lost’ wages began to emerge.  By this time nearly all job 
redistribution was anyway in the form of part-time jobs.  The unions did achieve 
some modest increase in wages for members but the resurgent economy did not last.  
By 1990 the government was declaring that the economy was in decline and by 1991 
the centre of gravity of industrial disputation had moved on to welfare reform.  
Nevertheless, the importance of the Wassenaar Accord should not be 
underestimated. Visser and Hemerijck describe it as ‘a major change in policy and 
mentality’ (1997:60).  This characterisation reflects the willingness of the social 
partners to prioritise investment for job creation.  Moreover, it recreated an 
atmosphere of trust between employers and unions which made later agreements 
possible. 
 
Thirty years later its principal architect, Wim Kok, who was then head of the FNV  
Trade Union Federation and subsequently prime minister, said of the Wassenaar 
Accord with Dutch employers: 
 
“We were so close to a real crisis with youth unemployment at 20 per cent that 
people were desperate.  Doing nothing was not an option.  I took a risk.  Certainly 
trade union members were not sending me flowers but the whole atmosphere was 
dominated by despair and sometimes people will accept what they might not 
otherwise.” 
 
(Wim Kok Interview, 12
th
  September, 2012). 
 
In summarising this period it can be said that the Wassenaar Accord marked the 
return to a policy of voluntary wage restraint on the part of the unions.  This policy 
endured, with some hiccups, during the next fifteen years.  The policy of wage 
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restraint did not begin with a consensus, but produced a consensus.  It was a process 
which gave primacy to profits and investment and this reflects the measure of trust 
which informed the process.  The union side had to believe that their sacrifices 
would result in significant employment gains – which it did, although not quite as 
they had hoped (Green-Pedersen, 2002:98; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). 
 
According to Jelle Visser and Marc van der Meer (2011) social pacts became the 
institutional alternative to state intervention after the Wassenaar Accord and are now 
standard operating procedure in times of crisis.  They characterise the Netherlands as 
a coordinated market economy of the corporatist variant embodying a high degree of 
mutual cooperation between unions and employers, and regular consultations with 
the government. 
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IRELAND 
The History and Political Economy of Ireland 
 
Ireland’s economic sustainability has been called into question on a number of 
occasions since independence.  The country’s experience prior to the 1990s has been 
described as ‘A Case Study in Failure’ by John Fitzgerald (2000:2) and MacSharry 
and White (2000) noted that economic crises in the 1950s and again in the 1980s 
caused people to wonder whether the country could succeed at all.  Having endured 
famine, mass emigration and de-industrialisation in the nineteenth century, Ireland 
continued to perform poorly relative to other European countries for most of the 
twentieth century. 
 
The first (Cumann na nGaedheal) government after independence in the 1920s 
adopted a Laissez Faire approach to economics.  Agriculture was their focus with 
policy geared towards exports and the needs of larger farmers. They did not change 
the banking system and maintained the link with Sterling.  Industrial policy followed 
the British approach of free collective bargaining in industrial relations but there 
were some disputes in which government even used military against strikers, most 
notable in the case of a Post Office strike in 1923.  There were some counter 
tendencies in evidence even then e.g. the establishment of the Electricity Supply 
Board, the Dairy Disposal Company and the Agricultural Credit Corporation as state 
owned entities.   
 
This all changed utterly when Fianna Fáil came to power in 1932.  They pursued a 
programme of economic nationalism with protectionism as a core element.  The 
Control of Manufacturing Act in 1932 was an example of this policy designed to 
keep industry under Irish control.  The Irish market became highly protected with 
tariffs of up to 75 per cent imposed on more than 4000 categories of imports by 
1936.  Protectionism was also extended to agriculture, with duties imposed on 
various imports and bounties offered to encourage tillage. This policy caused a 
deterioration in relations with Britain.  A prolonged dispute over the repayment of 
land annuities led to the ‘Economic War’ which lasted for six years until 1938. By 
then trade between the two countries had declined, while growth in the world 
economy had slowed due to the onset of the global depression (ibid). 
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It is important to point out that the economic war had as much to do with politics as 
with economics, inlcluding British antipathy to de Valera..  The Fianna Fáil 
government was committed to self-sufficiency and the need to create an industrial 
structure.  Unfortunately, they were not discriminating in the application of 
protectionism.  They did not target industries likely to succeed and no thought was 
given to what to do with infant industries when they matured.  No effort was made at 
innovation.   
 
The self-sufficiency aspect of policy was undoubtedly suitable to the war years.  But 
afterwards the general policy of protectionism did not fit with the emerging world 
order.  Ireland was slow to react and remained on the same economic footing even as 
other countries sought to restructure their economies.  Eventually the restricted size 
of the Irish market and increasing balance of payments difficulties began to take 
their toll.  Moreover, Ireland wanted Marshall Aid and America intended serious 
conditionality in the form of opening European markets to its exports to go with the 
aid.  (For a detailed treatment of this topic see Murray, 2009: Chapter 2).  Much 
credit is given to Whitaker and Lemass for effecting another transformation – this 
time to export orientated industrialisation – in the late fifties. But Denis O’Hearn 
(2001) argues that this was dictated by force of circumstances just described. 
 
Brian Girvin (2004) compares Ireland’s experience of Marshal Aid with those of 
Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, noting that each country had a 
dependence on foreign trade, though the nature of this dependency was not the same 
in each case.  His conclusion is that the Irish political elite, the electorate and the 
society valued continuity over the change promised by American involvement in 
Europe and thus the opportunity that was presented by Marshall Aid was one that 
was lost on Ireland. In each of the other small countries strategies for modernisation 
were elaborated which led to enhanced income, sustained growth and expanding 
welfare. By the early 1960s most of these states had industrialised, normally with a 
strong domestic dimension.  Even when Ireland began to industrialise and expand in 
the 1960s most of this growth was a consequence of foreign direct investment.  The 
losses accumulated between 1945 and 1960 were only made up during the 1990s. 
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Tom Garvin (2005; 190) concedes that there was an isolationist streak in Fianna Fáil 
but it was not shared by Sean Lemass who as early as 1929 said that both America 
and Europe would be important objects of Irish foreign policy in a post-British 
context.  Ireland joined the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation  
(OEEC) because it was necessary to do so to access Marshall Aid.  As Murray 
(2009:2) points out, becoming a Marshall Aid recipient drew Ireland into wider 
European economic cooperation that would eventually deepen into the integration of 
the European Economic Community (EEC).  This integration would create 
conditions within which Ireland would be able to reduce its dependence on Britain.   
 
It seems likely that the internal debate within Fianna Fáil was complemented by the 
exogenous pressure associated with Marshall Aid as described by O’Hearn (2001) 
and Garvin (2005).  Smith’s (2005) take on it is that it was not a case of having no 
ideational continuity at all but rather one of rearticulating the nationalist emphasis to 
suit the new circumstances.  Breen et al (1990) described it as Irish nationalism 
henceforth proceeding from an assumption that the primary objective was ‘to reap 
the benefits from full economic participation in the world economy’ (ibid: 38).  This 
thinking largely underpinned Ireland’s subsequent application for membership of the 
EEC.  It was a way to assert independence from Britain, the historic goal of Irish 
nationalism.  
 
The catalyst for a major policy shift towards export orientated industrialisation was 
the publication of Economic Development and the First Programme for Economic 
Expansion in the late 1950s.  T.K. Whitaker was the senior civil servant principally 
associated with these policy documents.  According to Murphy (2009) neither 
declared the explicit aim of entering a free trade bloc, but that was the direction in 
which they were headed and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) were possible destinations. 
 
The Lemass led government of the early 1960s actively sought to engage with 
farming and trade union interests in what, according to Murphy (ibid), was an 
effective realignment of government economic policy in which agricultural and 
industrial policy was placed on an equal footing.  Farming in particular would 
benefit from membership of an economic bloc. 
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Nevertheless, there was a perception within the agricultural community that Lemass 
was primarily focussed on industrial development and this came to a head in 1958 
when the National Farmers’ Association (NFA) passed a motion of no confidence in 
the government.  Under the leadership of Rickard Deasy relations deteriorated into 
major conflict in the 1960s, precipitated by a campaign to withhold rates in 
Kilkenny.  Deasy identified four main reasons for farmer unrest:  the increasing rates 
burden, a persistent decline in farm incomes, a bleak future and, most importantly, a 
general lack of attention to the fundamental task of planning agricultural 
development more coherently.  However, by 1964 Lemass managed to co-opt the 
farmers into a formal negotiating relationship with the government on the same basis 
as the trade unions (ibid). 
 
The economic depression which afflicted Ireland in 1957 and 1958 was, according 
to Brian Girvin (1989), often seen as a crisis for protectionism.  He argues, however, 
that it was more to do with fiscal policy in the short run and in the medium term it 
was a result of the failure of agriculture to increase exports and expand national 
income.  In the longer term, it was a consequence of the failure of the Irish economy 
and society to respond to the dilemma it faced.  On the one hand, the society wished 
to retain traditional patterns of economic organisation, particularly in agriculture.  
On the other it demanded an end to emigration and full employment and rising 
incomes.  The Department of Finance remained committed to an agricultural 
economy throughout the 1950s.  Nor had the Department of Industry and Commerce 
a realistic alternative at the time.  This depressing outlook had not changed by the 
time the cabinet discussed the practicality of participating in a European Free Trade 
Area in 1957. 
 
Girvin (ibid) is less effusive than most about the credit due to Whitaker for changing 
policy direction.  He argues that Economic Development written by Whitaker did not 
treat the industrial sector in any detail but stressed the need to improve the 
competitive position of agriculture.  Lemass’ emphasis was different. He put his 
personal stamp on the Programme for Economic Expansion differing from Whitaker 
in his belief that industrial expansion was a precondition for economic expansion. 
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For his part Whitaker (2006) chronicles the debate which took place within the civil 
service on the options for membership of EFTA and the EEC.  There were major 
reservations on the part of the Department of Industry and Commerce about the loss 
of industrial jobs and the special concessions that would be needed because of the 
country’s state of underdevelopment.  Indeed, Maher (1986) points to the fact that 
potential trade partner countries had come to see Ireland as having an economy 
which differed substantially from their own with its heavy dependence on 
agriculture and an inadequately developed industrial arm of recent growth and 
highly protected.  EFTA was a seven member British led rival project to the EEC 
and it was always going to be a delicate issue for Ireland as to which option to 
pursue by virtue of its unique trading relationship with Britain.   
 
Most small European countries joined EFTA but Ireland did not. The Scandinavian 
countries formed the Nordic Union.  Some small states joined the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Netherlands became a founder member of the 
EEC.  By comparison Ireland was relatively isolationist.  The other small countries 
were exploring various forms of cooperation, if not integration.  In reality Ireland’s 
commitment to interdependence, not to mention integration, was weak if not non-
existent (Girvin, 2004: 218).  Nevertheless, when Britain applied to join the EEC 
Ireland did too.  When President de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application Ireland too 
had to wait on the side-line until Britain reapplied in 1967, eventually achieving 
membership in 1973.  In the interim a free trade agreement with Britain was 
concluded in 1965 (Whitaker, 2006). 
 
The casualty rate among Irish industry in this progression towards free trade was 
horrendous, even though detailed analyses of the threats facing each sector were 
done in advance and government adaption and re-equipment grants were given to 
affected companies.  At the time of EEC entry, half the employment in indigenous 
firms was in sectors facing full free trade competition, like textiles, clothing and 
footwear.  By 1980, one out of four jobs was lost and in bigger companies with over 
500 employees, the losses were even more devastating – one out of two jobs 
disappeared.  According to MacSharry and White (2000): 
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‘The stars of the traditional Irish industrial firmament were grievously, if not 
mortally, damaged and in a weak position to proceed with investment and job 
creation.’ 
(ibid: 306) 
 
Denis O’Hearn (2001) has a less benign view of the stars of the traditional Irish 
industrial firmament.  He considers that it is one of the enduring failures of the Irish 
capitalist class that they are much more likely to invest outside the country than in it.  
He says bluntly: 
 
‘The regime was also unable to induce domestic capitalist to reinvest.  After they 
exhausted the few highly profitable local possibilities, Irish industrialists 
reinvested their profits in British financial markets.’ 
 (ibid: 119) 
 
A similarly critical view of the indigenous business community is detailed in Murray 
(2009:50). 
 
By the 1980s the policy paradigm began to break down and the implications of the 
compromises of the 1950s became more apparent.  The industrial development 
strategy of relying on foreign investment with little connection to the local economy 
was not sufficient to generate enough employment to meet the needs of an 
expanding labour force.  Linkages were especially low among US subsidiaries in the 
leading sectors of computers (6.7 per cent) and pharmaceuticals (3.25 per cent), 
which later came to dominate the miracle recovery of the so called ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
economy in the 1990s.  But by the middle 1980s Ireland was again looking into the 
abyss for the second time in thirty years.  As in the mid-fifties there were doubts 
about the capacity of the political and administrative system to overcome the 
challenges presented.  (MacSharry and White, 2000: O’Hearn, 2001; O’Riain, 2004; 
Smith, 2005).  Alarmed by this bleak outlook NESC commissioned the Telesis 
Consultancy Group to conduct a review of industrial policy in 1982.  It was heavily 
critical of the prevailing model of development, especially reliance on foreign direct 
investment.  A similar process led to the Culliton Report in 1992 which led to the 
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reorganisation of the Industrial Development Organisations (O’Riain, 2004: 181-
184). 
Ireland Turns the Corner:  The Single European Act to 
Maastricht: 1986 – 1994 
 
By late 1986 – early 1987 the viability of the Irish state was at issue for the second 
time in thirty years.  Cast in the role of Celtic pauper the country was a prime 
candidate for bankruptcy.  Concerns lay with credit risk or fear of default on national 
debt repayments.  By 1986 debt had reached 129 per cent of GDP.  In August 1986 
the Irish pound was devalued by 8 per cent against all EMS currencies.  Living 
standards had stagnated for five years and nearly 20 per cent of people were 
unemployed.  The economy was trapped in a vicious circle of high spending, high 
taxes, high interest rates and rising debt.  A measure of political instability was 
added by the collapse of the Fine Gael/Labour coalition government in January 1987 
(MacSharry and White, 2000).  As can be seen from the following tables Ireland did 
not compare very favourably with the other comparator countries in respect of 
unemployment and labour force participation rates. 
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Table 7: Standardised unemployment rates in comparator countries, 1980-95. 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Finland 4.6 5.0 3.4 17.1 
Denmark n/a n/a 7.7 8.2 
Netherlands 6.0 10.6 7.5 6.5 
Ireland 7.3 17.0 13.3 12.2 
 
Source:  Derived from Tansey (1998:56) and O’Hagan (2000:161) 
 
 
Table 8: Labour force participation rates compared 
Country 1983 1993 1995 
Finland 77.4 73.8 73.0 
Denmark 80.0 82.6 78.7 
Netherlands 59.0 67.5 68.8 
Ireland 62.7 62.4 63.3 
 
Source:  Derived from Tansey (1998:74) 
Writing about Ireland’s record in 1989 Joe Lee said of it: 
 
‘Irish economic performance has been the least impressive in Western Europe, 
perhaps in all Europe, in the twentieth century.’ 
 (Lee, 1989: 521) 
Similar bleak assessments were advanced by other authors around that time (see 
Girvin, 1989; O’Malley, 1989; Kennedy et al, 1988). 
 
In the 1980s growing alarm about the state of the economy inspired the production 
of a number of policy statements. Fianna Fáil published The Way Forward in 1982 
and the Fine Gael/Labour coalition government published Building on Reality in 
1984. Both emphasised budgetary targets but little progress was made in reducing 
the current budget deficit.  Smith (2005: 171) opines that what was really lacking 
was an alternative vision and there was little consensus about an appropriate future 
strategy. 
 
But some strategic thinking had been going on behind the scenes and in 1986 the 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) published A Strategy for 
Development.  Smith (ibid) credits this report as creating an ideational framework 
for a new approach based on macro-political bargaining.  It fulfilled the same 
purpose in this respect as the Whittaker Report did in 1958. 
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The significance of the NESC report was that its prescription was supported by all 
the major interest groups in Irish society – business, trade unions and agricultural 
groups.  All were represented by senior people on the NESC Council and once a 
consensus was reached in that forum it fell to the leaders to persuade their respective 
constituencies 
 
The reasons why the social partners – and particularly the trade unions – supported 
the NESC strategy are more complex.  Such centralised agreements were not foreign 
to the Irish experience having being tried a number of times in the 1970s (see 
Adshead, 2006; Hardiman, 2006;  Roche, 2009), but the most recent ‘National 
Understanding’, as the agreement was called, had collapsed in 1980.  Since then 
unemployment – a particular concern of the trade union movement – had 
deteriorated significantly.  Radical policy change introduced by the Thatcher 
government in Britain and by Roger Douglas in New Zealand, had changed the 
landscape in a very hostile way for trade unions.  It was clear that the failures in the 
Irish economy would have to be corrected and there was a fear that the correction 
would come at the expense of organised labour.  Therefore, there was on many 
fronts, a powerful imperative for the trade union movement to make a proactive 
intervention.  Such an approach was also consistent with the concept of social 
dialogue introduced as part of the EU integration project by Jacques Delors, two 
years earlier. 
 
John Dunne, former Director General of IBEC, expressed the view that employers 
were very hostile to the idea of a return to centralised bargaining. Experience of the 
earlier ‘National Understandings’ had convinced them that the price of stability had 
become too costly.  But an agreement was reached and it cemented trust.  
Subsequent agreements were not as good according to Dunne.  There were too many 
people, too many issues and it became too political.  Employers do not have the 
same social role as the union confederation.  A strategic core cared but the rest were 
only interested in the bottom line (interview, 16
th
  February, 2012). 
 
Farmers are somewhat different to the other social partners in that their income is 
largely governed by the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  In 1993 
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significant changes were made to the structure of CAP.  There is now a single farm 
payment which is decoupled from current production levels.  The exchange for this 
payment, based on historical production patterns, is conditional on keeping land in 
good agricultural and environmental condition.  CAP is now organised around two 
payments:  about 80 per cent of the budget is related to income support under the 
single farm payment. The second pillar covers ‘rural development’.  On average 
farm households derive 37 per cent of their income from farming.  Over the years 
Irish agriculture has benefitted from very substantial transfers from CAP.  In 1993 
Ireland’s net receipts from CAP were €1.46 bn.  By 2009 this had fallen to €1.00 bn. 
To that extent social partnership was much less critical to farmers than to unions 
(NESC, 2010). 
 
Anyway the emerging consensus manifested itself in the Programme for National 
Recovery.  It was the first of what was to become a series of seven Social 
Partnership agreements lasting for 22 years.  These agreements not only covered pay 
at a national level, but also allowed key elements of economic and social policy to 
become institutionalised as a feature of Ireland’s governance structure (Kirby, 2010: 
4; Proceedings of ICTU Conference, 1986). 
 
A few days before his death in 2006 the former Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, 
completed a paper setting out his views on Social Partnership.
22
  Writing specifically 
about the transformation in the Irish economy and society between 1986 and 2006 
he said: 
 
‘There were, of course, other factors which assisted that transformation but Social 
Partnership from its inception and for twenty years has provided the essential 
bedrock on which sound public finances and progressive fiscal, social and 
economic policies could be firmly based.  Should any proof of its basic soundness 
be required, it must surely be the number of individuals and bodies who have laid 
claim to its parenthood’ 
 (ibid: 1) 
 
                                                 
22 The author is indebted to Mr Padraig O’hUiginn, former Secretary General of the Department of An Taoiseach 
for providing him with a copy of this paper in December, 2010. 
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The economy began to emerge from recession towards the end of The Programme 
for National Recovery.  Economic growth averaged 3.6 per cent per annum between 
1987 and 1993 but by the latter year 294,000 people were still unemployed or 15.6 
per cent of the labour force.  Average incomes grew by 34 per cent between 1987 
and 1994.  The current budget deficit fell to 0.7 per cent of GNP by 1990 from 8.3 
per cent in 1986.  There was also a big improvement in industrial relations due to the 
agreement with the social partners.  It was a big shot in the arm for centralised 
bargaining and it solidly anchored the PNR agreement.  Sean O’Riain described this 
period from 1987 to 1994 as neo-corporatist stabilisation (O’Riain, 2008: 172 – 180; 
see also Kirby, 2010: 32; MacSharry and White, 2000: 102). 
 
Even though the maro-economic fundamentals were coming right, with exports 
growing at a rate of 4 per cent per annum, unemployment remained stubbornly high.  
This jobless growth undermined confidence again – particularly amongst the unions 
– because people could not see any social dividend emerging.  This concern became 
so acute that NESC once more stepped into the fray.  It commissioned a Norwegian 
academic, Lars Mjoset, to investigate why Ireland had not made the same degree of 
economic and social progress as other small European states.  An outline of Mjoset’s 
(1992) findings is contained in Chapter 1. 
 
While Mjoset’s (1992) emphasis on the need for a national system of innovation has 
informed policy making (with mixed success) in the intervening years, there is not 
much evidence that his report otherwise got much traction within the policy making 
community
.
 
 
One possible explanation is that by 1993 the economy began to take off.  
Unemployment began to fall, to the relief of all those involved with the Social 
Partnership project.  Ireland was about to enter its ‘Celtic Tiger’ phase as can be 
seen from the Table 9 below. 
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Table 9: Irish Economic and Employment Growth, 1993-2008 
Year GDP* GNP* Labour 
Force  
(000S) 
Employment 
rate among 
15-64 year 
olds (%) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
      
1993 5.8 6.3 1386 51.7 15.6 
1994 9.5 8.8 1423 53.0 14.3 
1995 7.7 7.2 1452 54.4 12.3 
1996 10.7 9.0 1498 55.4 11.7 
1997 8.9 8.1 1560 57.7 9.9 
1998 8.5 7.7 1645 60.6 7.5 
1999 10.7 8.5 1713 63.3 5.6 
2000 9.2 9.5 1767 65.2 4.3 
2001 6.2 3.9 1810 65.8 3.8 
2002 6.1 2.7 1845 65.6 4.3 
2003 4.4 5.7 1882 65.1 4.6 
2004 4.6 4.3 1920 65.5 4.4 
2005 6.2 5.6 2015 67.1 4.2 
2006 5.4 6.3 2150 63.3 4.5 
2007 6.0 4.4 2219 63.8 4.4 
2008 -3.0 -2.8 2247 63.7 6.4 
* at constant prices 
 
Source:  Kirby (2001: 33).  
 
 
Following the introduction of the PNR in 1987 Irish and German interest rates began 
to converge, while Irish inflation remained low.  This contributed to improving 
competitiveness until the currency crisis of September 1992 to February 1993 and 
the subsequent virtual collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in August 
1993.  Rory O’Donnell (2008) says of this period that the social partners became 
committed to a credible, non-accommodating exchange rate policy and eventual 
transition to the Euro. 
 
Convergence and Divergence of the Four Countries 
 
As explained in the introduction the purpose of this chapter is to provide an 
historical context for each country and to use the period between 1987 and 1994 to 
benchmark and compare their political economies.  The intention is to use this 
benchmark to compare how each country did or did not maintain the procedures and 
practices of political interaction identified by Katzenstein (1985), as Europeanisation 
intensified. 
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The comparative political economy literature reviewed in Chapter 1 points to a 
pattern in which Ireland is an outlier in the liberal market economy camp.  The 
Netherlands is part of the Continental/Christian democratic family but is linked to 
the two Nordic social democratic/social market economy countries – Finland and 
Denmark – by virtue of being a coordinated market economy. 
 
And yet there are similarities between all of the countries which suggests that it is 
hard to be absolutely clear cut about categorising them.  Minas et al (forthcoming) 
argue for a different clustering of welfare regimes, based on Esping-Andersen’s 
(1996) criteria but adding in factors of family and religion which would put Ireland 
into a cluster with southern European/Mediterranean countries.   Sean O’Riain 
(2004) and Nicola Jo-Anne Smyth (2005) have made the point about Ireland that it 
displays countertendencies to the Liberal Market Economy categorisation.  The 
institutional framework of Social Partnership which included farmers and 
community and voluntary NGOs in a way not replicated elsewhere in Europe, and 
operated for 22 years, is a case in point. The fact that this model did not sustain 
when the global crisis hit requires further discussion particularly the possibility that 
the model failed to reinvent itself in the manner suggested in a comparative study by 
Darius Ornston (2012) which we will return to in a later chapter.  Ireland also has an 
interventionist policy on industrial development in which it goes a long way towards 
trying to pick winners, for sectors if not for single enterprises – a concept which is 
an anathema to Liberals. 
 
In the view of Peter Katzenstein (1985) the small open economies in his study relied 
on proportional representation electoral systems and democratic corporatism to 
manage the vulnerability attached to being small actors in international trade.   
Arend Lijphart (1999) studies 36 democracies and categorised them as either 
‘majoritarian’ or ‘consensus’ models.  The former is epitomised in the Westminster 
system which operates on the simple principle of winner takes all.  In other words, in 
an election, the candidates with the highest number of votes is elected.  The 
consensus model also accepts majority rule, but only as a minimum requirement.  
Instead of being satisfied with narrow decision making majorities it seeks to 
maximise the size of those majorities.  Its rules and institutions aim at broad 
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participation in government and broad agreement on the policies that the 
government should pursue. 
 
Comparing our four countries we can note that all have proportional representation 
electoral systems although Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands operate a list 
system while Ireland uses a single transferable vote.  Ireland is categorised by 
Lijphart (ibid) as having a two and a half party system, a reference to the enduring 
but weak position of the Labour Party. The other countries all have multiparty 
systems with one party explicitly designating itself as ‘Christian’. This is an 
interesting comparison because, although a Catholic country, Ireland has never had 
an overtly Christian democratic party. 
 
There are three main types of PR.  The most common is the list PR system used in 
half the countries examined.  The system involves the parties nominating lists of 
candidates in multimember constituencies, the voters cast ballots for one party or 
another and seats are allocated to the party lists in proportion to the number of votes 
received.  The d’Hondt formula is a variation which has a slight bias in favour of 
larger parties.  A second form is the ‘mixed member proportionality’ in which a list 
and constituency local dimension are combined.  The third form is the Single 
Transferrable Vote (STV) system.  It differs from list PR in that voters vote for 
individual candidates instead of for party lists.  Votes are cast in the order of the 
voter’s preference and these preferences are distributed during the count as 
individual candidates are eliminated or exceed a quota set in relation to the total 
valid poll.  The advantage of STV is that it combines the benefit of allowing votes 
for individual candidates and of yielding proportional results.  It is rarely used, 
however, the only cases being Ireland, Malta and for the Senate elections in 
Australia (Lijphart, 1999: Chapter 8). 
 
Denmark and the Netherlands are constitutional monarchies while Ireland and 
Finland are republics of a semi-presidential character (ibid).  This means that the 
president is elected by popular vote but co-exists with a parliamentary system 
headed by a prime minister with executive power.   These powers were further 
curtailed to bring Finland closer in line with the EU governance structures.  For 
many years (1956-1981) the presidency was dominated by Urho Kekkonen and his 
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departure facilitated change. The Irish president is the formal head of state, but not 
of government, and has few powers. 
 
Different degrees of local government also apply.  Ireland is a unitary and highly 
centralised State with a high level of executive dominance.  Denmark and Finland 
are unitary but decentralised and Netherlands is categorised as semi-federal. The 
prime minister has consequently a high degree of influence in Ireland, medium in 
Denmark and low in the Netherlands.  In the Netherlands members of the cabinet 
cannot remain as members of Parliament although they can take part in 
parliamentary debates (ibid). 
 
Denmark adopted a unicameral parliamentary system in 1953 and Finland has 
always been so. The Netherlands has a bicameral Parliament in which both 
chambers have equal power unlike Ireland where the Seanad (upper house) has 
much less power than the Dáil (lower house).
23
  
 
It is also worth noting that Transparency International rates Denmark, Finland and 
the Netherlands as ‘totally clean’ in its corruption index (cited in Lijphart, 
1999:289).  Ireland, on the other hand has suffered a series of scandals over the last 
20 years involving the business-politics nexus. 
 
Lijphart (ibid) has developed a two dimensional conceptual map of democracy in 
which those countries on the left hand side are deemed to be consensus democracies 
in accordance with the criteria outlined above.  It can be seen that Finland, Denmark 
and the Netherlands fit into this category.  Ireland is problematical not fitting into 
either the consensus or the majoritarian boxes.  In fact it is exactly in the middle.  So 
just as some of the Varieties of Capitalism literature sees Ireland as a liberal market 
economy with countertendencies (O’Riain, 2004; Smith, 2005) in terms of its 
political institutions it is somewhat comparable to a Westminster majoritarian 
democracy with PR.  In this regard it is worth noting a point made by Lijphart 
(1999:306) that consensus democracy may not be able to take root and thrive unless 
it is supported by a consensual political culture.  Moreover, a consensus-orientated 
culture often provides the basis for and connections to the institutions of consensus 
                                                 
23 A Constitutional Referendum on the abolition of the Seanad on 4th October, 2013 was narrowly rejected. 
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democracy.   In the two dimensional consensus map of democracy of  Lijphart (ibid) 
four of the five elements of the executive-parties dimensions are structurally 
connected – PR leading to multipartism, multipartism to coalition cabinets, and so 
on – but there is no structural connection with the fifth element of interest group 
corporatism.  In Lijphart’s (ibid) view the most plausible explanation is cultural.  
Perhaps this can partially explain why Ireland found it so difficult to take its place 
permanently in Katzenstein’s (1985) world of small open economies. 
 
 
Figure 1: Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy 
 
 Source:  Ljjphart (1999) 
 
However, Kirby and Murphy (2011:26) warn that there are dangers within Ireland’s 
particular version of PR which, by virtue of the voters’ ability to  transfer their single 
vote in order of preference  to as many candidates as they like in multi-seat 
constituencies fosters local politicians with a focus on personal effectiveness.  The 
particulars of this Irish system of proportional representation make for a politics 
which is populist and legalist at the same time and this, according to Paus (2012), 
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caused populism and deal-making to triumph over developmentalism in the 2000s 
with tragic consequences for the country.  At a critical juncture when 
developmentalism needed to move up a gear from its credible performance in the 
1990s it actually became weaker. 
 
Huber and Stephen’s (2001) observations on partisan politics are interesting in 
relation to Ireland too.  They make the point (ibid, 343-344) that where the Catholic 
Church was strong, the development of a strong Christian democratic movement 
with a multiclass base and a project of mediation of class interest, and thus the 
development of a Christian democratic welfare state, was much more likely.  On that 
criterion Ireland should have a strong Christian democratic polity but in fact it does 
not.  John Bruton, former Taoiseach and leader of Fine Gael, the party sometimes 
regarded as being closest to the Christian democratic tradition, dismisses the 
connection saying that it was something tried in the 1930s but it got caught up in the 
corporatist thinking of that period.  It was accidental that Fine Gael joined the 
Christian democratic family in the European Parliament.  Nationalism dominated 
everything in Irish politics and his personal political icon was John Redmond, leader 
of the Irish Parliamentary Party in the early years of the 20
th
 century (interview, 8
th
  
March, 2012). 
 
Tom Garvin (2005:206) blames heavy handed leadership within the church for 
sweeping aside the nascent Christian democratic tendency in lay society in the 1950s 
through its insistence on control.  He mentions in particular Archbishop McQuaid’s 
engineering of a take-over of the social science discipline within the universities as 
generating an anti-clerical reaction which damaged irretrievably the prospects for a 
lay political Catholicism.    According to Joe Lee (1989: 579) Bishop Michael 
Browne of Galway engaged strongly in the debate about the church’s involvement in 
sociology denouncing economists and socialists who wanted to confine the church to 
‘confessional, sacristy and armchair’.  In truth the Catholic Church was so strong 
that, unlike other small European countries, Ireland had, in effect, a Catholic polity.  
Even political leaders on the left, like Labour’s William Norton, had to 
accommodate to that reality (Ferriter, 2012: 99). 
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Huber and Stephens (2001) also posit that a Christian democratic movement with a 
multi class base stunted the growth of social democracy by attracting working class 
support. Again Ireland appears to be an outlier in this respect.  Even without the 
competing attractions of a multiclass Christian Democrat movement social 
democracy has never taken a foothold in Ireland.  This is so despite the Labour Party 
being the oldest political party founded by the trade union movement in 1912.  John 
Bruton’s point about nationalism dominating everything politically is developed by 
Breen et al (1990).  His thesis is that the civil war in the 1920s shaped the political 
party structure with the two main parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, offering 
competing varieties of nationalism. Every significant issue was conceptualised in 
terms of independence rather than of class which militated against the growth of the 
Labour Party.  In a way one could say that this bears out Huber and Stephen’s 
(2001) findings except that the distraction for the working class in Ireland’s case was 
nationalism not ideology.   As Murphy (2009) points out, the influence of the trade 
union movement was greatly diminished by the existence of two competing trade 
union centres. The state of affairs had its origin in the absence in the United States of 
Jim Larkin, the principal figure on the union side during the Lockout, for eight years 
after 1913.  When he returned to reclaim the leadership of the Irish Transport and 
General Workers’ Union in 1923 he ran into strong opposition from William 
O’Brien, the interim leader.  This led to such serious division that Larkin was 
expelled from the ITGWU altogether and formed the Workers’ Union of Ireland (or 
more specifically his sons, Peter and Jim, were the people who did the organising).  
Sixteen thousand members, two thirds of the ITGWU membership in Dublin, 
defected to the new union.  This was the start of a civil war within the labour 
movement which resulted in two Congresses and two labour parties and a conflict 
which brought to the fore divisions between Irish and British based unions.  
Moreover, it deprived the left in Ireland of opportunities which were more open to it 
in the late 1920s, arguably, that at any time since.  The division with the trade union 
movement was formally ended with the formation of the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions in 1959. For a full treatment of this period refer to:  Morrissey (2007, 
Chapter 12), McCarthy (1977, Chapter 2), O’Connor (2011, Chapter 6), and Puirséil 
(2012).  To complicate matters, within the trade union movement in the 1940s and 
1950s education provision became a major cleavage with British style secular 
provision contesting with Jesuit adult education espousing the social teaching of the 
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Catholic church (Murray, 2009: Chapter 5).   Certainly Dick Spring, former Tánaiste 
and Labour Party leader, has no doubt that in his experience leading labour the 
legacy of the civil war is a major inhibitor of class politics (interview, 18
th
  
September, 2012).  Unlike the Finnish case where a party system also evolved from 
a civil war, there was little in the way of a class dimension to the internal Irish 
conflict. The bottom line is that the influences affecting the composition of the Irish 
polity are quite different from the other comparator countries where the party 
systems are structured, or founded, on class cleavages (Weeks, 2010). 
 
Another interesting area where Ireland has lagged the other countries is the degree of 
social cohesion achieved.  Ireland tends to be behind in indicators of equality, social 
transfers etc. as Huber and Stephens (2001) and Hemerijck (2013) attests by virtue 
of their categorisation of the country in the liberal market cluster.  And yet the Irish 
state has increased spending at different stages quite significantly.  Breen et al 
(1990) and O’Riain (2004) make a strong case that the issue is not so much that the 
state has not intervened but that it has intervened in the wrong way – to prop up the 
existing class structure. 
 
Nor is the polity of the other countries clear cut Keynesian in economic terms.   In 
fact the Rehn-Meidner Model adopted in Sweden in the 1950s and which has 
influenced the shape of the Nordic model generally is specifically not a Keynesian 
recipe as emphasised in Chapter 1 (Erixon, 2013).   Erik Jones (2008) observes that 
the Thatcher-Reagan neo-liberal revolution had no influence in the Netherlands.  
Policymakers from all parts of the political spectrum have long held economic views 
that would be considered neo-liberal.  It was just that these views were 
accommodated alongside a strong consensus approach to economic adjustment via 
the ‘Polder’ model.  In any event the decision in the mid-1970s to peg the Dutch 
Guilder to the Deutschemark foreclosed on economic options as Wim Kok 
(interview, 12
th
  September, 2012) pointed out.  Even in the aftermath of the oil 
crisis in the mid-1970s the Dutch followed a broad disinflationary policy while 
many countries were still responding via a Keynesian programme.  The centre right 
Christian Democrats governments of Ruud Lubbers continued with austerity into the 
1990s but they lost power to Wim Kok in 1994 for the first time in 70 years. 
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Finland has been characterised by a corporatist political culture such that 
parliamentary democracy in economic policy making has never enjoyed the same 
legitimacy as in other Nordic countries.  This has historical roots in the civil war 
outcome in which large employer organisations merged with the State in organising 
the campaign by the ‘Whites’ against the ‘Reds’.  Vartiainen (2011) argues that a 
conservative fiscal policy and a rejection of Keynesian demand management was 
partly as a result of the corporatistic political culture.     This, he asserts, is because, 
while Keynesian stabilisation policy can be attractive to the electorate and to labour 
interests, its support in a system dominated by business and export interests can be 
difficult to achieve.  In general Finnish economic policy has been quite conservative 
with even some prominent Social Democratic leaders on occasion being concerned 
about budget deficits.  Insofar as Keynesian interventionism featured it was in the 
form of repeated  devaluations and incomes policy.  Incomes policy was achieved 
through tripartite social contracts from the mid-1990s.  Its Nordic neighbour, 
Sweden, would, for example, have a far stronger Keynesian tradition than Finland, 
albeit, as already mentioned, this was modified by the Rehn-Meidner model in the 
1950s (Erixon, 2013).        
 
In a discussion about the concept of the knowledge based economy Bob Jessop 
(2010: 123) identifies some unique characteristics  of the Danish economy.  First he 
emphasises that Denmark is a small State with a negotiated economic, political and 
social approach to mobilising stakeholders and  citizens around its competitive 
economic strategy.  He notes that the term ‘knowledge economy’ first came into use 
in Denmark around 1997 but dropped out of economic discourse quite quickly.  He 
attributes this to the fact that the Danish economic model was never really Fordist 
and already displayed many of the features of the purportedly emerging new 
economy by the time the OECD began to adopt the term ‘knowledge economy’.   
 
Denmark has long been a source of particular interest to Ireland.  Rory O’Donnell 
(2010) draws attention to the similarity of size, climate, and geographical location.  
He recalls that as early as 1943 Beddy undertook a detailed comparison of the 
principal economic features of Denmark and Ireland with a view to establishing the 
basis of Denmark’s greater economic success.   This was followed by studies by Lee 
(1989), Mjoset (1992) and O’Rourke (2006).  Sir Horace Plunkett who set up the 
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Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (IAOS) was influenced by the achievements 
of Danish agriculture including the innovation of cream separators so important to 
dairy coops.   
 
However, Kevin H O’Rourke (2006) points out there are some important differences 
between Denmark and Ireland.  For example, Ireland was at one stage part of the UK 
whereas Denmark was always an independent country. Denmark has been a more 
homogeneous society than Ireland which suffered from religious and political 
cleavages and competing nationalisms.  Irish emigration far exceeded Danish 
emigration although emigration from Denmark was significant in the late nineteenth 
century.  Finally land reform was introduced in Denmark in the late eighteenth 
century more than a hundred years before Ireland.  But like both Ireland and Finland, 
Denmark has lived in the shadow of a powerful neighbour in Germany.   
 
For geopolitical reasons Finland did not benefit from Marshall Aid after the Second 
World War and Ireland received only limited assistance.  At the end of December 
1951 the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) was replaced by the Mutual 
Security Agency (MSA) changing the context of US aid provision from European 
economic recovery to strengthening mutual security and collective defence.  Ireland, 
like Finland, practiced a foreign policy with neutrality at its core and felt unable to 
sign up to the US Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 thus cutting itself off from 
further Marshall Aid after 1952.  The loss of technical assistance available under the 
programme was a big blow to Ireland inhibiting productivity improvement.  Overall 
more than six thousand European managers, workers, educators, and engineers 
visited the United States to learn production and construction methods by the end of 
1951 alone.  The programme continued for the rest of the decade and, as at the 
beginning of 1958, Denmark had received $9.01 million and Netherlands $11.28 
million.  However, Ireland’s comparative loss was mitigated to some extent by its 
involvement with the European Productivity Agency (EPA) which was established 
within OEEC in 1953 and provided an alternative source of technical assistance 
(Murray, 2009: Chapter 2). 
 
Overall the position of the comparator countries at the time when Katzenstein was 
writing in 1985 can be summarised thus; Denmark and Netherlands were advanced 
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industrial economies while Finland and Ireland were late developers in this regard.  
The Netherlands and Denmark were firmly within the German sphere of influence 
having their currencies pegged to the DM.  Finland was in a delicate geo-political 
and security relationship with Sweden and the Soviet Union, having a 1500km 
border with the latter.  Ireland had an important trade relationship with Britain, 
particularly for labour intensive food products, and was increasingly becoming a 
base for US multinationals exporting to Europe, a situation that was to accelerate 
after the passage of the Single European Act in 1986. 
 
In Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands social democracy and corporatism were 
under attack although the 1982 Wassenaar Accord began to turn the tide of opinion 
in the Netherlands.  Ireland at that time had no established system of corporatist 
exchange, early attempts at it having failed.  Social Democracy had always been 
marginal to Irish politics. In both political and economic terms Ireland was a Liberal 
Market Economy while Finland and Denmark were part of the Nordic social 
democratic model while the Netherlands was part of the Christian democratic SME 
tradition, albeit the most Nordic orientated of that cluster. 
 
Ireland was facing an existential crisis of its public finances, inflation, 
unemployment and emigration. Andersen’s (1996) pathology of ‘welfare without 
work’, gave rise to the expression ‘The Dutch Disease’ because 27 per cent of the 
population of the Netherlands was on disability or some other welfare payment. 
 
In Denmark the fact that collective agreements had automatic ‘cost-of-living’ 
adjustments built in to them meant that the oil crises generated increasing large wage 
movements which undermined competitiveness and impacted on employment.  This 
gave a strong impetus to reform in the 1980s (Lykketoft, 2009).  Finland’s emphasis 
on innovation and restructuring of its industrial base, and its use of devaluation 
cycles, left it in a more favourable employment position during the 1980s. 
 
The principal factors of convergence and divergence in 1985 can be depicted as in 
Table 10 below.  With few exceptions Ireland is at the bottom when it comes to 
economic indicators.  Its GNP growth was in fact above average and above both 
Denmark and Finland in the 1973-79 period, but, according to Mjoset (1992), this 
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performance rested largely on borrowing.  In the 1980-88s Ireland was at the bottom 
again. Consumer price inflation was the highest during both periods since 1973.  As 
for unemployment, there are interesting parallels between Ireland and Denmark.  
Both countries had a history of periods of high unemployment Between 1948 and 
1969.  After 1973 Ireland became one of the small mass unemployment countries 
and while Denmark was a little below the Netherlands, its employment record 
looked more like a continental than a Nordic country. 
 
In the next chapter we will explore how these relatively poor performances 
transitioned into ‘Employment Miracles’ during the 1990s. 
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Table 10: Characteristics of Institutional and Economic Convergence and Divergence of the Political 
Economies of the Comparator Countries in the World of Katzenstein (1985) 
 Finland Denmark Netherlands Ireland 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 
Nordic SME X X   
Continental SME   X  
Liberal Market 
Economy 
   X 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Majoritarian 
Democracy 
    
Consensus 
Democracy 
X X X  
Hybrid 
(Westminster + 
PR) 
   X 
Unitary State    X 
Unitary but 
Decentralised 
X X   
Semi-Federal 
State 
  X  
Class Base 
Politics 
X X X  
CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS 
Democratic 
Corporatism 
(Strong 
employer base-
decentralised 
until 1995) 
X X (Commenced in 
1987) 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Advanced 
Industrial Policy 
 X X  
Late Industrial 
Development 
X   X 
National System 
of Innovation 
X X X (Attempt to import 
via FDI) 
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Part of ERM    X 
Pegged to DM  X X  
Independent 
Currency 
X    
Annual Average 
Growth Rates of 
GDP (1980-89) 
% 
3.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 
Inflation (CPI) % 7.4 7.1 3.0 10 
Unemployment 
Average (1973-
85) 
Low (4.9) High (7.3) High (13) High (17.6) 
Employment 
Average (1973-
85) 
High (72.7) High (74.2) Low (51.2) Low (49.9) 
Employment 
Growth (1973-85) 
Negative (-0.1) Medium 
(0.4) 
Negative (-6.9) Negative (-16) 
 
Source:  Partially Derived from Mjoset (1992) and Lijphart (1992) 
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CHAPTER 4:  1994-2001 The Age of Employment 
Miracles 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the evolution of the political economies of Finland, Denmark 
and the Netherlands over the period 1994 to 2001 with particular reference to how 
each went about achieving the employment gains which caused the references in the 
literature to ‘employment miracles’ (Green-Pedersen, 2002; Becker and Schartz, 
2005).  Finland is an outlier to some extent because it was still in recovery mode 
after the twin crisis of the Soviet Union collapse and banking meltdown in the first 
years of the decade.  Ultimately, of course, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the decision of China to become capitalist by decree greatly enlarged the capitalist 
world and added 1.5 billion to the existing industrial workforce (Mason, 2009).  The 
world of Katzenstein (1985) was changing rapidly. The single European Act of 1986 
represented a sea change in regional integration.  Exchange control regulation in 
Europe was removed in 1990.  Financialisation of the global economy was 
increasing, culminating in 1999 with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act which had 
been enacted in the US in 1933 after the Wall Street Crash to separate commercial 
and investment banking.
24
  This cleared the way for an extensive range of sometimes 
fairly exotic financial investment products (Gyfason, 2010).  Globalisation of 
production was also a feature of the 1990s especially in the electronics industry.  In 
the world of high-tech peripherality became less important (Donovan and Murphy, 
2013, Paus, 2012). 
 
The period 1994 to 2001 is bookended by the Maastricht Treaty and implementation 
of the currency union.  The Maastricht Treaty was a crucial milestone on the path of 
European integration.  Passed in 1992 the die was cast for monetary union and the 
overriding policy imperative of the 1990s was to implement the necessary 
convergence adjustments to qualify for admission to the single currency.  Not alone 
was this achieved but a period that started with high unemployment and welfare 
expenditure, and crisis in the case of Finland, ended with considerable achievements 
                                                 
24 The purpose of the Act was to protect depositors’ money against speculative investment activity by banks.  It 
was repealed in the US Senate by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.  The banking industry had been 
lobbying for the repeal since the 1980s.  Ultimately this contributed to the 2008 crisis. 
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in these areas.  In Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands this coincided with a Social 
Democratic renaissance. 
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FINLAND 
 
Recovery to the Dotcom Decline: 1994-2001 
 
Economic recovery when it came to Finland coincided with the return to power of 
the Social Democrats although this did not imply an immediate or dramatic change 
in economic policy (Lindgren, 2011:58). 
 
In 1995 a new social democratic government led by Paavo Lipponen formed a 
broadly based coalition including the Conservatives as junior partners.  The priority 
of the new administration was to prepare the country for EMU accession.  EMU was 
very much a political as well as an economic objective for Finland since it 
conformed to the long held aspiration of being a core western European country.  
Being eligible for EMU membership required the country to attain certain fiscal 
standards.  This translated directly into the need for fiscal consolidation as well as a 
responsible incomes policy (Vartiainen, 2011). 
 
Shortly after entering office the Lipponen government presented a policy 
programme including expenditure cuts and tax increases.  This had the positive 
effect of causing a drop in the interest rate differential with Germany.  Whereas the 
ratio of debt to GDP continued to increase up to 1997 it started to decrease 
consistently from that year on.  The first central budget surplus was registered in 
1999 (ibid). 
 
The Lipponen government was also able to achieve a change of direction in incomes 
policy.  Vartiainen (ibid) maintains that the centre-right government of 1991-1995 
had a poor relationship with organised labour and no real attempt had been made to 
harness the centralised wage bargaining system to the service of macroeconomic 
policies.  The Lipponen government realised that both fiscal consolidation and an 
incomes policy were essential preconditions both of EMU membership and 
employment generation.  In Vartiainen’s words: 
 
“Economic theory suggests that loss of monetary autonomy (EMU) will in an 
economy with strong trade unions require a more stringent centralisation of pay 
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bargaining than that would be the case with a national central bank with an 
inflation target.” 
          (Ibid: 76) 
 
Accordingly, the government set about encouraging comprehensive pay agreements 
to limit the increase of unit labour costs.  The first Lipponen administration from 
1995-1999 and its successor (also led by Lipponen) from 1999-2003 were 
reasonably successful in most of its objectives.  One exception was unemployment.  
In 1999 the rates of unemployment were 9  per cent in the EU and 10 per cent in 
Finland; in 2000 Finland was still at 9.6 per cent (Personen and Riihinen, 2002, 
Vartiainen, 2011). 
 
The recovery when it came was quite rapid. By 1994 unemployment had increased 
by 12 per cent within four years.  The attempt to sustain the exchange rate of the 
Markka had to be abandoned in the autumn of 1991.  The currency promptly 
collapsed, so that the Bank of Finland’s currency index rose by almost 40 per cent. 
This contributed to a completely new direction for the Finnish economy.  Net 
exports started to increase, consumption remained moribund, fiscal deficits soared 
and a slow and painful de-leveraging process began.  By 1997 aggregate output had 
increased by 5 per cent.  In 1997 Finland’s gross domestic product equalled 23,309 
US dollars per capita which was higher than the EU average, but ranked eight of the 
EU 15.  By 1999 exports had started to recover from the effects of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  By 2000 the economy was growing again at a rate of 5.7 per cent 
while the whole EU could only manage 2.5 per cent.  In 2000 exports were 26 per 
cent higher than in 1999 and amounted to almost 43 per cent of GDP (Personen and 
Riihinen, 2002; Vartiainen, 2011).  The contribution of Nokia to the Finnish 
economy over the 20 years from 1991 to 2011 can be seen from Figure 2. The role 
of Nokia in Finland’s national system of innovation is summarised in Box 1. 
 
Sixten Korkman of the Finish Innovation Fund (SITRA) attributes the speedy 
recovery from the crisis to three factors, viz, devaluation, tax reform and 
stabilisation agreements with the trade unions.  In response to  a question about 
whether the country had become more liberal he said it had in some respects citing 
the removal of the ceiling on rents in Helsinki as an example (interview, 28
th
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September, 2012). Vesa Vihriala, Managing Director of the Research Institute of the 
Finnish Economy, recalls that there was a debate about whether fiscal consolidation 
was done too early but he feels the timing was right.  He also cites the decision to 
promote innovation through investment in R&D to change direction from being 
focussed on medium technology exports to the Soviet Union.  Also the tax base was 
broadened.  Corporation tax was reduced but offsets were eliminated.  Dividends 
were not taxed at all for a period.  He notes that reform of the labour market did not 
go very far until the Social Democrats returned to power in 1995 (interview, 28
th
  
September, 2012). 
 
However, the country’s export performance was rather asymmetrical. By the fourth 
quarter of 2000 the output of the electronics sector was almost 50 per cent higher 
than it had been the previous year, while other Finnish exports grew by only 5 per 
cent. The main cause of this boom in electronics was Nokia.  In 1992 it changed 
from being a diversified business to one concentrating on mobile communications, 
quickly becoming the world leader in this sector.  Its share of all Finish exports grew 
from 6 per cent in 1995 to 26 per cent in 2000.  It accounted for 70 per cent of 
Finland’s information technology exports.    The role played by Nokia in reinventing 
the Finnish economy is widely recognised in Finland.  Prof. Sixten Korkman of the 
Finnish Innovation Fund (SITRA) says the company was helped by its central role 
implementing EU standards in ICT and by the existence of private companies rather 
than State monopolies in the sector  But, he says, Nokia is still a bit of a mystery 
(interview, 28
th
  September, 2012).  Former prime minister, Mattie Vanhannen, 
notes that at one stage Nokia accounted for 1.5 per cent of Finland’s growth rate, 
although it is less important today (interview 27
th
  September, 2012).  The state 
secretary to the minister for Labour, Janne Metsamaki, recalls that the decision of 
Nokia to change from a conglomerate to focus on ICT was an internal company 
decision.  At one stage consideration was given to selling the company to Ericsons 
which would have been a terrible mistake. By the end of the 1990s Nokia accounted 
for 6 per cent of GDP, it accounted for 1 per cent in 2012 (interview, 26
th
  
September, 2012). 
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Figure 2: Contribution of Nokia to Finnish GDP from 1991 to 2011 
 
 
 
The entire Finnish IT cluster contained more than 3000 companies, 10 per cent of 
which were Nokia’s suppliers.  About 60 per cent of production of Finnish industrial 
companies is performed outside the country.  In 1980 Finish companies employed 
20,000 outside the country, but by 2000 the number had expanded to 200,000.  On 
the other hand 1500 foreign companies had come to operate in Finland employing 
about 10 per cent of the private sector labour force.  This internationalisation of the 
Finish economy reflects a concern with the strategic vulnerability of a small open 
economy. Domestic markets are not big enough so the countries that buy Finland’s 
products are a source of risk if their economies are not performing well. Also 
international competitiveness in a globalised world requires specialisation and this 
carries its own risk.  All in all though, Finland’s industrial policy in the 1990s would 
appear to bear out Peter Katzenstein’s (1985) thesis on small States, although it was 
not part of his original study. 
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Box 1:  Nokia and Finland’s National System of Innovation 
  
Nokia and Finland’s National System of Innovation 
 
The key to understanding Finland’s economic achievements from the 1990s onwards is to 
understand Nokia’s transformation from a pedestrian type of conglomerate to a world 
leader in information and communications technology.  According to Moen and Lilja 
(2005) there were two key factors involved.  The first was strategic coordination between 
industries which allowed Nokia to commercialise protracted development work done by 
Tele Finland within the framework of a publicly funded Nordic collaboration dating back 
to the 1960s. This collaboration provided some very rich outcomes including the Global 
System for Communications (GSM) which was ultimately adopted as a European 
Community standard for digital communications. When GSM became commercially 
available in the early 1990s it was the first such system used on a global scale presenting 
tremendous business opportunities for Nokia. 
 
The second factor was the unique enabling environment for innovation in Finland.  The 
seeds of transformation in the Finnish economy were planted in the early 1980s.  A 
political decision was made to support technology driven development and create a 
national system of innovation.  This was done by increasing research funding and 
establishing new policy making institutions.  These in turn institutionalised dialogue 
between political and economic actors which formerly had been ad hoc in nature.  A key 
institution was the Science and Technology Councils.  In effect the core coordinating 
functions of the formerly bank-based financing system were taken over by these 
institutions. 
 
Finland’s national system of innovation is interesting from a Varieties of Capitalism 
perspective.  Moen and Lilja (2005:353) observe that in a Coordinated Market Economy 
(CME) innovation is expected to happen incrementally whereas a Liberal Market 
Economy (LME) is expected to facilitate radical change.  Yet Finland, while clearly a 
CME, was able to achieve extraordinary change over the period of the 1990s. They offer 
a possible explanation in the form of the exogenous shock that hit the country by virtue of 
the Soviet collapse.  On the other hand they make the point that the basis of the 
transformation of the Finnish economy was policy decisions made in the 1980s. 
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Figure 3:  Trends in Finland’s Industrial Output from 1970 to 2000 (volume indexes, 1995=100) 
 
Source:  Personen and Riihinen (2002:250) 
 
Katzenstein’s view is further supported by the fact that 1995 marked the return to 
centralised bargaining in Finland.  The income policy agreement of that year was 
followed by similar agreements in 1997, 2001, 2003 and 2005.  In fact during the 
period 1995-2007, it was only in 2000 that wage bargaining was conducted at the 
industry level without a previous central agreement.  As in Sweden Finnish 
employers had turned against centralised bargaining but they found that 
uncoordinated bargaining rounds in the early 1990s produced higher pay increases 
than they expected.  According to Karl-Oskar Lindgren(2001) the decision to join 
the European Monetary Union was also a factor contributing to the revival of 
centralised wage bargaining.
25
 
 
Another important factor in Finland’s recovery in 1999-2000 was the strength of the 
American economy and an improving performance by the bigger European 
countries. But by the summer of 2001, when the government was finalising its 
budget for 2002, it was already apparent that America and the others were beginning 
to slow down.  Personen and Riihinen (2002) credit the government with prudent 
management of fiscal policy in light of these changing circumstances. 
 
                                                 
25According to Ollie Rehn (1996) The Liinamaa Agreement in 1968 represented “The peak in the history of 
Finnish incomes policy”.  Olli Rehn was EU Commissioner for Economic Affairs in 2011. 
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DENMARK 
 
The Danish Employment Miracle 1994 to 2001 
 
The 1990s saw the beginning of what turned out to be a period of very rapid 
expansion of the Danish economy coinciding with a prolonged period of Social 
Democratic rule from 1993 to 2001.  It was also the time when structural reform of 
the broad economy, the labour market and the welfare regime began to gain some 
traction.  Basically the Social Democrats were able to persuade people to accept 
change that they would not accept from Conservatives.   
 
It would be wrong to think that the extraordinary transition we are about to explore 
was easily or painlessly achieved.  In comparison to other advanced economies 
Denmark in the early 1990s had higher levels of unemployment and indebtedness.  
Measured in terms of days lost through industrial action Denmark, during the second 
half of the decade, exceeded all of the other EU countries.  Between 1996 and 2000, 
the average number of days lost through strikes was in excess of six times greater 
than the EU average (Campbell and Hall, 2006: 15). 
 
Nevertheless, the degree of economic progress made during the period was 
impressive.  In terms of economic growth as measured in GDP per capita Denmark 
outperformed most of the advanced capitalist countries.  Moreover, in 1998 
Denmark was able to run a budget surplus of 1.7 per cent of GDP while most of the 
other EU countries were running deficits.  The average duration of unemployment in 
Denmark was less than that of other EU countries except Norway and labour 
productivity grew faster on average during the 1990s than in the OECDs as a whole. 
Denmark was the fourth most competitive country in the world by 2003. At the same 
time Denmark managed to remain at once one of the wealthiest societies and the 
most egalitarian. During the 1990s GDP per capita increased from $18,463 to 
$22,123 making it the third best OECD country in 1998 and in 1997 it had a Gini 
coefficient of 0.21 which was the lowest in the EU.  During the mid to late 1990s 
poverty rates were reduced to 4 per cent, again well below the EU average of 12 per 
cent (ibid). 
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Table 11: Income Inequality and Poverty 
 
 
Gini Coefficient 
 
 
    1995            1997 
Poverty Rate* 
 
 
   1995            1997 
Austria 0.28 0.25 7 8 
Belgium 0.37 0.34 10 10 
Denmark 0.22 0.21 4 4 
Finland -- 0.23 -- 3 
France 0.30 0.30 9 11 
Germany 0.31 0.29 11 8 
Greece 0.35 0.35 16 16 
Ireland 0.34 0.33 8 10 
Italy 0.33 0.32 13 13 
Luxembourg 0.29 -- -- -- 
Netherlands 0.29 0.28 7 9 
Portugal 0.38 0.38 17 15 
Spain 0.34 0.35 12 13 
Sweden -- 0.23 -- 7 
United Kingdom 
 
0.34 0.34 13 16 
EU mean 0.32 0.31 11 12 
 
*The poverty rate is expressed as the percentage of household with disposable income 50 per cent 
under the median disposable income for that country. 
Source: Campbell and Hall, 2006: 16 
 
Per Kongshoj Madsen (2006) identifies the components of this successful strategy as 
including; the role of macroeconomic expansion in the 1990s; the long-term nexus 
between labour market flexibility and a generous level of economic support for the 
unemployed (flexicurity); the reforms of the labour market achieved from 1994 on. 
 
He summarises the accomplishments of the strategy as embracing a strong increase 
in public and private sector employment without deficits on the external balance of 
payments except in one year (1998). He also notes that it was achieved without a 
significant increase in wage inflation.  He observes that: 
 
“Denmark seems to have created an unique combination of stable economic 
growth and social welfare since the mid-1990s, at a time when Liberals were 
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arguing that the classical Scandinavian model was becoming obsolete and was 
no longer able to face the demands of flexibility and structural change arising 
out of technological progress and the growing forces of international 
competition.” 
(Madsen, 2006: 327) 
 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen was prime minister of Denmark from 1994 to 2001.  
According to him the government sought to kick-start the economy through 
investment in infrastructure and time limited incentives to business.  GDP growth 
went from 2.3 per cent to 5.4 per cent without inflation.  He achieved this by 
bringing the unions on board.  His proposition was rooted in investment in active 
labour market programmes (ALMPs) on a conditional basis i.e., no benefit without 
training.  It was a proposition involving obligations and rights. He says of the 
engagement with the unions: “It was a tough discussion.  The unions agreed on one 
condition – more jobs within two years or else!”. 
 
Reform and kick starting the economy went hand in hand.  By 1995 the plan was 
seen to be working so the trade unions were willing to continue with it; “You need to 
present people with a choice – people are not soldiers – it has to be a real choice, not 
a cover for austerity” (interview, 21st  May, 2012). 
 
Rasmussen’s main collaborator in this enterprise was Finance Minister (now 
Speaker) Mogens Lykketoft.  He recalls that the main worry about the high 
unemployment rate of 12 per cent in 1994 was the structural  (long term) component 
of 9 per cent.  The ‘growth packet’ included, as well as public investment and tax 
reform, a reorganisation of the mortgage market to convert old high interest loans 
into low interest loans with a longer time period.  High interest rates and the fact that 
the mortgage market had been frozen meant that resolving this problem boosted real 
estate and gave a kick start to the economy.  However, Lykketoft is adamant that the 
initiative on ALMPs – with new qualifications and training – was the most important 
single contribution to success (interview, 22
nd
  May, 2012).   
 
These labour market changes were achieved by redesigning the flexicurity model 
which is a voluntary insurance based scheme intended to give participants up to 90 
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per cent replacement income for 4 years.  It was highly regarded by the European 
Commission who made some efforts to promote it in other countries.  Wim Kok 
considered a social pact negotiated in the Netherlands in 1996 on the theme of 
flexicurity to be of seminal importance in that country (interview, 12
th
  September, 
2012). 
 
Rasmussen and Lykketoft are highly critical of the centre right government which 
took office in 2001 for hollowing out the flexicurity contract.  They say that the 
prime minister at the time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, gave tax deductions to the 
wealthy funded by cutbacks to flexicurity.  First he gave the tax cuts then paid for 
them by imposing austerity, they accuse (interviews, 21
st
  and 22
nd
  May, 2012). 
 
However, Goul Andersen (2011:116) draws attention to the fact that, 
notwithstanding Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s contract with the trade unions, the reforms 
after 1993 were not the subject of tripartite negotiations with the social partners.  
They were nearly all carried through as part of the annual budget negotiations 
between the government (minority) and other parties.  He claims this forms part of a 
broader de-corporatisation in Danish society – and fast moving political decision -
making processes.
26
  Organisations are included if there is time, and if legitimacy is 
necessary. 
 
Soren Kaj Andersen of FAOS, Sociologisk Institute, Copenhagen University, 
observes that Rasmussen’s ability to create jobs was what was important.  He 
believes flexicurity as a concept has been oversold or at least it is necessary to 
identify more precisely the circumstances in which it will work.  Whatever about the 
mid-1990s, using flexicurity to deal with the 2008 crisis was not as effective as the 
German approach to managing short time working. 
 
The trade union perspective is given by Anette Berentzen, European and 
International Officer of Danish LO.  She considers that great credit is due to Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen for kick starting the economy.  She does not believe that 
flexicurity can be successfully divorced from its cultural context and copied by other 
countries (interview, 22
nd
  May, 2012). 
                                                 
26 This is somewhat similar to what Kaspersen and Torsager (2009) describe  as ‘authoritarian liberalism’ 
referred to later in this chapter. 
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In Madsen’s (2006) reasoning the economic upturn in the 1990s was less a miracle 
and more a standard example of the demand-driven growth.  In 1994 both exports 
and domestic demand each recorded growth rates of 6 per cent. This kick start was 
sustained with steady growth rates over four years.  It was not until 1999 that 
domestic demand began to level off leaving exports to carry the expansion of the 
economy forward. This demand led expansion was engineered by the Social 
Democrats using fiscal policy when they took office in 1993.  It was helped by 
falling interest rates and rising property prices.  In 1994 alone private consumption 
increased in real terms by 7 per cent. Exports increased strongly driven by improved 
competitiveness facilitated by stable nominal wages after 1994.  However, what 
happened in Denmark in this period can also be plausibly interpreted as fitting 
Scharpf’s (1991, chapter 2) description of a Keynesian response to investment–gap 
unemployment as distinct from unemployment caused by a lack of demand. 
 
In any event the combination of causal factors outlined above stimulated ideas about 
the existence of a unique Danish model.  (Madsen, 2006: 329).  Christoffer Green-
Pedersen (2002: 45) writes about parallel developments in the Netherlands from 
1994 and speaks of a Dutch and Danish ‘miracle’. 
 
Per Kongshoj Madsen (2006), while acknowledging the tremendous achievements of 
the period, is a little more circumspect on this point.  He opines that the decline in 
unemployment can be explained easily enough within the framework of standard 
macro-economic analysis but the interesting thing is that it happened without an 
incidence of wage inflation.  He speaks instead of “The Golden Triangle” of the 
Danish employment system which embodies three unique features of the Danish 
labour market and labour market policy, via; a flexible labour market indicated by 
significant movements in and out of employment; high income replacement rates 
while unemployed; a focus on active labour market policies of upgrading the skills 
of those who find it hard to get back into employment. 
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Figure 4: The Golden Triangle of Flexicurity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Madsen (2006: 331) 
 
The labour market improvements in the 1990s can be summarised thus;  gross 
unemployment fell from 600,000 persons in 1994 to 434,000 persons in 2002.  This 
employment gain was balanced across both the public and private sectors of the 
economy and was achieved without wage inflation or deficits on the external balance 
of payments. This is based on a particular variant of flexicurity where a high level of 
mobility between firms is combined with income security (ibid). 
 
The operation of the labour market is obviously closely related to the system of 
collective bargaining for wages.  Mailand (2011:71) writes that in 1987 the social 
partners jointly agreed to take the overall macro-economic performance of the 
economy into account for wage bargaining purposes and in fact agreed on wage 
increases below the prevailing international wage inflation in order to improve the 
competitiveness of Danish industry. This joint declaration in 1987  continued to 
inform wage bargaining through the 1990s and beyond.  This was the ‘negotiated 
economy’ in action in a tangible way.  Over the period of the 1990s wage bargaining 
was decentralised to the level of individual firms to a large extent.  In 1989 the share 
of private sector wage agreements centrally negotiated was 34 per cent whereas by 
2000 only 15 per cent were centrally agreed (ibid).  According to a hypothesis 
developed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) decentralisation of bargaining could help 
to explain the subdued level of wage inflation over this period. 
 
Despite the obvious success of the negotiated economy Rory O’Donnell (2010:158) 
points to a subtle change in emphasis beginning in the early 1990s. The focus moved 
Flexible labour 
market 
Generous welfare 
systems 
Active labour 
market policies 
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to methods and procedures for devising policy prescriptions rather  than 
concentrating on substantive matters as it had formerly.  This was a move beyond 
classic neo-corporatism.  It was in response to the perceived need to change to 
structural policy which required it to change its institutions of social dialogue and 
concertation. 
 
On the whole O’Donnell (ibid) accepts this as a necessary and benign evolution.  
However, an alternative perspective is offered by Lars Bo Kaspersen and Linda 
Thorsager: 
 
“Over the last 10-15 years the Danish State has shifted power strategy.  In order 
to achieve its goals it intervenes more directly in societal matters unlike in 
previous periods,  when it most often negotiated with different societal and 
organised interests. We conceptualise this shift in power strategy as a move 
from the application of infrastructural power to despotic power.” 
 
 (Kaspersen and Thorsager, 2010: 247). 
 
This conceptualising of what began in the 1990s is located in the context of 
Denmark’s response to the pressures of globalisation.  It does not subscribe to the 
hyper globalisation thesis that State power and influence is diminishing, but rather 
that it is being reordered in response to changing exogenous forces – in Denmark’s 
case as a more direct State intervention than applying a negotiating form of State 
power. This alternative power strategy is termed ‘authoritarian liberalism’ by 
Kaspersen and Thorsager (ibid: 249). 
 
Another feature of the 1993 to 2001 periodisation was the emergence of 
Europragmatism as a refinement of Danish foreign policy. 
 
At a political level Denmark’s relationship with the EU has been a complex one 
attended by many frustrations.  In part this is due to the fact that policies favoured by 
the political elite, sometimes known as ‘the Privy League’, have been rejected twice 
by Danish voters. This happened in the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty 
and again in the 2000 referendum on Denmark’s continued Euro-cooperation.  Like 
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the UK Denmark was an EFTA graduate.  It did not share the commitment to 
political integration of the six founding members of the EC and worried about the 
implications of monetary union for its autonomy.  This mass-elite division did not sit 
well with a polity which relied so much on consensus building. The referenda of this 
period revealed Denmark as a country with a confederalist view of Europe.  It wants 
EU political decision making to complement rather than diminish the power of 
national parliaments.  It sees little value in a small well-functioning welfare state 
delegating political powers to the EU on welfare and constitutional issues.  This is 
much the same as the other Nordic countries.  They all subscribe to a model which 
delivers high quality welfare services on a universal basis by the State.  This 
approach involves a high level of female participation in the workforce and takes 
caring out of the family and into the formal economy.  This is much different than 
the  continental welfare model. Thus after the 1990s Denmark’s attitude to the EU 
was set within the limits of confederalism – a kind of Europragmatism.  This 
pragmatism manifested itself in the way Danish society, from the early 1990s, began 
the task of adapting to those demands of European integration that it was willing to 
accommodate and globalisation.  This was all part of the restructuring that was seen 
as an imperative of public policy.  Danish foreign policy traditions have deep roots. 
At one level Denmark has a ‘small State tradition’ that lends itself to a kind of 
passive adaption policy.  At another level Denmark has a more independent 
internationalistic tradition rooted in its earlier history as a small empire.  All this 
makes for the complex but yet pragmatic approach to foreign policy forged in the 
1990s (Abrahamson, 2006; Boss, 2010 b; Eichengreen, 2007, Hvinden, 2010; 
Kelstrup, 2006). 
 
It is important to note that foreign policy considerations must take account of 
Denmark’s historic and economic ties to Germany. The historic Schleswig Holstein 
link
27
 has been documented earlier but the economic links (like for the Netherlands) 
began in the 1980s when the currency began to track the D-Mark.  Niels Christopher 
Thygesen of the University of Copenhagen recalls that the early days of this 
relationship were difficult but there were no major problems after 2003.  Denmark 
had to upgrade the long term sustainability of the public finances. Debt was 
eliminated by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen but it is back up to 40 per cent of GDP now he 
                                                 
27 In the Danish Parliament building there is a stained glass window featuring two women embracing.  It is meant 
to depict a mother and daughter – the daughter representing the Danish population of Schleswig  
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claims.  He notes that Parliament signed up for the 2012 Fiscal Compact Treaty 
without reservation.  “We are a German satellite”, he concludes (interview, 22nd  
May, 2012). According to Anete Berentzen of Danish LO: 
 
 “We have always been protected by Germany. The Danish Krone was always 
supported since linked to the D-Mark.” 
(Interview, 22
nd
  May, 2012). 
 
She suggested that a factor in this regard might be the strategic importance of 
Denmark as a sub supplier of German industry.
28
   
 
  
                                                 
28 In 1993 Ireland expected support from Germany for the Irish Punt within the ERM against speculative attacks.  
It was not forthcoming and Ireland had to devalue by 10 per cent.  However, Denmark was supported (Connolly, 
1995). 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
 
The Netherlands Welfare State Reform and the ‘Jobs 
Miracle’1994-2001 
 
Whereas the period 1986-1993 was dominated by the re-emergence of corporatism 
the period 1994 to 2001 saw very far reaching reforms of the welfare state. 
 
The election of 1994 produced a result which changed the political landscape 
significantly.  The new government was led by Mr Wim Kok of the Social 
Democrats (PvdA) and included also the Liberals (VVD) and a relatively new party, 
the Democrats (D66).  It was popularly known as the ‘Purple’ coalition. This was the 
first time since 1918 that there was no Christian Democrat (or its predecessor 
parties) represented in government.  This also represented a break in the pivotal 
position of the CDA in the Dutch political system (Green-Pedersen, 2002; Visser 
and Hemerijck, 1997).   
 
The cause of the seismic shift was welfare reform.  It had become obvious towards 
the end of the previous decade that the system of social security disability pensions 
had become unsustainable.  These had been introduced as a measure to try to contain 
the unemployment numbers in the wake of the first oil crisis but, twenty years later, 
the system was being abused.  Employers were using disability pensions as an 
alternative to layoffs, and with the support of unions, in an effort to export the cost 
of industrial restructuring to the state and to allow them to hire younger, cheaper and 
more productive workers (interview with Wim Kok, 12
th
  September, 2012) .
29
    The 
government’s efforts to reform the system cost them a lot of votes because the 
disability regime was very popular.  The Social-Democrats (PvdA) lost a quarter of 
their votes and 12 seats in Parliament in the 1994 election.  Things were even worse 
for the Christian-Democrats (CDA) who lost a third of their vote and 20 seats.  
Overall, however, while the Christian Democrats were out in the cold, the Social 
                                                 
29 The President of FNV Trade Union Confederation, Agnes Jongerius, did not agree.  She argued that workers 
and employers were paying the bill through their social insurance contributions. She referred to her own 
experience of restructuring the inland shipping industry and said she had no moral qualms about using disability 
to cover people who might have lost their jobs after 30 years. But she acknowledged that high insurance 
contributions made labour costs very high.  The issue was one of sustainability rather than morality (interview, 
12th  September, 2012).  PvdA Chairman, Ruud Vreeman, added the important point that the restructuring 
concerned older industries predominantly and that the disability allowance was higher than unemployment 
benefit (interview, 12th  September, 2012). 
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Democrats were able to form a government with the two Liberal parties, D66 and 
VVD (ibid). 
 
Notwithstanding the drubbing received from the electorate the Purple government 
continued with welfare reform but tried to legitimise this by emphasising a strategy 
of higher labour force participation.  Thus ‘Jobs, Jobs, Jobs’ became the mantra of 
the government and they were right to the extent that low labour force participation 
had become the Achilles heel of the welfare state.
30
  The PvdA imposed one 
important condition on welfare reform; the level and duration of welfare benefits 
would not be tampered with.  There were essentially two pillars to the welfare 
reform project adopted on the advice of Mr Flip Buurmeijer (PvdA) who chaired a 
parliamentary enquiry into the subject which reported in 1993.  First, financial 
incentives and limited competition were used to reduce problems of moral hazard.  
Secondly, the roles and responsibilities of various actors in the system were 
restructured (ibid). 
 
The Buurmeijer committee had bluntly stated that the social partners had misused 
the disability scheme.  Acting on this finding the government removed the social 
partners from the administrative councils deciding on disability pensions and 
Parliament voted to reduce the number of advisory bodies.  At this time the concept 
of corporatism was also under attack from politicians who claimed the ‘primacy of 
politics’ in public policy making.  The combination of these circumstances induced 
the social partners to deepen their relationship with one another and unite behind a 
common approach.  One example of this was an ‘agreement to agree’ on the 
conditions for EMU on the basis of an opinion produced by the Social and Economic 
Council (SER). In the subsequent working out of the welfare reform programme the 
only scheme that did not suffer cuts was old age pensions.  Interestingly, it was the 
only area which did not involve the social partners.  Bluntly, therefore, trade union 
involvement in welfare administration, notwithstanding its contribution to job 
creation in the labour market, did not prove an effective shield against retrenchment 
(Green-Pedersen, 2002; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Visser and van der Meer, 
2011). 
 
                                                 
30 Prior to the initiation of reforms 27 per cent of Dutch citizens were in receipt of a transfer payment of some 
sort (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Linbert, 2007). 
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The employment achievements were formidable in the 1990s.  An average rate of 
employment growth of 1.6 per cent per annum halved the unemployment rate and 
had 6.8 million people in employment by 1997.  This Dutch ‘Miracle’ was 
comparable to that achieved by the American jobs machine but without the 
inequality.  How was it achieved?  A combination of Social Democratic incumbency 
and trade union pressure for an emphasis on increasing employment as a priority 
over wage increases within the corporatist model is the most likely answer. 
 
Table 12:  Employment Growth in the Netherlands, the EU and selected OECD countries 
 1983-1993 1994 1995 1996 1997* 
Netherlands 
EU 
 1.8 
 0.4 
 0.8 
-0.7 
 2.4 
 0.5 
 1.9 
 0.1 
 2.0 
 0.4 
Belgium 
Germany** 
France 
 0.5 
 0.7 
 0.1 
-0.7 
-1.8 
-0.4 
 0.3 
-0.3 
-0.4 
 0.1 
-1.2 
 0.9 
 0.5 
-0.9 
 0.2 
DK 
SW 
 0.2 
-0.6 
 1.2 
-0.7 
 1.6 
 1.6 
 1.0 
-0.6 
 1.3 
-0.4 
UK 
US 
 0.6 
 1.8 
 1.2 
 3.2 
 0.8 
 1.5 
 0.5 
 1.4 
 1.3 
 2.3 
*Projection      **Until 1993 West Germany only 
Source:  Visser and Hemerijck (1997:24) 
 
In the period under review two important social pacts were negotiated, New Course 
in 1993 and Flexicurity in 1996.  The former was signed on 16
th
  December, 1993 
and brought a multi-issue approach to the negotiations.  The agreement also marked 
a change from centralised to coordinated de-centralised wage bargaining.   Wim Kok 
places particular importance on the flexicurity agreement declaring it ‘a real 
breakthrough’.  The social partners made a compromise acceptable to government.  
Flexicurity was not just about losing social protection (interview, 12
th
  September, 
2012).   The government had, as in 1982, tried to cast the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ over 
the negotiations via the Wage Act.  The scope for this was limited because the 
circumstances for intervention are tightly circumscribed under the Act. But the 
government was also able to apply pressure by refusing to apply indexation to the 
minimum wage or to social welfare allowances. 
 
The Flexicurity agreement of 1996 represented a deepening of relations between the 
social partners.  The context for it was the inability of the 1994-1998 ‘Purple’ 
134 
 
government to agree on how to regulate a flexible labour market.  The employers, as 
a counterpoise to the unions’ demands for working time reduction, had been 
advocating for a greater degree of temporary and part-time work.  Although the 
unions were intuitively against this, fearing that it would undermine job security and 
conditions, they found that the flexibility involved was congenial to many women 
with caring responsibilities.  Accordingly, as the numbers of these atypical workers 
increased, two things happened.  A burgeoning temporary agency workers’ industry 
developed and unions changed tack to try to agree a regulatory labour market regime 
and employment conditions that would protect these jobs.
31
  In the union’s view 
these jobs would always be a ‘second best option’ but they adopted a pragmatic 
response to the reality of what the labour market had become.    Wim Kok says that 
there was no strategy behind the increase in part-time jobs.  It just happened.  The 
original intention was job sharing but this was not possible in some sectors.  There 
was a dual objective; to increase employment and to improve work life balance 
(interview, 12
th
  September, 2012). Agnes Jongerius  of FNV noted that the context 
was one of high unemployment and low female participation rates. Netherlands was 
very conservative with a marriage bar in public sector employment up to the 1960s.  
Consequently there was a pent up demand for part-time jobs.  Moreover, 
restructuring of the economy from manufacturing to services reinforced or 
complemented this pent up demand (interview, 12
th
  September, 2012).  The 
government also had difficulty getting to grips with this.  The temporary and part-
time work agency firms lobbied the Liberal members of the government to introduce 
a deregulated labour market whereas the unions lobbied the PvdA members in the 
opposite direction.  As a result the Social Affairs Minister, Ad Melkert, became 
locked in battle with the Liberal (VVD) Cabinet colleagues.  Melkert wanted to 
strengthen the hand of the unions without alienating employers. 
 
Visser and van der Meer (2011) conducted extensive interviews with the principal 
actors in these negotiations and cite the chief union negotiator, Lodewijk de Waal, as 
likening the process to ‘a kind of three dimensional chess’ in which each side had to 
deal with each other, with government, and with internally opposed constituencies 
(ibid:216).  The final outcome was that the market for work agencies and temporary 
                                                 
31 What happened in the Netherlands with the emergence of a Temporary Agency Workers’ employment 
placement industry almost certainly informed the EU Lisbon Strategy and the eventual emergence of an Agency 
Workers’ Directive.  Wim Kok was a major player in that process. 
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work was liberalised, but the employment, training, and social security of agency 
and temporary workers was improved.  In essence the unions conceded employment 
flexibility, whereas the employers conceded income security.  The deal prioritised 
employability rather than job protection.  In 1995 the first proper collective 
agreement for temporary workers, introducing a right of continued employment and 
pension insurance after 24 months of service, was concluded.  This in turn formed 
part of an agreement concluded in May 1996 at central level on ‘flexibility and 
security’ and paved the way for an overhaul of Dutch dismissal protection law (see 
also Visser and Hemerijck, 1997:44). 
 
The 1990s saw significant changes in the regulation of the Dutch labour market.  
The result was a phenomenal growth in labour force participation, by women 
particularly, at the rate of 1.6 per cent per annum.  This new Dutch ‘one and a half 
jobs per family’ model is widely admired but is not without its difficulties. Certainly 
from a union viewpoint the safety nets they managed to put in place were regarded 
as sub optimal.   But unions now have a more benign view. They consider that the 
arrangements work well and there is good social protection with the caveat that part-
time work does make it more difficult for women to progress to senior positions 
(interviews with Agnes Jongerius, FNV and Ruud Vreeman, President of PvdA on 
12 September, 2012).  One FNV representative, Martin Strickler, dissented to the 
extent that there is no investment in the labour market any more.  The Public 
Employment Service (PES) has been privatised (interview, 12 September, 2012).   
Former  President of the Dutch Employers, Alexander Rinnooy Kan, says employers 
are satisfied too although they need women to work for longer hours now.  A 
threshold of 12 hours per week is too low in his view (interview, 11 September, 
2012).  On the other hand low levels of labour force participation was formerly 
considered to be the Achilles heel of the welfare state.  By improving participation 
the Dutch dealt with one important aspect of the problem but they also had to tackle 
the issue of reform to make the welfare state sustainable.  It is to that issue that we 
will now return. 
 
In Green-Pedersen’s (2002) comparative study of Denmark and the Netherlands he 
categorises Denmark as an example of a Social Democratic political economy and 
the Netherlands as an example of a Christian democratic one, a difference that is 
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epitomised by the female labour-force participation rates in the two countries.  
However, it is also the case that the relatively low levels of female participation in 
the Netherlands left considerable headroom for employment gains, particularly in 
the services sector, in the 1990s.  On the other hand the social welfare regime was 
structured around low levels of participation.  Female labour force participation rose 
from 39.4 per cent in 1982 to 62.2 per cent in 1997.  In a sense, therefore, the 
expanding labour force might have been expected to ease the pressure for welfare 
retrenchment.  It is also necessary to reflect on another characteristic of the Christian 
democratic welfare model, viz, the financing of social security through social 
insurance contributions instead of general taxation.  The problem with the former is 
that it is damaging to low-skilled employment.  An option, which the Dutch 
followed, is to change the system of financing to favour low paid workers.  Thus by 
1997 the tax-wedge on low earnings in the Netherlands was lower than in other 
continental countries. Indeed it was lower even than in Denmark.  This was all part 
of a coherent strategy to address the ‘welfare without work’ problem which had 
dogged the Dutch economy.
32
 
 
Recall that the Buurmeijer Committee report of 1994 was a catalyst for political 
action on social welfare reform.  Not only did it result in the social partners being 
pushed out of administration but it precipitated large scale institutional change as 
well. In 1994 the cabinet of the Purple coalition  amended the Social Insurance 
Organisation Act of 1953 to provide for independent administration.  In 1995 two 
new bodies replaced the Social Insurance Council.  In 1997 a revised new 
Organisation of the Social Security Act was enacted to prepare for the introduction 
of market incentives in the implementation of social security legislation.  Also in 
1997 the social partners were brought back in – albeit in a more guiding rather than 
administrative role – in a permanent tripartite coordinating body known as The 
National Social Insurance Institute (LISV).  The LISV sets yearly premiums for the 
different social security schemes (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). 
 
                                                 
32 Lindert (2007) notes that heavy taxes on labour bring the tax burden to rest on the same income groups that 
vote in favour of the welfare state.  To a large extent workers themselves pay for the safety nets designed to 
protect the less fortunate.  This was the argument relied upon by Agnes Jongerius of FNV to justify using the 
Disability Scheme to facilitate industrial restructuring, an approach deprecated by Wim Kok as mentioned 
already (interview, 12th  September, 2012). 
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Perhaps the most significant change has been the introduction of a form of ‘managed 
competition’ to the Dutch welfare state.  For example the reform of sickness 
insurance was introduced in stages starting in 1994 and required employers to fund 
the first weeks of sickness pay. Then from March 1996 they became legally obliged 
to continue sick pay coverage, at a minimum of 70 per cent of a worker’s last earned 
wage, for up to one year.  Employers can choose private insurance to cover this risk.  
So also is the system of cover for disability open to private insurance.  In effect, this 
means that the system of coverage for sickness benefits has been privatised.  To an 
extent this also applies to health services delivery where managed competition is at 
the core of the system (ibid; ICTU, 2011).
33
   
 
Overall the Purple government’s efforts to reform social security enjoyed 
considerable success when measured in outcomes.  The total number of people on 
welfare declined quickly from a peak of 925,000 in 1994 to 841,000 in 1995, 
reflecting a fall in inflow and a strong outflow. On the other hand the Netherlands 
became a borderline welfare state.  Major cuts in its disability and other programmes 
brought the level of social transfers down close to 20 per cent which is the threshold 
identified by Peter H. Lindert (2007) as constituting a ‘Welfare State’.34   
 
Overall, Green-Pedersen (2002) finds that the Netherlands is the OECD country that 
retrenched social-security the most since 1980. 
 
Corporate governance also changed during the 1990s.  The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs was the architect of a scheme to privatise, liberalise and deregulate certain 
segments of the economy.  No doubt this was influenced by Brussels but the Dutch 
banking sector was also interested.  As noted earlier banking is a large part of  the 
Dutch economy and, taken in conjunction with large pension funds, these changes 
led to the doubling of market capitalisation.   As a ratio of GDP market capitalisation 
in the Netherlands in the 2000s ranked among the highest in the OECD countries.  
This development indicates a shift of corporate governance to institutional 
shareholders.   
 
                                                 
33 In the run up to the 2011 general election in Ireland Fine Gael health policy proposals were modelled on the 
Dutch system.  However, ICTU studies found that the limited development of the market for health insurance in 
Ireland would militate against adoption of the Dutch model. 
34 According to Lindert (2007) Ireland definitely left the ranks of the welfare state on this criterion. 
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Moreover, FDI flows into and out of the Netherlands more than doubled during this 
period.  The larger Dutch banks moved to increase their involvement with Global 
Financial Markets and to make Amsterdam a financial hub.  This did not seem such 
a clever idea in hindsight when the global financial crisis hit the Dutch banks hard in 
2008 (Houwing and Vandaele, 2011:130-131). 
 
Asked to comment on the restructuring of the economy by his government Wim Kok 
was fairly sanguine.  He acknowledged that deregulation had left the global banking 
system exposed when the crisis hit.  He said the Dutch banks were not unique but 
they did find themselves  more exposed than most.  On the concept of ‘managed 
competition’ he felt there were reasons to review the health system but the basic 
concept was sound.  His main concern was the need to develop a preventative 
approach to health care, otherwise health costs could rise to 35 or 40 per cent of 
GDP (interview, 12
th
  September, 2012). Ruud Vreeman said that public transport 
firms who came in from abroad had to employ  the old workforce.  Quality has not 
deteriorated and social conditions are satisfactory.  In health and education 
management numbers and salaries have increased while nurse and teacher numbers 
have come down.  But, he opined that the Dutch health and education systems are 
still the best in the world despite managed competition (interview, 12
th
  September, 
2012). Agnes Jongerius saw managed competition in public service delivery as a 
very liberal concept.  She recalled that when in government with the liberal VVD 
party Wim Kok had made a speech saying “ideology is from the past”.  The context 
was a booming economy and the pie was big enough to give everyone a slice. In 
effect health care was privatised with everyone obliged to have insurance.  The 
debate was about privatising a public good. There was a sense  that the pragmatic 
Dutch could manage any issue.  This was too optimistic.  The same was true of 
postal privatisation but people were unaware of the forces being released.  In general 
her feeling was that Wim Kok was an advocate for the ‘Third Way’ version of social 
democracy espoused  in the 1990s by Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. She felt this was 
mistaken. As she put it: 
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“What have market forces ever really done for us except to give us cheap 
telephones. We need to claim back our public goods”.35 
 
 (Interview, 12
th
  September, 2012). 
 
Martin Strickler, also of FNV, said that Wim Kok’s speech about  the end of 
ideology was interpreted as PvdA giving up its principles. While a lot of people 
were sympathetic to his argument “it turned out to be a wolf in sheep’s clothes” 
(interview, 12
th
  September, 2012).  On the other hand the Mayor of Dalfsen, Han 
Noten, felt that Dutch politics would increasingly converge on the centre ground 
because people want solutions (interview, 11
th
  September, 2012). 
 
Finally, it is worth recording an external event of this period which had a profound 
effect on the psyche of the Dutch people and which ultimately caused a government 
to resign.  On 11 July, 1995 Bosnian Serb forces entered one the so-called UN ‘safe 
areas’ in Bosnia, the town of Srebrenica. Thousands of Muslin refugees were under 
the protection of 400 Dutch soldiers but they offered no resistance to the Serbs.  In 
the course of the next four days 7,400 Muslim men and boys were murdered.  The 
Dutch returned safely to Holland.  Srebrenica was the worst mass murder in Europe 
since World War Two.  When the official report into the event was published Wim 
Kok and his entire government resigned as a matter of honour (Judt, 2005:677-678). 
IRELAND 
 
The Job Creating Machine – Maastricht to Nice: 1994 – 2001 
 
In many respects Ireland’s achievements in the 1990s were the most impressive of 
the countries under scrutiny.  How could a country with chronic mass 
unemployment and emigration come close to full employment and net immigration?  
How could a country with equally chronic large fiscal deficits, and public debt levels 
exceeding 100 per cent, get to run budget surpluses and a debt to GDP ratio of less 
than 40 per cent by 2000? 
 
                                                 
35 Agnes Jongerius quoted former PvdA leader, Wouter Bos as comparing the restructuring of the economy as 
akin to “letting loose Bookita in releasing market forces” (Bookita was a gorilla in the zoo which got loose and 
chased a woman). 
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In the period between 1994 and 2001 GNP grew at an average of 8.4 per cent per 
annum and 468,000 new jobs were created.  Whereas the economy had been 
stabilised prior to 1994, these were the years when real progress began.  It was this 
rapid growth that caused Ireland to be cast in the role of the test case for 
globalisation.  Its achievement was cited as evidence of how small nations can 
flourish in the global economy.  Indeed, having become famous as the ‘Celtic Tiger’, 
the Republic was widely regarded as a model economy for other countries to 
emulate.  Ireland became, in short, a showcase for globalisation (Antonaides, 2010,; 
O’Riain, 2008; Smith, 2005).  No doubt there were many factors which helped 
Ireland’s booster rockets to fire but foremost among them was a change in the value 
of the Irish pound.  The refusal of the Bundesbank to accede to Irish requests for 
support during the currency crisis of 1993 forced the government to request a 10 per 
cent devaluation within the ERM on 30
th
 January.
36
  The devaluation restored a 
competitive edge to the economy and laid the foundations for the subsequent years 
of rapid economic growth (MacSharry and White, 2000: 112, O’Sullivan, 2006: 72).  
This is also the view of former Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern.  He argued that the 
devaluation was deliberately fixed at a level large enough to give the country a 
competitive advantage.  This and the stability of the 1987 to 1992 period set up the 
Celtic Tiger  (interview, 13
th
  January, 2012). 
 
Donovan and Murphy (2013) advance the case that the more stable exchange rate 
environment post 1993, together with a growing confidence that interest rates would 
converge at German levels approaching EMU, boosted domestic demand. By the 
end of the decade Ireland was the second most open economy amongst OECD 
countries with exports and imports together amounting to 1.7 times the value of 
GDP (ibid). 
 
                                                 
36 According to O’Sullivan (2006) this was a major embarrassment to Ireland’s policy making community who 
had tried to be exemplary members of the ERM.  He observes that Mr Trichet (subsequently President of ECB) 
was indifferent to Ireland’s plight.  Interestingly, the Bundesbank intervened at that time to support Denmark’s 
currency.  Former Secretary of the Department of Finance, Tom Considine, recalls how this period was when the 
power of markets in a world of free movement of capital manifested itself.  He was struck by the fact that Britain  
had available a fund of £20 billion Sterling to defend the currency but this was swept aside by markets.  Asked 
about the failure of Germany to come to the aid of the Punt when they had supported the Danish Krone, he 
opined that this could be explained by the realisation that Denmark was a lot more stable – it would not have 
been affected by movements in an adjacent currency –  whereas Ireland was exposed to Sterling.  He posed the 
question; how would the Bundesbank know that Sterling might not drop again and expose the Punt to further 
speculative attack?  If they had tried to help Ireland there was no knowing how far and for how long they would 
have had to back to Punt (interviewed, 24th  May, 2012). 
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But Eva Paus (2012) draws attention to a conjuncture of particular regional and 
global factors and the cumulative effect of deliberate and fortuitous policies by the 
Irish authorities adopted during previous decades, first to attract FDI and later to 
advance social capabilities in education and infrastructure, as accelerating growth 
(see also O’Riain, 2004).  Horizontal and vertical industrial policies were used to 
attract investment to high-tech sectors and to support the advancement of local firm 
capabilities, both to create local linkage capability with foreign affiliates in Ireland 
and to help local firms become competitive in international markets.  It worked to 
the extent that by the end of the 1990s, Ireland had closed the income gap but not the 
capability gap.  Ireland had made virtually no income gains since joining the EU 
such that in 1986 GDP per capita was only 63.7 per cent of the EU average while 
Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands exceeded it.  But by 1999 Ireland had caught 
up with them. 
 
Economic growth was supported by investment which caused gross fixed capital 
formation as a share of GDP to rise to 17 per cent in 2000 partly due to FDI inflows.  
Net annual FDI inflows increased from $205 million during the 1970s and $141 
million during the 1980s, to $4.9 billion during the 1990s.  Labour supply was 
helped by an increase in female labour force participation from 35.3 per cent in 1990 
to 47.2 per cent in 2000 (Paus, 2012: 164). 
 
There was also a degree of industrial restructuring during the 1990s.  High tech 
foreign owned manufacturing (chemicals, electrical and electronic equipment, and 
professional goods) increased their share in total manufacturing employment from 
21 per cent in 1990 to 30 per cent in 2000.  Indigenous industry remained 
concentrated in traditional industries.  Another change was that by 2000 nearly a 
quarter of the industrial work force was employed in internationally traded services, 
up from 10 per cent in 1990.    The significant improvement in Ireland’s 
employment performance relative to the comparator countries is clear from the 
following tables: 
  
142 
 
Table 13: Labour Force Participation Rates 
 
Country                  Males                Females 
 1990 1998 1990 1998 
Finland 80.8% 76.6% 73.5% 69.7% 
Denmark N/A 83.5% 77.6% 77.5% 
Netherlands 80.8% 82.8% 53.1% 62.9% 
Ireland 77.7% 77.8% 42.6% 53.1% 
 
Source:  Derived from O’Hagan (2000:155) 
 
It can also be seen from Table 14 below that a significant proportion of female 
employment is part-time in Denmark and Ireland and especially in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 14:  Part Time Employment, 1997 
 Part-time Male 
Employment as a 
percentage of total Male 
employment 
Part-time Female 
employment as a 
percentage of total 
Female employment 
Finland 6.0 10.6 
Denmark 11.1 24.2 
Netherlands 11.1 54.8 
Ireland 7.0 27.2 
 
Source:  Derived from O’Hagan (2000:158) 
 
 
Table 15: Standardised Unemployment Rates as a % of the labour force 
Country 1990 1994 1998 2000 
Finland 3.2 16.8 11.4 10 
Denmark 7.7 8.2 5.1 4.8 
Netherlands 6.2 7.1 4.0 3.9 
Ireland 13.4 14.3 7.8 4.5 
 
Source:  Derived from O’Hagan (2000:161) 
 
Labour productivity did not improve between 1990 and 1995 but grew at an annual 
rate of 3 per cent between 1995 and 2000.  The most important external factors 
affecting economic performance in the period under review were the single market 
and globalisation of production, especially in the electronics industry. 
 
And just as structural funding was important in the post SEA period in helping to 
kick start the economy, so also were the cohesion funds negotiated by Ireland in the 
context of the Maastricht Treaty.  This second wave of funding was dedicated to 
closing the gap in economic performance between different EU countries.  It was 
focussed on providing financial assistance for projects in the fields of the 
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environment and trans-European networks.  The criterion to receive this aid was for 
a country to have a per capita GNP of less than 90 per cent of the overall EU 
average.  The improvements in governance required to access this funding is held to 
have improved public administration in Ireland (Adshead, 2008: 67-68). 
 
According to Donovan and Murphy (2013) structural and cohesion funds may have 
raised Ireland’s GNP by 4 per cent.  However, they observe that there was a 
reluctance at times to accept that the other side of the bargain was the adoption of 
German style fiscal discipline and low inflation policies.  
 
Rory O’Donnell (2008) points to the role of the EU in promoting deeper and wider 
mutual engagement between the state and civil society.  He emphasises some further 
profound effects on the Irish state as a political, administrative and legal order.  He 
cites as an example of this deeper effect, the EU approach to market regulation 
which required the establishment of numerous independent regulatory agencies. 
 
The fact that the 1987 Social Partnership Agreement, The Programme for National 
Recovery (PNR), stayed intact, notwithstanding initially disappointing social 
outcomes, inspired confidence in the parties to the agreement.  The PNR was 
followed by the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (1991-1994), The 
Programme for Competitiveness and Work (1994-1996), Partnership 2000, The 
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (1996-2002), Sustaining Progress (2003-
2005) and Towards 2016 in 2006.
37
  Maura Adshead (2008: 68) posits that the 
making and implementation of these agreements shows how closely employers and 
unions became involved both in making public policy and implementing it.  She 
refers to it as ‘partnership government’ while O’Donnell (2008: 89) describes it as 
being in part about ‘building a public system’. Nevertheless, the role of Social 
Partnership in Ireland is a highly contested space to this day (see also Begg, 2010 
and Collins, 2010). By 1993 the intellectual foundations for it were being discussed 
particularly its relationship with the models of neo-corporatism experienced in 
continental Europe (O’Donnell, 2008: 92). 
 
                                                 
37 Towards 2016 was a 10 year framework agreement which set out an ambitious programme of social change 
based on the requirements of citizens at different stages of their lives.  It was to be reviewed on a rolling basis.  It 
collapsed in December 2009, a victim of the pressures caused by the recession. 
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Ireland’s improving economy after 1993 made a positive contribution to reducing 
unemployment but its impact on social spending was less pronounced.  While social 
spending increased in absolute terms it fell proportionately from 12.3 per cent of 
GNP in 1992 to 7.8 per cent in 2000.  This welfare performance is characterised as 
being closer to Anglo-American neo-liberalism than the European Social Model 
(Millar, 2008: 101).  But is also seems to reflect Irish peoples’ more individualist 
values in explaining poverty and inequality as held at least during the 1993-2001 
period as seen in Table 16 below.  Bluntly, there is evidence of a pervasive view that 
the Irish public consider poverty to be the fault of the individual rather than that of 
society (ibid:  118). 
 
John Loughrey, former Secretary General of the Department of Public Enterprise, 
endorses this view: 
 
 ‘NESC and Social Partnership are redolent of social justice but are swept aside at 
the ballot box.  The realpolitik of Ireland is that solidarity dies at the ballot box).’  
 
(Interviewed, 7
th
  March, 2012) 
 
In his perspective Ireland is different from the comparator countries in that Social 
Partnership was never a shared vision, except in respect of the dangers to the 
economy, not about where we wanted to get to.  Unlike in the comparator countries 
it is not deeply embedded (ibid).  We will return to this discussion later. 
 
Table 16:  EU and Irish Citizens’ Perceptions of Why People Live in Need (percentage of population) 
 EU 15 
2001 
EU Poor 
2001* 
Ireland 
2003 
EU 15 
1993 
Ireland 
1993 
Injustice in society 35 49 25 40 32 
Inevitable part of modern progress 23 16 22 25 31 
Laziness and lack of willpower 18 13 25 12 10 
Because they (the poor) have been 
unlucky 
19 20 25 13 15 
None of these 6 2 8 6 5 
*’EU Poor’ specifies a subsample of respondents who are living in poverty, defined as serious solvency 
problems. 
 
Source:  Millar (2008: 111) 
 
Sean O’Riain (2008) takes the view that welfare effort during this period continued 
to preserve social solidarity by maintaining a basic level of social citizenship rights 
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on near-universal grounds, but allowed a mixture of public and private provision to 
ensure that the basic minimum of provision can be supplemented by the market.  He 
explains it thus: 
 
‘In short, the welfare state was in some respects strengthened for the middle 
classes even as it remained a minimalist support for the most excluded……it is 
the inequality of the state’s intervention in the market, rather than its withdrawal 
from the market, that distinguishes the contemporary Irish political economy.’ 
 
(ibid: 175). 
By the late 1990s the government was comfortably in surplus and a form of virtuous 
circle, the opposite of the experience of the 1980s, was in place.  The high growth 
rate of the economy caused budgetary surpluses which in turn facilitated debt 
reduction and lower debt servicing costs which led to further surpluses. By the end 
of the 1990s the debt/GDP ratio was well below the OECD average (Madden, 2000).  
This development is reflected in the trend of total government spending which fell as 
a percentage of GDP over the 1990s, as indeed it did in all the comparator countries 
(albeit having risen between 1987 and 1993 in Finland and Denmark). 
 
Table 17: Total Government Spending as % of GDP 
Country 1987 1993 1999 
Finland 44.2 59.6 47.1 
Denmark 56.9 60.9 54.6 
Netherlands 53.1 49.9 43.5 
Ireland 54.6 46.6 42.1 
 
Source:  Derived from Orla Lane (2000:86) 
 
Much of the conventional wisdom surrounding Ireland’s development in these years 
sees the period 1994-2001 as one of sustainable growth based on a competitive 
economy supporting a strong exporting manufacturing base. This is often favourably 
contrasted with the period post 2001 which is held to have been based on an 
unsustainable construction boom.  While events have supported the latter contention, 
the strength of Ireland’s manufacturing export performance in the former period may 
be somewhat overstated. 
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Sean O’Riain (2004) notes that manufacturing accounted for 18.6 per cent of total 
Irish employment in 2001 and for 14.5 per cent of the growth in employment 
between 1987 and 2001.  He makes the point that the improvements that there were 
in internationally competitive industry is not sufficient to explain the most 
impressive feature of the job creating machine that Ireland had become.  He 
identifies other factors affecting the growth in employment including expanding 
social service employment and expanding local demand for business, retail, 
construction and personal services.  If export competitiveness had driven some of 
the growth, it had gone hand in hand with public – sector expansion of social service 
employment.  Together, these twin drivers of economic development generated huge 
local demand from 1994 to 2001, resulting in rapid increases in employment in 
personal services and construction. As he puts it: 
 
‘Foreign investment and export competitiveness in internationally traded sectors 
interacted with such unfashionable factors as public – sector employment in 
creating patterns of local demand that generate further employment increases.’   
 
(O’Riain, 2004: 63) 
 
As suggested earlier, Ireland’s historical experience has been one of weakness in the 
indigenous capitalist class.  O’Riain (ibid) draws a distinction though between those 
in the traditional business elite and a new generation of entrepreneurs who mostly 
gained experience abroad, or with US TNCs, and who began to build an indigenous 
software industry in the 1990s.  Whereas at the start of that decade the indigenous 
software sector was dominated by small firms, by 2001 seven indigenous software-
product-development companies were publically listed on NASDAQ.  These were 
Smartforce, Iona Technologies, Baltimore Technologies, Trintech, Riverdeep, 
Parthus and Datalex.  Together these companies employed five thousand of the 
sector’s eleven thousand employees and generated half the sector’s revenues.  The 
earliest indigenous software firms focused either on services or made a transition to 
product development based on connections with large international customers 
located in Ireland.  By 2001 a new generation of firms were playing a more 
significant role in the economy.  They were the beneficiaries of a strongly 
interventionist industrial policy whereby the state invested in education and 
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telecommunications and made available resources to help them mobilise a 
combination of global and local resources. (ibid: 105). 
 
Donovan and Murphy (2013:13) have an interesting perspective on this period.  
They argue, following Krugman (1997), that globalisation undermined traditional 
convergence theory.  Whereas in a more industrial setting transport and 
communications costs conferred advantages on countries at the core, and where 
investment from the core could gradually help peripheral countries to converge 
economically, in a post-industrial high-tech world these concepts had started to 
become anachronistic.  Ireland had successfully made the transition from a donkey 
and cart economy to a high-tech economy without going through an intermediate 
stage of industrialisation.  Therefore it did not have legacy issues from that stage of 
development and could therefore more easily attract and benefit from investment 
attracted by low corporate taxes from multinationals involved a worldwide 
revolution in information technology.  
 
Conclusion 
 
What is remarkable about the period under review is that the four countries managed 
to re-engineer their economies in line with the Maastricht criteria in order to qualify 
for membership of EMU (Denmark did not ultimately join but its currency is pegged 
to the Euro) while simultaneously dealing with quite serious employment and 
welfare challenges.  How they made the transition from failure to success can be 
summarised in the following terms. 
 
Denmark and the Netherlands both placed a strong emphasis on human capital.  
They had less freedom of action during this period because of their currencies being 
linked to the DM.  Nevertheless, macro-economic expansion alongside active labour 
market policies was the key formula for Denmark.  A stimulus to the economy was 
achieved through investment in infrastructure and time limited incentives to 
business.  This was complemented by the famed ‘flexicurity’ model whereby high 
levels of social compensation are available within a flexible labour market, with the 
agreement of the trade union movement.  The Dutch ‘Miracle’ of employment 
growth of 1.6 per cent per annum was comparable with that achieved in the US but 
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without the inequality.  A combination of social democratic incumbency in 
government and trade union pressure to create jobs through reductions in working 
time led to an increase in part-time work and increased female labour force 
participation.  To a large extent this was not a planned outcome but rather a 
synthesis of the pressures already mentioned which originated with the Wassenaar 
Social Pact in 1982. 
 
As Eva Paus (2012) has written, unrestricted access to the single market made 
Ireland an attractive production location for multi-national corporations from which 
to export to the EU. The convergence process involved substantial net resource 
transfers from which Ireland benefited.  Structural funds throughout the 1980s 
amounted to 1.5 per cent of GDP but increased to 3.5 per cent in 1991-1993 and 
remained at 2.4 per cent for the 1990s.  Again Paus (2012) points out that this was 
equivalent in magnitude to the Marshall Aid that Ireland and other European 
countries received after the Second World War. She estimates that structural funds 
may have contributed as much as half a percentage point per year to GNP growth in 
the 1990s. This was a strong stimulus to economic activity. 
 
The employment gains in Ireland were, like in the Netherlands,  similarly based on 
increasing female labour force participation in the services sector of the economy.  
Genuinely developmentalist policies were assisted by the stabilising influence of 
Social Partnership together with the  stimulus from EU structural and cohesion funds 
and increased FDI consequent upon the 1987 Single European Act. Currency 
devaluations in 1986 and 1993 were also significnt. Social democratic incumbency 
in Finland and a return to social pacts in the mid-1990s were central to recovery 
following the 1992/93 financial crisis.   
 
The Finns completely reorientated their economy towards the west following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  Heavy investment in R&D saw the transformation of 
Nokia from a conglomerate to an ICT market leader and the consequent birth of a 
high-tech industry.  In effect both Finland and Ireland applied a developmentalist 
approach allowing them to shake off any disadvantage associated with being late 
industrialising economies and to participate in a globalising hi-tech revolution.  
Developmentalism is defined in this context by Eva Paus (2012) as using active 
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industrial policies to advance social capabilities.  She laments that, in Ireland’s case, 
the policy coherence underpinning this approach did not survive into the 2000s.  It is 
that periodisation we will now consider. 
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CHAPTER 5:  2001-2008 European Integration 
Intensifies 
 
 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the conduct of policy in each of the 
countries in the study in the period between 2001 and 2008 when the world was 
incubating the most acute financial system crisis since the Wall Street crash of 1929.  
By 2001 the global context had shifted still further from that in which Katzenstein 
(1985) analysed the polities of the selected small open economies of Europe.  That 
those countries had displayed a remarkable capacity for adaptation to changing 
circumstances is evident from the previous chapter. Ireland and Finland too seemed 
to be set to be developmental states characterised by innovative, nimble and 
coherent policies. 
 
In the first half of the decade there were a number of significant exogenous forces in 
play, any one of which would have been challenging on its own for a small open 
economy to deal with. 
 
The growth of a globalised ICT industry, and the power and influence of Silicon 
Valley in particular, had a big impact on financial markets.  This was characterised 
by vast flows of financial capital as investors and financial institutions tried to link 
in to the high-tech growth miracle.  Growing financialisation and financial product 
innovation meant increasing quantities of money looking for ever better investment 
returns.  It seemed for a time that all a company had to do was to append ‘dot.com’ 
to its name and then make an initial public offering at whatever price it choose. The 
fact that it had no earnings and no track record did not deter markets.  On 10
th
  
March 2000, the NASDAQ Composite Index peaked at 5000, double its value of the 
previous year.  The inevitable crash of the newly minted dot.com companies brought 
the internet boom down to earth with a bang throughout 2000 and 2001. Coinciding 
with war in Iraq, it led to a sharp downturn in the US economy and global trade.  
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The second significant factor was the advent of the new Euro currency on 1
st
 
January, 2002 and the third was the enlargement of the EU to include ten new 
central and Eastern European states on 1
st
  May, 2004. 
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FINLAND 
 
EMU to the Onset of the Global Crisis: 2001-2008 
 
The  revival of coordinated bargaining in Sweden and Finland in the late 1990s 
indicated at least a partial return to coordinated capitalism in those countries.  In 
Finland a major reform of pensions in 2005 was a direct result of tripartite 
bargaining between the social partners and the government.  There were also 
indications in both countries of a reversal of the more pronounced aspects of the 
liberalising trend which had influenced policy by the early 2000s.  The evidence for 
this can be seen in the mitigation of the welfare cuts implemented in the recession of 
the 1990’s.  Still there was no retreat from product market deregulation or 
liberalisation of corporate governance (Lindgren, 2011:62).
38
 
 
Average labour productivity growth in the economy between 1994 and 2003 was 
ahead of most EU countries at 2.5 per cent according to Vartiainen, (2011).  He lays 
a lot of stress on the contributions of the ICT sector and its rapid expansion led by 
Nokia.  He notes that, in contrast to the post war phase of capital accumulation, the 
new wave of productivity growth was driven by new technical processes, instead of 
just capital widening.  He draws attention to the significance of the so-called 
‘between effect’ in which the movement of workers from lower productivity to 
higher productivity firms boosts overall productivity.  He notes that there was also 
an increase in the quality of human capital which was partly a consequence of the 
policy failure of the crisis because so many people lost their jobs in primary and 
secondary production.  Of importance too, according to Vartiainen (ibid), were the 
Social Partnership agreements since they imposed a uniform pay increase on all 
segments of the labour market, meaning that the ICT sector which increased its 
productivity faster could of course enjoy a huge boost in profitability.
39
 
 
  
                                                 
38Lindgren (2011:62) is careful to point out that this trend towards corporate governance liberalisation should not 
be overstated.  It has not made much impact on the dispersion of ownership. Ownership is still quite heavily 
concentrated in family owned firms. 
 
39 This phenomenon was identified also in the multinational sector in Ireland by McGuinness et al (2010) who 
showed how the FDI sector was a significant beneficiary of the various Social Partnership agreements. 
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Table 18: Economic Outcomes in Finland, 1970-2004 
 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 
Finland        
Unemployment 2.9 5.7 5.8 5.0 10.9 12.9 9.1 
Employment 69.0 69.6 72.0 72.8 65.9 63.3 67.6 
Growth 5.6 2.4 3.1 4.0 -1.4 4.6 2.9 
Inequality 26.7 21.4 20.5 20.0 20.3 23.4 25.8 
Productivity - - - 2.6 1.1 2.3 2.0 
 
Source: Lindgren/2011: 48-50) 
 
 
By 2007 there was a change in political sentiment.  The Social Democrats did badly 
in the election of that year ending up only the third largest party in Parliament.  The 
Conservative Party emerged as the winner with the largest number of seats. 
Interestingly, however, as Vartiainen (ibid) observes, they campaigned on what was 
an essentially Social Democratic platform. In his interpretation this means that 
centre right parties can only win elections if they stick with the Social Democratic 
model.  He considers this to be the fundamental victory of the labour movement in 
all the Nordic countries. 
 
Karl-Oskar Lindgren (2011:66-67) concurs with this noting that Finnish politicians 
of all persuasions took great care to present welfare cuts, when they occurred, as a 
means to maintain the universalistic welfare state rather than as a way to abolish it.  
He further notes that the trade union movement remains strong and that in reviewing 
a period of change it is important to distinguish between institutional changes which 
weaken the capacity for coordination from those which do not. 
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DENMARK 
 
Structural Reform Intensifies in Denmark: 2001-2008 
 
Denmark’s europragmatism, based on a deep confederalism which leaves room for 
cultural differentiation and a variety of societal models within an integrated 
economic and political network, was seen to work around the turn of the 
millennium. The country’s economic success was largely due to institutional 
innovation, the negotiated economy concept of policy learning and corporatist 
strategies, a high degree of social and cultural capital and all embedded in national 
narratives, institutions and historical experience (Boss, 2010b: 286). 
 
And this economic success was complemented by impressive social cohesion. 
According to the Human Development Index, the OECD, the EU and other 
international organisations, Denmark has become one of the most successful 
economies in the world.  The World Economic Forum in 2003 ranked Denmark first 
overall in the quality of its public institutions. This metric covered measures 
including judicial independence, quality of property rights, enforceability of 
contracts and political corruption.  The same report ranked Denmark first in the 
world in terms of the effectiveness of public policy in reducing income inequality.  
Active labour market policy and wage bargaining seemed to have institutionalised 
the capacity of business and labour to constantly adapt to changing circumstances.  
The progress made by Denmark in comparison with other countries in achieving 
higher living standards from the 1970s to the end of the millennium can be seen in 
Table 19 overleaf.  (Campbell and Hall, 2006; Kaspersen and Thorsager, 2010). 
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Table 19:  GDP Per Capita  
(1990 Dollars) 
 
 1973 1990 1998 
Australia 12,759 17,043 20,390 
Austria 11,235 16,881 18,905 
Belgium 13,945 17,194 19,442 
Canada 13,838 18,933 20,559 
Denmark 13,945 18,463 22,123 
Finland 11,085 16,868 18,324 
France 13,123 18,093 19,558 
Germany 11,966 15,932 17,799 
Greece 7,655 9,984 11,268 
Ireland 6,867 11,825 18,183 
Italy 10,643 16,320 17,759 
Japan -- -- -- 
Luxembourg -- -- -- 
Netherlands 13,082 17,267 20,224 
New 
Zealand 
12,513 13,825 14,779 
Norway 11,246 18,470 23,660 
Portugal 7,343 10,852 12,929 
Spain 8,739 12,210 14,227 
Sweden 13,493 17,680 18,685 
Switzerland 18,204 21,616 21,367 
United 
Kingdom 
12,022 16,411 18,714 
United 
States 
16,689 23,214 27,331 
Average 12,020 16,454 18,811 
 
Source:  Campbell, Hall and Pedersen, (2006: 15) 
 
Denmark’s appreciation of the vulnerability of small nations to exogenous shocks 
and the forces of globalisation in general was well captured in the prime minister’s 
opening speech to parliament in October, 2000. This is what he said: 
 
“…..concerning globalisation and the new international economy.  Denmark’s 
dependence on the surrounding world is bigger than ever before……the 
constant international changes are a reality.  These are conditions of existence 
for Denmark in the future – both as a source of continuous wealth and as a 
pressure on our welfare.”  
 
(Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup, 2000; cited in Kaspersen and Thorsager, 2010: 260). 
 
This statement by the leader of the Social Democrats is evidence of how much the 
discourse on globalisation, its threats and opportunities, had been assimilated by the 
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Danish political elite.  The resultant preoccupation with restructuring the economy 
and society to cope with these issues continued through the early to mid-years of the 
first decade of the new millennium.   
 
Kaspersen and Thorsager (2010: 157) go so far as to say that the Danish political 
elite viewed globalisation as a potential crisis requiring the State to intervene 
extensively and intensively in societal matters.  They see this as a departure from the 
traditional approach of engaging civil society.  They argue that a gradual move 
toward the application of a more authoritarian liberal power strategy is discernible 
from 2001 onwards under the centre right coalition government. 
 
Certainly structural reform of the public sector continued at a heightened pace.  The 
idea of further major reforms was tabled by the government in 2002 for 
implementation by 2007.  In 2004, on the initiative of the education minister (a 
Liberal), a law was passed giving the State much more power to directly intervene in 
the running of schools – contravening a 150 year old tradition of allowing self-
government of primary and secondary schools. Earlier, in 2003, the governance 
structure of the universities was reformed.  A Welfare Commission was established 
in 2003 to analyse and make recommendations about the challenges facing the 
welfare regime. A Globalisation Council was established in 2005 which was charged 
with advising the government on the topic.  In relation to welfare and the labour 
market a special low cash benefit for immigrants was introduced in 2002 to prevent 
them accessing the high unemployment income replacement rates available to 
Danish citizens.
40
  More generally the Conservative-Liberal government in 2003 
introduced a radical reform of the labour market focused on getting people back to 
work quickly through activation.  It must be said, however, that Denmark’s spend on 
active and passive labour market measures in 2002 was the highest in the OECD 
(Kaspersen and Thorsager, 2010; Madsen, 2006).
41
 
 
Pensions were another important area of welfare reform.  Extensive tripartite work 
in the 1980s prepared the way for agreement in the collective bargaining round of 
1991.  Sectoral Pension Funds were established which took the form of investment 
                                                 
40 In 1993 Danish workers were entitled to receive 90 per cent of their wages prior to unemployment.  This was 
subject to a ceiling of 162,000 DKK (21,800 euro). 
41 The labour market reforms of 2003 are outlined in Madsen (2006: 337). 
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companies with both social partners equally represented on the board and with a 
trade union chairman.  By 2003 it was estimated that 92 per cent of all employers 
had coverage under these arrangements, although not all to the same extent 
(Mailand, 2011:82).
42
 
Towards the end of the period under review societal tensions began to emerge in 
Denmark which exposed the difficulty of transitioning from a homogenous 
population to one with a high immigrant content.  Cartoons in a Danish magazine 
depicting the prophet Muhammad in an unflattering way caused offence amongst the 
Muslim community and even resulted in riots in the Arab-Muslim world in 2006 
(Hill, 2010: 317). 
 
Poul Rasmussen says he lost the 2001 election because of a second wave of 
immigration from the Balkans in the 1990s.  He believes that Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen capitalised on this with the right wing Danish Peoples’ Party to create 
fear – a fear that was heightened by the 9/11 incident.  Mogens Lykketoft says that 
there are welfare sustainability issues connected with immigration for some groups.  
Muslims from rural areas in Turkey, for example have difficulty with issues around 
language and women joining the labour force.  This situation calls for passive 
welfare support in what is an active system (interviews, 21
st
  & 22
nd
  May, 2012). 
Anette Berentzen of the Danish LO says that failure by public bodies – and trade 
unions – to recognise local problems caused by immigration and lack of early 
integration efforts to help Mayors, caused the arrival of the Danish Peoples’ Party 
and allowed them to tap into a sentiment of people saying ‘enough is enough’.  But 
it was an over-action. She pointed out that there was no popular support for revoking 
the Schengen Accord on border control.  “The bottom line on immigration is that 
most people just want a job” she says (interview 22nd  May, 2012).  Former Social 
Democrat MP, Klaus Haekkerup, is not so sanguine. “ We have tried to integrate too 
fast without considering the social and economic cost. With wiser policies the 
resentment this caused could have been avoided” he declares (interview, 22nd  May, 
2012). 
  
                                                 
42 In 2005 Parliament decided that all employees should have a statutory right to occupational pensions (Mailand, 
2011:87). 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
 
‘Polder’ Model of Consociational Democracy Challenged – 
Immigration Concerns Influence Politics and Undermine 
Commitment to European Integration: 2001-2008. 
 
By the first years of the twenty first century Europe began to experience an 
extraordinary wave of immigration.  According to the Pew Research Religion and 
Public Life Project (2011) there were 44 million Muslims in Europe in 2010 
representing 2.7 per cent of the global Muslim population and 6 per cent of Europe’s 
population.  Such a large influx of religious people to communities which had been 
more or less secular in outlook posed difficult questions of social policy.  In the 
Netherlands there appeared to be a broad sense of tolerance for cultural distinction 
but this was called into question by subsequent events.  Public debates about 
immigration and asylum precipitated the rise to prominence of a new generation of 
xenophobic parties like the True Finns in Finland, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and 
List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands.  Tensions in the Netherlands were heightened 
by the assassination of Pim Fortuyn and a film director, Theo Van Gogh. Judt (ibid) 
argues that the problem was compounded by the absence of a counterweight to anti-
immigrant sentiment in the form of strong organs of the political left which, in the 
past, could corral and mobilise the insecurity people felt under the banner of class.   
In the Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn won 17 per cent of the vote in the 2002 general 
election in the aftermath of its leader’s assassination.   The party joined the 
government for a short period but its support collapsed in the next general election.  
With just 5 per cent of the vote its parliamentary representation declined from 42 
seats to 8.  To be fair to Fortuyn and his party they were not the reincarnation of a 
1930s model fascist party.  In fact they argued that Dutch traditional tolerance was 
under threat from religious fanaticism and retrograde cultural orientation of the new 
Muslim minorities (ibid:  744-745).  Mr Geert Wilders, Mr Fortuyn’s successor, is 
more aggressive.  In his case strong anti-Muslim vitriol is supplemented by anti-
Euro invective (Economist, 8
th
 September, 2012). 
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The two coalition governments led by Wim Kok over the period 1994-2002 
coincided with mainly stable economic conditions.  However, there was a downturn 
following on the so-called ‘dot-com’ crash in 2001 which, when associated with 
growing anti-immigrant sentiment, cost the loss of many seats from the Social-
Democrat PvdA to List Pim Fortuyn.  The new government was formed only after 
difficult negotiations which lasted three months.  It was a coalition led by Mr Jan 
Peter Balkenende of the Christian Democrat CDA with the Liberal (VVD) and List 
Pim Fortuyn (LPF).  However, this government disintegrated after only eighty-six 
days in office.  New elections were scheduled for January 2003. Faced with a 
deteriorating economic situation the Balkenende government adopted a very 
confrontational and ideological stance towards the principal union federation, FNV.  
This manifested itself in the elimination of the programme of ‘assisted jobs’ in local 
public services which was the flagship social policy of the previous government led 
by Wim Kok.  The outcome of this confrontation was a wage norm of 2.5 per cent 
for 2003 and the retention of some of the assisted jobs programme (Visser and van 
der Meer, 2011:217).
43
   
 
In the January, 2003 elections the List Pim Fortuyn vote substantially returned to the 
PvdA such that it regained what it lost in 2002.  Nevertheless, it ended up behind the 
Christian Democrat CDA and the initiative in forming a government fell to them.  
This time it took four months to form a government with the Liberals VVD and the 
Social-Liberal and radial Democrats 66 (D66). At this time the stance of the 
employers was for wage moderation.  This objective was not helped by a decision of 
the new government to achieve an extra €1.8 billion in extra savings to help meet 
EMU deficit criteria.  Visser and van der Meer (2011) observe that, contrary to 
expectations, an accord was reached in November 2003 for a zero wage increase in 
2004 and increases ‘approaching zero’ in 2005.  In return the government agreed to 
negotiate proposed changes to early retirement, disability and unemployment 
benefits.  In the event these negotiations were not successful and by mid-2004 FNV 
resiled from the terms of the 2003 agreement.  According to Barry Eichengreen 
(2007:417) the Christian Democrats led government had formed the view by 2004 
                                                 
43 This author recalls a discussion at an ETUC meeting in Brussels at this time with Mr de Waal of FNV in 
which the latter expressed the view that the Balkenende people seemed to be influenced by a kind of religious 
ascetiscm – if it wasn’t hurting it wasn’t working. 
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that the ‘Polder’ model of collaboration and consensus decision making had become 
too costly for a world of intense international competition. 
 
In their analysis of what happened at this juncture Visser and van der Meer (2011) 
draw attention to an ill judged media interview in which the employers’ VNO-NCW 
Chairman, Mr Jacques Schraven, suggested that trade unions were becoming 
irrelevant. The government also overplayed its hand by presenting a bill to 
parliament claiming that collective agreements need only be made universally 
applicable when it suits the government. The unions judged that they would have to 
react decisively against this twin pronged attack or see their influence diminish 
considerably.  So, on 2 October, 2004, the unions brought 300,000 members to 
Amsterdam’s Museum Square.  It was the largest demonstration of raw union power 
since the war and brought a greater sense of realism to the thinking of both 
employers and government.  The government was further unnerved at this time by 
the murder of film director, Theo van Gogh, by an Islamic terrorist.  Fearing social 
unrest the government opened informal discussion with the unions which, after an 
exploratory period, revealed that a deal was possible.  The employers were to some 
extent left in the dark but when an agreement was reached between the government 
and FNV they felt that they had little choice but to sign up for it.  The core element 
of the agreement preserved the collective nature of the regime of early retirement 
and the retention of the possibility of retirement at age 60 for those with 40 years’ 
service. Certain fiscal advantages for early retirement were scheduled to end in 2006 
but for other changes a transition to 2022 was agreed.  The government reversed its 
intended further reforms of disability pensions and unemployment insurance.  The 
matter was left to be discussed by the Social & Economic Council (SER) which in 
2005 produced advice acceptable to all parties. 
 
After 2004 relations between the government and the social partners stabilised.  All 
major organisations elected new leaders and in the 2007 election PvdA was back in 
coalition with CDA in a centre-left government.  The VNO-NCW employers 
precipitated a crisis by demanding a reform of dismissal protection.  In this they 
were supported by the new CDA Minister for Social Affairs, Mr Piet Hein Donner,  
but faced stiff opposition from PvdA ministers such that the government nearly fell.  
In accordance with a well-established procedure of Dutch politics the controversial 
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issue was referred to a ‘Committee of Experts’ which produced ideas but not a 
definitive proposal. Contrary to expectations this issue was resolved in direct 
negotiations between Ms Agnes Jongerius, head of FNV and Mr Bernard Wientjes, 
chair of VNO-NCW, in September, 2008.  The dismissal protection system remained 
the same but the costs were capped. The accommodation was timely as all parties 
were to be tested by the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis (ibid). 
 
Figure 5: Social Pacts, Government Coalitions, GDP Growth and Unemployment in the Netherlands 
 
 
Source:  Visser and Van der Meer (2011:208) 
 
 
In 2003-2004 a constitutional convention of the European Union produced a draft 
constitution which, given its record of commitment to EU integration, was 
surprisingly rejected by the Netherlands in the spring of 2005.  The intention of the 
constitution had been to create a political counterweight to a European Central Bank 
preoccupied with price stability.  This generated a shocked realisation amongst 
European policy elites that there was nothing inevitable about the further course of 
European integration (Eichengreen, 2007; Judt, 2005).  One possible explanation for 
the change of attitude on the part of the Dutch is the demise of the Stability & 
Growth Pact in 2003 as a cornerstone of EMU.  In 2004 France and Germany both 
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broke the terms of the Pact but, because of their political weight, could not be 
punished for it. 
 
Wim Kok’s assessment is that the 2005 rejection of the Constitutional Treaty was 
due to “a complete lack of interest in the whole process”.  He says it was a mistake 
to call it a constitution – otherwise there might not even have been a need to hold a 
referendum.  Another factor was that the Balkenende government was not popular.  
But he feels that support for Europe has regressed for a number of reasons – perhaps 
to punish governments (interview, 12
th
  September, 2012).  Alexander Rinnooy Kan, 
President of the Social and Economic Council, believes it was a rejection of the 
Dutch elite.  It also reflected the influence of Pim Fortuyn.  He believes there is huge 
support for integration and for the EMU in the Netherlands.  He said the attitude was 
that changes cannot be ignored.  It is better to face up to them and try to look after 
the victims.  In his words “integration is a non-debate topic” (interview, 11th  
September, 2012). 
 
By 2008 the Netherlands had completed a twenty year transition from being a ‘sick’ 
economy to ‘Dutch Miracle’.  Its productivity exceeded that of the United States and 
it had achieved virtual full employment.
44
  This had been achieved while preserving 
the institutions of a consociational democracy. The ‘Polder Model’ had been 
challenged politically and by external economic conditions and had come through 
unscathed.  The Netherlands was one of six countries that would provide an anchor 
during the banking crisis about to break over Europe. 
 
  
                                                 
44 An employment rate of 74 per cent in 2007 was in line with Nordic achievements but a very high proportion of 
jobs (60 per cent) are part time (Houwing and Vandaele, 2011:135). 
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IRELAND 
 
The False Boom:  Nice to Lisbon: 2001 – 2008 
 
Friedrich Engles once wrote of Ireland: 
 
 ‘The worst thing about the Irish is that they become corruptible as soon as they 
stop being peasants and turn bourgeois’. 
 
 (Ireland and the Irish Question P. 372 cited in O’Sullivan, 2006: 59) 
 
By the end of 2000 there were six tribunals investigating a range of governance 
failures in the corporate and public spheres in Ireland:  The Moriarty Tribunal 
investigating payments to Charles Haughey and Michael Lowry – a former Fine 
Gael Minister for Transport & Communications; The Flood Tribunal investigating 
planning corruption; The Laffoy Commission on the abuse of children in 
institutions; The Lindsay Tribunal on the infection of haemophiliacs by 
contaminated blood; The Barrow Inquiry on the Dublin Monaghan Bombings in 
1974; and a Non-Statutory Dunne Inquiry into organ retention in hospitals.  The 
early 1990s had seen an investigation into the collusion of government and business 
in the beef trade arising from a BBC documentary by Susan O’Keefe Where’s the 
Beef?.  Perhaps the most bizarre event to lead to a tribunal of enquiry involved 
supermarket tycoon, Ben Dunne.  As  a result of a cocaine snorting incident in 
Florida resulting in  Mr Dunne’s arrest his family business colleagues tried to oust 
him but found out in the process that he had given huge sums of money to certain 
politicians, which in due course led to the establishment of the McCracken Tribunal 
in 1997, the findings of which led to a wider tribunal into payments to politicians.  
The banks too were up to their necks in corruption.  Between 1989 and 1993, Allied 
Irish Bank (AIB) operated over 50,000 bogus overseas accounts in order to avoid 
paying DIRT (Deposit Interest Retention Tax) Tax, and in a secret deal with the 
Revenue Commissioners it was agreed to keep the issue under wraps and to impose 
no penalties.  The Irish section of a European Values System Study found that while 
Irish people were less tolerant of sexual morality infringements they were more 
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tolerant than other Europeans of social welfare fraud or tax evasion (Ferriter, 2005:  
677 -681). 
 
Economic growth was happening without any essential change in industrial strategy 
according to O’Hearn (2001: 191).  As in the 1970s and 1980s the IDA targeted the 
leading sectors of global production – computers, pharmaceuticals and 
internationally traded services – and the economy rode on that growth. 
 
It was, he argues, practically a universal conclusion among orthodox economists that 
wages and spending must be constrained for fear of making the economy 
uncompetitive.  Yet wages make up only a very small part of the costs of the TNCs 
that drove Ireland’s economic growth and despite the fact that Ireland had the lowest 
ratio of public spending  to GDP in the EU (see also Gray et al, forthcoming: 93).
45
   
 
In consequence O’Hearn (2001) argues that inequality in society was not just a side 
effect of the rapid growth in Ireland during the 1990s: it was a direct consequence of 
the neo-liberal economic model that was seen to be responsible for growth.  Thus, he 
argued, Irish growth in the 1990s was disarticulated.  It was not based, like that in 
small European economies which earlier developed to core status, on the 
development of a local market for products that could be the centre of innovation 
and expansion.  It was driven by the rapid external growth of the 1990s, by the new 
investment patterns that were associated with it and by the European policies that 
increased its attractiveness as a market for US goods.  About the future he entered 
some serious reservations: 
 
‘Although the mainstream economic experts refused to contemplate it, questions 
still remained as to whether this form of economic growth was sustainable or 
even desirable’.……as the limitations of Irish-style neo-liberal development 
become clearer, semi-peripheral countries may return to a model based on more 
interventionist and regulatory forms of developmental state.’ 
 
(O’Hearn, 2001: 193) 
 
                                                 
45 Even in 2010 average labour costs account for only 13 per cent of net output for foreign-owned manufacturing 
firms in Ireland. 
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This prediction was made as Ireland entered another phase of development.  The 
limitations of the neo-liberal growth model were not to become apparent for almost 
another decade.  In any case it was not universally accepted that the Irish state could 
be simply classified as a story of neo-liberal globalisation.  Authors such as O’Riain 
(2004, 2008) and Smith (2005) pointed to the role of the state in social and economic 
matters which, at the very least, constituted strong counter tendencies to neo-
liberalism.  Smith points in particular to Social Partnership as the most controversial 
and contested of the counter tendencies. (Smith, 2005: 120). 
 
Former Secretary General of the Department of the Taoiseach, Dermot McCarthy 
describes it thus: 
 
‘Social Partnership was constantly challenged within the system although nothing 
else was.  Ministers too were never happy because Social Partnership limited 
their scope to claim big initiatives.’   
 
(Interview, 4
th
  February, 2010) 
 
Former Director General of IBEC, Turlough O’Sullivan was equally scathing about 
the critics of Social Partnership: 
 
‘People who criticise it do so from a position of ignorance or malevolence – they 
did not understand what happened before or how we were able to sort out the 
problems.’ 
 
(Interviewed, 2
nd
  February, 2012) 
 
It is part of the accepted economic orthodoxy in Ireland that tax cuts created the 
Celtic Tiger economy.  But actually, in the macro economy, lower taxes largely 
came into force after the boom began to slow down.  The cutting of taxation was a 
political strategy that was made possible by the boom.  The result was levels of 
public spending in line with the US but considerably lower than the EU average.  In 
fact the culture relating to taxation in Ireland was central to the 2008 crisis and is at 
variance with that of other small countries in Europe.  As O’Riain (forthcoming 
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2014: 207) points out, corporate taxes are kept low to attract foreign firms, while 
Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI) and the broader tax wedge are kept low in 
order to promote smaller service employers. Crucially, the property sector was 
promoted by low rates of capital gains taxes.  Even the initial attempt to cool down 
the property market through the use of stamp duty transaction taxes had the effect of 
making the public finances dependent on the property bubble.  By 1997 Irish 
government spending had fallen to 35 per cent of GDP, marginally ahead of the US 
but 13 per cent below the European average (O’Riain, 2004:  Sweeney, 2004). 
 
Table 20: Ireland:  Central and Local Government Current Expenditure, 2000-2009 
Year % of GDP % of GNI 
2000 25.3 29.3 
2001 26.3 31.0 
2002 26.8 32.3 
2003 27.0 31.6 
2004 27.5 32.2 
2005 27.8 32.3 
2006 28.0 32.0 
2007 29.3 33.8 
2008 33.8 39.0 
2009 39.1 47.1 
 
Source:  CSO (2010) 
 
In terms of GDP per capita, Ireland moved over the course of the 1990s from a 
position of around 60 per cent of the EU average (which was consistent over the 
whole period from 1973 when Ireland joined the EEC)  to 145.4 per cent in 2006 
making it the second richest country in the EU after Luxembourg.  However, this 
disguises the true position.  Because of the relative importance to the Irish economy 
of TNCs, and because they repatriate about €32 billion in profits, Ireland is unique in 
having a gap of the order of 20 per cent between GDP and GNP.  For this reason 
Gross National Income (GNI) gives a more accurate reflection of relative living 
standards.  Using this indicator lowers Ireland’s place in 2006 to 125.2 per cent of 
the EU 27, or fifth place after Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark 
(Kirby, 2010: 32-33; O’Riain, 2008: 178)46. 
  
                                                 
46 In 2009 Ireland still had the second highest GDP per capita in the EU27 at 31 per cent above the EU average.  
But the value of GDP fell by 11.3 per cent in 2009.  Based on Gross National Income (GNI) Ireland had fallen to 
tenth highest place (CSO, 2010). 
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Table 21:  Per Capita GDP Growth, 2000-6: Ireland in the EU 
Country 2000 2006 
Luxembourg 200.0 279.1 
Ireland 
(GDP) 
114.8 145.4 
Netherlands 110.8 130.5 
Austria 115.2 127.5 
Denmark 116.8 125.7 
Ireland 
(GNI) 
99.3 125.2 
Sweden 106.2 124.6 
Belgium 107.3 119.8 
UK 102.0 117.9 
Finland 102.9 116.9 
Germany 106.1 114.1 
France 101.1 110.9 
Spain 82.0 104.9 
Italy 101.9 103.3 
EU 27 100 100 
Greece 65.3 97.3 
Cyprus 75.3 91.9 
Slovenia 70.1 87.8 
Czech 
Republic 
60.6 78.6 
Malta NA 76.9 
Portugal 68.1 74.5 
Estonia 40.0 68.4 
Hungary 49.6 64.8 
Slovakia 47.0 63.7 
Lithuania 35.3 56.1 
Latvia 30.8 53.7 
 
Source:  Kirby (2010: 34) 
 
A significant feature of the economic boom was an increase in female participation 
in the labour market.  Women accounted for two thirds of the employment growth in 
services but 32 per cent of women work part-time as distinct from 6 per cent of men.  
The general pay gap has stabilised at around 15 per cent.  In 1993 there were 
435,000 women in the labour force but by 2004 this had grown to 787,000 
increasing the female participation rate from 38.5 to 56.5 per cent just ahead of the 
EU average of 56.3 per cent (Kirby, 2010: 34). 
168 
 
 
There are a number of significant changes in the Irish economy and society which 
took place after 2001 which should be noted particularly as follows. 
 
After 9/11 and the puncturing of the dot-com bubble the Irish growth rate bounced 
back quickly as can be seen in Figure 6.  But the composition of that growth 
changed.  It has come to depend to a greater extent on domestic demand than it 
formerly had, relative to exports.  Export growth declined from an annual average of 
17.6 per cent between 1995 and 2000 to an average of 4.9 per cent annually between 
2001 and 2006.  The value of merchandise exports in 2006 was less than it was in 
2002. From a position of balance in 2003, the payments deficit reached 3.3 per cent 
of GDP by 2006.  This period also saw industrial employment begin to decline and a 
major increase in the construction sector whereby at the height of the boom 
employment  exceeded 286,000. Thus construction with services, became the main 
engine of job growth as can be seen in Table 22 below. The full extent of the 
construction boom can be appreciated by recalling that as recently as 1995 only 
82,000 were employed in the sector.  In general the shift towards services and 
construction had the effect of dampening productivity growth.  Although total labour 
productivity rose by 30 per cent between 1995 and 2005 (an annual average 2.6 per 
cent increase), growth began to slow after 2002 and remained virtually unchanged 
between 2004 and 2005
47
 (Kirby, 2010: 32-36; EIU Country Profile ‘96/97). 
  
                                                 
47 According to the Minister for Finance, writing in The Financial Times on 24th  November, 2010 Ireland’s 
productivity in 2010 was second highest in the EU.  The CSO (2010) also state that Ireland’s productivity is 30 
per cent above the EU average.  However, O’Sullivan (2006: 68) draws attention to the divergence in 
productivity between indigenous and foreign owned TNCs.   The former cannot match the achievements of the 
latter.  To compound the problem he asserts that transfer pricing for tax purposes makes it look as if the amount 
of added value to goods produced in Ireland by TNCs is greater than it really is – hence productivity is 
overstated. 
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Table 22:  Ireland - Sectoral Changes in Employment 2002-6 (000s) 
 
Sector 2002 2006 Change 
% 
Agriculture 124 117 -5.6 
Production 
Industries 
309 291 -5.8 
Construction 197 269 +43.9 
Services 1156 1362 +17.8 
Total at 
Work 
1777 2039 +14.7 
 
Source:  Kirby (2010:36) 
 
Figure 6: Irish Economic Growth 1989 to 2009 
 
 
The second factor of significance is the adoption of the so called ‘Lisbon Agenda’.  
The stated intention of this strategy was to turn Europe into the most competitive 
region of the world with  ‘More and Better Jobs’. O’Riain (2008) saw this as a more 
wholehearted embrace of neo-liberalism and the transformation of the whole of 
Europe into a ‘Competition State’.  Each European country was supposed to follow 
this prescription and to provide annual reports of its progress in doing so.  The 
Lisbon Strategy was reviewed in 2005 and the social dimension was further de-
emphasised relative to the market liberalising dimension. 
 
By and large the Lisbon process failed.  By 2010, its end date, its objectives were 
not secured and it was replaced by the ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’.  Its effects on Ireland 
though were to impart a further liberalising impetus and O’Riain (ibid) also noted 
Source: Fitzgerald & Kearney (2013:5) ESRI 
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that the Fianna Fáil – PD government had a distinctly neo-liberal edge to it.  He 
summed up this episode up by observing that: 
 
‘In believing their own rhetoric and failing to recognise the social and economic 
policies that have contributed to economic success, Irish policy makers have 
contributed to a rising level of inequality.  Tax cuts, spending gaps and 
deregulated markets have created a deeply unequal society in Ireland.’ 
 
(O’Riain, 2008:  179). 
 
Pointing to the unsustainability of the boom he wrote that while the professional 
classes and the self-employed could take advantage of a two-tier system of public 
subsidies, poorer sections of the community had been left behind with far fewer 
services to assist them to compete in the market.  Insofar as employment was 
concerned he identified a vulnerability in that  little had been done to guide those 
working in the boom industries of construction, retail and lower paid services into 
more secure employment (ibid). 
 
These boom employment areas also attracted many immigrants. When Ireland 
opened its labour markets fully after accession in 2004 thousands flocked to Ireland 
from CEE countries.  The only other countries to do so were Sweden and the UK.  
So it was plain that these three countries would see very big changes in the 
composition of their labour markets.  At the height of the boom about 10 per cent of 
the labour force were foreign nationals, annual overall immigration rose sharply 
from 52,600 in 2000 to 109,500 in 2007 before falling back to 57,300 persons in 
2009.  In 2005 about 33,700 persons moved to Ireland from the 12 new EU countries 
who joined in 2004 and 2007, rising to 52,100 in 2007 and then falling back sharply 
to 33,100 in 2008 and 13,100 in 2009 (CSO, 2010: 56).  In practice what this meant 
was that a lightly regulated labour market of 2 million was opened to one of 72 
million.  Not surprisingly there were problems involving some very high profile 
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industrial disputes.
48
  The trade unions tried to address these issues through the 
Social Partnership process with only limited success.
49
 
 
Table 23: Ireland:  Migration and Natural Increases*, 2000-2009 
         000 persons                              
Year  Inward 
migration  
Outward 
migration  
Net 
migration**  
Natural 
increase  
Population 
Change 
2000  52.6  26.6  26.0  21.8  47.9 
2001  59.0  26.2  32.8  24.8  57.7 
2002  66.9  25.6  41.3  28.8  70.0 
2003  60.0  29.3  30.7  31.9  62.6 
2004  58.5  26.5  32.0  33.3  65.3 
2005  84.6  29.4  55.1  33.5  88.6 
2006  107.8  36.0  71.8  34.2  106.0 
2007  109.5  42.2  67.3  38.8  106.1 
2008  83.8  45.3 38.5  44.6  83.1 
2009  57.3  65.1  -7.8  45.1  37.3 
 
                                                                                                           
*Data refers to the twelve months up to April for each year 
 **Net migration is the number of immigrants less emigrants 
 
Source: CSO (2010) 
 
 
Arguably the most significant event during the period under review was the coming 
into effect of the new Euro currency.  But this later turned out to be a double edged 
sword for Ireland.  On the positive side membership of the Euro gave monetary 
stability at the height of the Celtic Tiger boom and with the depreciation of the Euro 
against Sterling and the Dollar in the years following its creation in 2002, added to 
export competitiveness.  On the negative side Ireland lost control of monetary policy 
and with no power to fix interest rates the country was exposed to a low interest rate 
regime, which suited countries like Germany, but which fuelled the construction 
boom in Ireland.  Secondly, from the mid-2000s on the Euro began to appreciate 
against Sterling and the US Dollar and Ireland’s exports, which are high to the US 
and Britain, were badly hit.  What was not probably fully appreciated at the time of 
the introduction of the Euro, but which became very obvious after the onset of the 
2008 recession, is that Ireland’s situation with respect to EMU is sui generis.  While 
                                                 
48 The most notable involved a dispute in 2005 in which the Irish Ferries company replaced its Irish crew with 
non-nationals earning half the minimum wage. 
49 Legislative commitments to regulate the labour market were not fully honoured.  The most significant gain for 
the unions was the establishment of the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA). 
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EMU has significantly limited the policy tools available to all Member States the 
policy constraints on Ireland are particularly severe.  This is because the Irish 
economy cycles out of phase with that of the EU due to its heavy dependence upon 
the UK and US.  Since currency devaluation is no longer an option, EMU leaves 
Ireland less able to adjust to asymmetric (that is, country specific) shocks. The 
government is therefore limited to labour market and fiscal policy measures to effect 
adjustment to shocks. But it is also constrained by the parameters of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, most particularly the 3 per cent budget limit. (Kirby, 2010: 48; Smith, 
2005: 157). 
 
In 2002 the European Commission remonstrated with Ireland about its conduct of 
economic policy.  In the context of the Stability and Growth Pact the Commission 
felt that public spending was increasing too much. The perspective of the Finance 
Minister at the time, Charlie McCreevy, was that they wanted him to take more 
money out of the economy but Ireland was not breaking any rules and was running a 
budget surplus whereas Germany and France had broken the Stability and Growth 
Pact with impunity. What the Commission said, therefore, was only an opinion and 
he points out that when he left office the debt to GDP ratio was down to 27 per cent.  
Mr McCreevy was critical of how the Commission managed the Stability and 
Growth Pact noting that there were five separate rules and Ireland complied with 
them all strictly.  Ireland, for example, was one of the few that met the debt to GDP 
ratio criterion.   
 
Former Minister for Economic Planning, Martin O’Donohue, looks at these matters 
from a different angle.  He recalls that the new Fianna Fáil/PD government which 
came into office in 1997 commenced cutting taxes.  This was wrong because when 
in a monetary union which is not a political union there needs to be a correct mix 
between monetary and fiscal policy i.e. in circumstances where low interest rates 
were driving the economic boom at the time.
50
  He recalls that the disagreement with 
the Commission in 2002 centred on the role of the Stability and Growth Pact which 
was to keep the public finances close to balance or in surplus or ‘CTB0IS’.   He felt 
that policy was too expansionary.  Productivity rates were giving a false impression 
because they were driven by the hi-tech sector, in particular, pharmaceuticals.  The 
                                                 
50 Prof O’Donohue recalls presenting a paper to the PD leadership at the time to try to get them to understand the 
need for discipline in a monetary union without a political union. 
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underlying rate of productivity growth was more like 2-3 per cent and wage 
formation policy did not reflect this reality (interview, 22
nd
  November, 2011). 
 
A lot of official time – more than 50 per cent – was spent by the Department of 
Finance on European driven issues between 2004 and 2007 and the same was true of 
other departments, according to Kevin Cardiff, former Secretary General of the 
Department of Finance.  He recalls that there were full flights to Brussels every day 
bringing people to talk about integration, including financial services which was 
explicitly about the single market (monetary integration was dealt with separately 
through the ECB in Frankfurt).  The various State bodies had their own contacts but 
there were 10 to 15 cabinet sub-committees involved in integration matters at any 
one time.  He notes also that the European Parliament became more important from 
2004 (interviewed, 14
th
  December, 2011). Charlie McCreevy, former EU 
Commissioner and Minister for Finance, considered that Ireland failed to appreciate 
the significance of the European Parliament gaining more power.  He contrasted the 
disconnect between the Executive in Dublin and the European Parliament with the 
way in which Denmark briefs its MEPs (interview, 7
th
  June, 2012). The accuracy of 
this observation was confirmed by Anete Berentzen of the Danish LO who explained 
how the Social Democrats had held a joint seminar with employer and union 
involvement to impress upon Danish MEPs how they should try to protect the 
Danish national interest in Europe (interview, 22
nd
  May, 2012). Senator Joe 
O’Toole and Ruth Barrington, former Chair of the Irish Times Trust, also criticised 
this disconnect noting that the Department of Foreign Affairs for a very long time 
resisted an Oireachtas Foreign Affairs Committee because they did not want 
anybody looking over their shoulders on Europe (interviews, 4
th
  December, 2012 
and 9
th
  January, 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In seeking to identify the common links between the comparator countries we can 
start by noting that the Netherlands is now often categorised with the Nordic 
countries in the context of measures of redistribution, equality and labour market 
regulation in a way that detaches it from the continental SME cluster (Houwing and 
Vandaele, 2011; Schmidt, 2011:154).  As noted earlier, Schmidt (2011:149) has 
174 
 
drawn attention to the way these countries  have transcended economic crisis to 
reform their welfare states but to nevertheless do so in a way that preserves the core 
values and protections of the welfare state.  At the same time these small open 
economies remain amongst the most economically strong in Europe.  The ‘ideology 
of Social Partnership’ identified by Katzenstein (1985) as a key component of their 
success almost succumbed to the ‘Primacy of Politics’  argument during the 1980s 
and 1990s but recovered by the end of the 1990s to a point where it is seen as the 
first refuge in a crisis and seems to be firmly embedded in the institutional 
architecture of each country.  By contrast Social Partnership was one of the first 
victims of the crisis in Ireland.   
 
 
The period from 2001 to 2008 saw the Euro begin to function as a currency 
alongside the Dollar and the Yen.  However, early infringements of the Stability & 
Growth Pact, most notably by France and Germany, somewhat undermined the 
project.  A revised version of the Pact introduced in 2005 probably exacerbated this.  
It may also have contributed to votes against the new EU constitution in some 
countries, including the Netherlands.  For the first time perhaps it began to dawn on 
policy elites that the integration process was not inevitable.  EMU was soon to be 
challenged in a way that was not foreseen.  Despite the apparent tranquillity of the so 
called ‘Great Moderation’ the world was incubating a financial and banking crisis, 
which, when it broke in 2008, would hit the small open economies particularly hard.   
 
By the end of the 1990s it was apparent that Ireland was at a critical juncture.  It had 
closed the income gap but not the capabilities gap with the rest of Europe.  Put 
another way, it looked no better than the other peripheral countries in the EU.  In the 
case of R&D, for example, EU average expenditure was 1.93 per cent of GDP while 
Ireland was still at 1.17 per cent in 2001.  But Ireland actually needed to develop the 
necessary technological capabilities to compete on the basis of more knowledge-
based activities (Paus, 2012).  If anything the need for a national system of 
innovation was now more acute than had been identified by Lar Mjoset in his report 
for the National Economic and Social Council ten years earlier (Mjoset, 1992).  Paus 
(2012) concludes that it was the inability to replicate the institutional ability to find 
solutions and ensure coordination among the relevant actors to implement them, that 
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had been present in the 1990s, that led to the fall of the Celtic Tiger.  While this was 
undoubtedly one important factor regard must also be had for the doomed love affair 
with property investment in the 2000s (see O’Riain, forthcoming, 2014), in which 
speculative investment fuelled by tax incentives created a bubble which, when it 
collapsed, had serious consequences for the public finances and the economy as a 
whole. 
 
The deepening of European integration consequent upon implementation of EMU 
represented a sea change in the international order considered by Katzenstein (1985).  
Moreover, it had profound implications for the system of democratic corporatism 
because it imposed boundaries on the freedom of labour market actors to negotiate 
social compensation solutions.  Absent the capacity to devalue the currency the 
burden of adjustment to shocks had to be accommodated by labour markets.  It is 
true that Denmark and the Netherlands had much earlier tied their respective 
currencies to the DM but they could, in theory at least, have sundered that 
connection.  The institutional architecture of EMU is constructed in a way that is 
intended to prevent withdrawal of any member state. As well as that the 
independence and power of the ECB, with its singular focus on price stability, is not 
balanced by any EU institution concerned with social policy. 
 
Hemerijck (2013: viii) points to the considerable change that has occurred even in 
the last decade and its implications for social policy.  The EU has enlarged from a 
community of 15 to 27 member states in 2007 bringing added heterogeneity and 
complexity to domestic and EU-level policy spaces.  He contends that fragmentary 
economic analysis focussed on the integrity of the single market, low inflation, and 
sound public finances, anchored in the Stability and Growth Pact, precluded 
European macroeconomic policy makers from taking the Lisbon concept, ‘social 
policy as a productive factor’ really seriously.  
 
In the next chapter we will evaluate how each of the comparator countries dealt with 
the 2008 crisis within the limited policy space available. 
 
In concluding this chapter it may be useful to recall the principal features of each 
country’s developmental journey as summarised in Table 24: 
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Table 24: Principal characteristics of each country’s journey 
 BASELINE 
1987-1994 
REASON FOR 
JOINING EMU 
EVOLUTION 
OF  
DEVELOPME
NT MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NETHERLANDS 
 High unemployment 
 High welfare dependency 
 ‘Most spectacular 
unemployment failure in 
advanced capitalist world’ 
 Structural flaws – disability 
regime exploited for 
industrial restructuring  
 PvdA chooses welfare 
reform over relations with 
unions 
 But Wassenaar Agreement 
hugely influential 
 Economic reasons  
 Logical extension of 
close links to German 
economy and 1970s peg 
to DM 
 Preparation for EMU 
 Improving 
sustainability of 
welfare regime via 
increased labour 
force participation. 
 Unemployment 
problem  solved via 
part-time work (1.5 
jobs per family 
model) 
 Welfare/pensions 
reform  
 More limited role in 
welfare admin for 
labour market actors 
 But social pacts first 
default option in 
crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
FINLAND 
 Late industrialiser helped by 
war reparation requirements 
 Loss of Soviet market 
(estimated @ 20% of 
exports) 
 Banking/financial crisis 
compounded by 
liberalisation of capital 
markets 
 Geo-political imperative 
to be at the heart of 
Europe 
 Sub-optimal experience 
of monetary policy as 
conducted by Bank of 
Finland 
 Complete 
restructuring of 
economy and re-
orientation towards 
West 
 Big focus on ICT-
Nokia 
 Reversal of Cold-War 
policies e.g. 
neutrality  
 Return of centralised 
corporatist bargaining 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DENMARK 
 High unemployment as a 
result of two oil crisis in 
1970s 
 Compounded by peg to DM  
 Ameliorated through 
coordination of economy 
via market mechanisms 
embedded in collective 
agreements 
 Not a member but tracks 
Euro 
 Employment 
generated via public 
investment and strong 
labour market 
activation (flexicurity 
model) 
 Public sector reform 
to support export 
strategy 
 Strong focus on 
globalisation 
challenge 
 Exports influenced by 
innovation for 
domestic needs (e.g. 
Green Energy) 
 
 
 
 
IRELAND 
 Gradual recovery from mid-
1980s crisis but 
 Still high unemployment 
and GDP/capita of only 
60% of EU average 
 Early gains led to 
embedding of Social 
Partnership 
 Independence from UK  
 Earlier experience of 
currency volatility 
 Expected benefit from 
low interest rates 
 Strong coalition in 
favour 
 Sustainable economic 
expansion and job 
growth via productive 
investment to 2001 
 Post 2001 
construction boom 
fuelled by 
financialisation, low 
interest rates via 
EMU and perverse 
tax incentives 
 Pro-cyclical 
budgetary policies 
 Crisis and unwinding 
of Social Partnership 
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CHAPTER 6:  Beyond 2008: Coping With The Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
In a series of speeches in 2006 and 2007 the President of the European Central Bank, 
Mr Jean-Claud Trichet, was at pains to emphasise the positive features of the single 
currency.  He praised growing financial integration as contributing to diversifying 
and sharing risks and offsetting future economic shocks.  He described the single 
currency as ‘the most advanced feature of European unity and in many ways its 
emblem’ (cited in Marsh, 2011:241). 
 
This shows how unprepared the authorities were for the tide of financial market 
convulsions that washed through Europe in the wake of Lehman and Merrill Lynch 
banking collapses.  The Dutch bank Fortis, the Franco-Belgian financial group 
Dexia and Germany’s second biggest mortgage lender, Hypo Real Estate, all had to 
be saved from collapse with combined public and private sector rescue packages.  
European and North American governments moved to prop  up their banking 
systems with funding of between €3,000 and €4,000 billion to ward off the most 
serious financial threat to the world economy since the 1930s Depression.  The scale 
of the crisis was such that it was estimated that a quarter of the world’s financial 
wealth had been destroyed.  The IMF estimated that global GDP would fall from 5 
per cent a year to 0.5 per cent in 2009.  President Sarkozy of France was moved to 
say: 
 
‘The idea that markets were always right was mad…the present crisis must incite 
us to refound capitalism on the basis of ethics and work….laissez-faire is 
finished. The all-powerful market that always knows best is finished.’ 
 
(cited in Mason, 2009:29) 
 
According to Gylfason et al (2010) the Nordic countries were hit hard by the crisis 
even though it had nothing to do with the stability of their own financial systems or 
with their competitiveness in global markets.  The problem was that as small open 
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economies in a globalised world they were vulnerable to the fall-out from the 
bursting of asset price bubbles that had been inflated over many years through a 
combination of global imbalances, excessive credit expansion, and unhealthy 
increases in leverage.  Large financial flows looking for investment outlets 
contributed to keeping real interest rates low worldwide.  The abundance of liquidity 
and low interest rates encouraged financial institutions and asset holders to try to 
increase the rate of return on their portfolios by increased leverage at the cost of 
higher risks.  The global financial crisis emanated from the conjunction of 
widespread financial fragility and a lopsided globalisation process, proceeding 
rapidly amidst large financial imbalances. The inadequacy of regulation and 
supervision and mismanagement of large financial institutions was a compounding 
factor (ibid:16). 
 
On the positive side the Nordic countries were able to respond to the crisis in a 
countercyclical way by virtue of running general government financial surpluses 
over the period 1998-2008.  Countries running general government financial deficits 
have been forced into a pro-cyclical policy response (ibid). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how each country dealt with the crisis and 
to identify policy judgements at a domestic level which either eased or exacerbated 
the exogenous shock. 
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FINLAND 
 
Finland experienced a previous deep financial crisis in 1992/93 when unemployment 
rose to an unprecedented 17 per cent.  But Finland emerged strong from this crisis 
joining the EU in 1995.  The gross financial cost of the clean up after the 1992/93 
crisis amounted to 13 per cent of GDP (Gylfason et al, 2010).   
 
The primary driving force of the 2008 recession was a collapse in export demand.  
The lesson learnt from the 1990s is that the banking system is fundamentally sound.  
While budget deficits have increased rapidly, public sector indebtness has remained 
relatively low and the strong public finances has kept the cost of debt down.  
Discretionary fiscal policy has been expansionary.  Therefore, domestic demand is 
not held back by domestic financial disturbances and public finances will not be 
weakened by the need for bank support expenditure.  That is not to say that the 
crisis, like the one in 1992/93, will not have problematic consequences far into the 
future (ibid). 
 
Table 25: Economic Development in Finland in 2007-2011 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND IN 2007-2011 
 2007  2008 2009 2110 201
1 
Growth of 
GDP, % 
4.1 0.8 -6.9 0.4 2.4 
Unemployment, 
% of labour 
force 
6.9 6.4 8.3 9.7 9.7 
Gen. Gov. 
financial 
surplus, % 
5.2 4.4 -2.3 -4.8 -5.2 
Consumer 
prices, % 
1.6 3.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 
 
Source:   Gylfason et al (2011) 
 
According to Varitiainen (2011) Finland applied a modest fiscal stimulus during the 
crisis, comparable to the other Nordic countries.  He notes that, in the very long 
perspective, the country has been very successful and it’s EMU membership has 
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been a reasonable success.  Issues for the future are the long term sustainability of 
the welfare state and unfavourable demographic trends.   
 
2011 saw the return to centralised wage bargaining and the negotiation of a 2 year 
framework agreement.  This had been the ambition of the SAK trade union centre 
under the leadership of Lauri Lyly (interview, 10
th
  May 2011). The outcome of the 
sectoral bargaining round of 2008 was a rather high nominal wage increase which 
caused the Finnish government to postpone planned tax reductions.  This may have 
influenced the employers and the new government to return to centralised 
bargaining.  While Mr Lyly saw the new framework agreement as being strategically 
important it is not without its critics in Finland.  
 
Sixten Korkman said the negotiation of the framework agreement was a surprise.  
Employers wanted decentralised bargaining but felt that the new leader of the 
employers’ peak association may have gone along with the deal to reduce the 
possibility of strikes.  If it did not work out that way the agreement was unlikely to 
be renewed in 2013.  His view was that the labour market organisations were not 
active enough on labour market issues like pensions but should stay away from 
making agreements on tax and welfare which are more appropriate to Parliament 
(interview, 28
th
  September, 2012).  He also felt the wage settlement was too high 
for competitiveness.  He expressed some reservations about Finnish neo-
corporatism, saying that it tied the hands of government in certain areas thereby 
creating a democratic deficit.  He cited the health service as an example saying that 
collectively bargained health benefits provided by the private sector were leaving the 
public service only for poorer people and it was under resourced as a result.  Katja 
Lehto-Komulainen of SAK confirmed that there was some merit in the argument. 
 
The 2011 election was seen as something of a watershed in Finish politics.  In the 
2007 elections the True Finn Party took just 4.1 per cent of the vote but by 2011 they 
had secured 19 per cent of the vote putting them on level par with the three main 
parties, the National Coalition Party (Conservative), The Centre Party and the Social 
Democrats.   
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The Financial Times described the outcome as ‘a political earthquake’ in a country 
used to stable governments more wedded to pragmatism than to ideology.  The paper 
opined that the True Finns exploited a sense of economic insecurity felt by blue 
collar workers in particular due to the decline in traditional industries such as 
forestry and paper manufacturing.    Turnout rose from 67.9 per cent in 2007 to 70.4 
per cent in 2011, suggesting that the True Finns succeeded in rallying disaffected 
voters  (Ward, 2011 a: 7). 
 
The view amongst the political and administrative elite in Finland is that the leader 
of the True Finn Party, Timo Souni, is a brilliant communicator but there are a lot of 
unsavoury people in his party who don’t know how to use parliament and are 
regularly involved in scandals.  Protest parties are popular in Finland because the 
mainstream parties converge so much on policy that they all appear to be the same.   
The received wisdom in 2012 was that the Eurosceptic orientation of the True Finns 
means that they would never be acceptable in any government involving the 
mainstream parties.  If this were to change, which was unlikely, the True Finns 
would be found out because they have no coherent policy platform.  Because they 
don’t have to take responsibility for anything the party can continue its populist bent 
and so was likely to be part of the Finnish electoral landscape for quite some time.  
However, the True Finns should not be likened to some of the other far right parties 
in Europe.  They are not overtly racist and have been careful to select some 
immigrants as local elections candidates in 2012.  At least Timo Souni was trying to 
supress such racist elements within the party.  Many of its local election candidates 
were also public sector workers – like nurses and teachers – concerned about 
cutbacks.  The overall verdict seems to be that the True Finns are a protest 
movement and as such are not likely to make a big impact on Finnish politics in the 
long run (interviews with Vanhannen, Tiilikainen, Kekkonen, Metsamaki, Korkman 
and Kunola). 
 
The general expectation amongst the political elite in 2012 that the Finns (formerly 
The True Finns) would collapse under the weight of mainstream politics has not 
been borne out. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report (May, 
2013) the party consolidated its position in the October, 2012 local elections and is 
now a credible political force with a sustainable and expanding voter base that spans 
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all age groups.  In fact it is possible that the party could get sufficient support to lead 
a government after the next election in 2015.  There is said to be growing 
apprehension among the leaders of the mainstream parties about sharing government 
with the Finns, a fear fuelled by the Finns’ radical views on economic relations with 
the EU, hard-line immigration policies, and desire to shift the weight of taxation 
from personal income to corporate earnings and wealth.  According to the EIU 
analysis the Finns’ ability to attract new voters is indirectly served by a disgruntled 
ageing population fearing cuts to pension entitlements and the expanding ranks of 
younger and unemployed Finns who see bleak employment prospects and reduced 
job security. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing the EIU expects the six party coalition led by the 
conservative National Coalition Party (but including the Social Democrats, the Left 
Alliance, the Swedish Peoples’ Party and the Christian Democrats) to serve its full 
term until 2015.  But Finland  will be a more difficult partner in the Eurozone than 
before the 2011 election because of the destabilising effect of the Finns party. 
 
Nokia began to experience trading difficulties in 2012 and by September 2013 its 
mobile phone business had been sold to Microsoft. This was something of a shock 
given that Nokia had been the world’s largest maker of mobile phones in the 2000s.  
Earlier, NSN, Nokia’s telecoms business, shed 17,000 jobs worldwide in a deep 
restructuring (Milne, 2013). 
 
Finnish people interviewed for this research seemed mainly to be sanguine about the 
impact of Nokia’s trading difficulties on the Finnish economy.  Vessa Vihriala of 
ETLA said that Nokia makes zero contribution to GDP at this stage directly.  Most 
of the production capacity is abroad but there are 10,000 people working in R&D 
and marketing (interview, 28
th
 September, 2012).  Sirpa Kekkonen of the Prime 
Minister’s Office said there was some concern about the risk of relying on one 
strong pillar of the economy and there was a need to diversify into other areas e.g. 
green technology (interview, 25
th
 May 2012).  Former prime minister, Matti 
Vanhanen, conceded that Nokia was enormously important for R&D but suggested 
that there was no serious risks to employment because anyone affected by Nokia’s 
travails could be absorbed  by the broader ICT sector which is doing well – although 
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he did qualify this by noting that ICT was notoriously volatile (interview, 27
th
  
September 2012).  A dissenting view was entered by Kirsi Kunola, a specialist in 
disability, who said people were worried about Nokia.  It closed a major factory in 
Southern Finland in 2011 which closed off opportunities for students of one of the 
technical universities, all of whom were more or less certain to have worked in the 
factory formerly (interview, 13 November, 2012).   
 
Apart from the future of Nokia Finland is facing some strategic challenges: 
 
Finland has been less affected than many other countries by the financial crisis, 
given its resilient domestic demand, healthy banking sector, benign public finances 
and low exposure to highly indebted Eurozone members.  Nevertheless, there has 
been a GDP drop of 0.4 per cent in 2013, after a 0.2 per cent fall in 2012.  Average 
annual growth of 1.5 per cent is projected for 2014-17.  Industrial output contracted 
by 6 per cent year on year in February 2013, and new orders in the manufacturing 
sector dropped by 9.7 per cent in February 2013, up from 7.5 per cent in February 
2012.  Under a new inward investment strategy the government wants to develop 
Finland as a gateway for Russian and Asian investors and manufacturers to 
European markets.  A cut in corporation tax by 1.5 percentage points to 24.5 per cent 
has been implemented and a further cut of 4.5 per cent is promised from 2014. 
 
Richard Milne (2013) suggests in fact that Russian influence in Finland is growing.  
Russian is the most commonly spoken foreign language in Finland and 1.3 million 
visas were issued to Russians in 2012.  Trade between the two countries is growing 
again. Finnish exports to Russia increased by 1 per cent in the first seven months of 
2013.  In late 2013 Rosatom, the Russian owned United Shipbuilding Corporation, 
announced its intention to buy Arctech Helsinki, a shipyard specialising in building 
icebreakers. 
 
The public sector debt to GDP ratio is expected to remain low by international 
standards at around 60 per cent and the budget deficit is only 1.8 per cent.  It is an 
important keystone of policy for Finland to retain its AAA sovereign credit rating.  
A tripartite wage agreement for 2012-13 involved an income tax cut of 0.2-0.5 
percentage points (ibid). 
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Table 26: Economic Growth Forecast for Finland to 2016 
% 2012a 2013b 2014b 2015b 2016b 
GDP -0.2 -0.4 1.0 1.8 1.7 
Private 
Consumption 
1.6 0.7 1.2 1.8 1.7 
Government 
Consumption 
0.8 -0.2 1.2 1.8 1.7 
Gross fixed 
investment 
-2.9 -0.2 0.0 1.0 0.8 
Export of 
goods & 
services 
-1.4 -1.8 2.9 4.4 3.6 
Import of 
goods & 
services 
-3.7 -3.0 3.6 5.3 4.1 
Domestic 
demand 
-1.2 -0.9 1.1 2.0 1.8 
Agriculture -1.1 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 
Industry -1.9 -2.5 0.9 1.8 1.6 
Services 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.9 1.8 
 
 aActual bEconomist Intelligence Unit Forecasts 
 
Source: EIU Country Report Finland, May, 201, P. 10 
 
Lauri Lyly, President of the trade union confederation,  SAK, takes the view that the 
biggest labour market issue in Finland today is associated with the country’s 
demographics.  Employers want the retirement age raised to 65 from its current level 
of 63-68 (employees can now choose when to retire within these parameters).  SAK 
is opposed to this although it does share the analysis of the demographic problem, if 
not the solution proposed by employers.  Mr Lyly said unions want a more holistic 
approach to the problem dealing also with the fact that one third of all workers 
effectively retire on incapacity benefit at an average age of 52. Higher education 
means that young people are entering the workforce later and his view is that some 
way should be found to allow young people to start working earlier albeit within a 
flexible regime that would allow them to continue their education. He explained that 
this is a topic much debated in Finland.  He emphasised that this is an issue less 
about the pension system as such and rather more to do with the length of a person’s 
working life and the labour supply needs of the economy (interview, 10
th
  May, 
2012). 
 
Interestingly, Sixten Korkman is in agreement with the need for students to progress 
through university at a faster pace than the current 7 years.  He feels that the 
incentives which allow people to work in part-time jobs unrelated to their discipline 
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while having a good time and studying in a relaxed kind of way need to change 
(interview, 28
th
  September, 2012). 
 
As Lauri Lyly puts it, the demographic issue is forcing the country towards 
unpleasant choices between lengthening working life or increasing immigration.  
Juhana Vartiainen sums it up this way: 
 
‘Yet it is not obvious that Finland’s corporatist political system can easily cope 
with this new, internal challenge.  The main reason for this, in my view, is that 
the corporatist political culture may make it too difficult to manage 
intergenerational conflicts.  To take care of long-term sustainability, the 
government must balance the long term interests of future generations with those 
of the currently old and currently active.  This requires a solid political mandate, 
which may not really exist today.’ 
 
(Vartiainen, 2011:82) 
 
  
186 
 
DENMARK 
 
The right of centre government, consisting of the Liberal Party and the Conservative 
Peoples’ Party (KF) governed Denmark from 2001.  In November, 2011 the Social 
Democrats led by Helle Thorning-Schmidt returned to power.  All parties agreed 
that consolidation of the public finances is an imperative for medium term reasons.  
Because of an ageing population and dwindling North Sea oil, Denmark potentially 
faces a huge deficit by 2020 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010; Economist, 2011; 
MacCarthy, 2011). 
 
The wild card in Danish politics is the populist and anti-immigrant Danish Peoples’ 
Party and its leader, Pia Kjaersgaard. She has been described as “a sparsely educated 
grandmother with a magnetic hold on a large section of the electorate” (MacCarthy, 
2011).  According to MacCarthy (ibid) the DPP’S influence on the Danish political 
spectrum has been immense. Founded in 1996, it took 7.4 per cent of the vote in 
1998 and 12 per cent in the 2001 election, allowing it to enter an informal alliance to 
put the new centre-right government into office.  The position of the party was so 
pivotal in supporting the minority government that no major legislation succeeded in 
parliament without Ms Kjaersgaard’s approval.  She succeeded in shifting the centre 
of gravity to the right and virtually the entire political playing field shifted with her.  
The immigrant issue is now and for the foreseeable future front and centre in Danish 
politics.  This is a big change for a country that was widely perceived as a 
welcoming haven of Nordic tolerance.   
 
It is a little surprising that this issue has taken such hold given that only 8 per cent of 
Danish residents are foreign citizens.  Campbell and Hall (2010) discern the 
immigration issue as a new cleavage in Danish politics and observe that political 
elites are now concerned about the implications of this for national solidarity.
51
  
 
Clare MacCarthy (2011) also argues that the flexicurity labour market model has 
begun to unravel.  However, a study of the effects of the economic recession on the 
effectiveness of the flexicurity model by Torben  M Andersen (2011) does not 
                                                 
51 A report by the Globalisation Council in 2006 on how to bolster Denmark’s competitiveness called for better 
education and language training for immigrants in order to maintain the sort of social cohesion and national 
solidarity that served the country so well in the past. 
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support this conclusion.  He notes that the crisis imparted a great shock to the Danish 
economy causing output to fall by 6 per cent between  2008 and 2009 and 
unemployment to rise by some 3-4 percentage points.  Nevertheless, in a 
comparative perspective the performance is characterised by below average 
unemployment and no stronger tendencies for unemployment to become persistent.  
Overall, however, he concludes that it is too early to reach final conclusions about 
the effectiveness of flexicurity in a deep recession. 
 
Moreover, Vivien A. Schmidt (2011:55) argues that one of the problems of the 
Varieties of Capitalism school is its scant regard for the role of the state acting 
through its institutions.  She is highly complimentary of the success of the Danish 
state in promoting policy change through national level coordination mechanisms 
aimed at getting the long term unemployed back into the economy.  She contrasts 
Denmark favourably with Germany in this regard by virtue of the latter’s inability to 
mobilise the social partners for solidaristic purposes.  She specifically identifies 
centralised corporatism combined with a unitary state as the key to success. 
 
Dr Soren Kaj Andersen of the Sociologisk Institute (FAOS) is based in Copenhagen 
University. Conversely, he considers that the flexicurity model performed in a 
suboptimal way  compared to Germany’s approach to managing short time working.  
Germany did not suffer any rise in unemployment whereas 17% of industrial jobs 
were lost in Denmark (interview, 21
st
  May, 2012).  However, he does acknowledge 
the point made by others that the post 2001 government of the centre right hollowed 
out the ALMPs system such that when the 2008 crisis arrived flexicurity was not fit 
for purpose (Goul Andersen, 2011; interviews with Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and 
Mogens Lykktoft, 21
st
  & 22
nd
  May, 2012). 
The minority coalition of the Social Democrats, the Socialist Peoples’ Party (SF) 
and the Social Liberal Party elected in 2011 has suffered a slump in its poll ratings.  
The next general election is not due until 2015 and, while there is a long tradition of 
minority coalition governments in Denmark, it is possible that the government will 
not go full term, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report 
(April, 2013). 
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The government introduced an additional stimulus to the economy in 2013 and the 
2014 budget strikes a balance between some social and green growth investments 
and fiscal consolidation. Further welfare and labour market reforms designed to 
increase work incentives will be crucial to medium term fiscal consolidation.  
Longer-term policy priorities will be to address waning competitiveness, 
demographic change, and the pressures generally on public spending (ibid). 
 
Danish banks have received substantial State support since 2008, including capital 
injections, and State guarantees of deposits and bank debt (ibid). 
 
As regards fiscal policy Denmark compares favourably with the rest of Europe with 
a debt to GDP ratio below 50 per cent and a budget deficit of about 4 per cent.  It has 
been in a fiscal position to stimulate the economy by public investment to the tune of 
Dkr 10.7 billion (€2 billion) in 2012.  The government also tried to increase 
consumer spending by the reimbursement of pension contributions between April 
and October in a large once off cost to the State of around 1 per cent of GDP.  
Nonetheless, the economy contracted by 0.5 per cent in 2012 mainly as a result of 
the external sector.  Private consumption was resilient.  The EIU (2013) is 
forecasting that growth will recover mildly to 0.6 per cent in 2013 and will average 
1.6 per cent per year in 2014-17.  This will be aided by public investment which is at 
an all-time high and will continue to grow in 2013.  Construction of the Fehmarn 
Tunnel to Germany will support investment from 2014-15 (ibid).  According to the 
EIU, an erosion of competitiveness has taken place over the last decade and, despite 
productivity gains and pay restraint, this will restrain a recovery in exports.  
However, it is also worth noting that Denmark is a net exporter of petroleum.   
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Table 27: Economic Growth Forecasts for Denmark to 2017 
% 2012a 2013b 2014b 2015b 2016b 2017b 
GDP -0.5 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.9 1.8 
Private 
Consumption 
 0.6 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.9 1.7 
Government 
Consumption 
 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Gross fixed 
investment 
 2.2 0.8 2.9 3.1 4.1 4.2 
Export of 
goods & 
services 
 0.9 1.7 1.8 3.0 3.3 3.4 
Import of 
goods & 
services 
 2.5 1.3 2.5 3.2 3.8 3.6 
Domestic 
demand 
 0.5 0.6 1.5 1.5 2.1 1.8 
Agriculture  1.2
c 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Industry -1.2
c 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Services -0.3
c 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.0 
 
 aActual bEconomist Intelligence Unit Forecasts cEconomist Intelligence Unit Estimates 
Source: EIU Country Report Denmark, April, 2013, P.9 
 
How well has the Danish model survived the 2008 economic crisis?  According to 
the forecasts of the Economic Intelligence Unit outlined in Table 27  above it would 
appear that Denmark remains a strong and wealthy economy.  However, a 
combination of an ageing population, declining North Sea oil revenues, and a 
growing intolerance to immigration provide significant challenges in the years 
ahead. This is reflected in a concern amongst the political elite about growing 
heterogeneity and its implications for national solidarity and competiveness, 
underscoring the importance of homogeneity in the past.  In the face of these 
challenges the question is whether the negotiated economy can be as effective as it 
was heretofore?  And if it cannot, what is the alternative? 
 
Soren Kaj Andersen (interview 21
st
 May, 2012) also opines that, while the influence 
of the Danish Peoples’ Party may have peaked (the 2011 Social Democrat 
government actually reversed some of the anti-immigrant legislative changes 
introduced by the previous government under pressure from the DPP),  it is a fact 
that the Nordic welfare model is being threatened by immigration.  This is because 
immigrant workers, particularly in construction, are allowing the establishment of a 
secondary labour market with different pay and conditions.  In relation to welfare 
generally his view is that the phase of right-wing inspired reform terminated after 
the election of the Social Democrat led government in 2011.  He said that people are 
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not going to move further in that direction and that the new Government had not 
been afraid to relax the rules. 
 
Former MP, Klaus Haekkerup, identified himself as a dissident on Europe within the 
Social Democratic party although he says he is not so much against Europe as 
concerned about what we want it to be.  He says Denmark has a love-hate 
relationship with Europe.  It is an elite project opposed by manual workers and 
people who live in rural areas.  The Social Democrats are divided on Europe – half 
for and half against.  Every referendum is dangerous for the party.  The referendum 
in 2000 finished off Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s government (interview, 22nd  May, 
2012). 
 
This difference between the elite and the people was confirmed by Anete Berentzen 
of Danish LO.  According to her: 
 
‘We are a selfish people.  I liken popular views on Europe to that of a person 
coming out of a storm into a warm house but not wishing to contribute to the 
house.’ 
 (Interview, 22
nd
  May, 2012). 
 
Professor Niels Christopher Tygesen said there are two Eurosceptic parties, the 
Danish People’s Party (DPP) and the far left, with the former being a little 
xenophobic. The latter support the government but are not part of it. Otherwise 
Parliament would still join the Eurozone.  The prime minister, Helle Thorning 
Schmidt, is very pro Europe but everything is a bit uncertain now (interview, 22 
May, 2012). 
 
Asked if authoritarian liberalism as suggested by Kaspersen and Thorsager (2010) 
was a growing component of the Danish polity Thygesen said there was some 
evidence that it is.  He considers that the centre-right government of Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen was contract orientated, ‘government declares something and follows it 
through  - no tax increases etc.’   On the other hand the Danish LO were again 
negotiating in a tripartite forum under the new Social Democrat government, albeit 
negotiating below inflation wage increases to improve competitiveness with 
Germany (interview, 22
nd
  May, 2012).  Poul Nyrup Rasmussen also accepted that 
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the climate had moved towards a more authoritarian approach.  From 2001 there was 
a down grading of the importance of tripartite negotiations.  There was  ‘a lot of 
show but no substance’.  He felt that Anders Fogh Rasmussen was very clever about 
achieving this change by stealth.  However, he did also consider that the way things 
were evolving in Europe was a prime example of authoritarian liberalism.  In 
particular he felt that the Fiscal Compact Treaty was ‘foolish and conservative’.  He 
contrasted this with the approach to previous treaties like Maastricht where Denmark 
was not forced to accept a macro-economic regime it didn’t want to (interview, 2st 1 
May, 2012). 
 
In conclusion it can be observed that when the crisis hit Denmark had a very strong 
economy.  By July 2008, registered net unemployment reached a low point of 1.6 
per cent.    In 2006, the Finance Minister Thor Petersen became famous for this 
remark ‘we can buy the whole world’.    But from 2003 to 2008, Danish banks built 
up a large deposit deficit of 525 billion DKK or some 40 per cent of GDP.  Similar 
to Ireland the banks were depending on continuous refinancing of short-term loans, 
although not of the same order of magnitude.  Four weeks after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on 15
th
  September, 2008, the State guaranteed all lending and 
deposits in Danish banks.  A new State body ‘Financial Stability’ was established to 
take over banks heading for bankruptcy.  According to Goul Andersen (2011) efforts 
were made to restructure the mortgage market in a way that allowed for cheap loans 
to replace expensive ones and enabled home owners to consolidate.
52
   But, he 
warns, the long term impact of this could leave the Danish economy at risk: 
 
‘A volcano eruption would look like this:  the housing market has become 
sensitive to fluctuations in short-term interest rates, and sharp increases could 
affect housing prices dramatically.  With high indebtness, widespread insolvency 
could occur.  Finally, to take the worst case scenario, the massive need for annual 
refinancing of flexible loans – nearly 50 per cent of GDP – bears resemblance to 
the refinancing needs of the banks when they suffered the large deposit deficit in 
2008.  In case of financial unrest, there might be a sudden increase in interest 
rates on Danish bonds (as it happened in 2008).  Briefly this was the risk scenario 
in 2011.’ 
                                                 
52 This looks a bit like what Mogens Lykftoft did as Finance Minister in the early 1990s (interview, 22nd  
September, 2012) 
(Goul Andersen, 2011:127). 
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 THE NETHERLANDS 
 
A new right wing minority government was elected in October, 2010.  It was led by 
Mr Mark Rutte of the Liberals (VVD) and also involved the Christian democratic 
Appeal (CDA) and was supported in parliament by the Party for Freedom (PVV).  
PVV is an anti-establishment populist and anti-immigration party.  It is also Euro-
sceptical in orientation.  This political combination was not conducive to stability as 
the CDA was distinctly uneasy in its partnership with PVV and, to compound the 
problem, the government only had a slim majority.  In many respects multi 
culturalism in the Netherlands is under stress.  The current crisis of the Eurozone has 
opened up many opportunities for Euroscepticism (Dinmore, 2011; Economic 
Intelligence Unit, 2011; Economist, 2011).
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Another election on 12 September, 2012 produced almost equally strong 
performances by the PvdA Labour Party and the Liberal VVD led respectively by 
Diederik Samson and Mark Rutte.  They achieved a combined total of 80 seats out 
of a total of 150 and subsequently formed a new government .  The Eurosceptic and 
xenophobic Party for Freedom (PVV) led by Geert Wilders lost 40 per cent of its 
seats and had been blamed for bringing down the previous government.  The 
Christian Democrat Appeal (CDA) also performed poorly continuing what seems 
like long term decline.
54
  The election outcome moved the Financial Times to 
editorialise: 
 
‘The skies are clearing over Europe. This week Dutch voters injected a much 
needed boost of confidence after decisively rejecting Eurosceptic voices in the 
national poll.’ 
 (Financial Times editorial, 14
th
  September, 2012: P.10) 
 
However, Matt Steinglass (2012 a) also writing in The Financial Times a few days 
later challenged this conclusion.  He argued that it was not accurate to conclude 
from the result that the Netherlands had once again embraced a pro-European 
                                                 
53 By May, 2011 the Netherlands had pledged €4.7 billion to the €110 billion rescue plan for Greece.  Mr 
Wilders described this as “Throwing boxes of money over the dikes” (Gilmore, 2011:8). 
54 The actual distribution of seats was:  Liberals 41 (31), Labour 39 (30), Freedom Party 15 (24), Socialists 15 
(15), Christian Democrats 13 (21), D66 12 (10), Others 15 (19).  Seats in outgoing parliaments are recorded in 
brackets. 
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agenda, pointing out that the Liberals had, in fact, conducted a very Euro-sceptical 
campaign which attracted many PVV voters making it difficult for the party to turn 
pro-Europe again.  He also noted that the Socialist Party had maintained its 
complement of seats despite campaigning on a Eurosceptic agenda.  He also posited 
that the Freedom Party had lost seats, not because voters had turned against its 
policies but because other parties had ruled out joining a coalition with it.  The PVV 
position on Europe and the economy would make it difficult for any  government of 
which it was a member to maintain a coherent policy front and consequently render 
the Netherlands less influential in Europe. 
 
However, by 3
rd
 November, 2012, with the new government coalition in place, The 
Economist was reporting that the new government programme had set the country on 
a firmly centrist course.  Indeed, a shift to the left was highlighted in a provision in 
the programme committing the government to back Brussels’ proposed  financial 
transaction tax, a direct reversal of policy from Mr Rutte’s previous term as prime 
minister.  It also reported that the head of the employers’ peak association declared a 
revival of neo-corporatism stating ‘The Polder Model is back’. 
 
This may not be quite as straightforward as it looks.  The trade union confederation 
(FNV) imploded in December, 2011 in an internal dispute over the conclusion of a 
pension agreement and the President, Agnes Jongerius, resigned. This was part of an 
agreement to establish a new confederation to be called ‘The New Labour 
Movement’ which came into existence in June, 2012 and is headed by Ton Heerts. 
 
Asked whether it would be possible today to negotiate a new ‘Wassenaar 
Agreement’ Wim Kok said that such an agreement was needed – indeed a more 
wide-ranging agreement was needed to embrace issues like pensions and social 
security.  But, he said, it would not be possible at the moment because the trade 
union movement is in disarray.  It must be reinvented: 
 
“This is a time for a visible role for the social partners.  Reforms to the labour 
market are unavoidable.  The social partners have always played a strong role in the 
Polder model.  The political world will not wait for the social partners.  Decisions 
will be taken without them but this would be sub-optimal”. 
(Interview, 12
th
 September, 2012). 
2012). 
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Prof. Paul de Beer of the University of Amsterdam Business School opines that the 
crisis in FNV can be traced back to the 1980s.  In his view the trade unions have 
been struggling with the logic of influence versus the logic of membership.  The 
country has moved in a neo-liberal direction.  The trade unions had to admit that this 
was the dominant analysis.  They tried to deal with it by emphasising social issues 
and having this incorporated in policy.  In this the trade unions have had a marginal 
influence but have been unable to change the main neo-liberal thrust.  Members did 
not understand this and resented it.  They had to accept impositions and began to feel 
there was nothing to gain by being in a trade union. This created tensions within 
FNV.  The pensions issue was simply a catalyst for a much deeper problem.  The 
feeling was that if the leadership gives in on such an important issue as pensions, 
what is left?  The crisis in FNV involved a clash between two big unions.  Paul de 
Beer’s view is that the only solution is to emphasise industry level bargaining. 
Asked if this would not weaken the unions further, he said that possibly it would but 
the feeling amongst the membership is that it hardly matters since there is so little to 
gain at national level anyway (interview, 11
th
  September, 2012). 
 
Han Noten, Mayor of Dalfsen, acted as an advisor to try to resolve the FNV crisis   
This arose from the pensions crisis.  Employers had problems too but they managed 
them better.  He saw this as partially a political crisis but mainly it was an 
institutional crisis.  His analysis was that we are witnessing the emergence of a new 
kind of capitalism which traditional attitudes in unions cannot grasp.  Unions in the 
Netherlands were built on a Taylorist production model which is now much less 
relevant.  There are, for example, between 700,000 and 1.2 million self-employed in 
the Netherlands. The classical tools from traditional institutions are not working 
anymore.  Unions cannot accept that whereas collectivity worked in the past 
diversity must today be managed so that union power can be developed (interview, 
11 September, 2012). 
 
The employers’ perspective was that FNV undermined Agnes Jongerius in a 
straightforward power struggle.  It was not likely that union members would be 
satisfied with a new centre or that it would underpin the consensus model.  There 
was also a perspective on institutional weakness in that the Social and Economic 
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Council (SER) was not in a position to give advice to government on the pensions 
problem. This was because politicians interfered and also because employers backed 
out of a deal.  Agnes Jongerius was then left with little alternative but to resign 
(interviews with Hans Ten Berg on 26 June, 2012 and Alexander Rinnooy Kan on 
11
th
  September, 2012). 
 
From within FNV there was a view that the Confederation had been used by the 
Socialist Party in its battle with the PvdA Labour Party. There was considerable 
resentment at the fact that the socialists had fought tooth and nail against any 
concession on pension reform to the employers but then moderated their position 
during the election campaign when it was expedient to do so, leaving FNV torn 
asunder (interviews with Martin Strickler and Ruud Vreeman, 12
th
  September, 
2012). 
 
The ‘Grand Coalition’ government of Liberals (VVD) and Labour Party (PvdA) 
elected in 2012 was judged by the Economist Intelligent Unit in 2013 to be less 
effective than expected, but nevertheless likely to complete its full term of office to 
2016 (EIU, 2013).  The outlook for the Dutch economy is that GDP will contract by 
1.2 per cent in 2013 before returning to sluggish growth of 0.3 per cent in 2014.  The 
medium term range forecast is for average growth rates of 1.4 per cent in the period 
2015-17. Domestic demand is forecast to remain particularly weak.  The Dutch 
unemployment rate rose to 6.5 per cent in April, 2013 but remains far below the 12 
per cent average of the Eurozone (ibid). 
 
The government has been challenged by fiscal consolidation demands from the EU 
aimed at reducing the budget deficit below 3 per cent.  To that end austerity 
measures worth €4.3 billion, on top of €12 billion in savings already planned for 
2013-14, were agreed in March, 2013.  However, this agreement was subsequently 
rescinded and the EIU does not expect the 3 per cent target to be reached by 2016.  
The fiscal situation was not helped by a requirement to nationalise the country’s 
fourth largest bank, SNS Reaal, at a cost of €3.7 billion in January, 2013. 
 
One reason for rescinding the fiscal consolidation package was to facilitate a 
tripartite agreement between government, unions and employers in April, 2013, 
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suggesting that the Polder model is alive and working despite the internal travails of 
the FNV Trade Union Confederation. Actually by September 2013 it looks as if the 
new trade union structure is falling into place. 
 
The introduction of competition to health care provision has not been particularly 
successful. The Netherlands spends 2.5 percentage points of GDP more on 
healthcare than the OECD on average.  An important cause of the rising costs is the 
ageing population. The share of people aged over 65 in the overall population rose 
from 12.8 per cent in 1990 to 15.6 per cent in 2011 (ibid). 
Table 28:  Economic Growth Forecast for the Netherlands to 2017 
% 2012a 2013b 2014b 2015b 2016b 2017b 
GDP -1.0 -1.2 0.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 
Private Consumption  -1.4 -1.6 -0.5 0.2 0.5 0.8 
Government 
Consumption 
 0.0 -1.1 -0.8 0.1 0.5 0.4 
Gross fixed 
investment 
-4.6 -8.0 -2.0 3.0 2.8 2.5 
Export of goods & 
services 
3.3 2.5 3.5 4.2 4.0 3.7 
Import of goods & 
services 
3.1 0.8 2.5 3.8 3.6 3.5 
Domestic demand -.15 -2.5 -0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Agriculture  -0.6c -0.2 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.3 
Industry -0.4c -0.7 1.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 
Services -1.2c -1.4 0.1 1.5 1.3 1.2 
 
 aActual bEconomist Intelligence Unit Forecasts cEconomist Intelligence Unit Estimates 
 
Source: EIU Country Report Netherlands, June, 2013, P.8 
 
The substantive problem giving rise to institutional difficulties in the Netherlands is 
one of demographics, just like Denmark and Finland.
55
  Employers want people to 
work longer.  They feel that unions must know that unless there is reform, wages 
will be affected.  They see a simple solution; increase pensionable age in line with 
life expectancy. This would change the power to fire people but they would 
accommodate hard cases.  In this worldview the government would control a basic 
tier 1 State pension but employers and unions would control a tier 2 occupational 
pension (interview with Rinnooy Kan, 11
th
  September, 2012).  This is the first time 
that a problem of demographics has caused such an egregious institutional failure 
                                                 
55 To put the scale of the problem in perspective, however,  Mercers consider Netherlands to be second only to 
Denmark in terms of the quality of its pensions in a review of 18 of the world’s best pension systems 
(www.dutchreviews.nl/news/archives2012/10/dutch.pension_system) 
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and it is something of a shock that it happened in a country with such a long and 
stable tradition of neo-corporatist bargaining.  
 
Finally, Visser and van der Meer (2011) are persuaded that the real challenge for 
social partners in the Netherlands is to find a way to improve the poor employment 
prospects of people over the age of 50 and align them with an increasingly 
unpredictable and demanding economy in which cognitive skills are key.  This is a 
particular dilemma for employers because if they want to link retirement age to 
increasing life expectancy they have to do something about equipping older workers 
to be able to be productive.  Whereas in 1982 the solution was found in the 
‘Wassenaar Accord’, built around a formula of low wage growth facilitating more 
profits, investment and jobs – the landscape is more complex now.  All of the 
contentious issues of recent years – disability, unemployment insurance, and 
dismissal protection – come together in this contemporary challenge.  In their 
summation: 
 
‘The emergence and (re-)institutionalisation of pacts is not only a matter of 
power bargaining, and elite co-operation but also of inventing and accepting 
key ideas that can become drivers of change and compromise.’ 
(Visser and Van der Meer, 2011:229).
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IRELAND 
 
 
In 2009 the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) had analysed the crisis 
as one with five parts – economic, social, fiscal, banking and reputational.  It took 
the view that these sub crisis could not be dealt with partially or sequentially.  A 
holistic approach was needed (NESC, 2009). 
 
In the event no such holistic approach was attempted.   The government became 
preoccupied with the problem of the banking sector which eventually overwhelmed 
it.  A bailout to the tune of €85 billion at an interest rate of 5.8 per cent was more or 
less imposed by a joint team from the EU, IMF and ECB.  Belatedly a Programme 
for Recovery: 2011 – 2014 was constructed but, insofar as it dealt with the 
component parts of the NESC analysis, it did so in an orthodox application of neo-
classical economics.  This was epitomised in legislation to reduce the minimum 
wage by 12 per cent.   In addition there was a major assault on public service 
employment with a reduction in numbers of 12 to 15 per cent even though the size of 
the public sector in Ireland is small, especially by comparison to the other case 
studies, as can be seen from Figure 7 below.  Arguably the government made a 
crucial strategic error in the early part of the crisis in equating banking debt and 
sovereign debt in the form of a guarantee, not just to depositors but to bondholders 
as well.  The potential exposure of this guarantee was €440 billion, a sum no Irish 
government could afford to stand over.  The fact that the government could not stand 
over all its guarantees undermined confidence in bond markets and eventually 
locked the country out of money markets.  It was then that the IMF/EU/ECB came 
in.  Their mission was to save European banking systems and the Euro. 
 
However, Donovan and Murphy (2013) argue that the bank guarantee was the least 
worst decision available to the government.   We will return to this discussion later 
in this section. 
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While official policy expects an export led recovery, a renewed international focus 
on corporate tax competition raises questions about the strategic vulnerability of an 
industrial policy relying entirely on FDI. 
 
 
Figure 7: Numbers Employed in the Wide Public Sector as % of Total Labour Force – OECD 
Countries (2008) 
 
 
 
Source:  NERI Quarterly Economic Facts, Summer 2013 
 
 
200 
 
The Chairman of Forfas, Eoin O’Driscoll, is concerned about this industrial policy.  
He agrees that the 12.5 per cent corporation tax is too low but considers that it would 
be too dangerous to try to raise it.  Nevertheless, he opines that we have a broken 
model of industrial development and that the fix is not going to come from the IDA.  
He argues that some sectors, considered strong, are actually quite vulnerable.  As 
examples he cites medical devices and Intel.  The former he considers to be a kind of 
up market assembly operation and the latter ‘a very sophisticated knitting machine 
which could be moved to China tomorrow’.  Yet, he notes, this is regarded as the 
pinnacle of Irish business.  The type of industry we should promote is the agri-
engineering products of Keenans of Carlow which are based not just on exporting a 
high class engineering product but on establishing an on-going commercial 
relationship with the user of that product.  Our capacity to advance in this sector is 
inhibited by lack of skills.  He contrasts our preoccupation with FDI with that of the 
Finns who had very little focus on it but yet built a strong indigenous economy.  He 
said he was particularly impressed by what the Finns and Danes had achieved in the 
area of green technology.  In relation to Enterprise Ireland he concurred with Benner 
& O’Riain’s   (forthcoming) assessment that it lacked a narrative to underpin its 
work which was different from the free market liberal orientation of the IDA 
considered essential for attracting American  investment.  As he saw it the big 
failure of Enterprise Ireland and Forfas was not to be able to put indigenous industry 
on a sound footing.  Our relationship with Europe from an industrial policy 
viewpoint involved “very little engagement really” except for science policy.  
America dominates everything and the IDA is very strong.  Northern European 
models are different with funding mainly from banks and thus more patient capital.  
The biggest problem from his viewpoint is the impossibility of having a discussion 
about these matters in official circles (interview, 26
th
  April, 2012).  It would seem 
that there is strong evidence in this of path dependency in the institutions responsible 
for industrial policy.
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This rather pessimistic assessment of industrial policy was not shared either by 
Minister for Enterprise and Jobs, Richard Bruton, or Director of IBEC, Danny 
McCoy.  However, the former accepted that Enterprise Ireland did not succeed in 
                                                 
56 For a detailed treatment of the evolution of industrial policy in Ireland see Peter Murray (2009). 
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building clusters and that it was not a developmental organisation.  He also agreed 
that Ireland did not have enough indigenous ‘champions’57 – a point echoed by 
Minister for Education and Science, Ruairi Quinn – and that this was something of a 
failure. Danny McCoy countered this argument by pointing to Irish companies 
which were multinationals like Ryanair, CRH and Kerry Group.  He did not agree 
that imbalance in the Irish industrial base was a problem but does acknowledge that 
the companies mentioned are creating  jobs outside Ireland (interviews 10
th
  May, 
2012; 26
th
  May, 2012 and 27
th
  April, 2012).  Danuta Gray, Chairman of O2, 
considers the influence of the United States on industrial policy to be ‘startling’ 
given Ireland’s membership of the European Union.  She is critical of Enterprise 
Ireland in this respect too.  She said she is not a fan of the US.  Policy in Ireland is 
too much focussed on looking west and this is wrong because the US is too much 
driven by Wall Street and London, too short term (e.g. companies being taken 
private).  Germans and Danes look to the long term.  She feels, however, that there 
may be changes in financial models in the wake of the crisis (interview, 7
th
  
February, 2012).  Former Tánaiste, Dick Spring recalls that FDI was the key 
deciding factor that carried the decision to join EMU but Ireland is now 
‘frighteningly dependent on FDI’ (interview, 18th  September, 2012). 
 
There is some support in recently published literature for those who identify 
vulnerabilities in Irish industrial policy.  Blyth (2013: 236-7) points to the 
incongruity of Ireland being used as a role model for Greece inasmuch as there is a 
case to be made that growth based on export performance is misleading. This is 
because service exports reflect the revenue of multinationals operating out of 
Ireland, even in circumstances where there may be no real economic activity going 
on.  According to Blyth (ibid) it is this factor which explains an apparent boom in 
exports from 80 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 101 per cent of GDP in 2010.  In fact he 
suggests that services exports are overstated by as much as €30 billion which is 25 
per cent of GNP.   
 
By mid-2013 the pressure was increasing on Ireland’s system of low corporation tax 
rates used to attract FDI.  There was strong criticism of Ireland in the US Senate 
                                                 
57
 National Champions are firms capable of achieving success in strategic economic sectors thereby advancing 
the interests of the country industrially. 
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when it was revealed that some multinationals paid an effective corporation tax rate 
as low as 2 percent  Joseph Stiglitz (2013) was surely referring to Ireland when he 
wrote in the Guardian: 
 
‘There should be no room in our system for countries that are complicitous in tax 
avoidance.  Why should tax payers in Germany help bail out citizens in a country 
whose business model was based on tax avoidance and a race to the bottom.’ 
 
(Stiglitz, 2013: 30). 
 
Stewart (2013) argues that most companies in Ireland currently pay either zero or 
minimal corporation tax because effective rates bear no relationship to the nominal 
rate of 12.5 percent.  He asserts that the policy focus on reducing corporate income 
tax to tempt capital is attracting speculative capital not productive capital thereby 
hurting the innovation agenda. 
 
Ashoka Mody (2013:9) argues that there is no realistic prospect of a fiscal union in 
Europe, observing that such a possibility was not envisaged in either the 1970 
Werner Report or the 1989 Delors Report on European Monetary Union.  However, 
were a fiscal union to come to pass as part of a broader political resolution of the 
crisis it is difficult to see how the Irish model of corporation tax could remain intact. 
 
The phenomenon of redomiciled Plcs has been identified by John Fitzgerald (2013) 
as a distortion of the data relating to the performance of the economy.  He observes 
that over the last few years a number of companies have relocated their headquarters 
to Ireland without generating any real activity in the economy in terms of 
employment or purchases of domestic inputs. They have legal presence in the 
country and their retained profits are attributed to foreign owners.  He speculates that 
the rapid growth in the number of these companies relocating to Ireland since 2008 
may be driven by expected tax changes in other jurisdictions.   
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Table 29:  Ireland - Effect of Redomiciled Plcs on current account and real GNP 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 % of GNP 
Current account before 
adjustment 
-2.8 1.4 1.4           
6.1 
Current account after 
adjustment 
-4.1 -2.7 -3.2           
0.6 
Difference, percentage 
points 
 1.2  4.1 4.6          
5.5 
 Growth Rate, % 
GNP, volume, before 
adjustment 
-8.1  0.9 -2.5            
3.4 
GNP, volume, after 
adjustment 
-9.2 -1.9 -3.0            
2.3 
Difference, percentage 
points 
 1.1  2.9  0.5            
1.1 
 
Source:  ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2013: 36 
 
The Irish banking system had not been deeply involved in the period of export led 
growth between 1994 and 2001. But lending by Irish banks to the Irish private sector 
(individuals and businesses) increased almost five fold between 1999 and 2008 to 
reach €367.1 billion by 2008.  This was far ahead of the expansion of the economy.  
In 1999, lending represented approximately 100 per cent of GNP while by 2008 it 
had risen to 237 per cent of GNP.  The expansion of lending relative to the size of 
the economy was particularly strong between 2003 and 2008.  Lending outstripped 
the growth in deposits of Irish banks so banks became increasingly reliant on 
lending from abroad.  The net indebtness of Irish banks to the rest of the world 
increased from 10 per cent of GDP at the end of 2003 to 60 per cent of GDP by 2008 
(Honohan, 2009, The Economist, 20
th
 November, 2010, PP 11 and 73). 
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Table 30: Inter-bank Borrowing by Irish Banks 1999-2003 
 1999 2003 2008 2010 % change 2003 
to 2008 
 
Loans 
to Irish 
private 
sector 
(€ 
billions) 
 
 
€76.9 
 
€143.8 
 
€367.1 
 
€328.4 
 
155.3 
Loan to 
GNP 
ratio 
100.1 121.8 237.5 255.6 95.0 
 
Source:  NESC (2013) 
 
Why this all happened has been the subject of reports commissioned in 2010 by the 
Minister for Finance.  These reports identified a series of domestic and external 
factors that caused the crisis including the following.  First, the period after 2003 
was characterised by very liquid conditions  in global financial markets. Financial 
intermediaries in this period searched for higher yields.  Second, Ireland’s entry to 
the Euro led to reduced risk premia on Irish interest rates while membership of the 
Euro also facilitated the ability of banks to raise funds across borders.  Third, there 
was increased competition at retail level in European countries, particularly in 
peripheral countries and the new Member States.  In Ireland this meant that 
subsidiaries of UK banks became more active in the Irish market and offered 
cheaper mortgages on better terms to Irish customers, including 100 per cent loan to 
value mortgages.  Fourth, Anglo Irish Bank became a kind of market leader putting 
strong competitive pressure on the other banks.  Fifth, there was some shift towards 
less intrusive supervision globally and also a relative neglect of liquidity risks 
(Regling and Watson, 2010: 36). 
 
This is captured succinctly by David Marsh as follows: 
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‘At the end of September, 2008, the epicentre of the banking upheavals moved 
suddenly to Ireland, the country where years of heady economic expansion had 
earned it the sobriquet of Europe’s ‘Celtic Tiger’ but where unseen by the outside 
world, a deep-seated financial malaise had been building up with ramifications 
spreading well beyond its shores.  Recognising the exposure of the Irish banking 
system to the new mood of risk awareness on financial markets, and determined 
to protect Europe from another Lehman-like collapse, the European Central Bank 
in discreet telephone conversations with the Irish government requested all 
possible steps to prevent Irish banking failures.  Ireland subsequently took the 
momentous decision to guarantee all bank liabilities at six financial institutions – 
an estimated $570 billion, about 250 per cent of GDP – action that was to have 
cruelly spectacular effects in terms of increasing public borrowing and further 
enlarging Irish taxpayers’ exposure to ever increasing debt.’  
 (Marsh, 2011:242).
58
 
 
External sources were no more prescient in warning about the banking risk.  The 
OECD (2006) review of the Irish economy identified housing as the key domestic 
risk facing the economy.  But it said nothing about the banking related aspect and 
anyway considered that a soft landing was the most likely outcome but noted that 
this was not guaranteed.   
 
As late as June, 2007 Mr Trichet, President of the ECB, was lauding the Irish 
economy as ‘a role model for the Euro’ in a speech in Berlin. 
 
The IMF (2007) overview on the Irish economy found that: 
 
‘Fiscal policy has been prudent, with a medium term fiscal objective of close to 
balance or surplus, in line with fund advice.  In the past couple of years, windfall 
property related revenues were saved and the fiscal stance was not procylical, in 
line with fund advice.’ (IMF, 2007: 3). 
 
                                                 
58 See also Honohan, Patrick, (2010) ‘The Irish Banking Crisis Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003-2008: A Report 
to the Minister for Finance by the Governor of the Central Bank’, 31 May 2010, PP. 119-120 and Nyberg, Peter (2011) 
‘Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland’:  Report of the Commission of Investigation into the 
Banking Sector in Ireland, March 2011, P. 78.  Mr Nyberg was Director General of Financial Services, Finnish Finance 
Ministry.   
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While both the OECD and IMF identified risks facing the Irish economy, neither 
identified the extent to which the public finances were reliant on property related 
transaction taxes. 
 
This helps to explain the puzzle of why, if all the comparator countries were 
faithfully following the Stability & Growth Pact, any one should find themselves in 
more difficulty than another.  Willie Scally, former Economic Advisor to Dick 
Spring, explains the answer by reference to the fact that it was not enough to look at 
the formal Stability & Growth Pact requirement – it is also necessary to look behind 
those numbers at what was happening in the economy (interview, 11
th
  December, 
2012).  (See also NESC, 2010:92). Dermot McCarthy takes the view that people 
became cynical over time about EU discipline: 
 
‘That’s how our eye came off the ball.  We just focussed on the monitoring 
requirements.  There was no anxiety to consider issues below that which were 
building up including the building industry, pensions etc.’   
 (Interview, 4
th
  February, 2010). 
 
John Hurley, former Governor of the Irish Central Bank strongly defends the role of 
the bank in the unfolding crisis.  The bank did speak about price levels and 
competitiveness emphasising that it was a significant risk.  In addition the bank 
always spoke about house prices.  The 2006 Annual Report of the Central Bank 
signalled the first signs of stabilising or cooling off of the property market but it 
turned out to be a false dawn reversing later.  This was fuelled by a variety of 
interests talking up the property market and the spurt which occurred in 2007 was a 
real problem.  Mr Hurley recalls that he kept warning the government.  He warned 
the Minister for Finance in writing to prepare for the day when tax revenues would 
not be as strong.  Moreover, ‘there was never a meeting with government at which 
the property market was not discussed’, he asserts.  A specific warning on the 
implications of a fall in construction activity for the tax base was carried at the time 
by the broadsheet media.
59
  With regard to the Honohan Report’s charge that the 
Governor could have issued guidelines to the Regulator on what to require of retail 
                                                 
59 For a discussion on the role of the media in the crisis see Donovan and Murphy (2013, Chapter 8) and Mercille (2013).  
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banks, Mr Hurley felt this would be impractical for institutional reasons.  When the 
Financial Regulator was created as a separate autonomous entity, albeit within the 
umbrella of the Central Bank, the ECB requested legislation to allow for the 
imposition of a policy direction by the governor but this required joint meetings and 
both boards to sign off. But he pointed to another provision of the Central Bank Act 
which says that the regulator cannot be second guessed.  While acknowledging that 
the Central Bank Stability Reports could have been stronger and more specific – for 
example in relation to lending – he disagrees with the broad thrust of the separate 
Honohan and Regling/Watson Reports on the banking crisis.
60
   As he puts it, ‘The 
international vulnerabilities were so large that even now people can’t get to grips 
with them. What hope was there for us?’ 
(Interview, 9
th
  November, 2011) 
 
The current Central Bank Governor, Patrick Honohan, is not receptive to this line of 
argument.  He does not accept that the previous administration was powerless 
because of legal restraints.  He believes that the Governor could have found legal 
space to act given the seriousness of the matter.  He points to the constraints of 
confidentiality in the 2003 Central Bank Act but argues that he has been able to 
ventilate many issues publicly not withstanding those constraints (interview, 31
st
 
October, 2013).
61
 
 
In relation to Anglo-Irish Bank Govenor Honohan argues that it should have been 
closed right away and the management dismissed.  Not doing this was not 
understood and poisoned the atmosphere for Ireland internationally.  He recalls that 
the Finance Minister, Brian Lenihan, had a mistaken view that ‘a silk purse could be 
made out of a sow’s ear’ and that Anglo could be reorientated to become a lender to 
SMEs.  But Anglo was ‘a one trick pony’ with no capacity to change from what it 
was – a bank for property developers.  But, he acknowledged, once the government 
had agreed to guarantee the banks, Anglo bond holders could have claimed 
compensation if it was closed immediately.  Subsequently Europe would not allow 
                                                 
60Regling, Klaus and  Watson, Max, (2010), A Preliminary Report on The Sources of Ireland’s Banking Crisis; 
Honohan, Patrick, (2010) The Irish Banking Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy, 2003-2008 
 
61
 The relevant legislation is the Central Bank Act 1997 and the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority 
of Ireland Act 2003.  The latter was enacted for the purpose of separating the function of bank regulation into a 
separate authority with its own board. 
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the bondholders to be burned.  As compensation they did a deal to allow a €30 
billion Promissory Note by the government to Anglo to be extended over a 35 year 
timeframe (ibid). 
 
Former Secretary General of the Department of Finance, Kevin Cardiff, notes that 
the department was concerned about how to transition the economy to a lower 
growth rate. The challenge of controlling exuberance was a hard one.  Even 
investment caused asset price inflation in infrastructure, in health and the general 
public sector.  He recalls that in 2005 there was a review of fiscal policy relating to 
property reliefs but there was a concern that pulling the plug could  have accelerated 
the fall in the property market.  On the other hand property transaction taxes were a 
flaw in the tax base but less tax on transactions would have inflated a bigger asset 
bubble.  It would have been hard to increase taxation at a time of exchequer surplus 
and a historically low debt to GDP ratio.  With regard to capital ratios the Central 
Bank Act (1971) did give the power to set them at whatever was considered an 
appropriate level but there was a risk of unintended outcomes viz, foreign builders 
could have been operating in Ireland financed by foreign banks.  In general 
prudential controls could have been imposed on key players but others might have 
filled the gap, although he reflects that if this approach had been taken, the problems 
might now be more acutely felt in other capitals.  He adds that any action controlling 
credit would also have provoked a public outcry (interview, 14
th
  December, 2011). 
 
It is worth noting that the Department of Finance was not always so conservative.  
Under T.K. Whitaker and Charlie Murray in 1957 it was favourably disposed to 
French and Italian style planning and partnership-type thinking.  Its expanded role 
and influence in this period was also an object of bureaucratic jealousy (Whitaker, 
2006: 9-10). 
 
Another former Secretary General of the Department of Finance, Tom Considine, 
also addresses the issue of foreign banks – in particular the Scottish banks – which 
were active in the Irish market.  He says the Scottish banks drove down margins on 
mortgages thereby creating more demand.  This was combined with massive 
availability of money in wholesale markets but ‘when one takes flight, the whole lot 
take flight and this is also true of corporate deposits’.  Mr Considine argues that the 
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same failure of regulation happened also in the UK and the US (interview, 24
th
  
May, 2012).   
 
The defence of policy by the authorities at the time does not resonate with the 
business community. Danny McCoy, Director General of IBEC, does not put a tooth 
in it: 
 
‘No one realised the scale of the problem of bank borrowing except Patrick 
Honohan.  The soft landing hypothesis was possible in 2006.  Lehmans changed 
all that.  We were incredibly exposed but didn’t know it. The same goes for the 
tax base, the Finance narrative is not credible.’ 
(Interview, 27
th
  April, 2012). 
 
Gylfason et al (2010) are similarly critical observing that some of the more extreme 
crisis countries like Ireland and Iceland had predominantly homemade crisis that 
were only ignited by global developments.  Echoing Martin O’Donohue they say 
that these countries had for years done too little to ensure adequate regulation and 
supervision of their financial systems.  With respect to the conduct of fiscal policy 
they charge that tax policies not only permitted bubbles to inflate but left little scope 
for accommodative or expansionary initiatives to alleviate the consequences of the 
crisis when it happened.  Nevertheless, there is some mitigation too in the 
observation that: 
 
‘The errors committed by the management of financial institutions as well as the 
shortcomings in regulation and supervision of banks and other financial 
institutions are undeniable, but they are not at the root of the issue.  The global 
crisis emanated from the conjunction of widespread financial fragility and a 
lopsided globalisation process, proceeding rapidly amidst large financial 
imbalances.’ 
 (Glyfason et al, 2010:16) 
 
In any event the design of the bailout package for Ireland is seen internationally as 
flawed, inadequate and unfair and likely to lead to a ‘lost decade’ much as Latin 
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America experienced in the 1980s. (Krugman, 2010; Milne, 2010; Pisani-Ferry, 
2010; Stephens, 2010; Wolf, 2010). 
 
The problem with the austerity programme in economic terms is its impact on 
household consumption in addition to the diminished level of public and private 
investment.  Household consumption constitutes about half of Ireland’s GDP and 
about 63 per cent of domestic demand.  As of the first quarter of 2012, private 
consumption was continuing to decline at the rate of 2.2 per cent year on year.  A 
very high savings rate of 14 per cent influenced by the high levels of personal 
indebtness averaging 210 per cent of disposable income compounded this problem.  
The extent of households’ indebtness distinguishes Ireland from any of the other 
countries in debt (ibid).   Central Bank Governor, Patrick Honohan, takes a different 
view.  He believes that domestic demand is tied to middle-class confidence,  ‘when 
they think recovery is happening they will begin to spend again’ (interview, 31st 
October, 2013).  Presumably this would not be likely to be the case where people 
were trying to pay down personal debt. 
 
So it was that Ireland entered 2013 having made enormous sacrifices to achieve no 
more than a 2 per cent reduction in its debt to GDP ratio and with economic growth 
flat lining.  As can be seen from Figure 8 below the unemployment level was one of 
the highest in the EU and in or around twice that of any one of the comparator 
countries.  Under the EU/IMF/ECB programme growth rates of 2.75 per cent had 
been projected. The absence of any buoyancy to assist fiscal consolidation caused 
the government to reopen the Croke Park Agreement
62
 with a view to achieving 
public pay related savings of €1 billion.  After much difficulty, including a serious 
breakdown in negotiations at one stage and the threat of emergency legislation, this 
objective was secured in a further agreement with the public service trade unions 
known as ‘The Haddington Road Agreement.’ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 The Croke Park Agreement is an agreement to protect pay, pensions and security of employment in return for 
flexibility in the public sector aimed at reducing the cost base. 
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Figure 8: Rates of Unemployment in the EU, April 2013 
 
Source:  NERI Quarterly Economic Facts,, Summer 2013 
 
For Ireland the crucial objective is to sever the link between banking and sovereign 
debt so ill-advisedly conflated in 2008. In this they are relying on an agreement 
reached by Eurozone heads of government on 29 June, 2012 which mandated the 
Euro group to examine the Irish situation.  Unfortunately for Ireland, a number of 
creditor countries – Finland, Netherlands and Germany – publicly resiled from the 
agreement shortly after asserting that it could not deal with legacy issues.  Failure to 
resolve the debt issue would leave Ireland in a very bad space economically and 
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socially.  In large measure Ireland is trying to present itself as being exceptional and 
there is some support for this view in the literature mainly on the basis that its 
difficulties were caused by a property crash but the country’s economic 
fundamentals are sound (Andritzky et al, 2012; Brown, 2010; Gylfason, 2010). 
 
As of mid-January, 2013 the auguries for the early or even satisfactory resolution of 
this issue were not good.  The Financial Times editorialised that the European 
Commission would break its promise to sever the bond between sovereign and 
banking debt if it proceeded with a reported plan to have Member States make good 
the losses of private banks before they are recapitalised with Eurozone rescue funds.  
It noted that in Ireland’s case, nearly half the country’s annual income has gone to 
making whole private, risk-taking investors, mostly from other Euro members 
(Financial Times Editorial, January 15, 2013. P.10).  By the third quarter of 2013 no 
progress has been achieved.  Realistically the ESM will not be used to help Ireland 
alone. Some other country would need to be in the same circumstances for it to 
happen. 
 
 
In the medium term Ireland is sensitive to what Britain’s future in Europe may be.  
Congenital Euro scepticism on the part of the Tory Party may be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy with implications for Ireland.  Ireland’s foreign policy has been 
characterised by some ambivalence towards Britain – seeing Europe as a way of 
escaping Britain’s dominance and yet regarding her as our closest ally in Europe.  
(Economist, 8
th
 December, 2012, P. 15, Gillespie, 2012, interview with Charlie 
McCreevy, 7 June 2012; Ruane, 2010;).    Central Bank Governor, Patrick Honohan, 
takes an optimistic view of this situation.  He opines that it is to Ireland’s advantage 
not to be uniquely dependent on a slow growing Europe.  He does not regard debt as 
an unbridgeable burden at 6 per cent of GPD and recalls how it ‘melted away’ in the 
1980s.  We could become the Hong Kong of Europe – a bridge to the dynamic 
economies of the Anglo-Saxon world.  He acknowledges also that there could be 
fragmentation with southern countries leaving the Eurozone in the future but 
international expectations are that Ireland would stay in (interview, 31
st
 October, 
2013). 
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The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) central forecast for Ireland in June 2013 was 
that Ireland would exit the bailout programme on schedule at the end of the year but 
that achieving debt sustainability would require further action beyond concessions 
on the time period of promissory notes for Anglo Irish Bank given in the earlier part 
of the year.  The sustainability of Ireland’s sovereign debt remains uncertain.  The 
forecast was for the budget deficit to be still slightly above 3 per cent in 2017 (the 
target was 2015). The debt to GDP ratio is expected to peak at 129 per cent in 2014 
before declining gradually in 2015-17. The EIU is forecasting GDP growth of 0.5 
per cent in 2013 although ESRI is saying it might be as high as 2 per cent.  The 
current account of the balance of payments is expected to remain in surplus and to 
average 3.5 per cent in the period 2013-17.  Domestic demand is expected to remain 
weak with private consumption declining in 2013 and 2014 before returning to 
modest growth in 2015-17.   
 
The EIU also considers high mortgage arrears and a deterioration of the quality of 
loans to SMEs to pose a major risk to Ireland’s still fragile banking system.  
Unemployment is expected to remain high at around 14 per cent.  The EIU notes that 
export growth is heavily reliant on the pharmaceutical sector which accounts for 60 
per cent of the total value of export of goods.  The prospect of generic drugs eating 
into sales of Irish based multinationals is a serious concern.  Of the ten highest-
selling drugs due to lose their patent protection by the end of 2014 seven are 
produced in Ireland. 
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Table 31:  Economic Growth Forecast for Ireland to 2017 
 
% 2012a 2013b 2014b 2015b 2016b 2017b 
GDP 0.9 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.1 2.0 
Private 
Consumption 
-0.9 -0.8 -0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 
Government 
Consumption 
 -3.8 -3.5 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Gross fixed 
investment 
1.1 -2.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Export of 
goods & 
services 
 2.9 1.8 2.1 3.1 3.5 3.6 
Import of 
goods & 
services 
 0.3 -0.4 1.5 2.9 2.7 3.1 
Domestic 
demand 
 -1.5 -1.5 -0.1 1.1 0.6 0.8 
Agriculture  -12.2
 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 
Industry -0.1
 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 
Services 2.1
 0.7 1.0 1.8 2.1 2.1 
aActual  bEconomist Intelligence Unit Forecasts  
 
Source: EIU Country Report Ireland, June, 2013, P.9 
 
 
In July 2013 the ESRI also published a Medium Term Review involving three 
possible scenarios (Fitzgerald and Kearney, 2013).  The recovery scenario sees the 
EU economy returning to reasonable growth rates for the rest of the decade.  It also 
assumes banking issues are dealt with.  In this case growth in foreign demand would 
see a turnaround in domestic demand.  While the economy would not be likely to 
again reach full employment by 2020, the level of unemployment could be halved to 
around 6 per cent. 
 
The delayed adjustment scenario considers what would happen if the EU economy 
recovered but domestic banking issues, or other complications, remained unresolved.  
The effect might be two more austerity budgets in 2015 and 2016 and an 
unemployment rate remaining in double digits until 2020. 
 
In the stagnation scenario the EU does not return to growth resulting in a ‘zombie’ 
decade for the EU and with serious consequences for Ireland.  With no growth in the 
EU, the Irish economy, even if managed effectively, would do well to grow at 1 per 
cent a year over the second half of the decade.  In that case unemployment in 2020 
would be as bad as it is in 2013.  Austerity budgets would continue and the country 
would remain vulnerable to shocks.  Any attempt to use fiscal policy to boost 
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domestic demand in these circumstances would be inhibited by debt sustainability 
issues and the need to maintain broad balance on the current account of the balance 
of payments. 
 
In summary the scenario modelling conducted by ESRI suggests that if the recovery 
scenario materialises it should be possible to generate the escape velocity to get 
away from pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  If it is the stagnation scenario that would not 
be possible any time soon.  In fact the economy would be teetering on the brink of 
sustainability. 
 
Two other key points are made in the ESRI Medium Term Review 2013-2020.  Long 
term unemployment runs the risk of skills impairment such that people could be 
permanently locked out of the labour market even with recovery. This requires 
special attention to active labour market policies.  The second point is that it will be 
important that the driving force behind the export sector moves gradually away from 
businesses that are dependent on the low corporate tax regime to businesses that rely 
on other aspects of Ireland’s competitive advantage. 
 
The forecast principal features are captured in Table 32 below and Figure 9 below: 
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Table 32:  Summary Table of Forecast for Ireland to 2018 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 1
5
-
2
0 
Recovery Scenario 
GDP, % 1.7 3.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 3.7 4
.
0 
GNP, % 1.2 0.5 4.3 3.6 4.0 3.4 3
.
6 
General Govt. 
Deficit, % of 
GDP 
 
7.3 
 
5.0 
 
3.2 
 
1.2 
 
0.4 
 
-0.3 
 
-
0
.
1 
Unemploymen
t Rate, % of 
Labour Force 
 
14.0 
 
13.4 
 
11.8 
 
10.6 
 
9.5 
 
8.2 
 
5
.
6 
Delayed Adjustment Scenario 
GDP, % 1.8 1.9 2.7 1.9 2.7 3.0 3
.
3 
GNP, % 1.3 -0.9 3.0 1.1 2.8 3.1 3
.
2 
General Govt. 
Deficit, % of 
GDP 
 
7.3 
 
9.2 
 
3.2 
 
1.2 
 
0.3 
 
-0.4 
 
-
1
.
0 
Unemploymen
t Rate, % of 
Labour Force 
 
13.9 
 
13.8 
 
12.9 
 
13.5 
 
13.1 
 
11.9 
 
8
.
4 
Stagnation Scenario 
GDP, % 1.7 3.5 1.3 1.1 2.0 0.8 1
.
4 
GNP. % 1.2 0.0 1.9 0.6 2.1 0.4 1
.
1 
General Govt. 
Deficit, % of 
GDP 
 
7.3 
 
4.5 
 
2.7 
 
2.5 
 
2.0 
 
0.6 
 
0
.
7 
Unemploymen
t Rate, % of 
Labour Force 
 
14.1 
 
13.1 
 
12.5 
 
13.4 
 
12.8 
 
12.5 
 
1
1
.
8 
 
Source:  ESRI Medium Term Review 2013-2020  P.viii 
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Figure 9:  Unemployment Rate (ILO) Under Three Different Scenarios for Ireland 
 
 
 
 Source:  ESRI Medium Term Review 2013-2020 P. 35 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2008 global financial crisis has fundamentally redrawn the boundaries between 
states and markets (Hemerijck, 2013:7).  It emanated from the conjunction of 
widespread financial fragility and a lopsided globalisation process proceeding 
rapidly amongst large financial imbalances.  As Gylfason et al (2010) have pointed 
out small open economies are vulnerable to the fallout from asset price bubbles.  The 
vulnerability has increased significantly since Katzenstein (1985) formulated his 
thesis because EMU means that the option of devaluing the currency to maintain 
export competitiveness is not available (not even to Denmark).  The prescribed 
remedy under EMU for a country in difficulty is an internal devaluation via wage 
reduction. Since this affects domestic demand the effect is procyclical.  Domestic 
demand is also hit where the savings rate increases to retire private debt, usually 
mortgage related.  As a programme country Ireland was uniquely hit by both factors 
but the Netherlands was also in trouble with domestic demand because of high levels 
of private debt.  By contrast Finland did not suffer any significant reduction in 
domestic demand and Demark managed to keep it up reasonably by co-ordinated 
government action (public investment and pension contribution refunds). Finland’s 
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banking system proved to be robust in the aftermath of its 1992/3 restructuring.  
Danish banks build up large deficits equal to 40 per cent of GDP and had to be re-
capitalised.  Some Dutch banks had to be nationalised but the scale of their problems 
was eclipsed by the Irish case.  So in descending order of impact it would appear 
that Ireland was by far the most egregious case followed at a distance by the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Finland in that order. 
 
Does Katzenstein’s (1985) study help us to understand the problems created by the 
2008 financial crisis?  It does not give us the solution to these problems but it tells us 
how to go about solving them.  Katzenstein (ibid:198) makes clear that democratic 
corporatism is not an institutional solution to the problems of economic change but a 
political mechanism for coping with change.  It is distinguished by three traits:  an 
ideology of Social Partnership; a centralised peak structure of interest groups; and 
continuous political bargaining between interest groups, the state bureaucracy and 
political parties (ibid:32).  In the context of the 2008 crisis this bargaining was the 
immediate default option in Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands.   
 
It must be remembered that these countries could, as Schmidt (2011:158) points out, 
draw upon the resources of a deeply embedded collective memory that in the 1930s, 
at the time of agreements on collective bargaining institutions, served to remind all 
parties that cooperation was both possible and desirable.  It is a collective memory 
that retains a contemporary validity.  Mjoset (1992) makes a similar point noting that 
Ireland, with a small working class, and a party system derived from a split in the 
independence movement, was unable to develop the Labour Party/unions/farmers’ 
movement structure which led to the Nordic Red/Green Alliance of the 1930s, 
compromises which are at the root of the social democratic systems in Scandinavia.  
It is a testimony to this polity that the Nordic countries and the Netherlands have 
been able to establish new, virtuous mixes of equity and efficiency in their efforts at 
welfare recalibration (Hemerijck, 2013; Schmidt, 2011). 
 
Perhaps the intellectual lesson for Ireland lies in the constancy of approach of the 
other comparator countries.  What emerges from the interviews conducted for this 
research was a sense ‘that we had arrived’ when Ireland qualified for EMU 
membership; a feeling that nothing more needed to be done.  Ireland did not 
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assimilate the need for the constant discipline required by membership of a currency 
union.   From 1979 onwards, the Irish pound, newly linked to the currencies of the 
ERM floated against sterling.  The Irish Central Bank introduced exchange control 
regulations in 1979 to limit capital transactions outside the sterling area thereby 
protecting the value of the pound.  However, evolution towards EMU resulted in the 
abolition of these controls by 1992 (Donovan and Murphy, 2013:21).  Those 
countries with currencies historically linked to the DM were better equipped to deal 
with this reality.  A constant discipline is unlikely to be achieved without the 
embedded mechanism for managing change described by Katzenstein. 
 
For Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands this is a story of the renaissance of 
democratic corporatism and the ultimate sustainability, even in circumstances of 
radical global and regional integration, of the model described by Katenzstein 
(1985). But there is another story too; despite the divergence with the other 
comparator countries that began to emerge again in the 2000s, it is a fact that for a 
period in the 1990s Ireland was operating a democratic corporatist polity.  This lends 
considerable weight to the refinement of the general categorisation in the Varieties 
of Capitalism literature of Ireland as a Liberal Market Economy towards the view 
that it is more accurate to describe it as an LME with countertendencies (O’Riain, 
2004 and Smith, 2005).  What exactly constitutes those countertendencies, what 
gave rise to them, and how they compete with one another is explored in some depth 
in the context of selected aspects of European integration in the next chapter. 
 
Concerning Europe as a whole, by mid-2013 there were increasing doubts about the 
efficacy of austerity as a policy. The European economy was again in recession and 
some of the academic precepts upon which it was constructed had been found 
wanting.  Specifically, the IMF has admitted that assumptions about the way 
multipliers transmitted fiscal consolidation to the economy has been understated 
(Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). The Harvard Economists, Carmel Reinhart and 
Kenneth Rogoff (2010), who had argued that government debt above a critical 
threshold of 90 per cent can become a substantial drag on the economy, were found 
to have made a critical spread sheet error.  President Barroso admitted in a press 
conference that austerity had reached the limits of political acceptability.  Mark 
Blyth (2013) argues that the policy of austerity does not work and that it is based on 
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a fundamental misrepresentation of the facts.  Specifically, he points to the fact that 
the problem is not one of a sovereign debt crisis generated by excessive spending for 
anyone except the Greeks.  For him the crisis in the bond markets started with the 
banks and will end with the banks.  He puts the price of saving the global banking 
system at between 3 and 13 trillion dollars. He introduces the concept of ‘a fallacy of 
composition’ problem in which what is true about the whole is not true about the 
parts.  In other words, we cannot all be austere at once since all this does is to shrink 
the economy for everyone.  If a country’s private and public sectors are deleveraging 
at the same time, then the only way that country can grow is by exporting more to 
another country that is still spending.  But if everyone is following the same strategy 
of not spending, as is the case with Europe, then it becomes self-defeating (ibid: 9-
10). 
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CHAPTER 7: Unpacking Ireland’s Polity From A 
New Institutionalist Perspective 
Introduction and Recap on Methodology 
 
In the literature Ireland is most often characterised as a Liberal Market Economy 
albeit that some authors (O’Riain, 2004 and Smith, 2005) have pointed to 
countertendencies – an interventionist industrial policy and Social Partnership for 
example – which cast doubt on the total accuracy of that description.  Others, such 
as Gyfason et al (2012), acknowledge Ireland as a special case while Minas et al 
(forthcoming) clusters it with Southern EU States from a welfare perspective.  By 
and large Katzenstein’s (1985) research did not consider the possibility of 
countertendencies (and of course it did not include Finland and Ireland).  So far this 
thesis has concentrated on how well Katzenstein’s core proposition of democratic 
corporatism has held up as his world changed under the influence of European 
integration.  The purpose of this chapter is to focus on Ireland and on the nature of 
any countertendencies and their relevance to the evolution of its development model.  
It is proposed to do this using a ‘new institutionalisms’ approach via the model 
described in Chapter 2 to forensically unpack the components of its polity and 
associated decision making processes in the context of European integration.  The 
aspects of integration selected include; the general policy approach of successive 
Irish governments to European integration; economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
and its implications for Ireland and social policy generally and the role of social 
pacts in mediating integration pressures to the labour market. 
 
These three aspects were chosen because how the Irish government conceptualised 
what the process of integration would mean is central to understanding the polity.  
EMU is the flagship project of integration and in many respects the institutional 
architecture associated with it determined outcomes in other policy areas.  Not only 
that but, by definition, EMU marked out the contours of the European macro-
economy.   Social policy is an example of where EMU foreclosed options and social 
pacts were the instruments through which social policy was mediated for 22 years 
from 1987 to 2009.  Moreover, as Anton Hemerijck (2013:383) points out, the 
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interaction between economic performance and the welfare state is largely mediated 
by the labour market.   
 
The broad position of the four countries for each of the aspects of European 
integration considered can be represented by the following table: 
 
Table 33: Broad Approach to Integration in the Comparator Countries 
 Netherlands Denmark Finland Ireland 
Integration Core Europe.  One 
of the founding 
countries. 
Euro pragmatism 
with ‘voluntary’ 
discipline. 
Geo-political 
imperative to be at 
the core of Europe.  
Discipline. 
Unconditional 
support plus 
opportunistic 
behaviour within 
this. 
EMU Currency peg to 
Deutschmark since 
1970s.  Natural fit 
with EMU 
constraints. 
Voted out but 
tracks Euro strictly.  
Pegged to 
Deutschmark from 
1980s 
Strong supporter of 
disciplinary 
approach. 
Did not assimilate 
constraints of 
being in single 
currency.  
Assumed politics 
would trump. 
economic 
challenge (vs UK 
and EU) 
Social 
Pacts 
Competitive 
Corporatism. 
Creative 
corporatism 
keeping market 
mechanisms 
embedded in 
collective 
agreements. 
Creative 
corporatism 
Elements of 
competitive and 
creative 
corporatism.  Not 
deeply embedded. 
 
Using the methodology outlined in Chapter 2 the research task is to take the cover 
off the black box of the monolith state that is Ireland to see how its gears and levers 
operate.  The toolbox used for the task – being derived from the work of Allison and 
Zelikow in international relations and the new institutionalisms school of Varieties 
of Capitalism – can be depicted thus: 
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Table 34: Research Model refined from Allison & Zelikow (1999) by including perspectives from new 
institutionalism  
PARADIGM/NEW/INSTITUTIONALISM OBSERVABLE  
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 National Government Rationale Actor 
Model/Rational Choice Institutionalism. 
 
 
 
 How can the Irish State be categorised? 
 What objectives are being pursued in 
economic, social and foreign policy? 
 What are the best choices available?          
T
h
e In
flu
en
ce o
f Id
eas 
Capabilities and Practices of 
Institutions/Historical Institutionalism 
 What are the key State institutions? 
 What are their capabilities? 
 How well did they perform? 
 How are they influenced by culture and 
identity? 
 What tensions exist between them? 
 How well did the non-government 
institutions (e.g. Social Partnership) 
function? 
The Politics Paradigm (Role of the 
Elites)/Sociological Institutionalism. 
 What constitutes the elite in Ireland? 
 How did interchange (‘Pulling & 
Hauling’) between them affect outcomes? 
 
The Irish Approach to European Integration 
 
Ireland’s attitude towards European integration has been characterised by a 
somewhat narrow parochial view.  Primarily it is concerned with maximising the 
economic benefits of membership and with asserting independence from Britain.  
Paradoxically Britain is regarded as the country’s closest ally in Europe and both 
countries have often taken similar positions of opposition to social policy initiatives 
such as, for example most recently, the directive on regulation of agency workers.  
Ireland’s diplomacy in Europe is based on strongly supporting the Commission (like 
Finland) in the belief that this is the best way to protect small countries.  Yet it has 
never really bought into the overall integration project. 
 
In other words, Ireland was happy to go along with the idea of ‘ever closer union’ 
when it gave access to structural and cohesion funds and allowed multinationals 
based in Ireland access to the Single Market.  Access to the Common Agriculture 
Fund (CAP) was also an important consideration given the relatively high 
Black Box Labelled 
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importance of farming supports, socially and economically, in Ireland.    Low 
interest rates associated with EMU were also seen by some as a benefit (Baker et al, 
1996) although this eventually became a double edged sword.  But Ireland was not 
so accommodating towards integration when its vital national interests were 
perceived to be threatened.  Opt outs were sought and received from various treaties 
such as relating to military neutrality, corporate taxation and aspects of social policy.  
There is an interesting contrast here with Finland which reversed a long settled 
policy of neutrality when it joined in 1995 (Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003; Chapter 
7).   
 
The following three sub-sections will explore why Ireland’s approach to European 
integration is as narrowly focussed as it is, using the analytical model outline above. 
 
 
National Government – Rational Actor Model/Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
 
In the Varieties of Capitalism literature Ireland is widely categorised as a Liberal 
Market Economy (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Hall & Soskice, 2001, Huber & 
Stephens, 2001; Pontusson, 2005) although a more nuanced view of Ireland as an 
LME with countertendencies is taken by Smith (2005) and O’Riain (2004, 2008).  
The latter sets out detailed reasons why Ireland is a somewhat unique developmental 
network state while Kirby (2010) simply sees it as ‘a competition state’.  However, 
even in the context of the 2008 financial crisis Ireland does not fit easily into any 
box (Gylfason et al, 2010). 
 
Irish exceptionalism, if it can be said to exist, to some extent is predicated on a 
foreign policy based on the notion of a ‘Multi Interface Peripheral State’ (Ruane, 
2010).  In other words Ireland sees it as being important to have equal relations with 
Britain, the United States and Europe, although as pointed out earlier, the 
importance of Europe was recognised very early on by Sean Lemass (interview with 
Martin O’Donohue, 22nd  November, 2011).  Jack Lynch saw in Europe ‘a way of 
avoiding the Republican trap of the North’ according to Martin O’Donohue (ibid). 
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The problem for small open economies is that they are very exposed to pressures 
from global financial markets (Gylfason et al, 2010).  A willingness to cope with 
these pressures while simultaneously seeking to protect citizens from the worst 
extremes of markets was the principal characteristic of small open economies 
captured by Katzenstein (1985).   Boyer (2000) somewhat prophetically poses the 
question whether the European currency will be a step in a victory of collective 
intervention over market forces; or whether it will be the hidden strategic device 
invented in order to bring the forces of globalisation into the domestic space of each 
member state?  The point to make here is that the strategic options for any small 
open economy, including Ireland, are limited in the context of European integration. 
 
It can be argued that Ireland’s decision to join the European Economic Community 
(EEC) with Britain and Denmark in 1973 was a rational choice made in the 
knowledge of what ‘ever closer union’ meant.  It was already evident that strong 
inter-governmentalism between Germany and France was shaping monetary policy.  
In the wake of the 1972 decision by the Nixon administration in the US to abandon 
Dollar convertibility to gold, the EEC set up a new regional system of controlled 
currency floating, called The Snake.  The prospective EEC members, Britain, 
Ireland and Denmark, joined the Snake a week later.  Britain was forced out of the 
Snake by June of 1972 (Ireland was then still in a currency union with Britain).  
Twenty years later Britain was forced out of the ERM and Ireland had to devalue its 
currency by 10 per cent (Connolly, 1995; Marsh, 2011). 
 
In terms of openness to trade Britain was virtually the sole destination for Irish 
exports in the 1960s.  But the Irish authorities could see decline in this market and 
were concerned at over exposure to what they saw as a stagnant UK economy.  
Moreover, EEC membership was seen as likely to be highly beneficial from the 
viewpoint of agriculture, which it turned out to be (although not so for fisheries)
63
.  
Ireland negotiated a 14 year derogation on car assembly which was twice the normal 
of 7 years and got acceptance for capital transfers for infrastructure development,  
                                                 
63 As Dick Spring put it ‘for the farmer the most important man was the postman’ – meaning that transfers under 
the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) were highly beneficial to Irish agriculture (interview, 18th  September, 
2012). 
226 
 
Martin O’Donohue recalls that it had been hoped to develop a car components 
industry to mitigate the disappearance of car assembly (interview, 22
nd
  November, 
2011). 
 
Niamh Hardiman (2012:88) points to the evolution of Ireland’s trade post EEC entry 
such that by the 1990s its trade openness index was almost 100 per cent of GDP and 
120 per cent of GNP and with exposure to three export markets – Britain, America 
and Europe – the demands of which posed rather contradictory policy pressures on 
Ireland.   The extent of FDI and export reliance on the US market kept Ireland 
attuned to the US economic culture.  Britain was declining but was still very 
important.  Europe provided access to a single market much prized by the same 
multinationals investing in Ireland.  Thus as monetary union became an increasing 
focus of EU integration policy Ireland found itself positioned between three 
currency zones.  While managing this complexity is a significant policy challenge 
the benefits turned out to be equally significant.  By the early 1990s Ireland was 
receiving 1.7 per cent of total world FDI inflows.  In terms of FDI per capita Ireland 
was the EU’s largest recipient with three times the per capita rate of the Netherlands 
(Smith, 2005:66). 
 
Former SIPTU President and MEP, Des Geraghty has no doubts that EU integration 
was of great benefit to Ireland and a rational choice for the country’s policymakers: 
 
‘Technology and mass communications are driving globalisation outgrowing the 
nation state.  The US did away with the institutions of global governance.  The 
EU was meant to be an antidote to this.  It was intended as a counter to 
unregulated capitalism. There was no obvious alternative because all history 
teaches that you can’t put Chinese walls around things people want.  EU 
integration was an experiment to protect people’. 
 
(Interview, 12
th
  January, 2012) 
 
Chair of the Irish Times Trust, Ruth Barrington is equally positive albeit from a 
different perspective: 
 
227 
 
‘I shudder to think what this country would be like without Europe – perhaps the 
Isle of Man would be an example – private affluence and public squalor.  EU 
integration was the best thing that happened to the country.  It brought social 
harmonisation, including issues like equal pay.  Left to ourselves that would have 
taken another generation.  Integration affected policy making in a way that people 
had to think in European terms.’ 
 
(Interview, 9
th
  January, 2012). 
 
The influence of European integration on the policy making process is confirmed by 
Bertie Ahern.  In his view the positive effects of this were evident from the 
beginning.  He points particularly to the impact of regional funds (interview, 13
th
  
January, 2012).  Interestingly, the Secretary General of the Taoiseach’s Department 
for all of Mr Ahern’s time in office, Dermot McCarthy, has a more nuanced view: 
 
‘Yes, integration was influential in a policy sense in relation to labour markets, 
regulation, competition policy etc. But the approach was ad hoc.  There was no 
integrated framework approach.  There was no sense of being shaped as an 
administrative system by EU integration.  Cultural questions did not excite.  The 
issue was growth and jobs.’ 
 (Interview, 4
th
  February, 2010). 
 
John Coakley (2010:27) concludes that economic development has been strongly 
influenced by Ireland’s changing relationship with Europe pointing to popular 
endorsement of the Single European Act, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties in 
1987, 1992 and 1998 respectively although the Nice and Lisbon Treaties 
subsequently had a more difficult passage.  This implied substantial support for, and 
willingness to engage in, a new European political structure and a willingness to 
restrict Irish sovereignty. 
 
 In interviews for a report on Ireland published by the French Think Tank, Notre 
Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, former EU Commissioner, Peter Sutherland and 
Europe Minister, Lucinda Creighton, both characterised the Irish vote in favour of 
the Fiscal Compact Treaty as ‘Rational Choice’ based on the need to keep open the 
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possibility of access to the ESM (cited in Aziliz Gouez, 2013:19).  But that is not the 
full story.  A large number of people voted yes for negative reasons.  They feared 
Ireland might not be allowed access to further bailout funds unless it ratified the 
treaty.  Of the yes voters, 15 per cent voted yes for positive reasons while 21 per 
cent voted yes for primarily negative reasons (Eurobaramoter, 2012 cited in O’Riain, 
forthcoming, 2014:232). 
 
We can conclude that European integration, on this evidence, was a rational choice 
for Ireland because the nature of the Irish State is that of a Liberal Market Economy 
with a certain countertendencies principally relating to the level of state intervention 
in the economy and a degree of neo-corporatist Social Partnership. Joining the 
political construct which is Europe, being based on a Social Market Economy idea, 
gave a level of cover for these countertendencies, albeit that Britain and Ireland were 
outliers. Moreover, the objectives of economic, social and foreign policy were 
principally growth and jobs.  European integration, particularly the Single Market, 
immeasurably assisted the achievement of these objectives.  The most significant 
factor, however, was that Ireland in reality had no choice regarding European 
integration.  In fact it was the only choice once Britain decided to join. 
 
In conclusion one can opine that an armchair strategist, knowing the circumstances 
in which Ireland found itself, and in the context of an inflexible EU institutional 
framework, would surely have found the path towards European integration 
irresistible.  
 
Capabilities and Practices of Institutions /Historical 
Institutionalism 
 
For the purpose of this part of the analysis the most important institutions are 
government departments, State Agencies like the IDA, and the labour market 
institutions and actors. 
 
Returning to the influences which caused the critical juncture in the late 1950s – The 
Whitaker Report and moves towards export orientated industrialisation and 
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ultimately membership of the EEC – one can discern many conflicting pressures on 
policy makers.  The weakness of Ireland’s industrial base compelled Sean Lemass to 
try to form an industrial efficiency bureau as early as 1947.  This project failed in the 
face of resistance from a united domestic capitalist class and a deflationary coalition 
led by the Department of Finance.  A position had been arrived at by the 1950s 
whereby domestic capitalists were strong enough to resist efficiency measures but 
too weak to block the free trade that would ultimately decimate them.  While Ireland 
(unlike Finland) had participated in the Marshall Plan, it was less heavily 
incorporated into it and related European integration projects than some of the other 
small countries which were more successful in achieving auto centric national 
economies (Girvin, 2004, Mjoset, 1992; Murray, 2009; O’Riain, 2004). 
 
Out of this policy vacuum came the founding of the Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA) with a remit to support indigenous industry.  In time this mission 
metamorphosed into attracting foreign direct investment.  It is fair to say that the 
IDA enjoys widespread approval in Ireland and is very powerful.  Its former 
chairman, John Dunne, describes it thus: 
 
‘The IDA is a terrific organisation.  Its people are imbued with a sense of 
vocation, like the priesthood.  It had extraordinary leaders.’   
(Interview, 16
th
  February 2012) 
 
Minister for Enterprise, Innovation and Jobs, Richard Bruton, is less effusive.  He 
says of the IDA that it had a simple task.  It was really a marketing agency with a 
good product to sell.  It did it effectively and well but it had a simple mission 
(interview, 10
th
  May 2012). 
 
The IDA is an important institution to focus on because it is at the heart of a 
dichotomy in Irish industrial policy.  While European integration, via the Single 
European Act, made Ireland proportionately one of the largest recipients of FDI in 
the world it has not worked the same miracle for indigenous industry.  As Smith 
(2005:146) puts it, ‘a self-sustaining industrial base was simply not achieved after 
1958’.  Sean O’Riain’s (2004, 2008) explanation is that, in addition to the 
conservative disposition of Irish capitalism, the State agency responsible for 
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development of indigenous industry, Enterprise Ireland, never managed to develop a 
narrative for its existence independent of the IDA’s free market rhetoric.  In other 
words, it could never find a way of advocating or justifying a different State led 
approach. 
 
The Chairman of Forfás, Eoin O’Driscoll, largely agreed with this analysis and his 
evaluation of the industrial policy as exposed by the 2008 crisis has been outlined in 
Chapter 6.  He believes in the need for State sponsored enterprises (interview, 26
th
  
April 2012).  Richard Bruton feels this is ‘a bit unfair’ to Enterprise Ireland but feels 
it has been too mired in corporate welfare and did not succeed in building clusters.  
He too believes in the need to build national ‘champions’ as does Ruairi Quinn 
(interview, 10
th
  May, 2012 and 26
th
  May, 2012 respectively). 
 
Another perspective on this is offered by the chairwoman of telecommunications 
company 02, Danuta Gray.  She suggests that anyone from an American 
multinational is much more appreciated in Ireland than someone from another 
country of origin.  She considers this to be true both of politics and business 
‘especially IBEC’ (interview, 7th  February 2012).  This puts into context Niamh 
Hardiman’s (2012:88) conundrum that arising from increasing European integration, 
Ireland finds itself positioned between three currency zones.  The same is true for 
Ruane’s (2010) views on the complexity of operating a multi interface periphery 
foreign policy.   In its medium –term review of the Irish economy for the period 
2013-2020 the ESRI stresses the need for industrial policy to focus on businesses 
that rely on attractions other than tax policy (Fitzgerald and Kearney, 2013). 
 
Eoin O’Driscoll accepts that there has been very little engagement with Europe in 
the matter of industrial policy except in relation to funding for Science Foundation 
Ireland.  According to him: 
 
‘There was a strong attempt to understand Finland, Denmark and the German 
Mittelstands as models but the US always dominated.  Northern European 
funding via banks was different.’ 
 
(Interview, 26
th
  April 2012). 
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He says that culturally the Irish get on well with Americans and that we do not have 
that cultural ease with Europeans (ibid). 
 
Speaking from an IBEC perspective John Dunne did not accept the argument that 
industry did not look towards Europe.  He explained that during his tenure as 
director general there were extensive contacts with Sweden, even to the point of a 
Swedish person coming to Ireland to study business practice.  ‘We were starting to 
influence the Swedes’ he said (interview, 16th  February 2012). 
 
With regard to public administration another Director General of IBEC, Danny 
McCoy, noted that in relation to the capabilities of government departments they 
seemed to lack an overall narrative about the country. He opined that that there are 
different cultures influencing different government departments.  For example, the 
Department of Justice is so different to the Department of Finance and the 
Department of the Taoiseach (when strong) was different again.  However, he 
admitted that this was also true of IBEC because it was a blend of two different 
traditions embodied in the Federated Union of Employers and the Confederation of 
Irish Industry, the two bodies which merged to create IBEC (interview, 27 April 
2012). 
 
John Dunne recalled that there were ‘ferocious tensions’ between the Departments 
of Finance and The Taoiseach in the 1988 to 2000 period.   
 
In reality the quest for ‘joined up government’ proved elusive. While state spending 
increased during the boom years it was done by layering a series of policy initiatives 
alongside or on top of a relatively unreformed system of administration and social 
service delivery.  Unfortunately, this produced a dualism between a relatively under 
resourced existing infrastructure and a set of new agencies that could undertake 
particular projects.  It did not lead to good coordination (O’Riain, forthcoming, 
2014; Paus, 2012)). 
 
As regards managing Ireland’s relations with the process of European integration 
both former Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, Noel Dorr and former Secretary 
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General of  the Taoiseach’s Department, Dermot McCarthy, confirmed that there 
was a lack of coordination of policy (interview, 28
th
  November, 2012).  Noel Dorr 
recalls that Paddy Hillery fought off Finance wanting to be the coordinating 
Department for European Affairs (interview, 30 November 2011).  Charlie 
McCreevy was firmly of the view that Finance should have led on Europe ‘on the 
grounds that 95 per cent of our relationship with Europe is economic’ (interview, 7th  
June 2012)
64.  As he explained it DFA always wanted to be ‘best boy in class’ – a 
mind-set contributed to by Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald – and this is a weakness that 
persists to this day. 
 
Dermot McCarthy is not a huge admirer of the Department of Finance worldview.  
He asserts that, ‘the Finance outlook is that it is not worth doing anything. All 
expenditure is waste. They risked standing back and losing influence.  Yet they 
didn’t get fiscal conservatism right in the end’ (interview, 28th  November 2011).  It 
is interesting to juxtaposition this viewpoint with Kevin Cardiff’s concern (P. 208) 
that in the context of an overheating economy pre-2008 controlling credit would 
have produced an adverse public reaction. 
 
In relation to the process of European integration Dermot McCarthy recalls that 
senior Irish appointed officials used to feed back concerns about the perceived 
narrowness of Irish official engagement.  He says that Ireland always played by the 
rules and never tried to use Irish people in the Commission to advance the country’s 
national interest (ibid).  This is in marked contrast to how Denmark conducted its 
relationship with Europe as explained by Anette Berentzen of the Danish LO about 
the structured approach of both political and civil society actors towards ensuring 
that Danish national interests were upheld in Brussels (interview, 22 May 2012). 
 
Charlie McCreevy confirms that the Danish approach to mediating relations with 
Europe is much more integrated and active than Ireland’s.  He says that the 
Department of Foreign Affairs standard operating procedure is to always support the 
                                                 
64 He imparted an interesting anecdote about how Foreign Affairs came to lead, according to which the wife of 
Minister for Finance in the early years did not like travelling and so the then Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald agreed 
that DFA could take pole position. 
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Commission and go along with what they say.  Policy is made in consultation with 
the permanent representative in Brussels. He evaluates it this way: 
 
‘Is this wrong?  It worked for a time.  The €8 billion cohesion funding we got in 
the 1990s was down to the skill of our public servants.  But things change – you 
don’t train racehorses today the way they did sixty years ago.’ 
 (Interview, 7
th
  June 2012). 
 
Of his experience of the Commission he says that it is effectively run by France;  
 
‘They know exactly what their own people are doing at all times and they manage 
them very well at every level.  These are the Énarques
65
.   They all come from the 
same stable.  When the French eliminated the aristocracy in 1791 they replaced them 
with a new elite.  These are top class people.  It is accepted that they are political and 
their individual politics are well known.  They are nominally independent but they 
act in the French national interest.’ 
 (Interview, 7
th
  June 2012). 
 
This is a perspective substantially confirmed by Bernard Connolly in his strongly 
critical portrayal of the European Commission in which he served as a senior official 
(Connolly, 1995).  Given this situation and a less than fully effective Irish 
engagement, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Ireland has been dragged 
along by the events of European integration and that the institutions lacked the 
capacity to shape those events. 
 
Former Secretary General of the Department of Public Enterprise, John Loughrey, 
concurs.  He believes that despite their ability at rooting out money and working the 
corridors of power, Irish civil servants could not compete with other countries; ‘We 
don’t have the confidence of the French civil servants to speak truth to power 
sufficiently loudly’ (interview, 7th  March, 2012).  Conversely with Mr McCreevy, 
he argues that the Department of Foreign Affairs provided such intellectual 
firepower as there was and that they have done the State some service. 
                                                 
65 Products of an elite national university dedicated to the education of public administrators.   
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At an agency level it is the opinion of the former chief executive of the Electricity 
Supply Board (ESB), Padraig MacManus, that Ireland is super compliant but does 
not need to be.  He cites his experience of handing the process of negative 
integration
66
.  The ESB tried to pick strategic concessions which they felt were 
achievable and only those that were really important e.g. emissions trading.  His 
view of EU integration is summed up in the following statement: 
 
‘Small countries don’t matter.  What Ireland does doesn’t matter.  We are only a 
rounding error in anything to do with Europe.’ 
(Interview, 11
th
  January 2012). 
The Politics Paradigm/Sociological Institutionalism 
 
This involves studying the interaction of elite actors as they struggled with decisions 
relating to European integration. 
 
Verdun and Christiansen (2000) argue that the entire history of the European project 
has been one of pursuing the goal of political integration through the means of 
economic integration.  Is this what Irish policy makers consciously bought into? 
 
Broadly speaking the answer is in the affirmative even if at times it was a reluctant 
buy in.  Tom Garvin (2005:191) notes that as early as 1954, the Irish government 
was already discussing the possibilities of the economic unification of Europe and 
Ireland’s role in the process.  Laffan and Tonra (2010) suggest that after the Second 
World War Ireland was drawn in to a broader, more stable and increasingly 
interdependent international system.  In their perspective European integration 
provided a framework within which a small open polity could mediate the forces of 
growing interdependence and globalisation (although this only became a factor 
much later).  After the disastrous recession of 1955-1956 Ireland realised that its 
existing trajectory of policy was looking highly pessimistic. The report written by 
T.K. Whittaker in 1958 entitled ‘Economic Development’ and the subsequent white 
paper had ‘Startling Pro-Growth Orientation’ in the words of Eichengreen 
                                                 
66 Negative integration in this context is the process of competitive market making for public utilities.  
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(2007:120).  It was not so much that Ireland welcomed free trade; it was rather that it 
realised that the country would eventually have to face up to European integration.  
Thus it was that Whitaker’s Report and the White Paper provided the basis for an 
influential group of politicians, academics, trade unionists, business people and civil 
servants ‘to begin breaking away from the constellation favouring isolationism and 
stasis’ (ibid). 
 
Eichengreen (ibid: 121) asserts that this generation of leaders welcomed the 
opportunity to shift the country’s external relations away from Britain and towards 
Europe.  Opening and reform were pre-requisites for this reorientation.  All those 
interviewed for this research who expressed a view concurred with this analysis.  
That said, the fact that so much of domestically owned small business was critically 
dependent on UK markets always had to be factored in to decision making (Quinn, 
2005: 356). 
 
In so far as the conversion to openness was reluctant the coldly rational choice and 
the dilemma it posed is captured in the following somewhat acerbic assessment: 
 
‘The patriots had come reluctantly or otherwise to the conclusion that economic and 
cultural protectionism would have to be abandoned in favour of free trade, and that 
multinational capital would have to be used to supplement local capital.’ 
 
(Garvin, 2005:144) 
 
Garvin goes on to say that after 1956 opposition to European integration came from 
a broad, incongruous, noisy and usually ineffective coalition including the Irish left, 
insurrectionist republicans, anti-militarists and Catholic isolationists (ibid:192). 
Still Ireland had failed to benefit from the golden age of social democracy which 
lasted from 1943 to 1973 and was an outlier in Europe in terms of economic growth.  
As Tom Garvin puts it: 
 
‘Ireland combined the slow growth rates characterised of a rich and mature economy 
with the underdevelopment characteristic of a rather poor country.’ 
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(Garvin, 2005:12). 
 
To overcome this deficit through converging with other European countries was the 
political prize to be striven for.  On the face of it, it was an objective shared by all 
political parties, especially given the lack of ideological difference which is a feature 
of Irish politics.  But, as Garvin again points out (ibid), following Olson (2002), 
there is no guarantee that groups in society with a common objective will pursue it 
rationally.   
 
As Ireland turned its face towards Europe it was somewhat inhibited, at least as 
regards industrial policy, by a factor again identified by Garvin; the real long term 
effect of Marshal Aid was to expose Irish decision-makers and much of the broader 
Irish public to an American business culture (ibid:185).  The accuracy of this 
influence today is confirmed by Eoin O’Driscoll of Forfás and Danuta Gray of O2 
(interviews 26
th
  April 2012 and 7
th
  February 2012 respectively). But at a political 
level Garvin (2004:191) affirms that by 1954 the government was already seriously 
discussing the possibilities of an economic unification of Europe and Ireland’s role 
in that process.  On the Fine Gael side the emergence of Garret Fitzgerald, a 
politician and economist with a strong Europhile outlook, reinforced this thinking. 
 
There were early Labour Party and trade union reservations about  joining the EEC, 
mainly due to justified fears about the effect on indigenous industry and 
employment.  In fact labur advocated seeking association rather than full 
membership.  However, there was popular endorsement of the Single European Act, 
of the Maastricht Treaty and of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1987, 1992 and 1998.  This 
paved the way for Irish participation in a new European political structure and 
implied substantial support for the restriction of Irish sovereignty.  This trend was 
halted in 2001 when the Nice Treaty was rejected in a referendum but the decision 
was reversed by the people in 2002.  The same thing happened with the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2008.  All the major parties, together with employer and trade union peak 
organisations are generally supportive of European integration.  Opposition has 
come from the nationalist Sinn Fein party and from ultra-left and right-wing political 
groups.  However, the kind of political forces found elsewhere in Europe have been 
weak or absent in Ireland and the link between parties and particular social classes 
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has been tenuous.  The dominance of competing versions of nationalism represented 
by the two major parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, and a weak Labour Party,  
means that most big issues, including EEC membership, have been conceptualised in 
terms of independence rather than class interests (Breen et al, 1990, Coakley, 2010; 
Garvin, 2004; Gilland, 2004). 
 
Senator Joe O’Toole points to the electoral system as discouraging politicians from 
taking an interest in European affairs: 
 
‘There is no understanding of EU affairs in Leinster House because there is no need 
for it.  They have no role.  Ireland has a presidential style administration.  There is a 
lack of understanding of the differences between federation and confederation.  This 
leads to a confused debate about sovereignty and independence.  By contrast there 
was no debate at all, for example, about the Charter of Fundamental Rights.’ 
 
(Interview, 4
th
  December 2012). 
 
This sense of distance from Europe is echoed by former Tánaiste, Dick Spring.  He 
says that Ireland is a peripheral country with very little interaction with the others.   
 
And yet not every senior politician was conscious of Ireland’s peripherality.  Bertie 
Ahern, former Taoiseach, observes that in 21 years attending European Council 
meetings he never felt overawed or intimidated.  He concedes that Irish people do 
have a narrow view ‘but in their hearts they would not want Europe to fail’.  
Personally he said his only concern about European integration and enlargement is 
where the boundaries should ultimately be fixed.  He noted that Germany is now 
dominant in Europe: 
 
‘They invest massively in China and Africa. They have anchored themselves very 
cleverly.  For that reason Europe must stay together and strong.’ 
 
(Interview, 13
th
  January 2012). 
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Former Secretary General of the Department of Public Enterprise, John Loughrey,  
asserts that Ireland was hooked on grants.  He was not sure that we ever made a real 
contribution to European values: 
 
‘We were always concerned about venal issues of money or welfare.  Garret 
(Fitzgerald) was the only exception.  The Irish civil service was better than most 
at capturing money.  But there was no political or administrative imagination to 
get a better developmental outcome.  Irish ministers, for the most part, did not 
have an independent view.  Neil Kinnock
67
 did more for Ireland as a 
Commissioner than anyone else.’ 
 
Of the politicians with whom he engaged on the European integration issue Noel 
Dorr makes no secret of his admiration for Garret Fitzgerald (in his view Fitzgerald 
accepted the principle of European integration but others were just concerned about 
accessing funds).  He also says that Brian Lenihan senior also had a great sense of 
history while Paddy Hillery was ‘deep, subtle, intelligent and enthusiastic’.    He had 
a more difficult relationship with Charles Haughey when Taoiseach.  Nevertheless, 
he says of Haughey that he had a good sense of timing and of history.  Chancellor 
Kohl was very appreciative of his efforts during the second Summit of the Irish 
Presidency in 1990 and thanked him profusely.  They were, he said, creating a 
‘European Germany’ (Interview, 30 November, 2011)68.   
 
Thus it is that European integration has, for the most part and with honourable 
exceptions, been viewed by politicians as a way of maximising the financial benefits 
for Ireland.  As Coakley (ibid) points out it is likely that the most profound changes 
in the character of Irish politics will be incremental, as the freedom of action of the 
Irish political system is compromised by its incorporation in a larger political entity, 
the EU, and by global economic realities.  And in that cauldron Charlie McCreevy 
observes of the Member States of the EU: 
 
                                                 
67 Vice President of the European Commission (1999-2004). Former leader of the British Labour Party (1983-
1992). 
68 It is clear from the interview with Wim Kok recorded in Chapter 2 that Kohl placed a lot of value on loyalty 
and support.  This is evidenced in the negative in Wim Kok’s belief that Kohl treated Dutch Prime Minister 
Lubbers badly because of his lack of support for German unification.  We can only speculate that Ireland might 
have found a more sympathetic ear in Germany post 2008 if Kohl were still in office. 
(Interview, 7
th
  March 2012). 
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‘When it comes to the crunch they will all look after themselves.’ 
 
(Interview, 7
th
  June, 2012). 
Summary 
 
In this section we have used the analytical model described earlier to explain why 
Ireland’s approach to European integration is characterised by a narrow focus on 
maximising the economic benefits, asserting independence from Britain and 
generally supporting the EU Commission as the cornerstone of its diplomacy.   
 
European integration was rationally the only choice available to Ireland.  The failure 
to exploit the opportunities of the post war golden age left the country economically 
and socially backward.  Once a decision was made to move from import substitution 
industrialisation to export orientated industrialisation the die was cast.  A small open 
economy needs the protection of international institutions to enforce trading 
conditions that it is too weak to enforce itself.  It is clear that the inexorable logic of 
this situation dawned on the government as early as 1954.  However, it can be 
argued from the foregoing analysis that Ireland has failed to optimise the potential of 
European integration for a number of reasons viz: first, over dominance of a US 
focussed business culture as a residual from the Marshall Plan.  Second, a compliant 
mentality shaped by a Department of Foreign Affairs which desires to always please 
the EU Commission retaining strong indications of path dependence to this day.  
Third, a deflationary mind-set in the Department of Finance shaped by a fiscal 
conservatism which yet failed the country in the 2008 crisis.  Fourth, a lack of 
institutional engagement with Europe. The dominance of Germany and France 
means that it was always going to be difficult to make an impact, but there is no 
evidence of a coherence which might, if exercised in the manner of Denmark, have 
provided better outcomes. 
 
The institutionalist influences revealed by the application of the analytical model can 
be depicted using the radar diagram in Figure 14 below. 
 
The key problem of Irish policy on EU integration can be succinctly stated as a lack 
of strategic engagement based on an intellectual failure to grasp what the whole 
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project is about.  This is compounded by an electoral and parliamentary system that 
discourages interest in foreign affairs. The real and potential consequences of this 
failure will become clearer as we proceed now to look at the practical manifestations 
of integration that we have chosen to focus on viz; EMU and social policy/social 
pacts, using the same analytical model. 
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Figure 10: Radar Diagram outlining clusters of institutionalist influences on overall integration policy  
(strongest influences closest to the centre)  
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Economic and Monetary Union 
 
In the case of EMU Ireland’s policy approach was characterised by a similar 
imperative to demonstrate independence from Britain while hoping and expecting at 
the same time that Britain itself would join, if not in the beginning, then eventually.  
Ireland saw EMU also as a potential haven of currency stability after the experience 
of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and earlier currency volatility.  In essence 
the view was that the train was leaving the station and the overriding imperative was 
to be on it regardless of where it was going.  Because it was the great political 
project arising from German re-unification it was assumed that problems would get 
solved. Ireland never tried to shape EMU in its national interest.  The purpose of this 
section is to apply the three part analytical model to explain why this was the case. 
 
The flagship project of European integration is Economic and Monetary Union and 
that, while first advanced via the Werner Report in 1969, the project languished until 
after the Single European Act was passed in 1987.  It was taken off the shelf, dusted 
down and represented in a different format by Commission President Jacques Delors 
in 1989.  What really breathed life into it though was the prospect of German 
reunification consequent upon the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990.  Apprehensive at 
the prospect of a reunited Germany, and all that implied in an historical context, 
France promoted the idea of creating a ‘European Germany’ as distinct from the 
feared ‘German Europe’.  It was first and foremost a matter of high politics directed 
by Chancellor Kohl of Germany and President Mitterrand of France. Because EMU 
is primarily a political rather than an economic project there are certain unresolved 
problems which continue to defy resolution as set out below.
69
 
 
The institutional architecture is deficient. It provided only for monetary union via 
the establishment on Bundesbank lines of the European Central Bank (ECB).  Thus 
economic policy remains substantially uncoordinated as evidenced by the huge 
imbalances within the Eurozone.  Fiscal policy is still a domestic competence as is 
largely social policy. 
 
                                                 
69 In a recent paper Ashoka Mody suggests that while the Euro was a political decision it had no operational 
political dynamic in a key sense.  He asserts that there was never a realistic possibility that fiscal – and, hence, 
political – sovereignty would be surrendered (Mody, 2013:9). 
243 
 
Germany and its satellites (Netherlands, Finland, Belgium – and Denmark in 
practice) believe in the idea of an independent central bank, whereas France with the 
support of the Southern European countries has consistently advocated political 
control over monetary policy
70
. 
 
The Franco-German partnership has always been far more of a roller-coaster ride of 
political opposites than a smoothly functioning motor of European integration.  
Nevertheless, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the resurgence of Germany and the 
deepening weakness of France have changed everything.  We are in a space, post the 
2008 crisis, where federalism under German hegemony is an ever increasing real 
prospect if the Eurozone is to find a long term settlement of its difficulties.   Indeed, 
Beck (2013:44) writes that this is the best case outcome; in the worst it could be neo-
colonialism for the debtor countries.  This is the context in which it is now proposed 
to examine the evolution of policy in Ireland using the model derived from Allison 
and Zelikow (1999) and the new institutionalisms school of Varieties of Capitalism 
(Connolly, 1995; Verdun and Christiansen, 2000; May, 2013; Peel and Carnegy, 
2013). 
 
National Government-Rational Actor Model/Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
 
According to former Finance Minister and current Minister for Education, Ruairi 
Quinn, Jacques Delors seized the opportunity which the Single European Act (SEA) 
provided to reignite the whole European project.  While there had been a brief 
reference to economic and monetary union in the preamble to the SEA, the real work 
on the project began in 1988.  Known as The Delors Report it culminated in the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1991, which came into force in 1993.  Britain and Denmark 
argued successfully for an opt out of the treaty and the right to remain outside the 
single currency (Quinn, 2005:347). 
 
Clearly Britain’s decision to stay out of the currency had implications for Ireland 
which were ventilated at the time.  A large proportion of the domestically owned 
                                                 
70 These contesting viewpoints are characterised as differences between ‘Monetarists’ and ‘Economists’. 
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small-business sector was critically dependent on the British market.  However, 
there was a belief amongst the Irish political and administrative elite that Britain 
would eventually join.  Currency volatility was a worry for policy makers.  The Irish 
Punt was felt to be ‘flotsam and  jetsam ’ likely to be pushed around by speculators.  
The experience of ERM when Ireland was forced to devalue by 10 per cent in 1993 
tended to validate that fear (interviews with Ruairi Quinn, Dick Spring, John 
Loughrey).  Nevertheless, Dick Spring did say that the advice the government 
received was that if Ireland choose to align with Sterling as against joining the single 
currency the effect would be the same.  Interestingly, this is the assessment of 
Finland’s experience vis-á-vis Sweden held by people in Finland interviewed for this 
research.  Dick Spring confirms that the factor which carried the decision to join 
EMU was the potential effect on FDI.  It was felt that membership of the single 
currency would make Ireland an even more attractive place for investors (interview, 
18
th
  September 2012). 
 
Noel Dorr, by contrast, says that there was never consideration given to staying out 
of EMU for three reasons.  First, independence from Britain; here was a concern that 
the UK economy was stagnant and Ireland did not want to be linked to it. Second, a 
desire to be at the centre of Europe and third a belief that the discipline of EMU 
would be good for the country. 
 
 
Whatever the different emphasis on the reasons for joining EMU there is consensus 
amongst interviewees that the 1996 ESRI evaluation of the options was of seminal 
importance.   The report considered three scenarios.  The first was Ireland and the 
UK remaining outside EMU at least in its early years.  The second was Ireland 
joining without the UK, and finally  both Ireland and the UK joining EMU from its 
inception. 
 
The study also considered the loss of devaluation as a potential adjustment 
mechanism to shocks.  Its principle conclusion was that the gains of EMU would 
outweigh the losses (Baker, Fitzgerald and Honohan, 1996). 
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Moreover, a report on Ireland’s experience of, and prospects in, the European 
community published by the National Economic & Social Council also came out in 
favour of EMU stating:   
 
‘Based on these analyses our conclusion is that both Ireland and the community as a 
whole would have a lot to gain from moving to an economic and monetary union of 
the sort outlined above’. 
 (NESC, 1989:437). 
 
In fairness the NESC report drew attention to some risks of regional imbalances and 
pointed to the historical experience:  ‘That economic and monetary integration 
generally can, in the absence of countervailing policies, have a negative impact on 
peripheral regions’ (ibid:438). 
 
Although the ESRI report was well received amongst the policy making community 
its findings  were  contested in some sections of the financial press and on the 
grounds that it understated the risks of inflation and of a property bubble emerging. 
The Economist who coined the phrase ‘Celtic Tiger’ to describe Ireland of the 1990s 
employed his talent for colourful language again in a newspaper article, observing 
that: 
 
‘The economic advisers at the Central Bank, like a pub landlord with a headache, 
must be itching to call “time” , but will shortly find themselves having to stand free 
drinks all round.’ 
 
(Kevin Gardiner, 1998). 
 
Other commentators highlighted what they regarded as a financial analysis of the 
growth achieved in the 1990s on the grounds  that mostly it tended to prioritise 
supply side over demand side factors and did not give sufficient weight to the stable 
macro-economic management that had achieved this in an ERM regime that allowed 
the Irish Punt to adjust between a DM and Sterling peg, which flexibility would not 
be available under EMU with attendant potential consequences for employment 
(O’Leary, 1997; Neary, 1998; Leddin, 1998; Barry, 1998; Taylor, 1998).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
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Twenty one years later NESC again reviewed the experience of EMU and 
considered what might have happened if Ireland had stayed out of the single 
currency.  Citing Lane (2010) they opine that for certain mature economies, 
including Britain, Norway and Switzerland, with a strong tradition of monetary 
independence, this might be possible.  For others with less reputation for price 
stability, uncertain long term growth and a susceptibility to speculative capital flows, 
the exchange rate is less likely to play a stabilising role.  Boom and bust cycles 
could be amplified by exchange rate movements and interest rate policy.  Ireland is 
categorised as an intermediate case.  Nevertheless, NESC argues that the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’ growth narrative would, outside EMU, have plausibly led to considerable 
speculative capital flows and strong currency appreciation, posing severe 
stabilisation challenges.  In other words, things could have been worse outside EMU 
(NESC, 2010). 
 
On a rational choice basis the critical influencing factors were  judgement as to what 
Britain might eventually do and positive assessments from ESRI and NESC.  There 
was also the fact that the risks to peripheral countries could be mitigated by cohesion 
fund transfers.  Overlaying all this was the fact that EMU was in reality a political 
project driven by the biggest event in post war history viz: German reunification. 
 
In this context to join EMU was unquestionably a rational choice.  Whether it was 
the right choice or not – and NESC thinks it was – remains to be judged in light of 
the eventual outcome of the current crisis.  Once the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, 
and Ireland did not seek an opt out like Britain and Denmark, the die was in any 
event cast for membership of the single currency ten years later.  So, while prima 
facie a rational decision was made, we can now look at the process by which it was 
arrived at and see what other contingencies manifested themselves.    
Capabilities and Practices of Institutions/Historical 
Institutionalism 
 
As indicated above, the two foremost economic and social think tanks had come out 
in broad support of Ireland’s participation in EMU.  Some economists had 
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questioned the wisdom of joining the single currency if Britain stayed out but the 
two independent reports, and a belief that Britain would  join eventually, clinched 
the matter.  Former Secretary General of Finance, Tom Considine, had a contact in 
the UK Treasury who told him that Prime Minister Blair was confident of winning a 
referendum on the question.  The only question was whether to come in at the 
beginning or later (interview, 24 May, 2012). 
 
According to Tom Considine the main worry was about the effect of Sterling vis-á-
vis the Euro.  British Chancellor, Gordon Browne, made the Bank of England 
independent and stable.  Having devalued by 10 per cent in 1993 Ireland was super 
competitive and the worry was that Sterling might drop in value (ibid). 
 
On whether any consideration was given to the implications of a loss of control of 
monetary policy Mr Considine recalled that a Department of Finance working group 
on the implications of Euro membership existed in 1999.  He says of it that: 
 
‘There was a fair understanding that without monetary policy control other policies 
would have to take the strain.  The view on devaluation as a means of maintaining 
competitiveness was that wages catch up in about 18 months.  Therefore, 
devaluations give only temporary respite so it would not have been a panacea for us 
if we stayed out of EMU.’ (ibid). 
 
His colleague in the Department of the Taoiseach, Dermot McCarthy, concurs that 
there was concern about UK participation but Sterling remaining outside the single 
currency at that time seemed implausible.  Moreover, Ireland had experienced the 
perils of exchange rate volatility in the 1980s and there was a sense of how 
independent could you be really?
71
  But, he says, people never thought it would end 
in tears; EMU was always seen as a political project – it was believed that any 
problems would be fixed.  People felt Ireland had to join regardless of what Britain 
did, it was a matter of independence.  He recalls that the only other option seemed to 
                                                 
71 This thinking finds a resonates with Karl Polanyi’s views on currency 
 
‘No government except perhaps the most powerful, could afford to disregard the taboos of money.  For international 
purposes the currency was the Nation; and no Nation could for any length of time exist outside the international scheme’ 
(Polanyi, 1944:215) 
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be to stay out and that not much attention was given to other alternatives.  He sums 
up the official viewpoint in this way: 
 
‘People were sanguine about EMU in light of the exchange rate policy of the 
1990s.  Being in a single currency would force us to focus on competitiveness.  
Social Partnership was seen as settling the distributional questions leaving us free 
to focus on growing the economy.’ 
 (Interview, 28
th
  November, 2011). 
 
According to Noel Dorr EMU brought the Department of Finance centre stage and 
Foreign Affairs was slightly peripheral.  Nevertheless he recalls that it was a policy 
objective to be at the centre of the endeavour to create the single currency primarily 
because it was viewed as a political project.   
 
John Loughrey, Secretary General at the Department of Enterprise, says candidly 
that the full implications of the single currency were never thought through 
(interview, 7
th
  March, 2012). 
 
John Hurley, former governor of the Central Bank confirms the importance given to 
the ESRI report noting that the benefits were felt to outweigh any downside due to 
an inability to devalue.  As he puts it: ‘Not a lot of thought was given to failure’.  
The discipline of keeping to the Maastricht criteria was felt to be very good for the 
country, EMU was seen as a great protection.  He believes the outlook of the policy 
making community was essentially the following: 
 
‘Deciding to be part of the Euro was a bigger statement by us about where we 
saw ourselves, where our bed was going to be.  The economy was already 
catching up giving a strong signal to investors.  With flexibility in the domestic 
economy they would expect us to do well.’ 
 (Interview, 9
th
  November, 2011) 
 
Later he recalls that low interest rates at a time of overheating were unwelcome.  
Ireland locked into the common currency in 1999 and evidence of this overheating 
emerged by the early 2000’s.  Nevertheless, policy makers were sanguine.  Ireland 
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had achieved the 3 per cent budget deficit target.  As he puts it:  ‘We had arrived’.  
‘But’, he adds, ‘having achieved the requirements for entry to EMU control on 
expenditure and growth relaxed.  Property related transaction taxes gave buoyancy 
to revenue.  Still, it was all within the Stability and Growth Pact rules’ (ibid).The 
dysfunctional impact of this tax policy was ultimately made manifest in an 
oversupply of housing and hotel capacity and the displacement of investment from 
manufacturing into an already overheated construction industry (O’Riain, 
forthcoming, 2014). 
 
Willie Scally, Economic Advisor to the Tánaiste in 1996, says the Department of 
Finance used the Maastricht criteria as a controlling instrument but notes that 
meeting the targets was anyway not that difficult in a rapidly growing economy.  He 
considers that the institutional influence was strong. 
 
‘Ireland sort of drifted into EMU because the civil service was in favour of it.  
Fianna Fáil was also in favour of it. There was no serious internal government 
debate, it was more or less an evolution.’ 
 
(Interview, 11
th
  December, 2012). 
 
That said, he confesses to having had doubts himself about trade with Britain and the 
loss of the capacity to devalue – a view shared by a number of economists at the 
time.  He too confirms that the ESRI report was very influential and provided the 
intellectual underpinning for the Department of Finance position.  In particular he 
mentions that the prospect of low interest rates was considered to be important 
(ibid). 
 
For the IDA John Dunne argues that EMU was a factor in the agency’s success 
giving ‘enormous impetus’ to its efforts to attract FDI.  He recalls that government 
policy was universally expansionist – including the American and European 
economies – and that arguments about moving too fast were countered by ‘a concern 
not to take our foot off the accelerator’ (interview, 16th  February, 2012). 
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The evidence suggests that the NESC and ESRI reports, particularly the latter, were 
of seminal importance.   The Department of Finance had superseded the Department 
of Foreign Affairs as the leading actor even though EMU was recognised as 
essentially a political project.  The ESRI provided the intellectual underpinning for a 
pro-EMU policy stance at the Department of Finance.  Although it seems that the 
longer term implications of EMU were not widely considered at an institutional level 
there is evidence that the Department of Finance realised that, absent the facility to 
devalue, any adjustments due to external pressures would fall on other policy areas.  
The issue of independence from Britain arises again emphasising the strain of path 
dependency shaping policy making at the level of the state institutions.    
 
The Politics Paradigm/Sociological Institutionalism 
 
According to Verdun and Christiansen (2000) the particular design of EMU chosen 
was a reaction to the success of the German model of monetary policy and the 
perceived success of the European Monetary System (EMS) although those who 
designed it wanted to deconstruct the dominance of Germany.  The particular feature 
of an independent Central Bank was to create a European institution that was 
credible vis-á-vis the markets.  There was also a belief that monetary policy was 
most effective when it was geared towards a single objective such as price stability.  
In short the belief was that once EMU provided successful economic effects its 
institutions would gain credibility and legitimacy and this in turn would create a 
political commitment.  In that sense EMU was clearly a political project of 
enormous importance and the question is whether Irish politicians realised fully 
what they were committing the country to. 
 
On this point Ruairi Quinn, to whom it fell to guide much of the negotiations about 
EMU, notes that opinion at the time was that if the Euro was simply going to be the 
Deutschmark zone renamed then Ireland would have a problem.  In the event, 
however, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal  were all let in.  He makes it clear that 
they were engaging with ‘a uniquely and as yet untested, major political initiative’ 
(Quinn, 2005:356). 
 
251 
 
It is clear that the huge concern of policy makers was less about whether we should 
join the Euro but whether we would be allowed in.  This anxiety is described by 
Ruairi Quinn: 
 
‘There had been a lot of speculation about whether or not Ireland would meet the 
criteria and be able to join the single currency on day one.  If we were going to be 
in that league, then interest rates on Irish bonds and loan notes issued by the 
NTMA would fall as Ireland converged towards the Deutschmark and the single 
currency.  The potential savings were enormous, given the size of our national 
debt, which reached its height of 128 per cent and falling by 1994.  Paddy 
Mullarkey
72
 was particularly anxious about the perception of Ireland, not 
necessarily by domestic commentators, but more critically by London and 
Frankfurt  based financial journalists.  Diligently, he ensured that Irish embassy 
based staff in Bonn followed up unfavourable mentions or exclusions of Ireland 
in news stories about the currency project.’ 
 (Quinn, 2005:358). 
 
Noel Dorr recalls that  there was no real concern about an optimal currency area or 
whether there were deficits in the institutional architecture of EMU.  He recalls that 
a lot of the detail was worked out in December 1996 under the Irish Presidency with 
Finance Minister Ruairi Quinn, in the chair and that the Luxembourg Prime 
Minister, Jean Claud Juncker, was a ‘mover and shaker’ (interview, 30th  November, 
2011). 
 
Former Taoiseach, John Bruton, acknowledges that much of the work on EMU and 
the Stability & Growth Pact was done by Dick Spring and Ruairi Quinn because his 
own time was inordinately consumed by Northern Ireland.  He recalls, however, that 
the final deal was done by Kohl and Chirac with Juncker in a corner of the room at a 
meeting he chaired in Dublin Castle in 1996.  His recollection was that: 
 
‘We had not really thought  about what EMU meant – we had read the Werner and 
Delors reports but not much more.’ 
                                                 
72 Secretary General of the Department of Finance. 
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 (Interview, 8 March, 2012). 
 
He also mentions that in the lead up to Maastricht it was assumed that everybody 
was in but the Danes got out at the last minute.  On the general approach to Europe 
he says: 
 
‘European integration always worked on a “bring it on”  basisbut EMU was so much 
bigger.  We were on a train, the destination of which we were unsure of, we had 
bought tickets but we could not get off.’ 
 (ibid). 
 
Of the thinking in elite  circles he said that a level of philosophical enquiry did not 
exist here and anyway we were getting much more out of Europe than we were 
putting in (ibid). 
 
On the subject of EMU and the liberalisation of capital markets he says: 
 
‘It was the orthodoxy of the time.  We never thought through what it might mean in 
respect of imbalances.  Again it was an intellectual failure.’ 
 (ibid). 
 
Research conducted by Hay et al (2008) points to a strong political consensus in 
favour of EMU based on interviews with policymakers which consistently 
highlighted the advantages to Ireland of being able to operate at the heart of the EU 
decision-making process.  However, they note that the public articulation of political 
support for EMU was rather different.  An examination of Dáil Eireann debates 
reveals that the most common argument put forward was that the economic policy 
entailed by the Maastricht Treaty represented ‘good economic policy; to which there 
was no sensible alternative’.  The economic character of this consensus was broadly 
based across the political parties.
73
  Thus Ireland’s membership of EMU did not 
become a highly politicised issue. It was, and continues to be, articulated as a non-
negotiable external constraint.   Of course this ‘good economic policy’ was German 
                                                 
73 There were 45 speeches from Fianna Fáil, 16 from Fine Gael, 16 from Labour and 3 from the Progressive 
Democrats  reflecting this discourse (Hay et al, 2008:183). 
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ordoliberalism, the principles of which were incorporated in the ECB constitution 
and the EU Commission’s competition-focussed policies.  According to Blyth 
(2013) there is a consistent linkage between the Maastricht convergence criteria, the 
Stability & Growth Pact and the Fiscal Treaty and it is all about the rules, the ordo.  
The basic design of the EU reflects Germany’s focus on rules, obligations, a strong 
monetary authority, a weak parliament, and no spending to compensate for the busts.  
This conditions the EU’s response to the current crisis and it was, in effect, endorsed 
by the Irish political class, albeit perhaps not consciously in all cases. 
Table 35: Irish policy makers’ attitudes to the benefits of EMU membership 
 ‘Membership of EMU is good for  
Ireland’s economic performance’ 
‘Membership of EMU increases  
Ireland’s influence in Europe’ 
 Strongly 
Agree/agree 
(%) 
 
Neither ( 
%) 
Strongly 
disagree/ 
disagree (%) 
Strongly 
agree/agree 
(%) 
 
Neither 
(%) 
Strongly 
disagree/ 
Disagree (%) 
Civil 
Servants 
95.4 2.3 2.3 71.1 21.4 7.4 
Members of 
the Dáil 
92.0 4.8 1.6 74.2 14.5 9.7 
Fianna Fáil  92.0 4.0 4.0 72.0 12.0 12.0 
Fine Gael 100.0 0.0 0.0 85.7 14.3 0.0 
Labour 100.0 0.0 0.09 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Source:  Hay et  al (2008: 184) – based on 28 interviews conducted in 2002 and 2005 by Nicola J Smith. 
 
Charlie McCreevy confirms that there was a general political consensus that Ireland 
should join EMU.  He says that most studies and concerns focussed on the downside 
risks of staying out and a fear that the Euro would appreciate up to 1.10 against 
Sterling, noting, however, that in the event the opposite occurred.  He recalls also 
that as opposition spokesman on finance, (1994-1997) he participated actively in a 
Dáil finance committee which, under the chairmanship of the late Jim Mitchell
74
 met 
twice a week for over a year and in the course of which many of the concerns 
referred to above were  ventilated by people who gave evidence to the committee.  
His view of this political process was that it was very good and that he was very 
impressed by some of the arguments against participation in EMU most notably 
contributions by David Grafton
75
.  (interview, 7
th
 June, 2012). 
 
                                                 
74 Senior Fine Gael politician who held a number of ministries over the course of a long political career.  
75 Economic Advisor to Labour Party Leader, Michael O’Leary and subsequently Dick Spring.  He fell out of 
favour with the latter due to his opposition to EMU. 
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According to Mr McCreevy once the decision was made in 1999 to lock in the 
currencies the emphasis shifted to the role of the ECB.  There were opposing French 
and German perspectives on this and ‘you had to be on one side or the other’ (ibid).  
Germany wanted the Bundesbank model but France wanted political direction of 
monetary policy.  McCreevy took the German side in this argument, ‘not because 
central bankers make better decisions than politicians but because markets need 
consistency.’ (ibid). 
 
In his view it was important that the Germans won out.  The only mandate of the 
ECB is price stability (meaning inflation at or close to 2 per cent).  He says he 
knows all the ECB presidents - Duisinberg, Trichet and Draghi – personally and they 
all believe in this mandate (ibid). 
 
Asked if he thought it might not be wiser to change the remit of the ECB to require it 
to have regard to a broader range of economic conditions along the lines of the US 
Federal Reserve Board (FED)
76
, he replied: 
 
‘Perhaps, but to change the remit (of the ECB) you would have to overcome the 
psyche of the German people.  They have a deeply ingrained fear of inflation by 
virtue of their history.
 77’ (ibid).       
       
 
In the years following introduction of EMU Irish policy makers experienced some 
criticism from European colleagues on aspects of EMU.  Charlie McCreevy’s fight 
with the Commission about budgetary policy and the Stability & Growth Pact in 
2003 is a case in point.  Bertie Ahern recalls getting a lot of grief from President 
                                                 
76 The ECB’s mandate is set out in Article 105 of the 1992 Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht).  It is 
institutionally both narrow and exclusive.  It sets the maintenance of price stability as the ‘primary objective’ of 
the ECB, and of no other body. Although the ECB must support ‘the general economic policies in the 
community’ its support must be without prejudice to the objective of price stability’.  The plurality of goals 
means that the FED has to be prepared to work with others to coordinate policies and balance objectives (Taylor, 
2000). 
77 Mark Blyth (2013:56) explains that contrary to what is commonly assumed, inflation in the 1920s was not in 
fact the result of a policy of monetary stimulus by German central bank and treasury trying to stave off a 
recession.  The main cause was that World War 1 had been financed by debt rather than through taxes, which 
lowered post war exchange rates and made imports more expensive, which in turn fuelled inflation. A 
complementary factor was that the German government had an incentive to allow inflation to accelerate because 
it had the convenient effect of wiping out large amounts of government debt and stymied its ability to make war 
reparations payments to France. 
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Jospin of France about Ireland’s policy bias towards low corporation tax, although 
he says that the others did not feel as strongly about it (interview, 13
th
  January, 
2012).  On this topic Martin O’Donohue cautions that it is important to realise that 
the Germans always wanted parallel progress on fiscal union which is what brought 
in a common VAT structure.  A common tax structure involving, in the case of 
corporation tax a common tax base as distinct from common rates, is their objective 
(interview, 22
nd
  November, 2011). Charlie McCreevy’s view is that the corporation 
tax issue – in respect of which Ireland is an outlier – will eventually be settled on the 
basis of the common consolidated tax base concept. 
Summary 
 
In this section we have explained why Ireland’s policy approach to EMU was 
characterised again by concerns about independence from the UK and yet worries 
too about Britain’s non-participation.  Policy was also influenced by earlier 
experience of currency volatility.  Mainly, however, policy was characterised by a 
fear of not qualifying for membership and any caution there might have been was 
subordinated to this objective setting aside any attempt to influence the shape of this 
flagship project of EU integration. 
 
An exploration of the politics paradigm reveals some contrary evidence about the 
depth of knowledge of, or consideration given, to EMU.  What seems clear is that 
there was a European bandwagon for it.  This is hardly surprising given the political 
nature of the project and the urgency given to it by the imperative of creating a basis 
for  everybody to live with the prospect of German reunification.  Nevertheless, Irish 
politicians could have stood aside if they wanted to using uncertainty about British 
intentions as a justification for an opt-out similar to Denmark with their European 
partners.  Another justification for a cautious approach would have been that while 
EMU has significantly limited the policy instruments available to all national 
governments the constraints on Ireland are particularly severe.  As Smith (2005:157) 
points out, the Irish economy cycles out of phase with that of the EU due to its heavy 
dependence upon the UK and US.  Currency devaluation would not be an option in 
the event of an asymmetric shock. Government would have to rely upon fiscal policy 
and labour market flexibility to adjust to shocks.  But even these policies were 
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constrained under the terms of the Stability & Growth Pact which imposes a 3 per 
cent deficit limit on national budgets.  Here was a major political conundrum;  many 
politicians saw EMU as part of a process enhancing Ireland’s independence from 
Britain but the factors outlined above, taken together, actually add up to a serious 
loss of economic independence.  Interestingly, when the debate about EMU took 
place in Finland the Liberals under Matti Vanhanen (Prime Minister 2003-2011) 
argued against joining until the impact on at least one economic cycle could be 
evaluated (interview, 27
th
  September, 2012).  Nobody in Ireland’s political 
mainstream seems to have argued that case.  As John Bruton reflects, subsequent 
events point to ‘an intellectual failure’ in evaluation of the potential outcomes of 
policy decisions based on an absence of an adequate level of philosophical enquiry 
in elite circles (interview, 8 March, 2012).  Either that or there was a lack of 
intellectual willingness to face up to what the historic break with the UK might mean 
or to the constraints and implications nationally of living in the Eurozone.  
 
The institutional influences revealed by the application of the analytical model to the 
case of EMU can be depicted using the radar diagram in Figure 11 below. 
 
Social Partnership was the cornerstone of public policy when EMU came into being.  
What were the expectations of how these two policy pillars would relate to each 
other?  Was Social Partnership intended to be the transmission mechanism to the 
real economy of a neo-liberal EMU regime (Crouch, 2000; Regan, 2012) or was 
Social Partnership intended to look after distributional questions while government 
got on with the business of exploiting EMU to create growth and jobs (McCarthy 
interview, 2012, 4
th
 February, 2010). Social policy generally and social pacts in 
particular are the focus of inquiry in the next section. 
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Figure 11: Radar Diagram outlining clusters of institutionalist influences on EMU decisions  
(strongest influences closest to the centre) 
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Social Policy and Social Pacts 
 
The Irish welfare system is characterised by a greater reliance on transfer payments 
than service provision.  It is classified as a liberal welfare regime by virtue of 
relatively low levels of tax and public spending and a significant use of means 
testing (Hemerijck, 2013; O’Riain, forthcoming, 2014; NESC, 2005). 
 
Social policy evolution in Ireland has been hugely influenced by the European 
Union not least in respect of a system of Social Partnership which came into 
existence in 1987 and through which social policy was mediated. There are many 
claims to its parentage but it is not a coincidence that it followed hot on the heels of  
Delors’ 1986 institutionalising of social dialogue  as part of the Single Market 
construct.  Social Partnership is characterised in some of the literature as 
‘competitive corporatism’ (Ornston, 2012; Hemerijck, 2013, Kirby, 2010).  Yet this 
characterisation is contested (Adshead, 2006; Hardiman, 2006; O’Riain, 
forthcoming, 2014).  Others see the Irish model as sui generis (Boucher and Collins, 
2013, Hastings et al, 2007).  Nevertheless, for twenty two years Social Partnership 
was a key component of governance – flexible network governance as it has been 
described (O’Donnell, 2008) – in the Irish context.  What was distinctive about it 
was its reach across the range of public administrative activity and its inclusiveness 
in terms of the number of social actors engaged in it.  It proved to be durable for a 
long time but ultimately not embedded.  In this section the intention is to tease out 
why a model which was admired internationally was so contentious at home and to 
identify the influences on its ultimate unravelling.   
 
Smith (2005:158) citing Teague (2000:1) argues that the European Union has a 
much stronger social dimension than any other regional trading bloc in terms of the 
directives it legislates for and the forms of social action it engenders amongst policy 
communities and labour market actors. 
 
It is certainly true that the period from 1987 up to the onset of the 2008 recession 
was viewed very positively in Ireland in terms of social progress.  On the eve of the 
recession the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) published a study with the 
upbeat title Best of Times: The Social Impact of the Celtic Tiger.  In it a number of 
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respected academics reflected on what has been achieved – not just in regard to 
social progress indicators but on quality of life issues too.  Fahy et al (2007) noted 
that economic growth had brought average income to among the highest in the 
world, although they also confirmed that Ireland had a high degree of income 
inequality by rich country standards, albeit that this was not exacerbated by the 
Celtic Tiger phase.  They also concluded  that the rising tide had lifted many boats.  
Delving more deeply into wealth distribution Brian Nolan and Bertrand Maitre 
(2007), using Gross National Income (GNI) as distinct from GDP, concurred that 
GNI per capita was well below the average for OECD countries in 1995 but 
exceeded that average by 2002.  They deemed this to be a remarkable achievement 
in a very short space of time.  They also agreed that Ireland had a high degree of 
economic inequality by comparison with the Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands.  They drew attention to the low redistributive ‘effort’ as a long standing 
characteristic of Ireland’s welfare state. 
 
The generally upbeat tone of this IPA publication does not resonate with an earlier 
assessment from the same organisation in which O’Riain and O’Connell (2000:310) 
characterise the Irish welfare state as a case of interrupted development which falls 
far short of the European model by virtue of its overall State and welfare spend as a 
percentage of GDP being closer to US than EU levels. 
 
Sadly, these arguments were soon to become moot.  Ireland was on the threshold of 
the worst recession since the 1930s.   
 
In the 22 year period between 1987 and 2009 social policy in Ireland was mediated 
through a serious of seven social pacts in a process known as Social Partnership. 
Smith (2005) sees this as being directly related to EU integration noting that: 
 
‘One area in which the EU has played a “more subtle but more profound role” in 
Irish economic policy is that of Social Partnership.  It has been an important 
element in EU social policy, evident for example in the Cologne process, which 
aims to coordinate economic policy and improve interaction between wage 
development and monetary, budgetary and fiscal policy through macro-economic 
dialogue.  As the NESC notes, this has meant that national social partners have 
260 
 
been brought into “structured regular macro-economic policy dialogue” with the 
EU.’ 
 (Smith, 2005:158). 
 
However, some authors see the involvement of the EU as highly disingenuous in this 
context (Crouch, 2000; Regan, 2012).  Essentially their argument is that the design 
of EMU is premised on the non-existence of trade unions – or at least their 
ineffectiveness – and the neo-classical assumption that labour markets operate in a 
perfectly competitive fashion.  In this conception it is assumed that in the event of a 
macro-economic shock, and absent the facility to devalue the currency, the burden of 
adjustment will fall on labour markets.  A reduction in labour costs is presumed to 
act as a functional equivalent to currency devaluation at a macro level.  Crouch 
(2000) in particular draws on the work of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) in support of 
the proposition that  neo-liberal orientation is at the heart of the architecture of the 
treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and the constitution of the European Central 
Bank (see also Hay, 2004; Donovan & Murphy, 2013).   
 
Events since 2000 in the comparator countries which have seen something of a 
renaissance for social pacts would not seem to bear out Crouch’s  analysis 
completely although there is evidence to support it in the way the Troika of 
EU/ECB/IMF have focussed on internal wage devaluation as the primary instrument 
of adjustment to the shock of the 2008 crisis.  However, this theoretical 
conceptualising of what EMU means provides a useful ideological benchmark 
against which to judge Irish Social Partnership. 
 
The only comprehensive history of Social Partnership is that of Hastings et al 
(2007).  Interestingly, in the context just discussed, the most frequently used word 
and phrase in the book is ‘pragmatic’ and ‘non-ideological’.  The impression given 
is that actors on all sides were anxious to avoid this kind of discussion. 
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The periodisation under review saw a total of seven social pacts negotiated as 
follows: 
 
 1987-1993 
 
 1987-1990:   The Programme for National Recovery (PNR) 
 1990-1993:   The Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) 
 
 1994-2001 
 
 1994-1996: The Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW) 
 1997-1999: Partnership 2000 
 2000-2002: The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) 
 
 2001-2008 
 2003-2005: Sustaining Progress 
 2006-2008: Towards 2016
78
 
 
Over the 22 years of its existence the Irish Social Partnership model evoked great 
external interest and many visitors from the worlds of business and labour came to 
see how it worked.  A former General Secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions (ICTU), Peter Cassells, described it this way: 
 
‘It’s hard to explain to outsiders.  If you try to explain it as just Social Partnership, it 
doesn’t add up.  If you look at all the ingredients – the tax changes, Europe, inward 
investment, public service change and the young educated population – they were 
there before and it didn’t work.  What Social Partnership did was make all of these 
ingredients work by bringing them all together.’ (cited in Hastings et al, 2007). 
 
The peculiar nature of Irish politics, being principally built on competing forms of 
nationalism and no significant social democratic base, is key to understanding the 
sui generis version of neo-corporatism described above by Peter Cassells.  The 
                                                 
78 ‘Towards 2016’ was actually intended to be a 10 year framework agreement with medium term social 
objectives.  It was intended to negotiate pay terms every two years. 
262 
 
Fianna Fáil Party has always worked – and with some success – to secure trade 
union support, much to the chagrin of the Labour Party.  This is all the more 
surprising given that the Labour Party was formed by the trade unions in 1912.  
Indeed until 1930 the Irish Trade Union Congress and Labour Party were one body.  
They separated by mutual consent because it was felt at the time that low levels of 
union membership would hold the party back (Morrissey, 2007).  However, there 
were serious divisions within the labour movement in the 1940s and 1950s with 
Fianna Fáil being sympathetic to one side which may help to at least partially 
explain the relationship (Murray, 2009:80).
79
 
 
Emmet O’Connor (2011) argues that the Labour Party didn’t simply emerge in 1912:  
it was the product of an intellectual revolution in trade unionism, whipped up by 
James Larkin’s syndicalism and republicanism.  It was assumed at the time of 
formation of the party that trade unionists would vote Labour.  When by 1923 that 
assumption was seen not to be well founded, another intellectual revolution was 
required.  Continuing with the assumption that the unions would mobilise in pursuit 
of wage increases through collective bargaining in a voluntary system of industrial 
relations while the party would implement their political agenda via a Labour 
government was too simplistic.  It failed to take account of the ambitions of Fianna 
Fáil.  Fianna Fáil governments always had an agenda to reform industrial relations 
and in this respect their ambitions partly conflicted and partly converged with those 
of the unions.  The simple fact was that Fianna Fáil in government could be more 
use to the unions than Labour in opposition.  The effect was to drive the ITGWU 
and other Irish private sector unions towards Fianna Fáil, and induce a questioning 
of inherited assumptions about Labour-state relations which culminated in a serious 
division within the labour movement in the mid-1940s (see also Niamh Puirséil, 
2012). 
 
Suarez (2001) points out that the decision to move from import substitution 
industrialisation to export orientated industrialisation required a measure of labour 
control in order to attract foreign investment.  The only options available to 
                                                 
79 A factor was also the personal friendship forged between William O’Brien of the ITGWU and Eamon de 
Valera, first leader of Fianna Fáil during and after the 1916 Rising.  O’Brien was interned in Frongoch in Wales 
with members of the generation of leaders that would dominate Irish politics for most of the next half century. 
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government were coercion or co-option. For Fianna Fáil, which returned to 
government under Sean Lemass in 1959, co-option was the only policy consistent 
with its political objective to be seen as Ireland’s ‘real’ Labour Party.  This is an 
objective pursued to this day (interview with former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern on 13
th
  
January, 2012). 
 
Thus it was that a process of centralised bargaining on wages began in 1959 and 
continued with six more agreements on wages up to 1970.  There was a step change 
in 1970 with the establishment of the Employer-Labour Conference and government 
intervention in a National Wage Agreement which also brought trade unions into the 
public policy making process for the first time (Suarez, 2001). 
 
It was also a period of some internal conflict for the trade union movement.  The 
British based Amalgamated Transport and General Workers’ Union (ATGWU) 
deeply resented the ITGWU signing single union agreements giving it monopoly 
representation with foreign multi-national companies setting up in Ireland (ICTU, 
1982: 96-98). This tension exploded into a major industrial dispute in a Dutch 
factory named Ferenka making steel cord for tyres in Limerick.  The immediate 
cause of the dispute was worker dissatisfaction with the terms of a collective 
agreement on employment conditions signed by the ITGWU as part of the 
recognition agreement with the company.  A large percentage of the workforce 
joined another union, the Marine Port and General Workers’ Union (MPGWU) 
which commenced industrial action to secure improvements.  In the event Ferenka 
closed in 1977 with the loss of 1,400 jobs and this was largely blamed on the unions.  
The collateral damage to the trade union movement was not just reputational, 
Ferenka was a critical juncture after which it became increasingly difficult to 
organise MNCs not least because the IDA which had supported single union 
agreements withdrew that support (Paul Sweeney, Interview, 24
th
 May, 2012).
80
 
 
Six more wage agreements were reached in the period between 1972 and 1978 and 
there was a further incremental move in the direction of social pacts in the form of 
                                                 
80
 While closure of the factory was popularly blamed on the unions the real reason was adverse trading 
conditions associated with developments in tyre manufacture which Ferenka was not equipped to respond to.  I 
am indebted to Mr Laurance Crowley who provided accountancy services to the company for this information. 
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‘National Understandings’ in 1979 and 1980.  While these agreements were more 
sophisticated they did not secure industrial peace, control inflation or create jobs.  
This was, of course, a very difficult period economically following on two oil crises 
(ibid). 
 
During the 1980s Ireland experienced a long recession.  There was a decrease in 
union membership and strike activity reflecting a weaker trade union movement.  
But the government’s problems were enormous too with unemployment at 18 per 
cent, high emigration and a debt to GDP ratio of 130 per cent.   
 
 
National Government - Rational Actor Model/Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
 
The circumstances leading to the negotiation of the Programme for National 
Recovery have been referred to in Chapter 3.  Therefore, it is proposed only to focus 
here on what made the PNR a rational choice for all actors constrained by the 
institutional context of the EU at one level, and encouraged by the concept of social 
dialogue introduced two years earlier by Delors at another. 
 
For the government led by Charles Haughey the idea of involving unions was 
consistent with his party’s long held ambition to be ‘The Real Labour Party’.  He 
and his front bench spokespersons had put considerable time and effort into courting 
the unions in opposition.   
 
A second imperative was the appalling state of the economy.  The government led 
by Garret Fitzgerald of Fine Gael and his Labour colleagues had also toyed with the 
idea of trying to get an agreement.  It was clear that something radical had to be 
done.  But he could not really assimilate the idea of government sharing power and 
responsibility with the unions.  Ruairi Quinn of Labour wanted such an agreement 
but could not carry the government with him.  Haughey had no such inhibitions.  
Once he believed the trade unions were serious about sorting out the public finances 
he was willing to take a risk (Hastings et al, 2007). 
265 
 
And the trade unions were serious.  They had to be.  Unemployment at 18 per cent 
and rampant emigration was not only socially unacceptable, it was weakening the 
trade union movement too.  Like Wim Kok and the Wassenaar Accord in the 
Netherlands they felt they had to take risks too.  Moreover, there was a real fear that 
the influence of Thatcherism in the UK would take hold in Ireland with all that 
implied for trade unionism.  The formation of the Progressive Democrat Party on a 
strong neo-liberal political platform heightened that fear
81
.  A third consideration for 
the unions was that inflation  and the size of the tax wedge was eroding the real 
value of pay increases.  The then General Secretary of the Federated Workers Union 
of Ireland (FWUI), Bill Attley,  recalls that people were 7 per cent worse off in real 
terms in the period from 1980 to 1987 notwithstanding what appeared to be high 
nominal pay settlements (cited in Hastings et al, 2007:111).  Industrial relations as 
practiced at that time was a rough business.  As late as 1979 postal workers were 
engaged in a six month strike over pay. 
 
For the employers there was less pressure but things were still difficult.  They pulled 
out of centralised bargaining in 1981 opting instead for enterprise and sectoral 
bargaining in some cases.  Six years later they felt they had made some progress on 
their agenda of competitiveness.  But while they had made progress there was still a 
distance to go and the economy was in dire straits. According to Hastings et al 
(2007) the decisive factor in securing the employers’ support was a visit by the new 
Taoiseach to FUE headquarters in Baggot Street to meet the Executive Council.  
Two of the key players at the time give a more nuanced explanation. 
 
Former Director General John Dunne said the employers’ fear was that the 
government wanted a deal and they would end up paying for it.  There was a lot of 
disenchantment with the 1981 National Understanding and resentment of earlier 
attempts by Haughey to bully them.  A key problem (as in the Netherlands) was a 
union demand for a working time reduction of one hour.  However, in a broader 
sense he personally felt that productivity was the key.  He met privately to explain 
this to Peter Cassells of ICTU and to get him to understand the importance of 
credibility with employers.  This conversation and Cassells’ positive response – and 
                                                 
81 Although Hastings et al (2007) argued that there was never a real prospect of the PDs adopting a Thatcherite 
approach pointing out that the party leader, Mary Harney, was never hostile to Social Partnership. 
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ultimate delivery – was instrumental in removing the road block to the 
implementation of the 39 hour week.  Not only that but it cemented trust for years 
afterwards (interview 16
th
  December, 2012). 
 
John Dunne’s successor, Turlough O’Sullivan, recalls that working time reduction 
was very difficult and some people left IBEC over it.  Taking on the competitiveness 
agenda and the subsequent establishment of the National Competitiveness Council 
were positive developments. Still he feels it took people a long time to make the 
connection between a productive economy and social progress.  Exposure to Europe 
was very helpful in this regard.  People realised from what they saw that a better 
society was possible through working together.  Reflecting forward over the years he 
observed that: 
 
‘In the end Social Partnership deals were getting too expensive but only a 
minority of employers objected.  My principals (employer firm members of 
IBEC) wanted them and were prepared to pay for them.’  
    
                                    (Interview, 2
nd
  February, 2012). 
 
So in the end Social Partnership was the rational choice for all the main actors.  In 
time it developed into a pillar system to accommodate the agriculture and 
community & voluntary sector.  It was unique in terms of the wide range of 
participants and scope of its activities.  In institutional terms it fitted the European 
social dialogue innovation and prompted some innovative thinking of its own that 
we will now discuss. 
 
 
Capabilities and Practices of Institutions/Historical 
Institutionalism 
 
According to former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern the strong civil service advice given to 
the new government in 1987 was to stay away for any idea of a National Social 
Partnership Agreement. This advice was consistent with an institutional antipathy to 
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tripartism going back to the 1950s.  Peter Murray (2009:43) recalls that in the 
context of Marshall Aid the US Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 
wanted government, employers, unions and other interests to work together to 
improve productivity.  The Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce 
at the time rejected any labour involvement on the grounds that this might cause 
wages and conditions in certain industries to ‘get out of hand’.  The path dependent 
endurance of this thinking is reflected in a recent paper on civil service reform 
wherein two former Assistant Secretaries in the Department of Transport mount a 
strong attack on Social Partnership and the role of the Department of the Taoiseach 
in facilitating it at the cost of diminished influence of the Department of Finance 
which they deprecate (Lumsden and Mangan, 2013: 156-157).  Hostility to the 
Department of the Taoiseach in the context of Social Partnership is a function of the 
reality that its few individual champions within the system – Padraig O’hUiginn, 
Paddy Teahon, and Dermot McCarthy – happened to be successively Secretaries 
General of that department .  O’hUiginn who was Secretary General in 1987 was 
close to the Taoiseach who initiated Social Partnership, Charles Haughey, and was a 
very powerful mandarin by virtue of that relationship (Hastings et al, 2007; 
Interview with Bertie Ahern, 13
th
 January, 2012).   
 
His arrival in the Department represented a subtle shift in the power structure at the 
cost of the Department of Finance.  The latter remained critical  of the Social 
Partnership process for its entire life span.  John Dunne as Director General of IBEC 
was in an unusual position as a result.  The norm in pay negotiations was for the 
private sector to lead but it did require an understanding between IBEC and the 
Department of Finance about objectives. He recalls that in the 1988-2000 period 
there was tension between individuals and confusion of roles.  He had to conciliate 
between them to try to get a coherent employer position for the pay talks.  According 
to him the Secretary General of the Department of Labour was once excluded from 
the talks (interview, 16
th
  February, 2012).
82
 
 
                                                 
82 It is worth noting that what is described here represents an extraordinarily high level of coordinating 
responsibility being devolved to private sector employers which resonates with Hall and Soskice’s (2001) 
perspective of the role of the firm in Varieties of Capitalism 
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Labour market institutions have been created and altered  to support the maintenance 
of the social pacts.  Existing institutions like the Labour Court and Labour Relations 
Commission changed their standard operating procedures to better serve the needs of 
the new regime.  For example, the Labour Relations  Commission has from time to 
time appointed external assessors or auditors to validate claims made by contesting 
parties.  The Labour Court has publicly stated that its judgements will be confined to 
the parameters set by the social pacts.  A new body, the National Implementation 
Body, was established to police compliance with the terms of the pacts and put in 
place a new set of standard operating procedures for the duration of its existence 
until 2009.  It  was strongly interventionist, particularly relating to the resolution of 
industrial disputes.  Its membership was composed of the Secretary General of the 
Taoiseach’s Department together with the Director General of IBEC and General 
Secretary of ICTU (Hastings et al, 2007).   Similarly the National Employment 
Rights Authority (NERA) was established through Social Partnership to ensure 
compliance with employment rights. The National Competitiveness Council was 
also a project of Social Partnership. 
 
Within the trade union movement the constitution of ICTU was changed to restrict 
voting on social pact issues to unions with members within the Republic of Ireland. 
Where such issues are to be debated, a Special Delegate Conference, confined to 
ROI delegates, must be convened.  This is certainly unique within Europe because 
ICTU is the only trade union centre spanning two jurisdictions.  This change was 
necessitated to prevent delegates from Northern Ireland voting, perhaps for reasons 
of internal politics, against a social pact.  Should a vote be lost in these 
circumstances it would cause serious problems (ibid). 
 
There is a reason to doubt that there ever was ‘an ideology of Social Partnership’ in 
Ireland. Hastings et al (2007) emphasised the pragmatic nature of the Irish model 
and interviews for this research confirm that from the perspective of government and 
employers although some in the trade union movement saw it as an opportunity to 
build social democracy without the political base to complement it (ICTU, 2013).  In 
this respect Ireland is sui generis because social democracy never got a strong 
foothold in Ireland.  The ‘two and a half party’ system in which Labour is often in 
the unenviable position of supporting coalition government but never able to lead it, 
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contrasts with the multiparty systems of the other comparator countries where the 
Social Democrats have better possibilities to head a government. This makes for 
difficult conditions for the trade unions in Ireland.  They can never make an 
agreement which has a long term wage moderation/social wage exchange in the sure 
and certain knowledge that the political system will deliver. Without that certainty it 
has been difficult at times to contain internal wage pressure.  At the ICTU 
Conference in 2001 tensions emerged in public with teachers’ unions wanting to 
pursue special wage claims. Des Geraghty, President of the largest ICTU affiliated 
union, SIPTU, rounded on teachers for their lack of a broad vision in the following 
terms: 
 
‘You don’t live on the moon. Don’t expect that private sector workers are going 
to sit back and see you going in for your special, and your other special, and your 
other special, plus the other national agreements and say, “that’s grand, we didn’t 
notice”…..survival into the next millennium is entirely dependent on our ability 
to manage success effectively….we mustn’t take our eye off the ball of the social 
wage…if we descent into mere sectionalism, if we descend into the worst form of 
dog-eat-dog capitalism, because that is what it is about, the strong will succeed 
and the poor will go to the wall.’  
 
 (Cited in Hardiman, 2000:296) 
 
One institutional issue which has caused tensions in relations between unions and 
employers, and to a lesser extent between unions and government, is the absence of 
a legal right to collective bargaining.  This has been part of the trade union agenda 
since 1913. 
 
Emmet O’Connor (2011: 250-251) observes that it is difficult to be definitive on the 
impact of social partnership on trade union militancy. Stike activity fell under both 
free collective bargaining and centralised bargaining. This was an international trend 
as was declining union density.  Union membership reached a low of 475,000 by 
1990, thereafter it rose steadily as the numbers at work increased reaching a peak of 
843,995 in 2008 before declining to 768,991 in 2013.   In the EU as a whole 
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approximately half of all employees were unionised in 1991, but this ratio had 
declined to one in three by 2010 (ETUI, 2014: 79; ICTU, 2014). 
 
Where the Social Partnership process has been most innovative, however, has been 
in the pillar structure which facilitated participation by a wide range of civil society 
organisations.  This was more or less imposed on the social partners by government 
in 1996
83
.   Quite a few of the people interviewed felt that in retrospect this was a 
mistake because it made the process too unwieldy.   
 
At an academic level there is a debate about the nature of the Irish model.  
Following Crouch (2000), Regan (2012) charges that Irish Social Partnership 
legitimised an Irish neo-liberal model of development favoured by the architects of 
EMU.  He argues specifically that the legal and institutional framework of collective 
bargaining is the most important variable in accounting for the diversity of responses 
to the economic crisis across Europe.  His case is that the Irish liberal market 
economy model leaves Ireland uniquely vulnerable to internalising the macro-
economic shock affecting EMU via an internal wage devaluation. This is because its 
system of industrial relations allows conflict to be mediated through state 
conciliation machinery even though the national consensus based approach to pay 
bargaining and socio-economic policy has collapsed.  Regan (ibid) fails to 
understand the subtleties of the countertendencies to a pure LME even after the 
onset of the crisis.  In the first case a wage devaluation did not happen across the 
economy.  It happened in some sectors – the public service and construction for 
example – but by negotiation.  A case can be made that, even in its debiliated state, 
the Irish model was capable of protecting workers as well or better than in some of 
the other peripheral countries (see Bergin et al 2013). 
 
Nevertheless the circumstances under which the government moved a second time 
within the space of four years to retrench the cost of public service provision caused 
deep resentment amongst its employees and serious divisions between the public 
service unions.  In fact the ‘Haddington Road Agreement’ was actually a series of 
                                                 
83 According to Willie Scally, former Economic Advisor to Tánaiste, Dick Spring, Labour made an input to the 
1993 Programme for Government expanding Social Partnership to include wider societal representative groups.  
This was done initially by creating the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) to parallel NESC.  The 
Community & Voluntary groups eventually joined as full partners in 1996. 
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bilateral agreements between individual public service unions and the government as 
the Public Services Committee of ICTU was not able to agree on a collective 
position.  Just as in the Netherlands when governments on a number of occasions 
tried to cast ‘the shadow of hierarchy’ over wage negotiations (see pages 83,84 and 
133) to coerce social actors into settlements the Irish government presented the 
public sector unions with a kind of ‘Hobson’s Choice’.  The Financial Emergency 
Measures in the Public Interest Bill 2013 (FEMPI) provided for the implementation 
of pay reductions for staff earning over €65,000 per annum, reduction in pensions 
and suspension of incremental progression for all public servants for three years 
unless they were covered by a collective agreement modifying the terms of the Bill.  
For the unions it was a case of damage limitation. 
 
Michael Doherty (2011) considers that the ramifications of the 2008 crisis exposed 
basic flaws in the Irish social partnership model: 
 
‘To some extent the process generated its own momentum; as long as the tune of 
economic growth and employment creation was playing, the participants (whether 
music-lovers or not!) seemed unwilling to get off the dance-floor for fear of being 
left, lonely, at the margins.  However, when the band stopped playing, the 
weakness of the “deliberate governance” aspect of partnership was demonstrated.  
While deliberation and problem-solving became ingrained in the partnership 
process, “hard” decision making policy implementation remained centralised and 
ultimately, subject to government whim’. 
 
Doherty, 2011: 371-385) 
 
Bill Roche (2011) takes the view that it might have been possible to save social 
partnership via concession bargaining in 2009, as in many micro-economies of firms 
severly affected by the recession, were it not for the effects of other influences, not 
least the social partners’ inability to reach agreement on an economic recovery 
strategy.  His conclusion is that the collapse of social partnership can be attributed to 
the interaction of a series of influences that individually or severally might not have 
proven fatal but that in combination were lethal in their effects. 
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Ornston (2009) compares models of corporatism in different countries.  He considers 
the Irish model, and that of the Netherlands, to be ‘competitive corporatism’ aimed 
at securing macro-economic stabilisation, wage restraint and market orientated 
reform.  Denmark and Finland dismantled ‘core conservative corporatist’ bargaining 
over the course of the 1980s and 1990s and moved to a mode of ‘creative 
corporatism’.  The 1982 Wassenaar Accord in the Netherlands was a prototype 
competitive corporatist bargain, born out of dire economic conditions and is 
strikingly similar to the 1987 Programme for National Recovery in Ireland.  The 
main difference with creative corporatism would appear to be investment in supply 
side measures such as active labour market programmes with a view to driving high 
technology expansion.  A critical factor is also influencing sources of investment 
funding to support industrial objectives.  Ornston (ibid) identifies three conditions 
for neo-corporatist adjustment viz:  crisis, coalition building, and a tradition of 
cooperation. Crisis and coalition building led competitive corporatism while creative 
corporatism requires all three.  He notes that moves towards creative corporatism 
was perhaps most limited in Ireland  and the reason is easy to discern within the 
parameters of his definition.  As Hastings et al (2007) point out it was never possible 
to roll out Social Partnership extensively at enterprise or sectoral level despite 
establishing the National Centre for Partnership and Performance for this precise 
purpose (although there have been some successes and work organisation has 
evolved within the economy).  Unlike the other countries examined in this research 
there is not an embedded practice of engagement at a local level in Irish industry.  
Doherty (2011) refers to the lopsided nature of social partnership whereby 
cooperation at national level was never underpinned by a code of rights to guarantee 
social partnership engagement at enterprise level.  Murray (2009) draws attention to 
the reluctance of business to engage with unions at local level epitomised by its 
killing off of proposals for tripartite industry specific Development Councils in the 
1940s and 1960s. 
 
Adshead (2006) takes a more cautious approach to pigeon holing Social Partnership 
as ‘competitive corporatism’.  She says that if you accept the four pillar structure – 
business, unions, farmers and community and voluntary – at face value, then Social 
Partnership is self-evidently neither pure corporatism, neo-corporatism, nor 
competitive corporatism.  She observes that current institutional set ups would 
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suggest that there is more to Social Partnership than can be explained by and of 
these approaches.  She continues: 
 
‘On the other hand, if you are more discriminating about the evidence you select 
and point to the existence of a long-term well-established policy community, 
establishing a clear consensus between three major interests – government, 
business, unions (and agriculture) – then you might be equally swayed by neo-
corporatism or competitive corporatist definitions.  In doing so, you will however, 
be implicitly confirming that the status and conditions of the fourth pillar does not 
warrant attention.’ 
 
 (Adshead, 2006:333). 
 
There were in fact tensions within the Community and Voluntary Pillar of social 
partnership in the early 2000s.  One section comprised of organisations under 
umbrella group of Community Platform argued that their concerns were treated as a 
‘residual category’ in the course of the talks and they subsequently left the process 
(Hardiman, 2000).  Doherty (2011) and Larragy (2006) are both persuaded that there 
was a hierarchy of partners within which the Community and Voluntary Pillar were 
subordinate in bargaining power terms.  This is probably true but perhaps to a lesser 
extent than might be imagined.  Hardiman (2000:302) points out that governments 
wanted the inclusion of the sector because their support increased the perceived 
legitimacy of the social partnership agreements. 
 
O’Riain (forthcoming, 2014) is also srceptical about the competitive corporatism 
argument.  He observes that many of the elements identified by Ornston (2012) as 
defining creative corporatism in Finland and Denmark were also present in Ireland.  
He argues that, especially in the 1990s, there were initiatives to broaden the reach 
and scope of social partners participating in the development of local area 
partnerships, policy committees addressing a variety of social issues, and significant 
expansion of public sector employment.  At an industrial level the state intervened to 
provide venture capital, fund research and development and support other elements 
of the innovation system. These economic and social developments were made 
possible through the availability of EU structural funds, which provided not just 
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capital, but also the institutional space to let them happen.  According to O’Riain 
(ibid) Irish corporatism followed a different trajectory from the classic European 
manifestation by first negotiating social pacts and then building new governance 
capabilities around and through these pacts.  In effect these were the institutions of a 
developmental welfare state but they coexisted with, rather than replaced, the 
existing dominant policy system.  The following metaphor graphically summarises 
this particular characterisation of Irish Social Partnership: 
 
‘If the pacts were paving stones on a particular pathway to the future, the pacts were 
also building the machines that would cut and lay those stones – sometimes after the 
stones themselves had been laid.’ 
 
O’Riain (forthcoming, 1014:163). 
 
With respect to the academic discourse about the variants of corporatism the 
following table seeks to capture the degree to which elements of ‘Creative 
Corporatism’ were present in each country case study. 
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Table 36: Key indicators of types of corporatism in selected European economies, late 1990s and mid-
2000s 
  Ireland Denmark/ Finland Austria/ Belgium UK 
  Late 
90s 
Mid-
2000s 
Late 90s Mid-
2000s 
Late 90s Mid-
2000s 
Late 
90s 
Mid-
2000s 
Risk Capital 
Business Early 
Stage 
Venture 
Capital 
(% of 
GDP)   
5.2 2.0 6.7 4.5 4.4 1.2 4.7 8.7 
Public Sectoral 
Aid (% 
of GDP) 
.69 .19 .81 .55 .37 .13 .18 .08 
Active Labour Market Supports  
Business % of 
Labour 
Costs 
spent on 
Training 
2.4 2.2 2.7 2.1 1.5 1.5 3.6 1.3 
Public Spendin
g on 
Active 
Labour 
Market 
Policies 
(% of 
GDP) 
0.95 0.53 1.35 1.04 0.67 0.67 0.09 0.05 
R&D 
Business Busines
s 
Funded 
R&D 
.82 .70 1.48 1.93 1.31 1.72 .86 .74 
Public Govern
ment 
Funded 
R&D 
.29 .38 .78 .79 .79 .84 .55 .56 
 
Dates: 
Venture Capital, 1998-2001 and 2003-2006 
Training, 1999 and 2005 
Active Labour Market Policy, Sectoral Aid, R&D: 1996-99 and 2003-2006 
 
Sources: O’Riain, (forthcoming, 2014:168) 
 
 
For comparison purposes it is worthy of note that Denmark, Finland and Ireland 
were quite similar in relation to the provision of risk capital in the 1990s.  This was 
driven by state intervention as were supports for training. Sean O’Riain 
(forthcoming, 2014) observes that this is impressive because the use of GDP in 
Ireland’s case conceals a higher input due to a gap between GDP and GNP of the 
order of 18-20 per cent.  He concludes that in the 1990s Ireland’s Social Partnership 
model could be identified with the ‘creative corporatist’ economies in terms of 
provision of risk capital and training and active labour market supports.  However, 
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he discerns a diminution of this effort in the 2000s except in relation to R&D where 
the state concentrated its resources during the period.  While Denmark and Finland 
also did less, Ireland’s shift from developmentalism to financialisation, and 
associated inputs, was particularly egregious. Specifically, in the areas of risk capital 
and labour market policy, Ireland fell well behind Denmark and Finland.  O’Riain’s 
(ibid) overall verdict is that Irish corporatism is characterised by surprising if hidden 
progress in the 1990s but this progress was eroded in the 2000s.  He is critical of 
Ornston (2012) for failing to discriminate between these two periods in his analysis. 
 
Hardiman (2006) concedes that the Irish model of Social Partnership does bear some 
resemblance to competitive corporatism but she argues that the institutional 
framework and the relationship between actors is country specific.  In her 
perspective Social Partnership became intricately involved with obligations incurred 
at EU level and is best understood as constituting a new model of flexible network 
governance.  It became more firmly embedded into the political process than its role 
in shaping pay trends might indicate. 
 
The central player in the process from the late 1990s was Dermot McCarthy, 
Secretary General of the Department of the Taoiseach.  He says that Social 
Partnership was constantly challenged within the system although nothing else was.  
Ministers were never happy because Social Partnership limited their scope to claim 
bold initiatives (interview, 28
th
  November, 2011).  A strong antipathy to social 
partnership and to the public sector in particular, is an embedded feature of the Irish 
print media. An example of this is the way that a perfectly rational proposal for 12 
days unpaid leave – a form of work sharing which is a fairly standard approach to 
addressing commercial difficulties in the private sector – proposed by public sector 
unions in 2009 was rubbished by the media (Cawley, 2012; Doherty, 2011; Roche, 
2011).  Unfortunately, unions have on occasion given the media hostages to fortune 
as in the case of revelations about foreign junkets by union officials and public 
servants under a local level partnership training initiative sponsored by the Health 
Services Executive (HSE). 
  
In an historical context perhaps the most insightful observation belongs to the 
President of SIPTU, Jack O’Connor, who described the collapse of social 
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partnership in December, 2009 as the end of a contract between Fianna Fáil and the 
unions that began in 1942 (cited in O’Connor, 2011: 293). 
 
The Politics Paradigm/Sociological Institutionalism 
 
Although the Irish model of Social Partnership had distinctive features – particularly 
in respect of its wide scope and inclusiveness of a wide range of social actors – it 
was anchored in Jacques Delors’ concept of social dialogue as a sort of social policy 
counterbalance to the negative integration pressures of EU integration (Delors, 
1988).  At a minimum the Irish government would have had to provide a range of 
fora for consulting the ‘Social Partners’ on aspects of EU policy including directives 
relating to employment conditions. For the twenty-two years of its existence Social 
Partnership was a cornerstone of Irish policy.  Although it was constantly sniped at 
by commentators and some politicians it was never seriously challenged politically 
until the end.  According to Dermot McCarthy Social Partnership was seen as 
settling the distributional questions leaving government free to concentrate on 
growing the economy (interview, 28
th
  November, 2012).  
 
John Dunne, former Director General of IBEC, recalls that when government 
changed in 1994 the new Taoiseach, John Bruton, was opposed to Social 
Partnership.  He was initially surprised that employers would favour it but John 
Dunne convinced him of its merits such that he became a supporter and worked it 
well (interview, 16
th
  February, 2012).  John Bruton explained his change of mind in 
this way: 
 
‘My view would be that policy should be made in the Dáil and not outside the 
Dáil with people who haven’t been directly elected.  But I think, with the benefit 
of hindsight, we can see that, in any event, policy isn’t actually made in the Dáil.  
In the Irish system the government makes policy and the Dáil approves it, or 
disapproves it, and if it disapproves it there is a general election.’ 
 
 (Cited in Hastings et al, 2007:205). 
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Former Finance Minister and EU Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, is often 
perceived to be on the centre right of politics and assumed to be an opponent of 
Social Partnership.  This is not the case.  In fact he was a strong defender of the 
model and of public service pay benchmarking, one of its more controversial 
outcomes: 
 
‘I was in favour of Social Partnership because I liked the people involved and 
because it worked. Benchmarking was one of the best things we did because it 
avoided leapfrogging pay claims, a feature of the old Conciliation and Arbitration 
Scheme.’84 (Interview, 7th  June, 2012). 
 
Former ICTU President Peter McLoone is not convinced about Fianna Fáil’s 
commitment.  He feels that they were all in favour of Social Partnership as long as it 
suited their agenda. With hindsight he recalls that the Secretary General of the 
Department of Finance used to turn up at NESC meetings occasionally to impart the 
message that there should be no tilting at low tax, FDI and light touch regulation:  
“We thought we were active within a consensus but we weren’t really.” 
 (Interview, 25
th
  January, 2012). 
 
Crucial tensions which arose within the rainbow coalition government of 1994-1996 
concerning the negotiations of the Programme for Competitiveness and Work are 
recorded by the then Finance Minister, Ruairi Quinn.  He was involved in crucial 
Ecofin discussions concerning the single currency when he received a call from 
Tánaiste, Dick Spring, explaining that the government had received a virtual 
ultimatum from the union side about accepting the current pay claim.  He recalls his 
reaction: 
 
‘We had been resisting, in Finance, the scale of the pay demands coming from the 
unions.  I was looking for public sector productivity improvements and other 
economies to ensure that we would continue to meet the criteria for membership 
                                                 
84 The Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme for the public service was established by a Fine Gael Finance 
Minister, Gerard Sweetman in 1958.  By the 1990s it had become seriously dysfunctional as a system of pay 
determination due to a propensity to fix pay mainly on internal public service grade relativities with only a small 
number of comparisons with the private sector. The problem is well described in Hastings et al (2007: Chapter 
6). 
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of the single currency and to maintain budgetary discipline, especially with regard 
to public service pay….I was being gazumped and bushwhacked right at the time 
of the critical discussions which were going on at Ecofin.  Despite being furious 
with Dick, I also knew I was powerless.  The Taoiseach and Tánaiste had agreed 
to the pay deal.’ 
 (Quinn, 2005:363-363). 
 
Richard Bruton of Fine Gael, also a Minister in that government, says that Fine Gael 
was an outsider and a critic of Social Partnership but nevertheless worked it well in 
government.  His critique of Social Partnership would be that it failed to develop 
broader political underpinnings.  Indeed he developed this point in a speech to Dáil 
Eireann on 5
th
 July, 2006 as recorded in Hardiman (2006:368).  In effect this critique 
has as its core point the ‘supremacy of politics’ argument, a theme which arises from 
time to time in the comparator countries too. Another criticism voiced by Richard 
Bruton is that Social Partnership failed to take on the agenda of public sector reform 
citing FÁS as a case in point
85
 (interview, 10 May, 2012). 
 
Social Partnership seems to have caused less tension within the Fianna 
Fáil/Progressive Democrat coalition government which followed in 1997.  Bertie 
Ahern, former Taoiseach, said of it: 
 
‘O’Malley (Desmond, Leader of PDs) didn’t believe in it (Social Partnership) but 
he let me off to do it.’ 
 (Interview, 13 January, 2012). 
 
In fact, as Hastings et al (2007:74) record, in the run up to the general election of 
June, 1997, all of the mainstream political parties issued statements backing Social 
Partnership.  It was a remarkable convergence, almost ten years after the PNR was 
roundly condemned in the Dáil by Fine Gael and Labour.  Hastings et al (ibid) infer 
that the criticism may have been as much directed at the then Taoiseach, Charles 
Haughey, as against the social pact itself.  Nevertheless, within a similar space of 
time the wheel was to turn full circle only this time it was Fianna Fáil backbenchers 
                                                 
85 Management practices around foreign travel and other matters at the State training agency became publicly 
controversial in 2010 resulting in the demise of the agency and reallocation of its functions. 
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who brought down Social Partnership.  In December, 2009 in the teeth of a major 
fiscal and banking crisis the government led by Brian Cowan resiled from the terms 
of the then current agreement ‘Towards 2016’.  An alternative public sector cost 
saving agreement was negotiated but Cowen was unable to deliver it with his party.  
Partly this was through a misunderstanding of the terms of the putative agreement 
hyped up by elements of the media.  Essentially, the union side had proposed saving 
money by taking unpaid leave, but this was represented as seeking extra holidays 
(Roche, 2011).  Ironically a not dissimilar agreement – known as the ‘Croke Park 
Agreement’ – was negotiated with the public sector unions some months later.  But 
by this time it was too late to save Social Partnership.  The employers had by then, 
albeit reluctantly, resiled too.  The unions were able to retrieve some ground with the 
new government elected in 2010 in specific areas like restoration of minimum wage 
cuts. But still the demise of Social Partnership heralded a series of opportunistic 
legal attacks upon labour market institutions, some of which were established during 
the Social Partnership era, but some which even predated it.  This litigation was 
perhaps also encouraged by the hostility of the Supreme Court to union recognition 
rights reflected in a judgement which struck down a Labour Court Recommendation 
in favour of pilots in a case taken against Ryanair in 2007.  It had all the hallmarks 
of a Polanyian double movement except that it was the employers rolling back trade 
union gains.   
 
Summary 
 
In this section we have analysed the conflicting perspectives on the nature of the 
Irish Social Partnership model. Dermot McCarthy explains that it was integral to the 
national strategy  of adjustment to EMU insofar as it was a mechanism for handling 
distributional issues.  This is consistent with Smith’s (2005) view that Social 
Partnership was key to the Cologne process for improving coordination of economic 
policy and improving the interaction between wage development and monetary, 
budgetary and fiscal policy through macro-economic dialogue within the EU. Regan 
(2012) shares this perspective to an extent except that his assessment is that Social 
Partnership was mediating a neo-liberal implementation of EMU.  He is firmly in the 
‘competitive corporatism’ camp with Ornston (2012) and others.  Those who have a 
281 
 
more benign take on Social Partnership like O’Donnell (2008) who regard it as 
having advanced an experiment in flexible network governance, or Hastings et al 
(2007) who extol its pragmatic orientation, tend to point to its long record of success 
being central to providing the stability for the most sustained period of economic 
and social progress in Ireland’s history.  In the end the model turned out not to be 
sufficiently embedded to survive the 2008 crisis.  Overall the literature on Social 
Partnership is not as well developed as the literature on democratic corporatism in 
the comparator countries (for example, Becker, 2011; Boss, 2010 (a); Campbell and 
Hall, 2006; Campbell and Pedersen, 2006; Katzenstein, 1985; Mjoset, 2011; Visser 
and Van der Meer, 2011). 
 
The problem with the academic treatment of social pacts in Ireland is to either over 
intellectualise the process (Ornston, 2012; Regan, 2012) or to reduce it to pure 
pragmatism with no ideological context at all (Hastings et al, 2007).  The reality is 
that different actors had different objectives as this section has revealed. Sean 
O’Riain gets closest to the truth in a forthcoming publication (2014) when he 
observes that, at least in the 1990s, many of the attributes of ‘creative corporatism’ 
identified in Finland and Denmark by Ornston (2012) were also present in Ireland 
particularly in relation to State support for dynamic adjustment among firms and for 
venture capital, research and development and other elements of the innovation 
system.  In his summation it is best to understand Irish corporatism as the product of 
competing tendencies towards competitive and creative corporatism.  However, 
O’Riain (ibid) also asserts that Social Partnership was ‘hollowed out’ in the 2000s 
but the evidence for this is less convincing. For example, in the matter of social 
investment Hemerijck (2013:381) argues for a life-cycle approach as the most 
adequate framework for achieving it.  He holds that it is desirable to distinguish 
between different life-cycle cohorts – children, young adults, people of working age, 
pensioners and people are reliant on care, while asking what combination of social 
services, income support, and enabling regulation is necessary to achieve better 
social protection and promotion, and through what governance methods.  The last of 
the Social Partnership agreements, Towards 2016, provided exactly this framework.  
It was arguably the closest Ireland has come to delivering a social democratic 
programme.  While it is clear from the interview evidence that many people did not 
approve of such far reaching intervention in the policy arena, and that some believe 
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the electorate to be conservative on social policy, it was equally a trade union 
ambition to build a social democratic polity in Ireland within which all governments 
would have to govern (ICTU, 2013).  In this objective they were seeking to emulate 
the accomplishments of the Nordic labour movement.  They might have succeeded 
too but for the shock and speed of onset of the 2008 crisis.  Towards 2016 was 
perhaps too ambitious an undertaking for an institution not sufficiently deeply 
embedded to withstand the financial storm.   This is not to deny O’Riain’s 
(forthcoming, 2014) argument that broader public policy in the 2000s moved away 
from the developmentalism which characterised the 1990s. 
 
In 2013 Social Partnership occupies a sort of ‘undead’ status. The events of 
December 2009, together with a negative media retrospective which blames Social 
Partnership as a contributory factor to the unwinding of the Celtic Tiger (Cawley, 
2011; Roche, 2011), and a natural  antipathy in Fine Gael and a certain reserve in 
Labour, means that Social Partnership dare not speak its name.  Yet everybody 
speaks enthusiastically of ‘Social Dialogue’ and the Croke Park Agreement between 
the government as employer and the Public Service Committee of the Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions is seen as being vital to economic recovery and is really a kind of 
sectoral Social Partnership.  Otherwise, tentative discussions have taken place about 
re-creating the National Implementation Body in another format and even about the 
possibility of a legal right to collective bargaining.  Countertendencies to a pure 
liberal market economy model have weakened but are not completely extinguished.   
 
As Crouch suggests there may be something of a Sisyphus
86
  dimension to this 
question. 
 
‘Something about labour markets in many European countries seems to destine their 
major participants to keep returning to the task of constructing neo-corporatist 
agreements even though just as the tiring work seems almost complete something 
goes wrong and it crashes again.’ (Crouch 200:212). 
 
                                                 
86A figure in Greek mythology who kept pushing a huge rock up a cliff only to have it fall down on him again 
and again.  
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This he points out, may be because of the impossibility of the opposite task of 
achieving pure free labour markets and the refusal of neo-corporatist policy attempts 
to obey predictions of their final demise.   This is especially true of the Irish case.  
The opponents of Social Partnership have offered no credible alternative outside a 
free market context. The truth is that large sections of the political class, the public 
service elite and the media never bought in to it or understood what it was about.  Its 
main supporters were amongst institutions like NESC, employers, unions, individual 
senior civil servants and politicians.  In these circumstances what Social Partnership 
achieved in Ireland was significant. 
 
The institutionalist influences revealed by the application of the analytical model in 
the case of social pacts can be depicted using the radar diagram in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Radar Diagram depicting clusters of institutionalist influences on social policy and social pacts  
(strongest influences closest to the centre) 
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The Influence of Ideas – Ideational/Discursive 
Institutionalism 
 
John Maynard Keynes once famously wrote that; ‘It is ideas, not vested interests, 
which are dangerous for good or evil’ (Keynes, 1936:333).  Colin Hay (2002:205) 
notes that the role accorded to ideas in political analysis is highly contested and 
tends to reflect assumptions about the role of theory, the value of parsimony and 
whether ideas should be accorded a causal role independent of material factors or 
not.  Later (ibid:257) he argues that what differentiates social and political systems 
from the natural sciences is the capability of reflective actors to shape the 
environment in which they find themselves. Therefore, the ideas actors hold about 
that environment should be accorded an independent role in political analysis.  Hay 
describes this as ideational institutionalism while Schmidt (2006:109) uses the term 
discursive institutionalism.  In this research the influence of ideas is considered in an 
overarching way to seek out any causal role they may have had in any of the 
material decisions made by policymakers. 
 
As detailed in Chapter 4, Smith (2005: Chapter 7) points to the significant role that 
ideas have played in Irish policy making. She singles out in particular the idea 
amongst the elite  of achieving economic independence from Britain and later in 
1986 the role played by NESC in creating an intellectual platform for social 
partnership.  Independence was the principal motivation behind the economic 
nationalism of Fianna Fáil and its  purpose was stated as being ‘the reuniting of the 
Irish people through measures such as the making of Ireland as an economic unit, as 
self-contained and self-sufficient as possible’  (ibid, 168).  Above all the priority was 
to achieve economic independence from Britain.  It is clear from all the interviews 
conducted for this research that was still the main reason for joining the EU. 
 
However, insights offered by Professor Martin O’Donohoe (interview 22nd 
November, 2011) suggests that there were more complex ideas about independence 
and EU membership influencing the thinking of former Taoiseach, Jack Lynch.  He 
saw EU membership as a way of avoiding ‘the Republican trap of the North’ 
meaning that it was a way of turning Ireland away from an enduring and sterile 
obsession with the so called ‘National Question’ of independence.  In other words it 
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was a way of rendering paramilitary conflict in Northern Ireland meaningless if 
Britain and Ireland were both part of a new political construction in Europe. 
 
Smith (ibid, 175) observes that globalisation is considered a further opportunity to 
independence but also one that ultimately constrains policy choices.  Ireland is 
presented as having flourished under conditions of globalisation but must accept 
certain non-negotiable external economic constraints, mainly an imperative towards 
competitiveness. Discourses on European integration are conducted in a similar vein.  
The very perception that Ireland is competing on global markets has played a 
powerful role in driving a shift towards prioritising economic competitiveness.  
Nevertheless, she emphasises that this is not the same as driving the country towards 
neo-liberalism. Indeed, O’Sullivan (2006) argues that a great part of Irish society is 
untouched by globalisation, not least in the relative underdevelopment of its physical 
and social infrastructure.   
 
In a speech to the American Bar Association on 21
st
 July, 2000 the Tánaiste (Deputy 
Prime Minister of Ireland), Mary Harney, said: 
 
‘As Irish people our relationship with the United States and the European Union 
are complex.  Geographically we are closer to Berlin than Boston.  Spiritually we 
are probably a lot closer to Boston than Berlin.’ 
 
(Harney, 2000) 
 
These remarks subsequently became quite controversial in public discourse because 
they zeroed in on a fault line in Irish foreign policy, specifically the meaning of 
being a ‘multi-interface periphery’ (Ruane , 2010).  In other words, is Ireland closer 
‘spiritually’ to the ideal concept of a liberal market economy or, alternatively, does it 
identify with the concept of a European social market economy?  Mary Harney was 
nailing her colours firmly to the mast of the former.  This reflects a characteristic of 
public policy identified by a number of people interviewed for this research (Gray, 
O’Driscoll) which is that Irish government agencies  are disproportionately focussed 
on the American MNCs.  It is an idea that comes to the fore also in the argument 
about the characterisation of Ireland as a developmental network state (O’Riain, 
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2004) or a competition state (Kirby, 2010).   As leader of the Liberal Progressive 
Democratic Party, Mary Harney was often seen as the embodiment of neo-liberalism 
in Ireland.  However, Ruth Barrington (interview 9
th
 January, 2012) opines that the 
speech was in fact written by the Secretary General of the Department of Jobs, 
Enterprise and Innovation, Paul Harron, reflecting a reality that European funding 
opportunities had begun to dry up and the EU was not a cow to be milked anymore.  
Either way the speech, coming on the eve of the  introduction of the Euro, suggests 
at the very least a deep ambivalence about European integration, although strangely 
not embedded in any justifiable concerns about the functioning of the project.  
Moreover, it reinforced a particular perspective of industrial development as being 
orientated towards the American liberal market model arguably militating against 
Enterprise Ireland being able to develop an independent narrative for its mission to 
develop indigenous industry (O’Riain, 2008).  This is all the more incongruous 
given the importance of the 1987 Single Market Act in creating conditions for a 
massive expansion of FDI to Ireland from US multinationals seeking access to the 
single market.  More puzzling still is that the Dáil debates on EMU demonstrated a 
clear consensus on EMU.  It simply was not a political issue.  Gilland (2004) 
identifies the year 2000 as a critical juncture in Ireland’s relations with the EU. The 
Boston V Berlin debate, the budget row with Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy 
and the Nice Referendum added nuance to the debate on Ireland’s membership.  
However, she observes that when it came to decisive choices any latent 
Euroscepticism amongst the major political parties quickly dissipated. 
 
Contrary to public perception Des Geraghty (interview, 12
th
 January, 2012) suggests 
that Mary Harney was not a particularly ideological politician.  He characterises her 
as a pragmatist who believed in hard work and who adopted neo-liberalism because 
it made sense in a pragmatic way.  However, he holds a different view of some of 
her Progressive Democrat colleagues remarking that Pat Cox and Michael 
McDowell were strongly ideological.  Fianna Fáil he considered to be without 
ideology except striving for power.  By and large they bought into the neo-liberalism 
of the PDs (although Bertie Ahern was an exception) because it suited the power 
objective. Des Geraghty (ibid) characterises Fianna Fáil as a party which would do a 
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deal with anyone but which was ultimately destroyed ‘by creatures in business like 
Seanie Fitz
87
 who had more money than they had and kept them in power’. 
 
Whatever about the degree of buy in of individual political parties there can be little 
doubt that ideas associated with neo-liberalism shaped both the process of European 
integration and the emerging Irish polity, particularly after 2001.  Donovan and 
Murphy (2013, Chapter 2) comprehensively describe the influence of ideas such as 
new classical macroeconomics (NCM) and efficient markets hypothesis (EMH). 
NCM is a development of the monetarist thinking of Milton Friedman.  Its 
inspiration came from two of Friedman’s students, Robert Luca and Thomas 
Sargent. Whereas Friedman argued that Keynesian economic stimulus would only 
have a short term effect, the NCM analysis implies that macro-economic policy 
would be ineffective, even in the short run, the so called macroeconomic policy 
impotence rule.  From the 1970s on NCM became the dominant paradigm taught in 
American universities.  As graduates found their way into key positions of power in 
government and international institutions, including the newly established ECB, the 
influence of NCM ideas became quite profound.  Its rejection of any kind of 
economic stimulus based on the impotence rule implied that independent central 
banks should be used to take monetary and fiscal policy out of the hands of 
politicians.   
 
The efficient markets hypothesis became the ideological soul mate of NCM.  It is the 
brain child of another Chicago economist, Eugene Fama, and holds that asset prices 
will reflect all the relevant information that is available such that market actors 
cannot make excessive gains from trading.  Markets, by this reasoning, are self-
correcting and adjust for any change in information. The logical implication is that 
light touch regulation only is necessary. 
 
Together NCM and EMH ideas changed macro-economic policy thinking towards 
being less concerned with employment and growth and being preoccupied with 
inflation. This was accompanied by a change away from demand management in 
                                                 
87
 A reference to Sean Fitzpatrick, former Chairman of Anglo Irish Bank now facing prosecution for 
his role in the bank’s activities. 
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favour of supply side policies and taking decision making out of the hands of 
politicians and transferring it to independent central banks. 
 
The institutional architecture of EMU is consistent with the NCM/EMH philosophy. 
Under the Maastricht Treaty the ECB became a powerful independent institution 
with the single objective of price stability, leaving growth and employment to be 
determined by market forces.  Donovan and Murphy (2013:276) argue that 
prevailing ideas about the capacity of financial markets to largely self-regulate, 
subject to certain overall capital adequacy constraints and limited governance 
requirements, exercised a subtle, but pervasive influence on Irish policy thinking.  
This was confirmed in essence by former Secretary General of the Department of 
Finance, Tom Considine (interview, 24
th
 May, 2012).  In its investigation into the 
causes of the Irish banking crisis the Nyberg Report explicitly criticised the light 
touch approach to banking regulation (2011:4).    
 
The most disturbing ideational dimension of Ireland’s engagement with Europe is 
characterised by former Taoiseach John Bruton (interview 8
th
 March, 2012) as a lack 
of capacity for philosophical enquiry – an ‘intellectual failure’ to grasp what the 
whole thing was about. In practical terms this manifested itself in a failure to explore 
options, even if to reject them, on the path to making policy choices.  The 
overwhelming sense seems to have been a belief in no alternatives. 
 
Donovan and Murphy (2013:153) make the point that this failure was evident in 
academia as well as in politics and public administration noting that 
macroeconomics in general, and financial stability issues in particular, received 
progressively less attention in the research priorities of university economics 
faculties. They observe that consideration of major downside scenarios to the Celtic 
Tiger era seem to have been almost entirely absent from mainstream policy making 
by official institutions as well as by auditing and consultancy firms involved in 
assessing the true state of the financial institutions (ibid:290).  They conclude that: 
 
‘The absence of sufficient self-questioning lies at the heart of the underlying 
causes of the Irish crisis.’ 
 (ibid:288) 
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It can be argued that a lack of willingness to be realistic about downside risks was 
evident in the ESRI (1996) report on EMU. The report stressed the advantages to the 
construction industry of lower interest rates but did not apparently anticipate that this 
could lead to an asset boom.  Given the influence of ESRI with policy makers this 
was significant. 
 
Dermot McCarthy (interview 4
th 
February, 2010) has stressed the importance of 
Social Partnership in managing issues of distributive justice while leaving 
government free to concentrate on growing the economy.  But he also identifies an 
intellectual failure of policy makers to engage seriously with some of the more 
important ideas, such as the concept of a developmental welfare state, that emerged 
from the Social Partnership process via NESC.   It is clear from Hastings et al (2007) 
that the whole Social Partnership project was presented as a pragmatic engagement 
rather than one rooted in Katzenstein’s ‘ideology of Social Partnership’.  This was so 
notwithstanding that some on the trade union side saw it as a means of building 
social democracy in unfavourable political circumstances (ICTU, 2013). 
 
Smith (2005:167) observes that if we accept that actors are not blessed with flawless 
knowledge of their environment then we must acknowledge the role that ideas play.  
O’Riain (2008) sees this as being particularly important within coalitions which 
shaped the course of Ireland’s development between the 1990s and 2000s.  The 
developmentalism which was inherent in the policy which created sustainable 
development from 1994 to 2001 was supplanted by  a more liberal orientation within 
the policy making community which took the country down the path of speculative 
rather than productive investment.  Mainly this was concerned with ideas about tax 
incentives described elsewhere in this thesis, which, unfortunately, coincided with 
ideas of growing financialisation together making a toxic mixture.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has undertaken the task of lifting the cover off the black box that is 
Ireland’s polity shaped by its engagement with the process of Europeans integration. 
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Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) methodology has been used as a toolbox to identify 
how the gears and levers that are historical, rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism come into engagement.  This has been overlaid with an assessment 
of the influence of ideas thereby bringing ideational institutionalism into 
engagement as well.  The objective is to weave together explanations from each 
component of the methodology to form a view about repertoires of action available, 
which, if adopted, might have produced different outcomes from Ireland’s 
engagement with EU integration. 
 
In relation to European integration there is substance to John Bruton’s charge of an 
intellectual failure on the part of the elite. It is clear from the evidence that Ireland’s 
approach to Europe was primarily mercenary.   With few honourable exceptions 
there was no big vision or no contribution to formulating one. Irish officials were 
good at rooting out money which they saw as their principal remit.  Similarly, Irish 
ministers seem to have had a low level of engagement at European Council level.  
The exception was when Ireland held the presidency when it was seen as important 
to achieve results.  
 
It would appear too that the Oireachtas is not geared to deal with European issues. 
The electoral system militates against it and the committee system, being based on 
the Westminster system, is not conducive to effective engagement.   However, it has 
been suggested that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) did not welcome 
parliamentary scrutiny.   Always  supporting the Commission did not equip Ireland 
to deal with the changing power shifts, both to inter-governmentalism or to the 
European Parliament. 
 
The conclusion is that Ireland’s engagement with Europe was sub–optimal. 
 
With EMU Ireland was effectively moving into a space similar to that occupied by 
the Netherlands in relation to Germany since the 1970s.   Having met the criteria for 
membership of EMU it was not assimilated at any level of society that this implies 
running the economy on German lines. Instead the policy was pro-cyclical. 
Admittedly, since Ireland did not benefit from the 1945-1973 ‘Golden Age’ of 
economic growth there was a catch up element involved.  But still, economic growth 
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seemed to become a goal in itself.  This was epitomised by a circular relationship in 
which people invested in houses built by immigrants who rented the same houses.   
Opening the labour market on the occasion of the 2004 European enlargement might 
have served to cool wage inflation but it increased demand for public services and 
boosted the housing market.  It was not a matter upon which the social partners were 
consulted. 
 
Wages and prices in Ireland moved ahead of the rest of Europe. When Germany was 
negotiating rises of 1 to 2 per cent Ireland was negotiating 4-5 per cent. But this was 
driven by property prices and a general cost of living up to 29 per cent above the EU 
average. 
 
Because the Irish economy cycles out of phase with the rest of Europe – by virtue of 
our trading relationship with Britain and the US – it might have been prudent to 
delay entry to the Eurozone so as to observe at least one economic cycle.  Ironically 
one of the principal advantages of EMU membership identified by the influential 
ESRI (1996) report was low interest rates and the positive effect they would have on 
the construction sector. The ESRI misread the impact of this effect and this was 
significant because the report provided the intellectual underpinning for the 
Department of Finance pro–EMU position at the time. 
 
It was a serious policy failure not to tackle the narrowness of the tax base and its 
dependence on property transaction taxes.  It would have been politically difficult 
but introducing a property or site value tax, as the country is now doing belatedly, 
would have saved a lot of grief. 
 
Overall the property market would have been easier to control if the 1974 Kenny 
Report on land prices had been implemented by successive governments since.  The 
key recommendation in the report was to cap the price of development land at one 
and a quarter times its agricultural value. 
 
This could also have indirectly affected the whole economy.   For example, although 
capital stock increased by 157 per cent between 2000 and 2008  only 14 per cent was 
invested in productive assets, and that mainly by semi–state companies.  The bulk of 
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it went into property.  Concerns about the Kenny Report are largely related to the 
property rights protected in the constitution.   These same provisions have prevented 
changes to upward only rent reviews.  Not implementing the Kenny Report could 
come back to haunt policy makers.  Even by late 2013,  although the country is 
otherwise still just bouncing along the bottom of an ‘L’ shaped recession, prime 
Dublin sites are again making between €8 million and €10 million per acre 
(Buckley, 2013). 
 
Central Bank stability reports and letters to government did identify the risks but did 
not speak truth to power loudly enough.   Nor did the ECB and OECD for that 
matter.   Similarly the anomalous position of Scottish banks in the Irish market was 
not attended to, nor has it been yet. 
 
For their part, trade union negotiators did not understand that, absent the ability to 
devalue, and in the event of a macro-economic shock, the structure of EMU is such 
that the whole burden of adjustment falls on labour markets. If they had insisted like 
the Finns in creating buffer funds as part of the social pact negotiations, it might 
have been possible to ease the burden on workers and even preserve the Social 
Partnership model. 
 
Finally, for much of its history European integration proceeded on the basis of a 
‘permissive consensus’ which allowed for a neo-functionalist or an 
intergovernmentalist gradual progress of ever closer union. This process was 
conducted in a technocratic manner, ever more so in the case of financialisation but 
also in the context of European institutions, coalitions and social compacts intended 
to deliver auto-centric development.  The peripheral countries only partially 
managed to benefit from this process. Now Europe needs to embark upon an even 
more ambitious phase of integration and institution building to complete economic 
and monetary union and resolve the current crisis.  Apart from doubts as to whether 
popular support for this exists any more there is the problem of the underlying 
failure to reconcile the very different social compacts, and therefore economic 
models, that were to be integrated within the European economy.  Therefore, it can 
be argued that just when it was most needed, Ireland set about dismantling its much 
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vaunted Social Partnership model (Lawrence & Nohria, 2002; Mjoset, 1992; 
O’Riain, forthcoming, 2014; Senghaas, 1985; Verdun, 2010). 
 
In summary, this chapter has focussed on decision making in Ireland.  It has used the 
model outlined in Chapter 2 to unpack the polity in a forensic way and to question 
how and why decisions were made about three key aspects of European integration, 
economic and monetary union, and social policy and social pacts.  The 
institutionalist influences and ideas at play can be depicted in a composite way in the 
radar diagram at Figure 13 below. 
 
It reveals that Ireland’s engagement with Europe was sub-optimal, being more 
focussed on gains from structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy than 
on any broader vision of Europe’s destination.  In former Taoiseach, John Bruton’s 
words, Ireland suffered from a ‘lack of philosophical enquiry’ or ‘intellectual 
failure’ permeating many layers of the policy making community. 
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Figure 13: Composite Radar Diagram of Clusters of Institutionalist Influences/and Ideas (Ideas 
on circumference)  
(strongest influences closest to centre) 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 
The intention in this chapter is to pull together the similarities, differences, puzzles 
and dilemmas which can be identified from a study of the evolution of the political 
economies of Finland, Denmark, Netherlands and Ireland over the last 25 years.   
 
Recall that this research has been conducted through the lens of European 
integration which is appropriate for two reasons; first because integration will 
continue and will likely intensify for the foreseeable future and secondly because it 
is the process through which globalisation is mediated in a regional sense.  There is 
also the consideration of whether national Varieties of Capitalism are possible in the 
face of deepening integration as posited by Boyer (2000). 
 
In the periodisation used, which is explained in Chapter 2, the period from 1986 to 
the coming into effect of the Maastricht Treaty in 1994 was used as a reference 
baseline for all four countries in the study.  The purpose of doing this was to 
evaluate to what extent the structure of the respective political economies at that 
time conditioned outcomes in later years.  As Raunio and Tiilikainen (2003) and 
Verdun (2010) have argued, the Maastricht Treaty was a critical juncture of 
European integration.  Post Maastricht the jurisdiction of the EU began to extend 
into a much wider range of policy areas.  Accordingly, the second periodisation was 
from Maastricht in 1994 to the Nice Treaty in 2001, the latter coinciding with the 
collapse of the hi-tech bubble.  The third periodisation chosen was from the Nice to 
the Lisbon Treaties – 2001 to 2008 – and the onset of the financial crisis and finally 
the period beyond 2008 to the fifth anniversary of the Lehman Bank collapse, 
September 2013, was considered.  
 
Contrasting Varieties of Capitalism 
The 1980s was characterised in all four countries as a period of high unemployment 
and high welfare dependency.  In Ireland’s case unemployment levels of 18 per cent 
were compounded by high emigration and a debt to GDP ratio of 130 per cent.  
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Unemployment in the Netherlands reached 14 per cent, a situation characterised by 
Goran Therborn (1986) as the most spectacular employment failure in the advanced 
capitalist world.  In addition 27 per cent of the workforce was officially on disability 
benefit mainly because employers and unions were using relatively generous level of 
benefits available under that heading to restructure industry.  It was a combination 
described in economic text books of the time as ‘The Dutch Disease’ (Visser and 
Hemerijck, 1997).   As a result Dutch politics in the 1980s and 1990s was dominated 
by welfare reform. 
This posed a major dilemma for the PvdA Labour Party in government because 
reform of disability hit its natural working class constituency and went directly 
against the policy of the trade unions.  However, in Chapter 4 former Dutch Prime 
Minister Wim Kok explained that, from his perspective, it was an issue of the 
sustainability of the welfare state which he believes in deeply.  
Finland, like Ireland, was a late industrialiser and the process was only completed in 
the 1960s.  According to Senghaas (1985), writing from the perspective of 
development theory, Finland was assisted in its journey from peripherality to the 
metropolitan core by the requirement to make $300 million worth of war reparations 
to the Soviet Union in the form of manufactured goods comprising ships, railway 
wagons, machinery, cables and other goods from sectors of production which, in 
Finland, at the time, did not exist at all or existed only in rudimentary form.  Finland 
was confronted by major dilemmas on two fronts at the same time in the early 
1990s.  First of all this Soviet relationship had morphed into a major export market 
of low quality goods or ‘trash’ as one interviewee described it.  When the Soviet 
Union collapsed Finland had to find alternatives quickly.  They chose to completely 
restructure their economy and redirected it towards hi-tech goods for western 
markets.  Nokia is the best known manifestation of this directional shift (Gylfason, 
2010; Personen and Riihinen, 2002; Raunio and Tiilikainen,2003; Vartiainen, 2011). 
The second dilemma was caused by the worst financial/banking crisis since the 
1930s which hit Finland in 1992/93.  Formerly the country had tended to use a kind 
of Keynesian inspired monetary policy involving frequent cycles of devaluation and 
wage increases.  Although there was not a consensus on it amongst those 
interviewed, liberalisation of capital markets, which was introduced without proper 
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advance planning, seems to have compounded the financial crisis.  Suffice it to say 
that monetary policy as practiced by the Bank of Finland was sub-optimal.  An 
alternative, and the course ultimately chosen, was EMU, but Finland was not even in 
the EU at that time.  It joined in 1995.  Joining the EU was a dilemma in the context 
of national security and the relationship with the Soviet Union (ibid).   
Denmark too suffered high unemployment after the two oil crises of the 1970s.  
According to Poul Nyrup Rasmussen this was a strong factor, as well as the general 
state of the economy, in returning a Social Democrat led government in 1993.  
Denmark, like the Netherlands, has a long standing policy of a fixed exchange rate 
with the Deutschmark (from1982, Netherlands from the 1970s).  This ultimately led 
to a gradual reduction in inflation and real interest rates.  However, it posed a 
dilemma in that the other side of the coin, so to speak, was high unemployment.  The 
solution, insofar as one existed, was to effect coordination of the economy through 
keeping market mechanisms embedded in collective agreements thereby giving 
unions influence on social policies to mitigate the negative effects of monetarism.  
Despite the pegging of the currency to the Deutschmark Denmark voted against the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Kelstrup, 2006;Pedersen, 2006).   
This poses a puzzle and perhaps a future dilemma.  If the currency is pegged to the 
Deutschmark anyway what is the point in staying out of the single currency in 
practice?  In the longer term if the solution to the current financial crisis is, as it 
seems to be, even deeper integration of the Eurozone, can Denmark continue to 
remain outside?  If the judgement is ‘no’ can the political elite of Denmark achieve 
what they have failed to achieve to date viz; persuade the electorate to vote for 
EMU? 
The 1990s was the era of ‘employment miracles’ (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).  In 
Denmark this was achieved through a combination of active labour market policies- 
combined with ‘flexicurity’- and public investment to stimulate the economy.  In the 
Netherlands though employment restructuring involved increased female labour 
force participation and large numbers of part time jobs in services.  In Ireland’s case 
450,000 new jobs were created in the most sustained period of economic expansion 
the country has known.  A major factor was the stimulus given to the economy by 
foreign direct investment attracted by the opportunities for access to European 
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markets created by the 1986 single European Act.  However, over 80 per cent of the 
new jobs were not driven by exports but by domestic demand (O’Riain, 2004 and 
2008).  Finland was an outlier in this respect.  The 1992/93 crash had a devastating 
effect on employment but the recovery began in 1994.   
What were the common factors behind this positive trend?  First of all each of the 
economies is very open and positive towards globalisation
88
.  Second, an upswing in 
global trade was an advantage in this context.  Third, the US economy particularly 
went through a long period of expansion.  In Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland 
social democratic governments came to power.  By political orientation they were 
anxious to boost employment and they anticipated, and received, a measure of 
cooperation from trade unions in a way that centre right governments would not.  
This had positive results validating Huber and Stephens (2001) proposition that 
social change is most effectively achieved through social democratic incumbency 
and strong trade union peak organisations.  In political terms Ireland is the outlier in 
this dimension.  The Labour Party was a minority party in government from 1994 to 
1997 but this changed to a centre right coalition in 1997 (O’Riain, 2008).  It is a 
peculiarity of the Irish political scene that trade unions have cooperated as well with 
the populist Fianna Fáil party as with Labour (Doherty, 2011; Hastings et al, 2007; 
Quinn 2005; MacSharry and White, 2000; Garvin, 2004, Roche, 2011; Yeates, 
2011). 
Nevertheless, there are quite striking parallels between the Wassenaar Accord 
negotiated in the Netherlands in 1982 and the Programme for National Recovery 
negotiated in Ireland in 1987.  Both agreements are categorised in the literature as 
‘competitive corporatism’ by some authors (Ornston 2009; Regan, 2012) although 
this typology in Ireland’s case is challenged by others (Adshead, 2006; Hardiman 
2006; O’Riain, 2014 forthcoming).  Both addressed dire economic and employment 
situations.  Both restored social pacts as the institutional alternative to direct state 
action (Visser and Der Meer, 2011).  Both commenced a series of social pacts (8 
between 1980 and 2009 in the Netherlands; 7 between 1987 and 2009 in Ireland).  
Both focused on working time reduction to create employment, although this 
                                                 
88 Although as Smith (2005) points out globalisation is a bit of a misnomer in Ireland’s case.  Ireland has three 
main markets and sources of FDI viz, Eurozone, Britain and the US.  Thus it can be said to be highly 
international and open but not global as such. 
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morphed into part-time work in the Netherlands.  Both established a reservoir of 
trust between the main actors which helped to solidify the process into the future.  In 
both cases the embrace of wage moderation set the pattern of bargaining for the 
years ahead. 
The roots of neo-corporatism are quite different in each comparator country.  In 
Ireland they go back to the period of Ireland’s transition from import substitution 
industrialisation to export oriented industrialisation in the 1940s and 1950s and the 
need to either coerce or co-opt labour to the task of attracting foreign direct 
investment.  Social democracy has never had a strong foothold in Ireland but the 
aspiration of Fianna Fáil, the larger of the two main nationalist parties, to present 
itself as the ‘real’ labour party meant that co-option of trade unions to neo-
corporatism fitted perfectly with the policy of the time (Breen et al, 1990; Hastings 
et al, 2007; Garvin, 2004; Suarez, 2001; Yeates, 2011).  Vartiainen (2011:57) 
explains that, while Finland is regarded as being part of the Nordic family it stands 
out from the other countries in two respects.  Firstly, it has historically operated 
under the tight geo-political constraint of its long border and relationship with 
Russia.  This has strongly influenced most of its economic policy choices.  
Secondly, Finland has been characterised by an extremely corporatist political 
culture such that parliamentary democracy in economic policy making has never had 
quite the same legitimacy as in other Nordic countries.  This dates back to the 19
th
 
century nationalist revival in which an organic Hegelian view of society was the 
dominant theme.  Corporatism in a Finnish context was employer dominated.  This 
is because large employer organisations joined with the state during the civil war to 
organise the military capacity to defeat the ‘red’ front.  During the interwar period 
Finnish corporatism was of a distinctly ‘right wing’ type.  However, during the 
Second World War trade unions did cooperate with the war effort and the post-war 
era saw the emergence of a new political grouping of forces which made it possible 
for left wing parties to exert more influence on economic and labour market polices.  
From the 1950s trade unions could engage in incomes policy debates and this 
became a standard part of economic policy making.   
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Overall, however, Vartiainen (ibid) considers that the distribution of power 
resources between corporatist organisations and the government is not clear-cut and 
he sees this as a strategic vulnerability. 
Neo-corporatism in Denmark can trace its roots back to the war with Germany in 
1864.  The vulnerability this exposed convinced Danes that to survive as a nation 
they had to pull together.  Social democracy was firmly established in Denmark in 
the 1930s on the eve of Hitler’s accession to power.  However, there was also 
always been a strong parallel liberal influence which is a product of the 
Grundtvigian movement of the 19
th
 century.  Nevertheless, Denmark is a society 
with a strong commitment to ‘the common good’ and with institutions to support its 
achievement.  Thus Denmark has a variety of capitalism which is neither liberal in 
the Anglo-Saxon sense nor social democratic in the traditional understanding of that 
model.  It has been described as a ‘negotiated economy’ (Kjaer and Pedersen, 2001; 
Pedersen, 2006; Jessop, 2010; Boss, 2010; Campbell and Hall).  O’Donnell 
(2010:150) interprets the negotiated economy concept as a development of classic 
neo-corporatism similar to Social Partnership in Ireland.   
Historically Dutch society has been deeply fragmented across ideological or 
religious cleavages.  Because of this political elites strove to form consensual 
governments.  As a result the country responded to economic change through 
negotiated solutions that share the burden of adjustment, (lost income, 
unemployment etc.) across society.  This ‘pillarisation’ in which religion played a 
big part, began to change slowly from the 1960s.  Consociational democracy began 
to evolve and the tradition of consensus building lends itself to neo-corporatism.  
This sits alongside a preference for hard currency policies influenced by the need to 
import a lot of components for manufacture.  The Netherlands pegged its currency to 
the Deutschmark as early as the 1970s and maintaining this position, with its 
implications for employment, required a widespread acceptance of the policy.  
According to Jones (2008) the Netherlands ‘Polder Model’ as it is called appears to 
bear out Katzenstein's (1985) thesis about small states and world markets.   
Visser and Van der Meer (2011) suggest that social pacts became the alternative to 
state intervention in the Netherlands after the Wassenaar Accord of 1982. 
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Not only did the Dutch manage to preserve consensus but they were able to achieve 
welfare state reform, improve competitiveness, support European integration and 
engineer an employment miracle. 
 
However, the Dutch Model is not without its critics.  Wiemer Salverda (2005) 
argues that, when the Dutch relative performance finally improved at the end of the 
1990s this was not related to the essentials of the Dutch Model and its policies as 
commonly perceived, i.e. wage moderation and exports.  On the contrary, he 
suggests that strong domestic consumption growth, composed of wage growth 
instead of moderation, a wealth effect associated with rising house prices (by 60 per 
cent between 1996 and 2000) and the related increase in tax-favoured mortgages for 
consumption purposes played a prominent role.  He identifies three characteristics of 
the model which he claims are misinterpreted.  First, the success of the job creation 
was largely based on the previously low participation rate of women and a large 
demographic decline of the youth cohort of the population.  Second, the Wassenaar 
Agreement, which has the same status in the Netherlands as has the Saltsjöbaden 
Agreement of 1938 in Sweden (see p. 27), actually came at the end of a long period 
of wage moderation instead of initiating it.  Also neither the growth of part-time jobs 
nor that of contractually flexible jobs in the Netherlands was initiated by the 
institutions of the labour market.  Finally, the labour market achievements seem less 
convincing when the amount of informal employment and the plight of vulnerable 
groups such as low skilled minorities is taken into account.  He concludes that the 
working of the dominant set of institutions and policies in the Netherlands is 
primarily adaptive and not initiating ‘making itself small in a big nasty world’ (ibid: 
61).  
Writing in the 1990s Traxler (1996), cited in Crouch (2000:212-213) argues that 
industrial relations systems are embedded in past practice and develop in ways 
consistent with past trajectories.  In the typology he uses Finland, Denmark and 
Netherlands are considered to be part of an inclusive pattern of collective bargaining 
of a highly coordinated form in which agreements made are applied to all firms in a 
sector or nationally.  In this initial work Traxler did not include Ireland but in a 
subsequent publication in 1997 he concludes that Ireland cannot be categorised 
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either in this form or in the alternative, a more disorganised form of bargaining 
based on single employer agreements with no extensions.   
So, from the viewpoint of establishing a benchmark, it would appear that, while 
pragmatism is a factor in all four countries, there is considerably more evidence of 
path dependency and thus historical institutionalism and a deeper embeddedness and 
philosophical belief in neo-corporatism in Denmark, Netherlands and to a lesser 
extent, Finland, than Ireland. 
In macro-economic terms there were exogenous factors such as global, and 
particularly American, economic expansion, and the Single European Act which 
contributed to the employment miracles in the 1990s.  However, some factors were 
unique.  For example, Ireland devalued its currency by 10 per cent in 1993 which 
gave a huge boost to exports.  Similarly Finland devalued the Markka by 30 per cent 
which helped it to recover quickly from the banking crisis of 1992/93.  However, 
Denmark and the Netherlands had pegged their currencies to the Deutschmark in 
1982 and the 1970s respectively.  Employment growth in Denmark was achieved 
through active labour market policies and in Netherlands through an expansion of 
part time working in the services sector.  Finland completely re orientated its 
economy towards western markets and hi-tech products.  Thus from the viewpoint of 
how benchmark conditions affected longer terms outcomes, it would seem that 
Denmark, Finland and Netherlands accomplished what they did much more via 
endogenous reforms than did Ireland.  Foreign direct investment is a case in point.  
Finland and Denmark have an industrial base and a national system of innovation 
which is indigenous and has been invested in heavily and institutions built to support 
it.  As far back as 1992 Mjoset identified this as vulnerability for Ireland.  The 
former Secretary General of the Taoiseach’s Department, Dermot McCarthy, says 
the Department of Finance saw all investment in research as waste (interview, 28
th
  
Novermber.2011).  In effect Ireland tried, not very effectively, to import a national 
system of innovation via FDI.  While Ireland can claim to have intervened in the 
economy, its overreliance on US multinationals and low corporation tax, and 
relegation of institutions for promoting indigenous industry to second class status, 
tends to support the contention, except for a period between 1994 and 2001, that it 
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intervened in the wrong way (O’Driscoll and Gray interviews; O’Riain, 2004 and 
2008).   
Another baseline distinction of importance is that social democracy has been an 
influence on the polity of the Nordic countries in a way that it never was in Ireland.  
Nationalism and the civil war in the 1920s ensured that virtually all major issues in 
Ireland have been conceptualised in terms of independence rather than of class 
interest (Breen et al 1990; Weeks, 2010).  In effect all governments, whatever their 
political orientation, have to govern within a social democratic polity in the Nordic 
countries.  This, according to Vartiainen (2011), has been the great success of the 
labour movement.  It is rooted in ties that bind strong trade unions – with 
membership density up to 90 per cent – to social democratic parties.  In fact the 
Nordic model was designed by two LO  (trade union) economists in Sweden in the 
1950s and has more or less been adopted by all countries in the region since.  
Neither social democratic politics not trade unionism is quite as strong in the 
Netherlands but it is categorised as the most Nordic of the continental social market 
economies. 
Welfare effort is also of a different order as has been researched in some detail and 
as can be seen in Table 37 (Esping Andersen, 1990; Hemerijck, 2013;  Huber and 
Stephens, 2001; Pontusson, 2005).  Ireland with Britain has been categorised as a 
liberal model with much more emphasis on safety nets and means testing rather than 
universal and state provided services.  Traditionally, also, Ireland operated a kind of 
mixed economy of welfare with many services being delivered by church 
institutions.  A critical difference between social market economies and liberal 
market economies as described by Pontusson (ibid:98) is that the coordination of 
wage bargaining characteristic of social market economies provides an effective 
mechanism to ensure that wage growth remains consistent with the requirements of 
non-inflationary growth and international competitiveness.  Lacking such 
institutions, the liberal market economies must rely on unemployment to discipline 
Labour.  In Social Partnership Ireland had some of these features of co-ordination 
but it also had above average inflation and a cost of living higher than the EU 
average.  
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Table 37: Public Social Expenditure by Function (% of GDP) 
 Total Social 
Expenditure 
Old 
Age 
Survivors Incapacity 
Related 
Health Family Active labour 
market 
programmes 
Unem
ploy
ment 
Housing Other social 
policy areas 
Scandinavian 
Regime 
 
          
Denmark 27.3 7.3 0.0 4.3 5.9 3.4 1.7 2.8 0.7 1.0 
Finland 26.1 8.5 0.9 3.8 6.2 3.0 0.9 2.0 0.3 0.5 
Sweden 29.8 9.6 0.6 5.6 6.8 3.2 1.3 1.2 0.5 0.6 
Norway 22.9 6.3 0.3 4.4 5.8 2.8 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.6 
Continental 
Regime 
          
Germany 27.9 11.2 0.4 1.9 7.7 2.2 1.0 1.7 0.6 0.2 
France 29.5 10.9 1.8 1.9 7.8 3.0 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.4 
Netherlands 21.6 5.5 0.3 3.6 6.0 1.6 1.3 1.5 0.3 0.6 
Belgium 26.4 7.2 2.0 2.3 7.3 2.6 1.1 3.3 0.1 0.4 
Austria 28.1 12.6 2.4 2.4 6.8 2.8 0.6 1.1 0.1 0.3 
Anglo-Saxon 
Regime 
          
Ireland 16.7 2.9 0.8 1.6 6.5 2.5 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.3 
United Kingdom 22.1 6.1 0.2 2.4 7.0 3.2 0.5 0.3 1.4 0.2 
Mediterranean 
Regime 
         0.0 
Italy 26.5 11.6 2.5 1.7 6.8 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.4 
Greece 20.5 10.8 0.8 0.9 5.6 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.5  
Portugal No data 
available 
         
Spain 21.2 21.2 0.6 2.5 5.8 1.1 0.8 2.2 0.2 0.2 
Visegrad 
Countries 
          
Czech Republic 19.7 7.5 0.2 2.4 6.3 1.7 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.4 
Hungary 22.5 8.8 0.3 2.8 6.0 3.1 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.1 
Poland 21.0 10.4 1.0 2.7 4.3 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Slovakia 18.8 6.2 0.2 1.7 5.3 2.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5 
 
 
Source:  Hemerijck, 2013 
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The Differential Impact of Integration on Development Models 
The principal pre-occupation of all of the comparators during the 1990s was meeting 
the criteria to qualify for membership of EMU.  This imposed considerable 
discipline.  To the extent that all four countries qualified – against expectations in 
Ireland’s case according to the Finance Minister (Quinn, 2005) – this was itself a 
benchmark of achievement.  It is noteworthy too that change in the scale and pace of 
European integration had to be accommodated while simultaneously managing a 
transition from  high 1980s levels of welfare expenditure and unemployment. 
One of the principal structural reforms was based on a dawning realisation that low 
labour force participation rates was the Achilles heel of the welfare state.  Thus it 
was that collective bargaining and social pacts were pressed into the service of 
changing the balance through flexicurity in Denmark and part time jobs in the 
Netherlands.  There was also a more strategic overhaul of welfare systems in respect 
of which labour market actors were more or less bypassed.  This included pensions 
which, not surprisingly, was very contentious.  
In Finland the first Lipponen government (social democratic) and its successor from 
1999 to 2003 were very successful in achieving comprehensive pay agreements.  
They did not succeed so well in relation to unemployment which in 2000 was still 
9.6 per cent.  Nevertheless, the revival of collective bargaining marked a return to a 
coordinated market economy.  The most important development for Finland was the 
restructuring of the economy and financial system that saw the emergence of Nokia 
and an extensive ICT industry which became a market leader. 
Concern that privatisation and deregulation- the so called ‘negative integration’ 
effects – need to be balanced by social policy initiatives at an EU level saw a 
qualitative increase in activism in employment and other policy areas between the 
mid-1990s and mid-2000s.  The Dutch presidency of the EU in 1997 put forward the 
idea of rethinking social policy as a ‘productive factor’ favourable to economic 
development.  At that time 13 of the 15 member states had social democratic 
governments sympathetic to such thinking and this was further advanced when 
Finland joined in 1995.  Thus it was that at the Amsterdam summit a renewed 
European social policy agenda emerged based on respect for the integrity and 
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divergence of national systems.  While this helped to protect values and standards in 
the Nordic countries and the Netherlands it also means there has been little or no 
harmonisation across the EU leaving countries like Ireland in a relatively inferior 
position as regards welfare effort 
 
But these efforts at social policy reform were in any event inadequate to counteract 
the pressures from an Europeanisation that came at a cost of failing to address the 
very different social compacts, and therefore economic models, that were to be 
integrated within the European economy.
89
   The financial flows and general 
relationship between core and periphery were altered between the 1990s and 2000s 
such that the capital flows from core to periphery arising from financial 
liberalisation overwhelmed the public development of the structural funds 
programme.  This caused a structural change within the real European economy 
reflected in major current accounts imbalances (Hooghe and Marks, 2009 cited in 
O’Riain, forthcoming, 2014:147). 
The period 2001 to 2008 saw an unwinding of some of the more progressive 
achievements of the social democratic governments e.g. a hollowing out of the 
flexicurity system in Denmark.  The credibility of EMU was also undermined in that 
period by infringements of the stability and growth pact by France and Germany and 
the impotence of the EU Commission to respond.  In addition the banking systems of 
the world were incubating a crisis, which when it broke in 2008, hit the small 
countries hard because their economies are so open. 
The thirty years before 2008 was essentially an era of neo-liberalism often referred to 
by the euphemism ‘The Great Moderation’, A combination of increased global 
labour supply, disinflationary effects from Chinese exports and cheap credit kept 
growth high and inflation low.  Modest wage increases were facilitated by the stick 
and carrot of outsourcing and cheap credit.  But the great moderation was being 
slowly undermined by global imbalances, excessive credit expansion and unhealthy 
increases in leverage.  These were feeding into both consumption and investment and 
the build-up of asset bubbles.  The growth of shadow banking, the inadequacy of 
                                                 
89 Denmark and the Netherlands were ahead of the curve having learned to deal with these pressures from the 
time they linked their currencies to the DM by using social pacts to mitigate employment effects via social policy 
innovations. 
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regulation and the greed of banks which drove inappropriate risk taking, were all part 
of the problem.  High saving rates in emerging economics gave rise to large financial 
flows looking for investment outlets.  This abundance of liquidity encouraged  risk 
taking in the hope of better returns.  The global crisis emanated from the conjunction 
of widespread financial fragility and a lopsided globalisation process, proceeding 
rapidly amidst large financial imbalances (Gylfason et al, 2010; Marsh, 2011; 
Mason, 2009) 
As indicated above all small open economies were hit hard by these events but 
amongst the comparator countries only Ireland had a financial crisis. 
In reflecting on the evolution of the development models we can first of all note as 
outlined in Chapter 5 that the Netherlands is now often categorised with the Nordic 
countries in the context of measures of redistribution, equality and labour market 
regulation in a way that detaches it from the continental group of SME countries.  
We can note also that in Finland, Denmark and Netherlands significant welfare 
reforms have taken place.  But, politically the social reform agenda has been shaped 
by pragmatic considerations.  These countries have bounced back from the crises of 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Their reforms have maintained the principles of universalism 
and the core values of the welfare state.  At the same time these countries remain 
among the most economically strong, productive, competitive and socially cohesive 
in Europe if not the world.   Besides cost containment the most important leitmotiv 
of the Nordic reform agenda was ‘activation’.  Moreover, the ‘Social Partnership’ 
identified by Katzenstein (1985) as a key component of their success, which, while it 
almost succumbed to the ‘primacy of politics’ argument during the 1980s and 1990s, 
recovered  in all three countries to a point where it is now seen as the first refuge in a 
crisis and is firmly embedded in the institutional architecture of each country.  By 
contrast Social Partnership had collapsed in Ireland by 2009 unable to survive the 
five part crisis-economic, social, banking, fiscal and reputational-identified by NESC 
(2009) (Howling and Vandaele,2011; Schmidt, 2011; Hemernick, 2013). 
 
Managing the Financial Crisis within EMU 
Finland had a financial crisis in 1992/93 but Denmark had one in the 1980s.  The 
Danish financial system, as a result, maintained a sharper distinction between the 
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various classes of institution.  One consequence of this was that the Danish mortgage 
system by 2008 was probably the most stable and trouble free in the world (Mjoset, 
2011: 369). 
Mjoset (2011) is careful to explain that monetary policy in the Nordic countries is 
quite nuanced, being neither neo-liberal nor orthodox Keynesian.  He observes that, 
to the extent that applied empirical research has influenced policy makers in the 
finance ministries, it has floated between saltwater (new Keynesian) and orthodox 
Keynesian
90
.  The important point to make is that the Nordic countries and the US 
are the only ones running counter cyclical fiscal policies since the crisis began.  The 
Nordic countries can do this because they ran fiscal surpluses over the period 2001 to 
2008.  So did Ireland but the money was blown away by bank debt.  The Nordics 
believe in fiscal discipline so that they can finance counter cyclical measures when 
they need to. 
In any event, and by contrast, Marsh (2011:242) recalls that when the epicentre of 
the banking upheavals moved suddenly to Ireland in September, 2008, the ECB put 
pressure on the Irish authorities  not to let any bank fail lest, like with Lehman Bros., 
this might reverberate through the European banking system.  The authorities 
guaranteed all bank liabilities at six institutions, an exposure amounting to €440 
billion or 250 per cent of GDP.  This, in the end, left Ireland with a staggering bank 
debt, taken on as sovereign debt, of €64 billion.  The key misstep was that of 
including Anglo-Irish Bank which was not strategic and could have been allowed 
fail, as indeed it eventually was several years later.  This alone cost Ireland in excess 
of €30 billion (see NERI, 2013).  
But what got Ireland into this space in the first place?  It seems to be remarkably like 
an account of the Finnish crisis of 1992/93 given by Gylfason et al (2010).  The 
difference is that Finland did not have to work within the framework of EMU at the 
time where, as Crouch (2000) points out, the entire burden of adjustment is expected 
to be carried in labour markets through an internal wage devaluation. 
                                                 
90 ‘Saltwater’ is intended to designate east coast US academies as distinct from ‘freshwater’ meaning Chicago 
school or neo-liberal.  New Keynesians tend to accept rational expectations, but are nevertheless able to conclude 
that markets can fail (Skidelsky,2009:44) 
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However Gylfason et al (2010) also make the point with some justification that in 
Ireland’s case a combination of inadequate regulation and supervision of financial 
systems, fiscal policies which allowed bubbles to develop and conversely left no 
room for accommodating or expansionary policy to alleviate the consequences of the 
crisis, were compounding factors. 
A second question is whether the difficulty of managing the crisis can be traced to 
anything in the baseline periodisation.  In 2003 there was a spat between Ireland and 
the EU Commission about the stance of budgetary policy being too expansionary.  
With hindsight a case can be made that if the economy had been reined in at that 
time, and perverse property incentives reversed, investments might have been 
directed to ends which would have improved the productive capacity of the 
economy. 
The problem was that these difficulties were not foreseen, not by the Irish authorities 
and not by anyone else.  As late to 10
th
  May 2007, the President of the ECB, Mr 
Trichet, at a press conference in Dublin, lauded the Irish economy as a role model in 
many respects for the Euro area (Marsh, 2011:241). 
As we have seen in Chapter 7 there was no general appreciation of the discipline 
required of membership of a monetary union.  Apart from the Department of Finance 
nobody assimilated the fact that, in the event of a macro-economic shock, and absent 
the capacity to devalue, the burden of adjustment would fall on workers and welfare 
recipients.  Nobody seemed to realise that EMU was designed that way to establish 
credibility with markets.  John Bruton spoke in his interview about an ‘intellectual 
failure’ and Dermot McCarty spoke of a lack of policy coherence and a sense of the 
notion that once Ireland qualified for EMU that was it.  There was nothing more to 
be done.   
The problem may have been more to do with people not speaking truth to power 
loudly enough.  The Central Bank stability reports identified some of the risks and 
vulnerabilities as did NESC.  Former Central Bank Governor, John Hurley, 
references particularly the 2005 Stability Report (interview, 9
th
 December, 2011).
91
  
                                                 
91 Mr Hurley also recollects writing to the Minister for Finance in 2004 drawing attention to the risk posed by 
property tax reliefs.  He recommended phasing out the reliefs but this was not done at the pace he suggested.  
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However, former Central Bank senior economist and advisor, Raffique Mortiar has 
made the point that stability reports went through an iterative process involving 
several layers of senior management before they saw the light of day.  They were so 
carefully nuanced that it would be difficult for a non-expert to identify signals 
pointing to serious risk (interview, 7
th
 May, 2013).  Peter McLoone recalled in his 
interview raising concerns about the sustainability of the high rate of economic 
growth with Brian Cowen as Minister for Finance, but not a lot of notice was taken.  
Indeed, when the external authorities were clearly regarding Ireland as a poster child 
of European integration, who internally could expect to get a good reception for 
expressing reservations about the transparency of the Emperor’s clothes? 
However, Ireland still did not break the stability and growth pact terms so there is a 
puzzle here as to why it went into crisis and the comparator countries did not?  A 
possible answer is provided by Labour’s economic advisor, Willie Scally, when he 
observes that the Stability and Growth Pact indicators were not capable of measuring 
what was going on in the real economy.  The EU Commission may have been right 
to attempt to call Ireland to book over its budgetary policy in 2003 but Charlie 
McCreevy had an unassailable defence in being able to point to compliance with the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  The Commission’s case was not helped by their failure to 
discipline France and Germany for actual breaches of the pact.  Moreover, as 
Hemerijck (2013:367) points out, the EMU’s bias towards public budgetary 
discipline made Eurozone and domestic policy makers in Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
completely ignorant of the destabilising effects of accumulating private sector 
indebtness.  As pointed out in The Economist (26
th
 October, 2013) the household 
debt burden is especially heavy in Ireland and, surprisingly in the Netherlands, 
exceeding 100 per cent of GDP in both places.  It cites the IMF as saying that private 
debt is a bigger drag on Europe’s growth than government debt, presumably because 
of its implications for domestic demand. 
So, reverting to the research question outlined in Chapter 1 what are the findings 
from this study in comparative political economy? 
                                                                                                                                                        
This decision followed a study commissioned from Inbucon.  He thought the Department of Finance was worried 
about precipitating a collapse of the property market. 
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First of all we can say that Katzenstein’s thesis on democratic corporatism does hold 
true for Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, notwithstanding the pressures of 
financialisation and globalisation and, particularly, Europeanisation over the ensuing 
quarter of a century.   We can agree with Hemerijck (2013:8) that the competitive 
strength of the Nordic economies before and after the 2008 crisis, is slowly but 
surely being recognised as in part a product of their expensive, active and 
capacitating, universal provisions in areas of work, care and welfare in direct contrast 
to neo-liberal dogma.  We can say too that the institutions of democratic corporatism 
are deeply embedded but flexible enough to allow each country to respond as 
appropriate in its own cultural context to the different situations presented at 
different stages of the periodisation. An example of this is Finland’s response to the 
twin crises of the 1990s which was unique to it, albeit that Denmark and Netherlands 
experienced their own crises in the 1980s.  What makes these countries better able to 
deal with crises is the strength of their tradition of accommodative politics which as 
Katzensten (1985:35) points out dates back beyond the nineteenth century and 
facilitated the political reorientation that took place in the 1930s and 1940s. The 
distinctive political structures and practices built on this tradition allow pragmatic 
bargains to be struck by a handful of political leaders.  The fact that institutions are 
so deeply rooted affords them a protection from exogenous shocks (ibid:89). Thus 
the depth of commitment to European integration must be understood in this context.  
It is a constant which influences policy in all aspects; a spine to the system that does 
not shift.  This tradition is absent in Ireland.  In fact the Irish case validates 
Katzenstein’s thesis insofar as its institutions collapsed under the pressure of an 
exogenous shock in the form of the 2008 financial crisis precisely because they were 
not deeply rooted in an ideology of Social Partnership. 
But if, as Vivien Schmidt (2011) asserts, these small open economies of Northern 
Europe managed to achieve enormous structural adjustment while preserving their 
core values, what if anything did it cost them?  The answer to this question is not 
easy to discern but this research unearthed a number of considerations worthy of 
mention.  The first concerns the role of elites emphasised by Katzenstein (1995).  It 
is arguable that their influence has diminished under the unremitting pressure exerted 
on livelihoods and employment security by the liberalising trend of European 
integration. This is important given the role of elite bargaining in the structures and 
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practices of accommodative politics.  The second is that the narrative which 
underpinned social democracy is no longer as coherent as it once was due to the 
compromises which have had to be made with the neoliberalism of European 
integration. Absent that coherence, when economic conditions deteriorate and people 
ought to move to the left, there is, as Benn (2013:282) suggests, a reaction of 
pessimism which leads people to be attracted to right wing arguments about 
immigration and welfare.  This lends itself to a cynicism corrosive of the values upon 
which Katzenstein’s thesis was built in the first place. 
Katzesnstein did not deal with the possible existence of countertendencies to the 
ideal type of small open economy on which his research is based.  Some 
countertendencies are present in each country.  For example, there is a strong liberal 
influence in Danish society going back to the Grundtvigian movement; Finland has a 
model of democratic corporatism which for historical reasons is based on 
asymmetrical power constellations and yet is vested with more legitimacy than the 
parliamentary system; the Dutch consociational system is based on unique religious 
and political cleavages but gives unions a much higher level of influence than their 
membership levels would suggest.  Although countertendencies did not interest 
Katzenstein it appears that the democratic corporatism he described is capable of 
dealing with them.  On a less encouraging note one would be less certain about its 
capacity to accommodate new emerging cleavages in society such as arising from 
immigration and demographic change. 
For a period during the 1990s Ireland appeared to converge with the other 
comparator countries, achieving as good or better employment and economic 
outcomes.  The developmentalism driving the convergence was not sustained.   
Figure 14 seeks to capture this trajectory of convergence and divergence over the full 
periodisation (1987-2013) and align it both with critical junctures of European 
integration and the interpretation of Ireland’s performance by elements of the 
international business press.  Chapter 7 is dedicated to a forensic analysis of the Irish 
polity and the countertendencies which differentiate it from an ideal type liberal 
market economy in an effort to expose factors contributing to this lack of 
sustainability.  Nor does the country have an embedded institutional framework of 
democratic corporatism going back to the 1930s as is the case with the others.  For 
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reasons explained in the next section it is imperative to recapture that 
developmentalism and to make another attempt at convergence especially in the 
context of what European integration will mean in a post crisis scenario. 
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Figure 14: Katzenstein’s World Changes. Small open economies grapple with Pressures of European 
Integration  
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Futures and How to Construct Them 
 
i. Europe – Dilemmas, Trilemmas and Repertoires of Action 
Europe in the autumn of 2013 was not in a particularly good space.  Unemployment 
across the Eurozone averaged 12 per cent.  Gross domestic product in the second 
quarter of the year was 3 per cent below its pre-crisis trend.  The peripheral countries 
remained fragile.  All were heading for public debt levels in excess of 100 per cent 
of GDP.  Several countries were close to deflation, running the risk of increasing 
their debt burden even more.  The ECB’s stated intention in mid-2012 to be willing 
to intervene in bond markets to prevent unwarranted increases in sovereign bond 
yields did succeed in calming markets and generally worries about the future of the 
Euro area appeared to recede.  Yet the Euro crisis could still be revived again by any 
one of several events: a banking crisis, another slump, a political backlash or 
interventions by the German constitutional court (Donovan and Murphy, 2013; The 
Economist September 28
th
, 2013; Wolf, 2013a). 
 
The approach of the newly elected German government was spelled out by the 
Finance Minister in a Financial Times article (Schauble, 2013).  He made it clear 
that the approach adopted in Germany - deflationary austerity – would continue to 
inform Germany’s input to the Eurozone crisis.  This was strongly criticised a few 
days later in the Irish Times by Martin Wolf who observed that Dr Schauble’s 
refusal to accept any role for domestic demand in his analysis meant that Eurozone 
policy would fail, explaining that: 
 
‘But it also will not work, for two reasons.  First the Eurozone is far too big to 
achieve export-led growth, as Germany has done.  Second, the currency is likely 
to appreciate  still further, thereby squeezing the less competitive economies all 
over again’. 
 (Wolf, 2013b:16) 
 
Adherence to its current policy line by Germany ultimately poses a dilemma for 
Europe.  Donovan and Murphy (2013:286) make the point that the debt burden of 
the Euro area is unsustainable for many of the individual countries.  Given that there 
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is a limit to the extent of fiscal adjustment that can be insisted upon, some way of 
dealing with the debt will have to be found.  If creditor countries are unwilling to 
foot the bill via debt write offs, fiscal transfers or large-scale interventions in 
sovereign bond markets, then higher inflation could end up as part of the solution. 
Basically this would involve the ECB quietly abandoning its 2 per cent target to 
allow debt levels to be floated down over time.  It is hard to see this being more 
acceptable to Germans than Dr Schauble’s current line but debt levels pose a 
dilemma which will have to be resolved at some stage. 
 
An associated dilemma is the imbalances within the European economy. Germany 
can hardly expect peripheral countries to cut their current account deficits while 
maintaining its own surplus. As Wolf (2013 b) further points out, a large country 
with a huge structural current account surplus does not just export products.  It also 
exports bankruptcy and unemployment, particularly if the counterpart capital flow 
consists of short-term debt.  It is clear from the interviews conducted for this 
research that business in the creditor countries is not inclined to allow its 
competitive position to deteriorate in order to contribute to a correction of 
imbalances. 
 
Herein lies a fault line at the heart of EU decision making which is likely to mean 
that a solution to the current crisis will remain elusive. Fritz Scharpf (1999:74) 
points to the probability of policy initiatives being blocked at the Council of 
Ministers increasing exponentially with the number of veto positions associated with 
unanimous or qualified majority voting.  He cites the ‘Coase Theorem’ in support of 
the proposition that, in principle at least, negotiations will allow the participating 
parties to realise all outcomes that are Pareto-superior to the status quo (Coase, 
1996).   This means that Europe is capable of positive action if, and only if, there is a 
possibility of common gains.  With the Eurozone divided between debtor and 
creditor countries such common gains are increasingly hard to perceive. 
 
The man who designed the Troika programme for Ireland, Ashoka Mody, 
subsequently became one of its strongest critics and a pessimist about the state of 
affairs in Europe.  He broadly endorses the assessment of the Glienicker Group 
which is that: 
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‘None of the fundamental problems underlying the Euro crisis have been solved – 
not the banking crisis, nor the sovereign debt crisis, nor the competitiveness 
crisis.  National debt problems continue to escalate. Banks are overloaded with 
bad loans, crippling the private sector.  In the crisis countries a generation is 
being deprived of their livelihoods  and opportunities.  The margins of the 
political spectrum in these countries are becoming increasingly radicalised and 
willingness to find common solutions for the Euro area appears to be rapidly on 
the wane.  We – eleven German economists, lawyers and political scientists – 
cannot accept the prospect of further playing for time and betting – with ever-
larger wagers – that the crisis will eventually pass.  Europe has structural 
problems that require structural solutions.’ 
 
(Von Bogdandy et al ‘ The Glienicker Group’, 2013: 1). 
 
However, whereas the Glienicker Group favours deeper integration and economic 
Government now, Mody (2013) argues for ‘a decentralised resting stop (which) 
would provide an opportunity to reset, reflect, and plot the best course towards a 
more stable, more integrated Europe’. This approach could be embodied in what he 
describes as ‘ a Schuman Compact for the Euro Area’ providing time and space to 
reinforce the core values that have guided integration for more than sixty years.  He 
warns that continuing to stumble forward could lead to a debilitating, if not fatal, fall 
(Mody, 2013:32).  Of one thing we can be certain: it is impossible to effectively 
manage a monetary union without a fiscal and political union (Hemerijck, 2013:13).   
 
There are other dilemmas to be grappled with by Europe in the medium to long term.   
 
Perhaps the longest standing of these dilemmas is that relating to the ‘Economists’ 
and ‘Monetarists’ debate.  This is an argument about monetary policy being decided 
by an independent central bank or by a system of economic government.  The former 
view is held by Germany and its satellites, the latter by France and the southern 
countries.  The 2008 crisis clearly revealed this dilemma as a fault line in the 
integration project.  One expects that it will finally be decided in the context of a 
move towards political union.  France has never been able to dominate this debate in 
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the way that Germany has.  Having the ECB modelled on the Bundesbank was a 
victory for Germany but the project cannot stand still simply as monetary union.  It is 
meant to be economic and monetary union and even this understates what is at stake.  
Although it has always been presented as an economic project, EMU is clearly a 
political project.  As such European citizens are unlikely to be willing to accept an 
undiluted German perspective on discipline.  This is especially so since EMU is 
constructed in a way that requires the burden of adjustment to a macro-economic 
shock to be borne by workers via internal wage devaluations.  Here again Polanyi has 
insights to offer.  His claim that “laissez-faire was planned” seems to fit EMU.  As 
Fred Block (2001) observes, it requires state craft to impose the logic of the market 
and its attendant risks on ordinary people. 
 
Compounding this dilemma is the fact that the Eurozone is about to embark upon the 
most ambitious phase of economic integration when there was never less support for 
it from EU citizens
92
.  Integration was always the ambition of the elite rather than the 
masses but for most of its 50 year history it could proceed on the basis of a 
permissive consensus. That is not the way it can be after riots in European cities.  
Both the populations of creditor and debtor countries are up in arms, albeit from 
opposite perspectives.  The True Finns in Finland, The Danish Peoples’ Party and 
The Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands  and the Alternative for 
Deutschland (AFD) in Germany are manifestations of Euroscepticism in creditor 
countries.  Golden Dawn, an overtly Nazi Party, is a more sinister manifestation in 
Greece. 
 
Yet another dilemma relates to those countries outside the Eurozone.  The more 
deeply the Eurozone integrates the more obvious a two speed Europe becomes. 
 
Then there is the trilemma of the social service economy (Iversen, 2005; Hemerijck, 
2013).  The concern here is that the shift from an industrial to a service economy, in 
                                                 
92The Pew Research Centre Global Attitudes Project reported in mid-2013 that the European  project now stands 
in disrepute across much of Europe. The favourability of the EU fell from a median of 60 per cent in 2012 to 45 
per cent in 2013.  Interestingly the survey reports strong divergence in public opinion between Germany and 
France with 77 per cent of French people believing that European economic integration has made things worse 
for France.  Whereas, only 43 per cent of Germans took that view. 
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the shadow of accelerating economic internationalisation, makes it impossible for 
welfare states to achieve budgetary restraint, earnings equality, and job growth.  The 
trilemma arises from the idea of having to let go of distributional justice, providing 
full employment or fiscal discipline. 
 
Associated with this trilemma is the prospect of permanently lower growth rates in 
Europe.  This was a particular concern of Wim Kok in his interview because the 
prospect of an increasing aged cohort of the population living longer with chronic 
illness will pose enormous tax challenges for a younger generation.  One solution 
would be to allow increased immigration but this generates its own backlash as 
evidenced by the growth of right wing populist parties referred to above.  
Paradoxically lower growth is a consequence of the reversal of the trajectory of 
financial integration caused by the 2008 crisis
93
 
 
Looking at the growth in support for anti-immigration and Eurosceptic political 
parties across Europe this has the hallmark of Polanyi’s double movement.  It is a 
reaction against an elite project for economic and monetary union, which, in order to 
maintain credibility with markets, imposed the burden of adjustment on citizens.  
The evidence from the interviews conducted is that people who vote for these parties 
are nostalgic for a past which is being eroded. 
 
What it is really necessary to do is to rethink the interaction between economic 
progress and social policy in order to mobilise the productive potential of citizens in 
order to mitigate new kinds of social risk.  It is a space ripe for exploitation by a 
reimagining of social democracy.  As Hemerijck (2013:170) points out the idea that 
sustaining the welfare of an ageing population requires a highly productive labour 
force and high levels of female participation is much more widespread in Nordic 
countries than in any other welfare clusters.  As he states it the key challenge for 
social policy is to make long-term social investment and short-term fiscal 
consolidation mutually supportive, both economically and politically (ibid:375). 
 
                                                 
93 Eurozone banks have reduced cross border lending within the Eurozone by $2.8 trillion since 2007 (David and 
Lund, 2013). 
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The problem is that in trying to get to grips with these challenges Europe is in a kind 
of decision trap.  The further European integration progresses, particularly as led by 
EMU, the more it infringes on the basic rights, provisions, and redistributive 
functions of national welfare states.  Primarily this is because price stability and 
sound fiscal policy are privileged under EMU.  But, because welfare is a domestic 
competence, and because of the great variations in levels of welfare effort across the 
enlarged EU, Members States are unable to collectively further EU social policy 
integration to balance the effect of EMU (ibid).   In order to create the political space 
to build institutions of social policy to balance EMU institutions the Nordic countries 
would have to be willing to surrender their sovereignty over social policy in favour 
of collective EU action.  This is a huge ask given the diversity of social systems 
amongst the 27 member states and the potential for erosion of the Nordic model as a 
result.  It goes to the heart of the question about maintaining Varieties of Capitalism 
in EMU. 
 
What repertoires of action might be available at European level if Member States 
were willing to act?  The most important single action would be to change the remit 
of the ECB to bring it more in line with that of the Federal Reserve Board in the 
United States.  The ECB has an exceptionally strong single mandate of ‘price 
stability’ and with its independence it is not counterbalanced by any other European 
institution.   To all intents and purposes the ECB is not accountable to anyone.  By 
contrast, under the Humphrey Hawkins Act of 1978, the FED is required to take on 
board the government’s economic goals including achieving economic growth near 
potential combined with ‘reasonable price stability’. Changing the remit of the ECB 
would require the unanimous agreement of member states which is a high 
benchmark.  Without that, however, it is difficult to conceive of any institutional 
arrangement to balance the priority given to inflation.  Without easing up on the 
inflation target of 2 per cent it is difficult to see how the Eurozone economy can be 
reflated.  Without reflation it is difficult to see how 25 million unemployed people 
can be helped. 
 
Another requirement is the creation of a Banking Union with proper bank resolution 
processes, deposit guarantee insurance and mutualisation of debt requires only the 
political will to do it.  A Fiscal Union would pose particular challenges to Ireland 
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because of its current attitude to corporation tax yet it is difficult to see how tax 
competition could be allowed to continue.  The bottom line is that Europe’s  banks 
need to be fixed because firms in peripheral economies are still facing crippling 
borrowing costs.  Here again Germany is key because it wants to exclude its smaller 
banks from the system of banking supervision and resolution (The Economist, 26
th
 
October, 2013). 
 
Over time Europe needs to become a joint coordinated market economy with the 
ECB acting as a lender of last resort.  This implies also the coordination of industrial 
policy to eliminate the imbalances between the core and the periphery.  It should also 
be able to legislate to ensure that supply chains do not result in higher prices for 
goods in one country than in another.  For example, it is hard to understand why, 
after five years of recession, the cost of living in Ireland is still 17 per cent above the 
EU average. 
 
Most immediately though the challenges for Europe is to achieve the escape velocity 
to get out of recession.  This requires growth. Sean O’Riain (2014, forthcoming) 
argues that the policy mix in Europe is wrong.  Whereas the US is practicing a 
mixture of Keynesian demand management with efforts to boost private sector 
confidence, and the Nordics complement fiscal consolidation with public investment 
in infrastructure, the EU has the worst of both worlds; fiscal consolidation and an 
expectation that same will restore confidence.  It is a variation of the notion of 
expansionary fiscal contraction, which in reality is an economic oxymoron (see also 
Blyth, 2013).  O’Riain (ibid) suggests, as a practical solution to the ideological 
contestation inherent in this argument, combining fiscal consolidation with public 
investment at a European level.  His views resonate with those of Anton Hemerijck 
(2013:22) who argues that the key challenge is to make long-term social investment 
and short-term fiscal consolidation mutually supportive at both EU and member state 
levels. 
 
ii. Recapturing the Developmentalism of the 1990s 
It is clear from the previous section that Ireland’s future is highly contingent on 
whatever policy is adopted at EU level.  Indeed it is important to be realistic about 
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how constrained the available policy space actually is.  In Chapter 7 it was outlined 
how the institutional architecture of EMU is constructed on ideas emanating from 
new classical macroeconomics (NMC) and efficient markets hypothesis (EMH).  
Despite the many weaknesses exposed during the financial crisis it is clear that 
German policy towards Europe as explained in The Financial Times by the Finance 
Minister, Wolfgang Schauble, (17
th
 September, 2013:13) remains consistent with 
this paradigm.  
 
Moreover, Fritz Scharpf (1991 and 1999) has written extensively about the obstacles 
encountered by social democratic governments attempting to use Keynesian demand 
management strategies to achieve full employment.  Whereas Nordic countries have 
tried to get around these obstacles by using active labour market policies (ALMPs), 
German Social Democrats have tried to deal with unemployment by reducing the 
labour supply rather than promoting employment.  Thus Scharpf  (1999:192) 
remarks that there is no single type of non-Anglo-Saxon ‘welfare capitalism’ or 
’European social model’ which could be adopted for the EU if only the political 
support could be harnessed for it.  Instead he posits that there are diverse, 
historically contingent, and complex national solutions, deeply embedded in the 
institutions, values and established practices of specific societies – constantly 
evolving and changing, it is true, but capable of changing only in path dependent 
ways if change is to be distinguished from dismantling. 
 
The essence of Scharpf’s argument is that EMU enforces a strict division of 
responsibilities which directly cuts through national policy autonomy.  This bereaves 
Member States of any effective macro-economic instruments and problems are thus 
largely left to wage policies. 
 
Also writing from a social democratic perspective Olaf Cramme (2013) argues that 
restricted policy space is a reality of the modern world that has to be engaged with.  
It is not simply a product of economic integration but a consequence of increased 
debt and deficit financing in circumstances of low growth compounded by a need for 
increased social investment to meet the needs of an ageing demographic. He argues  
that opting out from EMU would be unlikely to significantly improve the policy 
space as the debt burden cannot be wished away.  Moreover, he argues that the large 
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majority of citizens have accommodated to these constraints although less well-off 
people are being pushed towards the margins of politics by virtue of feeling 
unrepresented by the mainstream parties.  Cramme (ibid) holds that the left-right 
axis of political contestation remains the central frame in European politics but 
nowadays competes with a new mainstream versus populism cleavage.  
 
This is a fairly accurate depiction of what is happening in each of the comparator 
countries.  The fringe parties – The Finns in Finland, The Party for Freedom in the 
Netherlands, The Danish Peoples’ Party and Sinn Féin in Ireland – are enjoying 
considerable support mainly on the back of opposition to austerity and to the EU.    
However, Eoin O’Malley (2008) points out that these so called ‘Radical Right’ 
parties are often quite dissimilar. Sinn Féin is in fact a left-wing party which, by 
virtue of its radical nationalism and anti-establishment position, might be attractive 
to the type of voter who in another country, with a different nationalist past, might 
support a radical right-wing party. 
 
When asked about the impact of the 1789 French Revolution by President Nixon in 
1968, the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, is reported to have replied ‘It’s too early to 
say’. This may be the most appropriate response in relation to the Irish case too 
because, for all the reasons set out above, what happens to Ireland is highly 
contingent on what happens in Europe.  The most critical phase of EU integration is 
yet to come and the Irish case is hugely complicated by its close relationship with 
Britain and that country’s future in Europe is, to say the least of it, somewhat 
uncertain just now. 
 
However, Donovan and Murphy (2013:291) draw attention to some positive 
achievements. Although there can be little doubt about the costs of the financial 
crisis and the damage to society the impact has not been as great as in other 
peripheral countries.  The economy and the people appear to be more resilient.  
Many positive elements of the Celtic Tiger period remain intact.  Ireland still ranks 
highly in GDP per capita in the global economy and the MNC sector remains intact, 
which is important given its role in driving the economy forward in the 1990s.  It has 
shown further signs of growth in areas such as social media technology.  NESC 
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(2013) concurs with this analysis noting that foreign direct investment into Ireland 
has held up well with employment in IDA Ireland companies returning to pre-crisis 
levels of 150,000.  Moreover, the rate of unemployment fell from a peak of 15.1 per 
cent in the first quarter of 2012 to 13.9 per cent in the second quarter of 2013.   
 
However, NESC (ibid) offers a highly qualified assessment overall.  It observes that 
while there has been some progress recovery has been limited.  In a comparative 
perspective Ireland’s initial recovery is considerably weaker than that experienced by 
Finland following its financial crisis in the early 1990s.  By this stage of economic 
recovery Finland had experienced recovery of domestic demand in contrast with the 
extended decline in Ireland.  According to NESC: 
 
‘This underlines the unusual scale and complexity of Ireland’s crisis, the fragility 
of the international economy compared to the early 1990s and the policy and 
institutional challenges which confront Irish society.’ 
 (NESC, 2013:11) 
In truth the jury on Ireland may be out for some time yet and it may be more 
productive to seek to identify the repertoires of action that could propel Ireland 
towards a more sustainable long term future, albeit acknowledging the limited policy 
space available.  That means, inter alia, finding the means to recapture the 
developmentalism of the 1990s. 
 
First of all, however, there are two related dilemmas for Ireland which should inform 
any policy choice.  Neither features to any extent currently in political discourse 
about the future. 
 
The first concerns Ireland’s foreign policy and its relationship with Britain in 
particular.  Operating a multi-interface periphery foreign policy as described by 
Ruane (2010) becomes more difficult in circumstances where completion of the 
EMU architecture involves eventually moving towards a fiscal, banking and perhaps 
eventually, social and political union.  To be sure there are dilemmas for Europe 
(described in the previous section) which could impede progress towards this goal.  It 
is true too that, as the Economist Intelligence Unit and Governor Honohan of the 
Central Bank  warn, there is still an outside possibility that the Eurozone could 
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dissolve  in the medium term (EIU Country Report for the Netherlands, June 2013:9; 
interview, 31
st
 October, 2013).  Nevertheless, at this stage of the crisis it is prudent to 
base policy on a working assumption that this will not happen because to do 
otherwise would lead to paralysis.  But with Britain distancing itself further from the 
EU, and given that Britain is acknowledged as Ireland’s principal ally in Europe, 
how should Ireland deport itself in the Eurozone?  Should not Ireland try to build 
alliances with the other small open economies to try to balance the dominance of 
Germany in circumstances where intergovernmentalism is now the principal means 
of policy making?  In the past small countries, like Ireland and Finland as we have 
seen, relied on the Commission for fairness.  Ireland indeed did so to a fault.  
However, while the other small countries looked at in this research are all 
strategically important to Germany, Ireland is not.  But it is Britain’s sixth largest 
trading partner. 
 
Yet there seems to be little choice but for Ireland to make the best of its involvement 
with the Eurozone.  As Donovan and Murphy (2013:23) point out, by deciding to 
join the ERM as far back as 1978, Ireland had effectively anchored its currency in 
the Deutschmark (DM) block.  It was always hoped that Britain would eventually 
stay the course with Europe but as Martin O’Donohue explained in his interview 
(22
nd
  November, 2011), based on his experience of British politicians, this was the 
triumph of hope over experience.  If anything Britain is today more semi-detached 
from Europe than ever.  The Tory Party is congenitally Eurosceptic and it has the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) snapping at its heels. Moreover, the 
press and public also seem to be firmly Eurosceptic.  However, Britain will always 
be important to Europe, not just because it is one of the largest economies, but 
because of the role of the City of London.  Without the City the Euro will perhaps 
struggle to assert itself as an alternative pole of currency to the Dollar and the Yen 
(Talani, 2000).  Jonathan Powell (2014) points to the potentially dysfunctional 
economic relationship that could affect the British Isles specifically if Scotland were 
to vote for independence from Britain in September, 2014 and Britain was 
subsequently to leave the EU.  A patchwork quilt of EU membership could result in 
the imposition of border controls in what is now a common travel area.  It is possible, 
of course, that Ireland may be able to redefine its multi-interface peripheral foreign 
policy to carve out a role as an intermediary between Britain and the US and Europe 
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by leveraging its cultural, linguistic and economic links with them all, as Honohan 
puts it, ‘to become the Hong Kong of Europe’ (interview, 31st October, 2013).  One 
suspects that this will only be possible in the context of an unequivocal commitment 
to Europe. 
 
This brings us to the related dilemma; what would an unequivocal commitment to 
Europe imply in terms of the polity of the country, given that it is considered to be 
part of the Liberal Market Economy (LME) group of countries?  It seems hardly 
likely that Ireland could maintain a position as the sole LME within a social market 
economy group of countries.  One would expect convergence pressures to force 
Ireland to realign its polity such that the countertendencies identified by some 
authors (Smith, 2005; O’Riain, 2004 & 2008) would become mainstream, so to 
speak.  As can be seen from Figure 15 the plan for Ireland’s recovery worked out 
with the EU/ECB/IMF Troika sees tax revenue and public expenditure return to its 
pre-crisis trajectory – well adrift of the EU average.  This is hardly sustainable in a 
more deeply integrated Eurozone.  Not just that, but fiscal convergence would 
require Irish people to be weaned away from their addiction to low taxes and low 
public spending.  The same would apply to corporation tax.  Colin Hay’s (2004) 
observations that common trajectories followed at different paces in a path-
dependent world invariably lead to divergent, not convergent, outcomes may be 
tested in the Irish case.   
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Figure 15: General government revenue and expenditure: Ireland and EU 27 
 
 
Source:  NERI Quarterly Economic Facts, December, 2013 www.nerinstitute.net  
 
Taking the foregoing as a context there are a number of repertoires of action which 
can be identified to help Ireland cope with the dilemmas it confronts and propel it 
towards a more sustainable future. 
 
The first repertoire of action must deal with the intellectual failure that has 
characterised Ireland’s development and its engagement with the European 
integration project.  Of course it is not possible to legislate to make people more 
strategic or more responsible in their thinking and actions.  But institutional reform 
can help to ensure that policy making is, as far as possible, evidence based and 
inclusive.  Towards the end of their recently published book on Ireland, Donovan and 
Murphy (2013: 290) opine that what has happened in Ireland is the by-product of a 
small country where personal and professional relationships are built up over many 
years and sharp disagreements tend to be avoided.  Pointing out that this is not 
inevitable based on the experience of other small countries they argue that a 
constructive and important step would be for Ireland to study closely the policy – and 
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decision – making processes of countries similar in size in order to identify what 
lessons might be drawn.  This is what this thesis tries to do. 
 
Starting with the political system, the Varieties of Capitalism literature beginning 
with Katzenstein (1985) lays stress on the importance of proportional representation 
electoral systems in creating consensus democracies, whose merits over majoritarian 
systems are detailed by Lijphart (1999).  Ireland has a PR system but it is bolted on 
to a Westminster majoritarian system.  As in so many other things Ireland is neither 
fish nor flesh – neither wholly consensus democracy nor wholly majoritarian 
democracy.  In Lijpharts ‘two dimensional conceptual map of democracy’ Ireland is 
exactly on the border line between both systems (ibid:  Chapter 14).  A number of 
authors (Kirby and Murphy, 2008; Paus, 2012) have drawn attention to the 
propensity for populist politics which arise from this situation.  Candidates from the 
same party compete with one another in multi-seat constituencies minimising what 
they have in common (as distinct from other parties) and emphasising their ability to 
work for local issues.  Thus localism trumps over ideology and the candidate’s 
potential as a legislator.  Taken in conjunction with the historical dominance of 
nationalism over class interests this means that Irish politics and electoral systems 
are fundamentally different from those of the comparator countries.  An effort at 
political reform was tried in October 2013 but rejected in a constitutional 
referendum.  It was a proposal to abolish the Senate, or Upper House of Parliament,  
but was pursued on no sounder basis than a whimsical idea of the Taoiseach.  It was 
not a proposal rooted in any serious plan for political reform. The introduction of a 
list system alongside the existing multi-seat PR electoral arrangement occurs to this 
author as being the simplest way to get over the problems identified earlier.  The 
rejection of the referendum may mean that the Senate will be reformed to give it a 
more active role in scrutinising European issues, which, as the evidence has revealed, 
is a major lacuna in the Irish system.  Ireland needs to engage in a serious debate 
with other countries on the future of Europe.  Ruth Barrington in her interview (9
th
 
January, 2012) made the point that she could not recall any major speech on Europe 
by any Irish politician.  For far too long Ireland’s only concern was to work the 
system to extract as much by way of structural funds and agricultural support as 
possible.  That was bad self-defeating politics. 
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Intellectual failure is evident too where one would least expect to find it – in the 
universities.  Donovan and Murphy (2013:153) remark that the intellectual strands of 
thinking associated with new classical macro-economics and efficient markets 
hypothesis were reflected in the research priorities of academia where 
macroeconomics in general, and financial stability issues in particular, received 
progressively less attention.  It is to be hoped that the emergence of more social 
democratic research institutes like TASC and the trade union financed Nevin 
Economic Research Institute (NERI) will stimulate a more heterogeneous research 
environment.  
 
At a societal level Ireland will have to fully rehabilitate Social Partnership.  It may, 
and perhaps should be, a different model, but without a national central bank 
deciding monetary policy and within a fiscal union the levers to influence pay policy 
available to government are non-existent.   Yet Irish workers will be expected to 
behave as Finns, Danes and Dutch do, looking to Germany for guidance.  Unless 
there is an appropriate institutional architecture of the labour market to mediate 
signals from the ECB to the workforce then no coordination can happen.  By early 
2013 there was no significant wage pressure in the system but if the economy begins 
to recover in two or three years by then there will have been almost ten years of pent 
up wage pressure.  In circumstances of tighter labour markets this pressure could 
explode into a series of individual industry pay demands potentially cutting off any 
putative recovery before it begins
94
.   This problem could be compounded by the 
obsolescence of institutionalised wage bargaining skills in both unions and firms. 
In the absence of Social Partnership there is a danger that the National Economic and 
Social Council (NESC) could become a stranded asset.  If there is no obvious forum 
for its output to feed into then it will be hard to maintain the enthusiasm of its 
members and staff.  By early 2013 it has become clear that many organisations and 
government departments are not sending their most senior representatives to Council 
meetings.  Similarly if there is no reconstitution of, or replacement body for, the 
National Implementation Body (NIB) then there will be no forum in which unions 
and business can discuss issues particular to the labour market e.g. pension’s reform.  
Absent these institutions, working effectively and with the respect and trust of 
                                                 
94 This is a matter discussed in general terms (not specifically for Ireland) by Crouch (2000:211). 
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relevant societal actors, Ireland has no means of establishing a consensus about the 
common good for the future.   Specifically, there will be no way to construct a post-
bailout distributional settlement. 
 
Restructuring of the institutions of labour market actors also needs to be considered.  
Continuing with 48 trade unions – as many as in Britain – for a working population 
of 1.8 million makes no sense.  Moreover, some trade unions are headquartered in 
the UK and tend to be influenced by quite different policy drivers than their Irish 
counterparts e.g. in relation to incomes policy.  Again this could become a more 
acute problem in the event of British disengagement from Europe.   Changing this 
situation sounds logical and sensible but it is as a well to remember that, as recounted 
by Peter Murray (2009, Chapter 5) and Emmet OConnor (2011),  the role of UK and 
Irish based trade unions straddles a fault line which caused a serious trade union rift 
in the 1930s  and 1940s.  Consolidating the trade union movement is a necessary but 
challenging project.  
 
The Nevin Economic Research Institute (NERI) has pointed out that when Ireland 
eventually exits the EU/ECB/IMF bailout agreement the profile of its tax and 
spending will return to pre-crisis patterns in percentage terms.  This places the 
country towards the bottom of the EU 27 member states (NERI, 2013). The world is 
going through a paradigm shift involving low growth, high public debt, an ageing 
demographic and a significant challenge to social investment to maintain welfare 
states (Hemerijck, 2013). A return to business as usual is not sustainable in this 
context.  Moreover, Ireland has to reconstruct its tax base because of its 
overdependence on property related transaction taxes.  The goal of policy should be 
to move towards the tax and public spending profiles of other Eurozone members.  
This would be a very significant policy shift requiring a parallel distributional 
accord.  It would bring to the fore issues around the taxation of people earning below 
the minimum wage and in receipt of welfare benefits. Broadening of the tax base in 
this direction would have to be balanced by the minimisation of tax expenditure 
(reliefs) at the corporate and higher end of the socio-economic spectrum. Serious tax 
reform challenges some very fundamental aspects of Irish society e.g. the extent to 
which the State intervenes to support the existing class structure as posited by 
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O’Riain (2008).  Yet this is a necessary and inevitable adjustment in the context of 
building a sustainable economy and society in a more deeply integrated Europe.     
 
Ireland also needs to rebalance its economy in a number of respects.  Its 
manufacturing base is the mirror image of Denmark and Finland to a lesser extent.  
Ireland badly needs to increase the strength of its indigenous industrial base.  An 
overreliance on US FDI attracted by low corporate tax rates does not look to be 
sustainable in a fiscal union.  Charlie McCreevy tacitly acknowledged this in his 
interview (15
th
 May, 2012) when observing that ultimately this is likely to be 
resolved through the common consolidated tax base. Moreover, if Britain does 
disengage from the EU to any significant extent it is likely to become a more 
aggressive competitor for investment based on a combination of lower corporate 
taxes and lighter regulation (O’Ceallaigh and Kilcourse, 2013).  Ireland needs to 
begin to consider industrial policy in a European context.  Up to now it has seen 
itself mainly as a gateway to the Single Market for US MNCs.  But the Eurozone 
itself will have to rebalance to smooth out current account deficits and surpluses and 
Ireland will surely be expected to fit in with this.  Obviously it will be necessary to 
plan for construction accounting for 8-9 per cent of employment not 15 per cent as 
happened during the boom. There are aspects of banking, specifically the role of 
foreign banks, which have not yet been resolved.  Most of these are from the UK 
which could pose a complication in the event of a banking union within the 
Eurozone.  While the IDA continues to be successful in attracting FDI, its equivalent 
for indigenous industry, Enterprise Ireland, needs to grow to at least parity of esteem 
and develop a narrative for its mission which is not in the shadow of the IDA.    
Availability of credit is crucial for indigenous SMEs who do  not have access to 
capital markets.  A state owned Strategic Investment Bank similar to the Industrial 
Credit Corporation (ICC) of past times is a pre-requisite to creating a strong 
indigenous industrial base, particularly in circumstances of a shrinking banking 
sector.   Creating innovative indigenous firms should be the cornerstone of industrial 
strategy as pointed out in a recent TASC publication (Jacobson, 2013).   
 
Although the demographic profile of Ireland is more favourable than that of the 
comparator countries there is a danger that structural unemployment, running at over 
60 per cent of the total in 2013, could constitute a long term social welfare revenue 
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drain and impediment to recovery (Fitzgerald & Kearney, 2013).  During a recession 
active and passive welfare measures tend to merge (Puntusson, 2005) so it is 
imperative that economic recovery is accompanied by strong activation measures lest 
a cohort of the population be trapped in long term unemployment. 
 
But bearing in mind the Danish experience of the 1990s that ALMPs are not 
effective where unemployment exceeds 12 per cent (Lykketoft, 2009) more 
immediately an initiative to create employment is necessary.  Kirby (2010) has 
drawn attention to a suggestion for a slower pace of fiscal consolidation aimed at 
giving growth an opportunity to do some of the heavy lifting of adjustment proposed 
by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU).  In its pre-budget submission for 
2014, ICTU also proposed the creation of an investment fund of €4.5 billion for 
infrastructure based on a paper by Victor Duggan (2013).  For reasons already 
explained the policy space for a traditional Keynesian response at national level has 
been circumscribed by EMU.  However, it is possible, using money from the 
National Pensions Reserve Fund, private pension funds (€73 billion in total) and 
various combinations of public-private partnerships, to raise money which can be 
leveraged via the European Investment Bank (EIB). The ICTU argues that 
investment in infrastructure, taking into account multiplier effects, could create up to 
40,000 jobs.  This would be of great assistance to the army of construction workers 
made redundant since 2008.  It would increase confidence in the economy and 
generate growth because spending power would increase domestic demand.  It would 
also improve competitiveness by improving Ireland’s infrastructure which does not 
rate well by international standards.  It is an approach which compliments Sean 
O’Riain’s (2014 forthcoming) proposal for a change in the policy mix at Eurozone 
level to allow for public investment to balance fiscal consolidation. 
 
Finally, Ireland needs to develop a land use policy faithful to the principles enshrined 
in the unimplemented 1974 Kenny Report.  Land speculation must never again be 
allowed to drive a property bubble.  Kenny proposed restricting the premium on land 
sold for building to 1.25 times its agricultural value.  Ireland is a small island and 
land is a finite resource.  Its proper use is also important for environmental reasons as 
evidenced by the damage caused by developers building on flood plains during the 
boom.  This is a matter in which we encounter Polanyi’s thesis about fictitious 
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commodities.  Land is not a commodity, it is a public good in the sense that 
governments need to play an active role in managing markets and that role requires 
political decision making; it cannot be reduced to some kind of technical or 
administrative function. 
 
These issues – institutional reform, industrial rebalancing, tax base reconstruction 
and land use policy – are interconnected.  Institutional reform can create conditions 
for a consensus democracy and potentially a Danish approach to a negotiated 
economy via a rejuvenated Social Partnership.  This in turn can create the climate for 
a distributional settlement which can accommodate broadening of the tax base.  The 
distributional settlement can be underpinned in return by social investment. Social 
investment can be supported by higher levels of labour force participation made 
possible by improved competitiveness generated by infrastructural investment and a 
stable industrial relations climate which should continue to attract inward investment. 
Gradually industrial policy, aided by institutional coherence at agency level, should 
facilitate a strengthening of indigenous industry to leave the country less vulnerable 
to tax competition.  Controlling land prices should provide protection against house 
prices pushing up wages and undermining competitiveness.  Most importantly these 
initiatives could allow for a return to the developmentalism of the 1990s by 
recapturing the capabilities which created conditions for the most sustainable era of 
development in Ireland’s history.  In other words, Ireland could definitely be a 
developmental network state of the nature described by O’Riain (2008). 
 
It boils down to this; if one accepts that Ireland cannot afford to revert to the 
speculative and unsustainable trajectory it was on pre-crisis, then the logical course is 
to try to recapture the developmentalism of the 1990s – the period when Ireland 
appeared to converge with the other small open economies of Northern Europe. This 
means reconnecting with the unfinished work of Mjoset (1992) and with the 
democratic corporatism of Katzenstein (1985).   
 
The foregoing is intended as simply an outline of the broad parameters of a plan for 
Ireland’s future development model or political economy.  What is needed is to 
mould these parameters into a comprehensive medium to long term plan for the post 
Troika era by emulating the way the Swedish LO Economists, Gösta Rehn and 
335 
 
Rudolf Meidner, created a development model for Sweden in the 1950s and which 
ultimately shaped the acclaimed Nordic model.  The circumstances of today’s world 
are very different, and there is less policy space in which to manoeuvre, but a plan  is 
essential all the same.  Why?  Well because of what Zygmunt Bauman (2013), 
referred to as Imaginaire.  Imaginaire is in other words how we imagine the world 
order, what the conditions for our actions are, and for what values it is worth 
struggling or, if necessary, make a sacrifice. Bauman (ibid) laments that the neo-
liberal world view still dominates policy thinking even though its ideology is in 
crisis.  As he puts it: 
 
‘The misfortune of today’s social democracy is that there is no alternative vision.  
Chancellor Schroder has gone down in history with his remark that there is no 
capitalist or socialist economy, there is only good or bad economy.  It is as if we 
had thrown in the towel:  “I give in, I have nothing to say”…. there was no 
thought here of this semi-bankrupt bourgeois imaginaire.’ 
 
(Bauman, 2013:4) 
 
This is challenging for Ireland because it is such an outlier relative to the comparator 
countries.  It has no strong tradition of social democracy nor is an ‘ideology of Social 
Partnership’ embedded as explained by Katzenstein (1985:35) in ‘distinctive political 
structures and practices’ for resolving distributional conflict going back to the 1930s.  
The democratic programme of the first Dáil in 1919, authored by the leader of the 
Labour Party, Thomas Johnson (assisted by William O’Brien and Cathal O’Shannon 
of the Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union), was probably the only occasion 
when a social democratic polity was seriously considered in Ireland.  Thereafter 
nationalism dominated politics (Yeates, 2011:298).
9596
  Nevertheless, the shock 
                                                 
95 It is intriguing to speculate what might have happened if Labour and Fianna Fáil had remained in government 
under Bertie Ahern’s leadership in 1994. Ahern is a Social Democrat who considers himself to be to the left of 
Labour (interview, 13th January, 2012).  Ireland might have had its own version of a red-green alliance. 
96
 The catalyst for the Democratic Programme was an international Socialist conference in Berne. Sinn Féin 
were interested in this conference as a possible support for Ireland’s case for independence.  To promote their 
cause at Berne they thought of formulating, with Labour, a Democratic Programme, a strong statement of the 
social and economic aims of the new state.  However, some members of Sinn Féin were uneasy about the 
‘Communist’ flavour of the document and spoke to William O’Brien about it.  How O’Brien responded is not 
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imparted to the national psychology following the collapse of the Celtic Tiger must 
allow for consideration of new ideas if only they can be presented in a credible 
narrative about the future of the country in Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the end of September, 2013, Ireland’s economy was becalmed, bouncing along 
the bottom and lacking the escape velocity to effect a convincing recovery.  Its 
future is highly contingent on EU policy which reflects a dogged German adherence 
to deflation and austerity, a policy supported by a handful of donor countries too.  
This accords priority to stabilising national budgets at the expense of welfare 
systems, public services and collective goods (Harbermas, 2013). Debt, both public 
and private, weighs heavily on Ireland’s efforts to extract itself from the depression 
into which it has sunk.  The immediate focus of government policy is to exit the 
bailout agreement with the EU/ECB/IMF Troika by the end of 2013. Austerity as  a 
policy has been undermined by its own failure and even at an intellectual level by 
IMF error admissions concerning multiplier effects and in respect of debt 
sustainability levels assumed in influential work by Harvard economists Rogoff and 
Reinhart (Blyth, 2013; The Economist 4
th
 May, 2013). Austerity is implemented in 
the so called programme countries by ‘The Troika’, an apparently socially 
indifferent technocracy of zealous neo-liberal persuasion. This technocracy operates 
as it does because Germany imposes its will, not by action, but by studied inaction 
(Beck, 2013; The Economist  28
th
 September, 2013). We are at a critical juncture 
which brings to mind Gramsci’s definition of a crisis as a situation which, ‘consists 
precisely in the fact that the old order is dying and the new cannot be born.’ 
 
(Gramsci, 1998) 
 
The Varieties of Capitalism practiced in the comparator countries are quite different 
to Ireland.  They are classified as social market economies in the literature and the 
Nordic version has a distinct emphasis on universal and publicly provided public 
                                                                                                                                                        
recorded but the degree of serious committtment by Sinn Féin to the Democratic Programme needs to be 
evaluated in this context (Morrissey, 2007: 162) 
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services, high labour force participation and high productivity industries.  The 
Netherlands is classified as part of a continental Christian democratic type of social 
market economy, yet close to the Nordic model.  All have engaged with challenging 
economic conditions over the last twenty five years, have reformed labour market 
and welfare systems but have preserved the core values of their societies.  Ireland is 
classified as a liberal market economy, the only one of its kind in the Eurozone.  
Such countertendencies as were evident in the developmentalism of the 1990s have 
been almost extinguished by the speculative excesses of the 2000s and the post-crisis 
imposition of austerity policies. 
 
European integration has dominated public policy choices and this is particularly the 
case with EMU.  Further integration of the Eurozone seems inevitable and this poses 
dilemmas and trilemmas as outlined above.  It is unlikely in the circumstances to be a 
smooth passage.  Not least of the problems for the comparator countries will be 
preserving their national systems against the liberalising emphasis of negative 
integration and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).    It is 
possible, of course, that some accommodation in an institutional sense will be made 
to balance the power of the ECB but having tried and failed with the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005 politicians may find this challenging.  The question is will there be 
convergence on just one variety of capitalism and to what extent will the European 
authorities and governments respond to evidence of a ‘Double Movement’ in the 
form of populist politics? 
 
Wolfgang Streeck (2014) considers that Europe is on the road to a ‘consolidation 
state’ governed by a one size fits all authoritarian neo-liberalism, a political 
jurisdiction close to the ideal of a market economy freed from politics by politics 
itself.  He argues that by surrendering the right to their own currencies, and with it 
the option of devaluation to protect their citizens’ economic situation, European 
countries have been party to what Polanyi called ‘planned Laissez-Faire’ (Polanyi, 
1944: Chapter 12).  Streeck (2014) argues that four decades of neo-liberal progress 
have left Europe in a space where democracy and social justice are contesting with 
market justice. The main task of democratic politics should be to reverse the 
institutional devastation wrought by neo-liberal convergence. Democratisation 
should mean building institutions through which markets can be brought back under 
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the control of society:  labour markets that leave scope for social life, product 
markets that do not destroy nature, credit markets that do not mass-produce 
unsustainable promises.  He makes the case for a new type of European Monetary 
System based on Keynes’ ideas for the Bretton Woods regime with its fixed but 
adjustable exchange rates.  The Euro would not necessarily have to be abolished; it 
could remain as a non-national anchor currency alongside national currencies, rather 
like the artificial currency called Bancor proposed by Keynes. Streeck also believes 
there is evidence of a Polyanyian double movement but that authoritarian champions 
of neo-liberal reform, such as Wolfgang Schauble of Germany, will simply respond 
with more of the same ‘reforms’.  Streeck’s is a bleak assessment of the future. 
 
In the ninety years or so since independence Ireland has looked into the abyss of 
economic destruction four times.  The first was in the 1930s when de Valera took 
over and moved policy from agricultural laissez faire to import substitution 
industrialisation.  The second was in the 1950s when Lemass and Whitaker reversed 
course towards export orientated industrialisation and ultimate membership of the 
EEC.  The third time was 1987 when a combination of the Single European Act, two 
devaluations and Social Partnership took the country off the rocks.  Although it is 
otherwise full of hubris, MacSharry and White’s (2000) account of the Celtic Tiger 
period mentions that in the early 1990s people were wondering whether Ireland was 
a viable economic entity at all.  It was at that time that the National Economic and 
Social Council asked Lars Mjoset (1992) to compare Ireland with other small open 
economies to find out why they were doing so well and Ireland was doing so badly.  
Twenty years on this thesis seeks to explain, using Varieties of Capitalism theory and 
the experience of European integration, why Ireland did so well for so long, before 
succumbing to the 2008 financial crisis in such a catastrophic way. 
 
The conclusion is that Ireland can still build on what was achieved.  All was not lost 
but a new national narrative is needed which assimilates the lessons of the mistakes 
made.  It must also attempt to factor in the enormous challenge associated with 
deepening Eurozone integration coinciding with probable British disengagement.   In 
effect Ireland is at a critical juncture and needs a Rehn-Meidner type model on the 
lines of that constructed by the Swedish LO economists in the 1950s and which 
subsequently shaped the acclaimed Nordic model.  It will not be the same because 
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times, values, cultures, and the circumstances are different. But at the very least, it 
may help to recapture the developmentalism of the 1990s and put the country on a 
trajectory towards a sustainable future.  Without a political vision of where we 
should be headed, we become mere spectators of our own drift. 
 
On a personal note this research has thrown up some aspects which were unexpected.   
Firstly, given their history of tolerance and social cohesion it is surprising that 
Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands have had such a reaction against migration 
flows and the exogenous pressures of European integration.  It is not what one would 
intuitively expect from societies steeped in a tradition of corporatism of the type 
described by Katzenstein (1985) or ‘The Negotiated Economy’ as referred to more 
generally in the Varieties of Capitalism literature for the Nordic countries. For its 
part, the Netherlands has built a model of ‘consociational democracy’ from a society 
historically used to pillarisation. But each has seen the emergence of new, and 
sustained political forces which are, to say the least, considerably to the right of the 
mainstream parties. In my view these forces are likely to be a permanent feature of 
the political landscape and alter the centre of gravity of the polity in the direction of 
Euroscepticism. This will be so because the mainstream parties will struggle to 
respond to the populist appeal of these new parties.  This phenomenon has not really 
been addressed in the existing literature. 
 
A second aspect worth remarking on is that the dog that has not barked since the 
2008 crisis is organised labour.  To be sure there have been many public protests, 
particularly in Southern European countries, and strong advocacy against austerity in 
individual countries and at ETUC level, but nothing comparable with, say, the 
sustained campaign by the Solidarity Union in Poland in the 1980s which was central 
to the regime change.  In circumstances where 26 million people are out of work one 
might have expected more serious challenges to the order.  Scholars like Crouch 
(2011) expect that social movement will emerge as the catalyst for change but more 
or less dismiss organised labour, as indeed do many of those considering the state of 
social democracy (e.g. Cramme and Diamond et al, 2012; Meyer and Hinchman, 
2007; Painter, 2013).   This suggests that a double movement in a Polanyian sense is 
not on the cards.  I do not share these views for a number of reasons.  Social 
movements often have a single issue focus, are not usually mass membership based 
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or have difficulty with financial sustainability.  The Occupy movement came and 
went without leaving an intellectual trace.  By contrast trade unions are primarily 
focussed on the world of work, have a mass membership, have a representational 
status within a legal framework in most countries,  and are organised at national, 
European and global levels. They are incomparably better equipped to be agents of 
change than social movements as suggested by Crouch (2011). On the other hand 
their capacity to effect change depends on mobilising their members. This is 
incredibly difficult to do during a depression where people are fearful of losing their 
jobs, or even their homes if they have mortgages.  It is worth remembering that the 
New Deal in the US did not emerge until 1935, some six years after the Wall Street 
Crash.  My expectation is that the labour reaction will coincide with economic 
recovery.  There could be a number of influences on this e.g. tightening labour 
markets (to some extent associated with demographics), the possibility of a shrinking 
wage gap between advanced economies and emerging economies making 
outsourcing less attractive (See PWC, 2013), and a reaction to, by then, perhaps ten 
years of wage stagnation.  Most importantly, the middle classes are unlikely to 
tolerate the kind of precarious employment relationships that inhibit them from 
buying houses and forming families. The easiest way to rectify these problems is 
through demanding better terms and conditions from employers. So long as trade 
unions remain in existence it is plausible to suggest that they will be eventually the 
vehicle for a Polyanian double movement.  After all that was the experience of 
Europe after World War 11.  The 1950s were a period of stagnant wages as Europe 
was rebuilt but the 1960s saw a wage explosion all over Europe. 
 
A related question is the interconnectedness of demographic trends, the sustainability 
of welfare systems, and labour markets addressed by Anton Hemerijck (2013).   It 
seems to me that this is becoming an increasingly urgent field of study.  The 
cleavages in society potentially arising therefrom would, prima facia, appear to have 
implications for the Varieties of Capitalism discourse. Reform of welfare systems is 
a huge part of the VoC literature but the dilemma of sustaining universal welfare 
services in the face of an ageing demographic and increasing precariousness of 
employment less so.  Reforms such as lengthening working life do have implications 
for people coming in to the labour market and insecure and poorly paid employment, 
together with inadequate pension provision, actually throws more people into a state 
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of dependence on public services. This greater demand requires a broader tax base 
which can only in turn be underpinned by well-paid secure employment.  In a sense 
it seems as if the Rehn-Meider model in its original form is necessary more than ever 
but the policy space for that at an individual country level is now much more limited 
than in the 1950s. The cleavages which societies will encounter as a result of 
conflicting objectives of social sustainability and competitiveness in a more deeply 
integrated Europe could include some such as between migrants and indigenous 
populations and between generations in a way not experienced before. This could 
become a really serious problem in circumstances of endemic low growth.   
 
The nature of the EU’s response to the 2008 financial crisis fails to resonate with 
Jacques Delors’ declaration twenty years earlier that: 
 
‘The social dimension is an integral part of the European way of life.  It is part of 
our identity’. 
 
(Delors, 1988:8). 
 
And yet, as Wim Kok in his interview for this research points out, that for all its 
faults, Europe is the only political entity in the world concerned with the collective 
issues of welfare sustainability as a public good.   I am inclined to agree and to 
believe that the issues identified above will eventually force a new distributional 
settlement in Europe.   
 
As mentioned earlier one of the dilemmas of holding social policy at national level is 
a decision trap which leaves the ECB all powerful. Bluntly my own view is that if 
there is not to be a German Europe a new social democratic narrative of Europe is 
required.  It has to provide answers to these dilemmas to be credible to the middle 
classes and  also be capable of winning working class people back from the margins 
of populist politics.  By definition it implies a more deeply integrated Europe to 
embody the distributional settlement referred to above.  It all comes back to the 
influence of ideas.  Ideas offer the possibility to bring people together and enable 
them to believe that they can control their collective destiny. 
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Lastly, as regards Ireland it is surprising that electoral politics remained so 
impervious to Europeanisation.  In the literature this is generally explained in terms 
of the competing varieties of nationalism emerging in the form of Fianna Fáil and 
Fine Gael after the Civil War in the 1920s, and the dominance of the independence 
question (compounded by 40 years of conflict in Northern Ireland) over class interest 
issues (Coakley et al, 2010; Breen et al, 1990).   Other factors are relevant too such 
as the existence of a de facto Catholic polity and a lack of engagement with Europe 
on anything deeper than Ireland’s immediate concerns. However, my own view is 
that this goes deeper.  The Civil War was preceded by the War of Independence from 
1919-1922.  Before that was the Easter Rising in 1916 and before that again the 
Lockout in 1913 which involved 25,000 workers being locked out in an industrial 
dispute by a combination of 400 employers in Dublin.  It lasted five months, five 
people were killed and eventually the workers were starved into submission.
97
 Given 
that a similar dispute in Sweden in 1931 ushered in the hegemony of Nordic social 
democracy, it is surely surprising then that, not only did something similar not 
happen in Ireland, but social democracy never really got a foot in.  My personal 
explanation for this is that one of the key figures on the union side in 1913, and a 
founder of the Labour Party, James Connolly, came to perceive physical force 
nationalism as being the only way to bring about a new social order.  He committed 
the armed wing of the labour movement at that time, the Citizen Army, to the 
nationalist revolution thereby ideologically confusing future generations of trade 
unionists.  Connolly was executed for his part in the 1916 Rising.  The playwright, 
Sean O’Casey captured it this way: 
 
‘Nationalism became his daily rosary, while the higher creed of international 
humanity that had so long bubbled from his eloquent lips was silent forever, and 
Irish labour lost a leader.’ 
 
(Cited in Yeates, 2011:74). 
 
Finally, it is appropriate to record that the year 2014 marks the millennium of the 
Battle of Clontarf when, on 23
rd
 April, 1014, the Irish King, Brian Boru, defeated 
                                                 
97
 The dispute would have been over much earlier but for the foodships financed to the tune of £100,000 by the 
TUC in Britain. 
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Danish invaders.  If the outcome had been otherwise Irish people might today be 
living in a prosperous and progressive social democracy.  It may be that this was a 
public policy failure of a magnitude far beyond anything described in this thesis.   
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Appendix 1 
 
List of Persons Interviewed 
 
DENMARK 
 
NAME POSITION DATE OF 
INTERVIEW 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen Former Prime Minister 21st   May, 2012 
Soren Kaj Andersen FAOS Sociologisk Institute, 
Copenhagen University 
21st  May, 2012 
Niels Christopher 
Thygesen 
Copenhagen University 22nd  May, 2012 
Mogens Lykketoft Speaker of Parliament and former 
Finance Minister 
22nd  May, 2012 
Kraus Haekkerup Former MEP 22nd  May, 2012 
Anete Berentzen European and International Officer 
of LO 
22nd  May, 2012 
 
FINLAND 
 
NAME POSITION DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Sirpa Kekkonen Policy Analyst, Primer 
Minister’s Office 
24th  May, 2012 
Janne Metsamaki State Secretary to the Minister 
for Labour 
26th  September, 2012 
Vessa Vihriala Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy 
28th  September, 2012 
Teija Tiilikainen Finnish Institute for International 
Affairs 
26th  September, 2012 
Matti Vanhanen Former Prime Minister 27th  September, 2012 
Sixten Korkman Senior Advisor to the Finnish 
Innovation Fund (SITRA) 
28th  September, 2012 
Kirsi Kunola Disability Sector Specialist 13th  November, 2012 
Lauri Lyly President SAK Trade Union 
Confederation 
10th  May, 2011 
 
 
NETHERLANDS 
 
NAME POSITION DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Hans Ten Berge Secretary General Euroelectric 26th  June, 2012 
Alexander Rinnooy 
Kan 
President of Social & Economic 
Council (SER) and Former Head 
of Employers’ Association 
11th  September, 2012 
Paul de Beer University of Amsterdam 11th  September, 2012 
Han Noten Mayor of Dalfsen 11th  September, 2012 
Wim Kok Former Prime Minister 12th  September, 2012 
Ruud Vreeman Chairman of PvdA 12th  September, 2012 
Martin Strickler FNV Trade Union Federation 12th  September, 2012 
Agnes Jongerius President of FNV 12th  September, 2012 
21st  June, 2011 
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IRELAND 
 
NAME POSITION DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Dermot McCarthy Former Secretary General of 
Taoiseach’s Department 
4th  February, 2010 
18 November, 2011 
 
Martin O’Donohue Former Minister for Economic 
Planning/Minister for Education 
24th  February, 2010 
22 November, 2011 
Noel Dorr Former Secretary General of 
Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Ambassador to UN 
30th  November, 2011 
John Hurley Former Governor of Central Bank 
and ECB Board Member 
9th  November, 2011 
Kevin Cardiff Secretary General, Department of 
Finance 
14th  December, 2010 
Bridget McManus Secretary General, Department of 
Education 
19th  December, 2011 
Ruth Barrington Chair of Irish Times Trust and CEO 
of Molecular Medicines Board 
9th  January, 2012 
Padraig McManus CEO of Electricity Supply Board 
(ESB) 
11th  January, 2012 
Des Geraghty Former MEP and President of Trade 
Union, SIPTU 
12th  January, 2012 
Bertie Ahern Former Taoiseach 13th  January, 2012 
Paddy Teahon Former Secretary General of 
Taoiseach’s Department 
24th  January, 2012 
Peter McLoone Former President of Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions 
25th  January, 2012 
Turlough O’Sullivan Former Director General of 
Employers’ Organisation (IBEC) 
2nd  February, 2012 
Danuta Gray Chairman of Telecoms Co. O2 7th  February, 2012 
John Dunne Former Director General of 
Employers’ Organisation (IBEC) 
16th  February, 2012 
John Loughrey Former Secretary General of 
Department of Public 
Enterprise/Board of IDA 
7th  March, 2012 
John Bruton Former Taoiseach (1994-97) 8th  March, 2012 
Colin Hunt Former Political Advisor to 
Ministers for Transport and Finance 
20th  March, 2012 
Eoin O’Driscoll Chairman of Industrial Strategy 
Board (Forfas) 
26th  April, 2012 
Danny McCoy Director General of IBEC, Former 
ESRI Economist 
27th  April, 2012 
Tom Considine Former Secretary General, 
Department of Finance 
24th  May, 2012 
Joe O’Toole Senator and former Head of 
Teachers Union (INTO) 
4th  December, 2012 
Paul Sweeney Chief Economist, Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions 
24th  May, 2012 
Charlie McCreevy 
 
Former Minister for Finance & 
European Commissioner 
7th June, 2012 
Raffique Mortiar Former Senior Economist, Central 
Bank 
7th  May, 2013 
Patrick Honohan Governor of Central Bank and ECB 
Board Member 
31st  October, 2013 
Dick Spring Former Tánaiste and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs/Leader of the 
Labour Party 
18th  September, 2012 
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